Socrates and Plato

I. The Good for Human Beings: The Problem

A. Introductory Remarks
B. The Character of Cephalos
C. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis
D. Polemarchus and Thrasymachus: Two Attempts to Analyze Moral Uprightness
E. Glaucon and Adeimantus: A Digression on Moral Uprightness and Happiness

II. Moral Uprightness (Diakosune)

A. The Analogy between the State and the Individual
B. The Education of the Guardians
C. The Three Parts of the Soul
D. The Cardinal Virtues
E. Why the Morally Virtuous are Better Off than the Morally Corrupt

III. The Philosopher as the Paradigm of Human Flourishing

A. The Definition of the Philosopher
B. The Characteristics of the Philosopher
C. The Philosopher and Death
D. Why Philosophy is Unpopular in a Democracy

IV. The Theory of Forms

A. Knowledge of the Form of the Good
B. An Outline of the Theory of Forms
C. The Theory of Recollection
D. Critique of the Theory of Forms

V. Cosmology and Extrinsic Teleology

A. Cosmogony and Cosmology
B. Explanation and Extrinsic Teleology

IA. Introductory Remarks

On Philosophy: Synthetic Vision vs. Analytic Depth

On Socrates:

As portrayed by Plato
Focus on ethical questions
Socrates and the Sophists -- what, exactly, is the difference?

On Plato:

Three periods: early, middle, late ..... but some think that the 28 dialogues were carefully planned out to be read in sequence as a pedagogical introduction to the philosophical life and can thus be divided into seven tetralogies (this particular arrangement is due to Bernard Suzanne ).
The dialogue form

On the Republic

Plato and democracy
Our focus: moral rather than political

IB. The Character of Cephalos

Cephalos seems to be morally upright, and yet he is (relatively) unreflective. This raises three questions:

Does Cephalos have moral knowledge?
Can philosophical reflection yield moral knowledge?
What sort of grasp of moral truths does philosophical reflection presuppose?

IC. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis

1. What is it that is analyzed when F-ness (e.g., moral uprightness, piety, virtue, etc.) is analyzed? There are three possible answers to this question:

The meaning of the word <F>
The concept <F-ness>
An abstract reality signified by the term <F> and the concept <F-ness>

2. To analyze F-ness is to give an account (logos), i.e., to produce a formula, that

applies to all things that are F
applies only to things that are F
pinpoints what makes a thing F.

Concerning this last condition, compare the following two formulas from the Meno:

shape = what always accompanies color
shape = the outermost boundary of a solid

ID. Polemarchus and Thrasymachus: Two Attempts to Analyze Moral Uprightness

Polemarchus:

Moral Uprightness (diakosune) = The skill (techne) by which one gives each his due

Counterexample: Insane Man

Moral Uprightness = The skill by which one gives benefits to friends and injuries to enemies.

Worries: Is moral uprightness a skill? What if our friends are bad?

Moral Uprightness = The skill by which one gives benefits to good people and injuries to bad people.

Worry: Does one who is morally righteous do harm to anyone?

Thrasymachus (compare with Callicles in the Gorgias):

Moral Uprightness = Doing that which is in the interest of the stronger rather than that which is one's own interest. (Shades of Nietzsche.)

Question: Is it the righteous or the unrighteous who have the best chance of being happy and flourishing human beings?

IE. Glaucon and Adeimantus: A Digression on Moral Uprightness and Happiness

There are three sorts of goods:

Goods that are valued only for their consequences
Goods that are valued only for themselves
Goods that are valued both for their consequences and for themselves

Glaucon and Adeimantus: The common view is that moral uprightness is good only because of its consequences and not because it is an intrinsic excellence (arete).

Glaucon:

The origin and nature of moral uprightness = narrow self-interest. For even though the best condition is clearly to be able to inflict injury and yet avoid punishment in the pursuit of our narrow self-interest and of the goods it requires, all of us have to settle for the best viable condition, viz., to inflict no injury and to avoid punishment. In that way we can get at least some of the goods we want without suffering evil consequences. So we adopt conventions and laws that generally reward "morally upright" conduct and punish "immoral" conduct, even though we would each prefer to be able to act "immorally" with impunity in the pursuit of our narrow and individual self-interest. (358e-359b)

We practice moral virtue only reluctantly. Witness the story of the ring of Gyges (359d-360d)--after all, what would you do if you had the ring? Wouldn't you act in a way analogous to that in which Gyges acted?

