[corrected November 18, 1996]
Report of the Academic Affairs Committee
November 6, 1996
Investigation of the Presidential Appointment
G. Robert Blakey
William J. & Dorothy
O'Neill, Professor of Law
Notre Dame Law School
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Dissenting Views of Professor Blakey
When Vice Chair Professor Jean Porter, on September 11, 1996, presented to the Senate, in behalf of the Executive Committee, the original Resolution, which we do not report out, concerning the appointment of a candidate by the President to the Department of Theology, I was deeply troubled. Professor Porter, in summary, told the Senate--
Two years ago the department was informed that a priest of the Congregation of Holy Cross was completing his doctoral studies shortly and would be applying to the department for hiring as a teacher; a budget line for his salary would be provided to the department by the University for this purpose. In February '96, he officially applied, and in April he was interviewed and gave a public lecture. In the course of its procedures, the department did not consider him qualified for an appointment and turned down his application. In May at the request of then provost Timothy O'Meara, the department considered him for a visiting assistant professorship. Again this proposal was turned down. The record of an ad hoc faculty meeting in June showed overwhelming sentiment against the hiring. Also in June, the chair of the department was told that President Malloy had overruled the department and had extended of an offer of a visiting assistant professorship for 3 years which the candidate had accepted. Further contact with the candidate was to be through the Office of the Provost. The department had never received any of the normal paperwork (such as Form Q).
Porter continued by saying that some members of the department alleged irregularities and manipulation in the department's processes and asked the Dean of the College to investigate. He found no basis for any such charges. The Senate's executive committee felt this was not a matter of the Theology Department only, but a matter for full discussion at the University. While the resolution as formulated did not deny the right of the president to make such an appointment, even over a department's objections, the executive committee felt he had disregarded the University's normal procedures and discredited the academic integrity of the Theology Department. The executive committee unanimously recommended passage of the resolution (emphasis added).
Questions immediately arose:
What rationale might the President have had to make the appointment?
No rationale was attributed to him. A need to hear from the President
was pressing. The Senate ought not condemn him without hearing from him.
Even the Devil is, after all, entitled to due process, as Robert Bolt so
beautifully shows us in A Man For All Seasons 38 (Vintage Book 1962).
Was the appointment, as it was represented, really that arbitrary and capricious? Was the President utterly lacking in good judgment?
What did the "record" of the ad hoc faculty meeting in June show? No copy of it accompanied the resolution.
Allegations of irregularities were made against the Theology Department. What were they? Against whom were they made? We were not told.
Supposedly, a report had been made by the Dean of Arts & Letters of his investigation into the allegations. What did he do? To whom did he talk? What evidence did he examine? We were not told.
The resolution did not deny the right of the President to make the appointment--or so it was said --but it did not explicitly recognize it either. What were the proper roles of the Theology Department and the President in making such appointments? Exploration of these delicate questions was obviously in order.
By bringing the Resolution to the Senate, the Executive Committee had necessarily involved the Senate in the relation between the Theology Department and the President over a particular personnel decision. What jurisdiction did the Senate have over such matters?
Troubling, too, was the membership on the Executive Committee of two members of the Theology Department, including the Chair and the Vice Chair, who was also the Deputy Parliamentarian. In Anglo-American law, at least since 1610 in Dr. Bonham's Case, the principle has been firmly-established: no person ought to sit in judgment in his own case. (8 Coke 114).
The Theology Department was complaining about proper procedure. Was the Senate itself--in a rush to judgment--being asked to act without due regard to proper procedure?
If what was alleged to have happened, in fact happened, the matter was serious beyond doubt, and it required appropriate, strong action.
I moved, seconded by Professor Dennis Doordan, that the Resolution be referred to the Academic Affairs Committee.
Professor Porter opposed the Motion to Refer. She suggested that a written record to support the Resolution "seemed superfluous". Professor Mario Borelli wanted to see the documentation and to hear from the President, as did Professor Michael Detlefsen. Professor Joseph Blenkinsopp said that due process for the President, "who held all the power anyway, meant nothing." Professor Borelli "wish[ed] to get all the information out and all concerns aired...." Professor Joseph Buttigieg also favored "a full airing...on the seriousness of...[the] incident...." The Resolution was referred to the Academic Affairs Committee.
The Committee Investigation
After the Resolution was referred to the Committee, it met to formulate an investigative plan. I suggested, to no avail, that it proceed in several phases. First, the Committee should obtain the relevant documents, including correspondence between the Theology Department and the President, the relevant papers associated with the particular appointment, information in connection with other similar appointments so that a comparative base line could be drawn, and the Dean's report concerning the allegations of irregularities. Second, the Committee should study the proper procedures to be followed in making such appointments, including the relative roles of the Theology Department and the President. Third, the Committee should take public or, if appropriate, private testimony from the parties involved--and anyone else, who might wish to shed light on the facts or the policy questions that faced the Committee.
Sadly, the Committee decided not to conduct a full or fair investigation,
as envisioned by the Motion to Refer, and the Senate debate. In fact, its
investigation was confined to writing several letters.
No independent study was undertaken.
No testimony was heard.
Nevertheless, we now have a handful of facts that we did not have September 11, 1996, including President's brief statement of his rationale for his action, as expressed in his letter of July 24, 1996, which is attached to this Report. This letter was, however, written well before the Senate's September 11, 1996, meeting, the meeting in which the Senate was asked to pass judgment on the President's actions. Because this Committee has failed to undertake a full and fair investigation, the Senate does not now know why this letter was not made available to it on September 11th, or referred to in the discussion of the Resolution or the Motion to Refer. This ought, if possible, to be explained. The failure seems inexcusable.
