The presence of a dear friend as a guest at my table is to me an object at once of will and of intention. The presence of a stranger who accompanies my friend, and without whom my friend would not have come, is to me an object of will, but not of intention. I should not have invited that gentleman by himself. Volition then extends to three acts. --

• (a) Intention, boulêsis (Eth. Nic. III, iv, 7-9), of the end willed for its own sake: observe, this use is quite apart from the distinction made in English philosophy between intention and motive.
• (b) Choice, proairesis (Eth. Nic. III, iv, 9) of means to the end.
• (c) Acceptance of circumstances attached to the end, or more usually to the means, but not in themselves regarded either as good, as in the end, or useful, as in the means.

  I have endeavoured to bring out the practical importance of these distinction in my Ethics and Natural Law, pp. 31-35, 203-208, 222-224.

  ---

  Of God and His Creatures: 3.5