From The Everlasting Man, Part II
Chapter Two: THE RIDDLES OF THE GOSPEL To understand the nature of this chapter, it is necessary to recur to the nature of this book. The argument which is meant to be the backbone of the book is of the kind called the reductio ad absurdum. It suggests that the results of assuming the rationalist thesis are more irrational than ours; but to prove it we must assume that thesis. Thus in the first section I often treated man as merely an animal, to show that the effect was more impossible than if he were treated as an angel. In the sense in which it was necessary to treat man merely as an animal, it is necessary to treat Christ merely as a man. I have to suspend my own beliefs, which are much more positive; and assume this limitation even in order to remove it. I must try to imagine what would happen to a man who did really read the story of Christ as the story of a man; and even of a man of whom he had never heard before. And I wish to point out that a really impartial reading of that kind would lead, if not immediately to belief, at least to a bewilderment of which there is really no solution except in belief. In this chapter, for this reason, I shall bring in nothing of the spirit of my own creed; I shall exclude the very style of diction, and even of lettering, which I should think fitting in speaking in my own person. I am speaking as an imaginary heathen human being, honestly, staring at the Gospel story for the first time. Now it is not at all easy to regard the New Testament as a New Testament. It is not at all easy to realise the good news as new. Both for good and evil familiarity fills us with assumptions and associations; and no man of our civilisation, whatever he thinks of our religion, can really read the thing as if he had never heard of it before. Of course it is in any case utterly unhistorical to talk as if the New Testament were a neatly bound book that had fallen from heaven. It is simply the selection made by the authority of the Church from a mass of early Christian literature. But apart from any such question there is a psychological difficulty in feeling the New Testament as new. There is a psychological difficulty in seeing those well-known words simply as they stand and without going beyond what they intrinsically stand for. And this difficulty must indeed be very great; for the result of it is very curious. The result of it is that most modern critics and most current criticism, even popular criticism, makes a comment that is the exact reverse of the truth. It is so completely the reverse of the truth that one could almost suspect that they had never read the New Testament at all. We have all heard people say a hundred times over, for they seem never
to tire of saying it, that the Jesus of the New Testament is indeed a most
merciful and humane lover of humanity, but that the Church has hidden this
human character in repellent dogmas and stiffened it with ecclesiastical
terrors till it has taken on an inhuman character. This is, I venture to
repeat, very nearly the reverse of the truth. The truth is that it is the
image of Christ in the churches that is almost entirely mild and merciful.
It is the image of Christ in the Gospels that is a good many other things
as well. The figure in the Gospels does indeed utter in words of almost
heart-breaking beauty his pity for our broken hearts. But they are very
far from being the only sort of words that he utters. Nevertheless they
are almost the only kind of words that the Church in its popular imagery
ever represents him as uttering. That popular imagery is inspired by a
perfectly sound popular instinct. The mass of the poor are broken, and
the mass of the people are poor, and for the mass of mankind the main thing
is to carry the conviction of the incredible compassion of God. But nobody
with his eyes open can doubt that it is chiefly this idea of compassion
that the popular machinery of the Church does seek to carry. The popular
imagery carries a great deal to excess the sentiment of 'Gentle Jesus,
meek and mild.' It is the first thing that the outsider feels and criticises
in a Pieta or a shrine of the Sacred Heart. As I say, while the art may
be insufficient, I am not sure that the instinct is
Now the first thing to note is that if we take it merely as a human
story, it is in some ways a very strange story. I do not refer here to
its tremendous and tragic culmination or to any implications involving
triumph in that tragedy. I do not refer to what is commonly called the
miraculous element; for on that point philosophies vary and modern philosophies
very decidedly waver. Indeed the educated Englishman of to-day may be said
to have passed from an old fashion, in which he would not believe in any
miracles unless they were ancient, and adopted a new fashion in which he
will not believe in any miracles unless they are modern. He used to hold
that miraculous cures stopped with the first Christians and is now inclined
to suspect that they began with the first Christian Scientists. But I refer
here rather specially to unmiraculous and even to unnoticed and inconspicuous