It is not the case (as Socrates suggests) that any morally upright and virtuous person is better off, or has a better life, than any morally corrupt person. For we can easily imagine a morally corrupt man (A) who has a reputation for being virtuous and thus reaps all the benefits of being virtuous, and we can easily imagine a morally virtuous man (B) who has a reputation for being corrupt and thus suffers all the consequences of being wicked (360e-362c). Ask yourself: If you had to choose between being A and being B, which would you choose? Yet Socrates is committed to the claim that B, despite all his unjust suffering, is better off (i.e., happier or closer to fulfilling the good for human beings) than is A!!!.

Adeimantus:

Ordinary moral and religious education shows that we value moral virtuousness not for itself but only for its consequences (reputation, honor, glory, wealth, success, enjoyable afterlife, etc.) (362e-363e). ("Don't lie, Peter, because if you do, people won't trust you and you won't be a success in life." "Michael, keep on working hard and someday you will be wealthy." "Don't sulk, Stephen, because if you act like that, you will never be popular.")

Ordinary people all agree that moral goodness is a matter of convention with no deep roots in our nature, and that being morally upright is much more difficult, unpleasant, and burdensome than being morally corrupt. In general, ordinary people are perfectly ready to admire and even to honor wicked and morally corrupt individuals as long as those individuals are rich or powerful or famous. Because of this, ordinary people generally believe (even if they won't say so out loud) that anyone who has the chance to be "immoral" with impunity is stupid and irrational if he isn't in fact "immoral". What's more, even the gods can be bought off by expensive rituals and sacrifices--so we need not even fear punishement in the afterlife for being immoral (363e-367a).

Ask yourself: What would moral education be like if we really did value moral uprightness for itself and not for its consequences?

IIA. The Analogy between the State and the Individual

The nature of analogical reasoning
Analogical reasoning as a tool of discovery
Positive and negative analogy in the case at hand

IIB. The Education of the Guardians

The connection between sentiment and moral knowledge, and the importance of shaping the passions or emotions through habituation (401e ff.). (Contrast with Hume and Kant -- see C.S. Lewis's The Abolition of Man.)
The connection between self-love (or self-interest) and moral uprightness: narrow self-love transformed into willing the good for others and for committing oneself to a higher good that transcends one's own private good. Self-love as the motive for the desire to become the sort of person who is fit for genuine friendship and a commitment to make sacrifices for a transcendent common good. (Plato as an alternative to Hobbes and Kant.)
The importance of the moral community for conveying and promoting an appreciation of a good that transcends narrow self-interest and that provides the moral context and direction for all those crafts that have an intrinsic good but are not of themselves directed toward the good for human beings.
The arts and the content of moral education -- gods, heroes, and good rhythms.
Pain, pleasure and strength of character -- courage, self-sufficiency, seriousness, truthfulness, self-discipline, generosity, broadness of vision, etc. No brutality or softness.
Constant Socratic theme: The parallel between health of the body and health of the soul, i.e. between physical health and moral health.

IIC. The Three Parts of the Soul (psuche)

Reason (To logistikon) -------------------------------> The guardians

The spirited element (ho thumos) ------------------> The auxiliaries

Lower appetite (to epithumetikon) ------------------> The commercial class

IID. The Cardinal Virtues

Prudence (practical wisdom): An excellence with respect to reason

Courage (fortitude): An excellence with respect to the spirited element

Self-discipline (temperance): An excellence with respect to the lower appetite

Moral Uprightness ("general justice")

IIE. Why the Morally Virtuous are Better Off than the Morally Corrupt

Moral uprightness: soul :: health: body

See the Hydra, the Lion, and the Man (588B-592B)

Question: Is it possible to know what is right and still do what is wrong? (See Jordan's discussion of Aristotle's reply to Socrates -- Jordan, 158-159)

IIIA. The Definition of the Philosopher

Philosopher = one whose heart is fixed on the true being (to on) of things (480a).

Knowledge (episteme) -------------------> Being
Opinion (doxa) ------------------------> Becoming
Ignorance (agnoia) -----------------> Non-Being

The Philosopher as a moral authority (the philosopher-king) who knows what health of the soul is and in whom non-philosophers can place their trust.

