Of God and His Creatures
The presence of a dear friend as a guest at my table is to me an object
at once of will and of intention. The presence of a
stranger who accompanies my friend, and without whom my friend would
not have come, is to me an object of will, but not of
intention. I should not have invited that gentleman by himself.
Volition then extends to three acts. --
- (a) Intention, boulêsis (Eth. Nic. III,
iv, 7-9), of the end willed for its own sake: observe, this use
is quite apart from the distinction made in English philosophy between
intention and motive.
- (b) Choice, proairesis (Eth. Nic. III, iv, 9)
of means to the end.
- (c) Acceptance of circumstances attached to the end, or more
usually to the means, but not in themselves regarded either as
good, as in the end, or useful, as in the
I have endeavoured to bring out the practical importance of these
distinction in my Ethics and Natural Law, pp. 31-35, 203-208,
Of God and His Creatures: 3.5