parts of the story. There are a great many things about it which nobody
would have invented, for they are things that nobody has ever made any
particular use of; things which if they were remarked at all have remained
rather as puzzles. For
First, a man reading the Gospel sayings would not find platitudes. If
he had read even in the most respectful spirit the majority of ancient
philosophers and of modern moralists, he would appreciate the unique importance
of saying that he did not find platitudes. It is more than can be said
even of Plato. It is much more than can be said of Epictetus or Seneca
or Marcus Aurelius or Apollonius of Tyana. And it is immeasurably more
than can be said of most of the agnostic moralists and the preachers of
the ethical societies; with their songs of service and
The statement that the meek shall inherit the earth is very far from being a meek statement. I mean it is not meek in the ordinary sense of mild and moderate and inoffensive. To justify it, it would be necessary to go very deep into history and anticipate things undreamed of then and by many unrealised even now; such as the way in which the mystical monks reclaimed the lands which the practical kings had lost. If it was a truth at all, it was because it was a prophecy. But certainly it was not a truth in the sense of a truism. The blessing upon the meek would seem to be a very violent statement; in the sense of doing violence to reason and probability. And with this we come to another important stage in the speculation. As a prophecy it really was fulfilled; but it was only fulfilled long afterwards. The monasteries were the most practical and prosperous estates and experiments in reconstruction after the barbaric deluge; the meek did really inherit the earth. But nobody could have known anything of the sort at the time-- unless indeed there was one who knew. Something of the same thing may be said about the incident of Martha and Mary; which has been interpreted in retrospect and from the inside by the mystics of the Christian contemplative life. But it was not at all an obvious view of it; and most moralists, ancient and modern, could be trusted to make a rush for the obvious. What torrents of effortless eloquence would have flowed from them to swell any slight superiority on the part of Martha; what splendid sermons about the Joy of Service and the Gospel of Work and the World Left Better Than We Found It, and generally all the ten thousand platitudes that can be uttered in favour of taking trouble--by people who need take no trouble to utter them. If in Mary the mystic and child of love Christ was guarding the seed of something more subtle, who was likely to understand it at the time? Nobody else could have seen Clare and Catherine and Teresa shining above the little roof at Bethany. It is so in another way with that magnificent menace about bringing into the world a sword to sunder and divide. Nobody could have guessed then either how it could be fulfilled or how it could be justified. Indeed some freethinkers are still so simple as to fall into the trap and be shocked at a phrase so deliberately defiant. They actually complain of the paradox for not being a platitude. But the point here is that if we could read the Gospel reports as things as new as newspaper reports, they would puzzle us and perhaps terrify us much more than the same things as developed by historical Christianity. For instance, Christ after a clear allusion to the eunuchs of eastern courts, said there would be eunuchs of the kingdom of heaven. If this does not mean the voluntary enthusiasm of virginity, it could only be made to mean something much more unnatural or uncouth. It is the historical religion that humanises it for us by experience of Franciscans or of Sisters of Mercy. The mere statement standing by itself might very well suggest a rather dehumanised atmosphere; the sinister and inhuman silence of the Asiatic harem and divan. This is but one instance out of scores; but the moral is that the Christ of the Gospel might actually seem more strange and terrible than the Christ of the Church. I am dwelling on the dark or dazzling or defiant or mysterious side of the Gospel words, not because they had not obviously a more obvious and popular side, but because this is the answer to a common criticism on a vital point. The freethinker frequently says that Jesus of Nazareth was a man of his time, even if he was in advance of his time; and that we cannot accept his ethics as final for humanity. The freethinker then goes on to criticise his ethics, saying plausibly enough that men cannot turn the other cheek, or that they must take thought for the morrow, or that the self-denial is too ascetic or the monogamy too severe. But the Zealots and the Legionaries did not turn the other cheek any more than we do, if so much. The Jewish traders and Roman tax-gatherers took thought for the morrow as much as we, if not more. We cannot pretend to be abandoning the morality of the past for one more suited to the present. It is certainly not the morality of another age, but it might be of another world. In short, we can say that these ideals are impossible in themselves.
