2. Moreover, there is some manner of likeness of creatures to God (Chap. XXIX).
3. When there is no more than a mere identity of name between several things, we cannot be led from one of them to the knowledge of another; but from the attributes found in creatures we are led to a knowledge of the attributes of God (Chap. XXX, XXXI).
5. There is no use predicating any name of any thing unless by the name we come to understand something about the thing. But if names are predicated of God and creatures by a mere coincidence of sound, we understand by those names nothing whatever about God, seeing that the significations of those names are known to us only inasmuch as they apply to creatures: there would at that rate be no use in saying or proving of God that God is a good being, or anything else of the sort.
If it is said that by such names we only know of God what He is not -- in that, e.g., He is called 'living' as not being of the genus of inanimate things -- at least it must be allowed that the predicate 'living,' applied to God and to creatures, agrees in the negation of the inanimate, and thus will be something more than a bare coincidence of name.*
1.32 : That nothing is predicated of God and of other Beings synonymously
1.34 : That the Things that are said of God and of Creatures are said analogously