IIIB. The Characteristics of the Philosopher (484a-487a)

Love of any branch of learning that reveals eternal realities
Truthfulness and singleminded devotion to the truth ("the inability to consciously tolerate falsehood")
Self-discipline ("constitutionally incapable of taking seriously the things which money can buy")
Magnanimity and breadth of vision ("a mind constantly striving for an overview of the totality of things human and divine")
Courage
Moral Uprightness
Innate high intelligence
Excellent memory
Sense of proportion and elegance

(Compare Socrates in the Apology)

IIIC. The Philosopher and Death (Apology and Phaedo)

Philosophy as a vocation (see Apology 38a)
The body as a hindrance to finding eternal realities (Phaedo, 64c-67b)
Asceticism and immortality: the philosophical life as a preparation for death (see Phaedo, 83d-e)
Looking ahead: The Philosopher and (vs. ?) the Saint

IIID. Why Philosophy is Unpopular in a Democracy

True philosophy conflicts with skepticism and/or relativism about the good for human beings

In democratic societies philosophy easily deteriorates into sophistry

IVA. Knowledge of the Form of the Good

The Simile of the Sun (506e-509c)

What should we want?
Philosophy as ascent and purification

The Divided Line and the Cave (509d-521b)

Knowledge (episteme) -----------------------------------> Forms (Being)

Intellection (noesis)
Hypothetical Reasoning (dianoia)

Opinion (doxa) ---------------------------------------------> Sensible Things (Becoming)

Belief (pistis)
Illusion (eikaisia)

IVB. An Outline of the Theory of Forms

The Big Claim:

We can have a deep understanding of the visible world only if we understand it by reference to the world of eternal realities, which is "visible" only to the soul.

The Properties of the Forms:

Eternal
Ungenerable
Imperishable
Unchanging
Non-sensible
Immaterial
Do not admit of their own opposites

(Shades of Parmenides)

The Forms and Particulars:

The Forms are exemplars which are approximated by sensible particulars

F-ness is perfectly F
x is F to degree n

A sensible particular is F because of its relation to F-ness

x participates in F-ness
x exemplifies F-ness
x has F-ness

Question

The Forms, Thought, and Language

The Forms are known through reason (noesis) by means of the giving of an account (logos)
The Forms are what make sensible particulars intelligible to the extent that they are. (Timaeus: The Forms impose order on an indeterminate receptacle)
The Forms are signified in different ways by concrete and abstract terms:

<F-ness> signifies F-ness and is true of it
<F> signifies F-ness and is true of things that are F

IVC. The Theory of Recollection

The Paradox of the Learner (Meno)
Innate Ideas (See Phaedo on Equality: Shades of Descartes and Leibniz)
General Ideas: Where do they come from? (Abstraction vs. Illumination)

IVD. Critique of the Theory of Forms (See the Parmenides)

Problems with mud and hair, but even more problems with unrestricted generality (Russell's Paradox: see below)
Problems with Participation
The "Third Man" Argument
The Viability of Conceptualism

VA. Cosmogony and Cosmology

The universe is a perfect animal, spherical and rotating, fashioned by God (the Demi-urge) in the Receptacle and patterned after the Forms, which are images of God.

Receptacle----> Space (?)
Rotation----> Time
World Soul---> Fashioned from the Same, the Different, and Being
Body---> Fashioned from the Elements
Elements----> Isoceles and half equilateral triangles combining to form regular solids:

Cube = earth
Tetrahedron = fire
Octahedron = air
Icosohedron = water

Individual Souls----> Created individually, making four kinds of living things from the elements:

Stars (fire)
Birds (air)
Fish (water)
Mammals (earth)

VB. Explanation and Extrinsic Teleology

Four types of explanation (Phaedo)

Material
Efficient (moving)
Formal (the "safe explanation")
Final (teleological)

Some teleological notions

Tendency
Propensity
Intention
Purpose
End (Goal, Aim)
Good and evil (proper and defective relative to the end)

Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Teleology

Russell's Paradox for Properties

Principle of generality: If 'is F' is a meaningful predicate, then there is a Form F-ness.

(1) Some Forms (e.g., Moral uprightness, Redness) are such that they do not exemplify themselves. (premise)

(2) So 'is a non-self-exemplifier' is a meaningful predicate (premise)

(3) So there is a Form Being a non-self-exemplifier (call it N). (From (1) and the principle of generality)

(4) N either does or does not exemplify itself. (Obvious)

(4b) If N does not exemplify itself, then it does exemplify itself

(5) So N exemplifies itself if and only if it does not exemplify itself. (From 1, 2, and 3)
Therefore, N both does and does not exemplify itself--a contradiction.