Exactly what we cannot say is that they are impossible for us. They are
rather notably marked by a mysticism which, if it be a sort of madness,
would always have struck the same sort of people as mad. Take, for instance,
the case of marriage and the relations of the sexes. It might very well
have been true that a Galilean teacher taught things natural to a Galilean
environment; but it is not. It might rationally be expected that a man
in the time of Tiberius would have advanced a view conditioned by
The same truth might be stated in another way by saying that if the
story be regarded as merely human and historical, it is extraordinary how
very little there is in the recorded words of Christ that ties him at all
to his own time. I do not mean the details of a period, which even a man
of the period knows to be passing. I mean the fundamentals which even the
wisest man often vaguely assumes to be eternal. For instance, Aristotle
was perhaps the wisest and most wide-minded man who ever lived. He founded
himself entirely upon fundamentals, which have been generally found to
remain rational and solid through all social and historical changes. Still,
he lived in a world in which it was thought as natural to have slaves as
to have children. And therefore he did permit himself a serious recognition
of a difference between slaves and free men. Christ as much as Aristotle
lived in a world that took slavery for granted. He did not particularly
denounce slavery. He started a movement that could
The truth is that when critics have spoken of the local limitations of the Galilean, it has always been a case of the local limitations of the critics. He did undoubtedly believe in certain things that one particular modern sect of materialists do not believe. But they were not things particularly peculiar to his time. It would be nearer the truth to say that the denial of them is quite peculiar to our time. Doubtless it would be nearer still to the truth to say merely that a certain solemn social importance, in the minority disbelieving them, is peculiar to our time. He believed, for instance, in evil spirits or in the psychic healing of bodily ills; but not because he was a Galilean born under Augustus. It is absurd to say that a man believed things because he was a Galilean under Augustus when he might have believed the same things if he had been an Egyptian under Tutenkamen or an Indian under Gengis Khan. But with this general question of the philosophy of diabolism or of divine miracles I deal elsewhere. It is enough to say that the materialists have to prove the impossibility of miracles against the testimony of all mankind, not against the prejudices of provincials in North Palestine under the first Roman Emperors. What they have to prove, for the present argument, is the presence in the Gospels of those particular prejudices of those particular provincials. And, humanly speaking, it is astonishing how little they can produce even to make a beginning of proving it. So it is in this case of the sacrament of marriage. We may not believe
in sacraments, as we may not believe in spirits, but it is quite clear
that Christ believed in this sacrament in his own way and not in any current
or contemporary way. He certainly did not get his argument against divorce
from the Mosaic law or the Roman law or the habits of the Palestinian people.
It would appear to his critics then exactly what it appears to his critics
now; an arbitrary and transcendental dogma coming from nowhere save in
the sense that it came from him. I am not at all concerned here to defend
that dogma; the point here is that it is just as easy to defend it now
as it was to defend it then. It is an ideal altogether outside time; difficult
at any period; impossible at no period. In other words, if anyone says
it is what might be expected of a man walking about in that place at that
period, we can quite fairly answer that it is much more like what might
be the mysterious utterance of a being beyond man, if
I maintain therefore that a man reading the New Testament frankly and
freshly would not get the impression of what is now often meant by a human
Christ. The merely human Christ is a made-up figure, a piece of artificial
selection, like the merely evolutionary man. Moreover there have been too
many of these human Christs found in the same story, just as there have
been too many keys to mythology found in the same stories. Three or four
separate schools of rationalism have worked over the ground and produced
three or four equally rational explanations of his life. The first rational
explanation of his life was that he never lived. And this in turn gave
an opportunity for three or four different explanations, as that he was
a sun-myth or a corn-myth, or any other kind of myth that is also a monomania.
Then the idea that he was a divine being who did not exist gave place to
the idea that he was a human being who did exist. In my youth it vas the
fashion to say that he was merely an ethical
Above all, would not such a new reader of the New Testament stumble
over something that would startle him much more than it startles us? I
have here more than once attempted the rather impossible task of reversing
time and the historic method; and in fancy looking forward to the facts,
instead of backward through the memories. So I have imagined the monster
that man might have seemed at first to the mere nature around him. We should
have a worse shock if we really imagined the nature of Christ named for
the first time. What should we feel at the first whisper of a certain suggestion
about a certain man? Certainly it is not for us to blame anybody who should
find that first wild whisper merely impious and insane. On the contrary,
stumbling on that rock of scandal is the first step. Stark staring incredulity
is a far more loyal tribute to that truth than a modernist metaphysic that
would make it out merely a matter of degree. It were better to rend our
robes with a great cry against blasphemy, like Caiaphas in the judgement,
or to lay hold of the man as a maniac possessed of devils like the kinsmen
and the crowd, rather
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