Unfortunately, the investigation that this Committee did undertake was not only limited in scope, but ineffective. The President appeared before the Senate on October 11, 1996, but he declined to discuss the specifics of the appointment, offering the confidentiality of personnel decisions as his rationale. While he fully answered questions of policy, he refused to be drawn into question of fact. So, too, did the others that the Committee wrote. Except for obtaining the President's letter of July 24, 1996, and the minutes of the Theology Department "public" meeting of June 27, 1996, the Committee obtained little that is of use in resolving the factual and policy questions before us.
Because the Committee did not undertake, engage in, or successfully complete either a full or a fair investigation, I moved at its meeting of November 4, 1996, that it take no position on any aspect of the President's appointment of the candidate to the Theology Department. Judgment without facts is uninformed. In a word, is it rash. Without a sufficient foundation to do otherwise, no person ought to assume as true any fact touching on the proper conduct of another. Without sufficient foundation to do otherwise, each person should give to the other the benefit of doubt, that is, accord him or her--out of basic human charity--a favorable interpretation, until sufficient evidence dispels the presumption of regularity or innocence. One who would speak ill of another has the burden of proof to back up his or her judgment--or he or she ought to remain quiet. "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Wittgenstein, Tractatus 7.
The Committee's Resolution
Undaunted by its lack of information, the Committee decided to press forward. Centrally, the Committee recommends to the Senate that it conclude that it could find "'no evidence that the Theology Department has failed to observe its responsibility to give 'special consideration in personnel decisions consistent with the prevailing standards of excellence, to the Congregation's unique role at Notre Dame in past or present personnel actions.'"
Since the Committee did not conduct a full and fair investigation of this personnel action--much less past personnel actions--this conclusion--"no evidence"--was foreordained. Indeed, the Committee could just as easily have concluded the reverse; it also found "no evidence" that the Theology Department, in fact, observed its responsibility. In truth, it found no evidence either way. Indeed, the premises for its conclusion are also false. Had it made an inquiry, it would have learned, as I have, that any number of appointments to the faculty as well as to chairs have been made, since 1967, by the President over the objections of various Departments.
Nevertheless, what flows, if anything, from "no evidence" is determined by presuppositions. If you assume the best of others, until the contrary is shown, adverse judgment may not flow from "no evidence;" if you assume the worst of others, until the contrary is shown, adverse judgment may flow. Without a prior commitment to trust or distrust, an inference cannot be drawn in this matter from "no evidence."
That the Committee goes on--from its finding of "no evidence"--to criticize the President reflects more than its distrustful presupposition; its position is also self-contradictory. If it is willing to accord the Department of Theology a presumption of regularity, why should it not also accord the President a presumption of regularity. Then the presumptions would cancel each other out. If the Department and the President are treated evenhandedly, the Committee cannot conclude anything, since it has insufficient evidence to chose between them. In the absence of evidence, no judgment is warranted.
That the Committee chooses to go with the Department demonstrates that it presumes--without evidence--that the President acted improperly. In fact, the Committee does not know why the Department acted as it did, as it does not know why, save as he has summarily explained himself in his letter of July 24th, the President acted as he did. Unless the President is willing to go beyond his letter, which he is not, at least in a public forum, the Committee lacks sufficient information to condemn the President's action. Saying something is so does not make it so. The plain fact is that the Committee failed to fulfil its charge, and it ought to refrain from rash judgment.
The failure of the Committee to undertake a full and fair investigation has also led it, as the Theology Department before it, to a problem of role confusion. What is the proper role of the Department? What is the proper role of the President? The Department fails to distinguish between "proposal" and "disposal." The Department, in short, proposes; the President disposes.
The University is a "body corporate and politic" by virtue of Indiana law. The Statutes of the University create a body of "Fellows of the University" (Statutes of the University, Art I), who, in turn, vest "all power" in a "Board of Trustees" (Bylaws of the University, §1) The President is the "first officer of the University." (Id. §2) He is "vested with full and final authority over all matters pertaining to [the University's] government...." (Id.) (emphasis added) "He shall make appointments to the academic and non-academic staff by the University...." (Id.) (emphasis added) The Statutes of the University also provide that the "University's operations shall be conducted in such manner as to make full use of the unique skills and dedication of the members of the Priests of Holy Cross, Indiana Province, Inc. ... [including in] Theology ... [where] their talents and training permit ...." (Statutes of the University, Art. V(f)(1)-(2) (emphasis added)
If the Department of Theology or the Senate is dissatisfied with present policy, its remedy is to amend the appropriate documents of the University, not bring about an illegal role reversal. The President had the power (ability) and the authority (legitimate power) to act as he did. Granting him the power de jure, but withholding it de facto, as the Department and the Committee propose, is a functional Putsch.
The Senate ought to have no part in it.
Centrally, the Committee recommends that the Senate also conclude that
it finds "no justification" for the President's action. What
is said above in reference to the "no evidence" finding is equally
applicable to the "no justification" finding. If you do not conduct
a full or fair investigation of the question of justification, "no
evidence" here, too, will be found, and from "no evidence,"
nothing can be concluded. Zero plus zero equals zero--in all disciplines
with which I am familiar.
After these two crucial findings of fact, the Committee--rightly--goes on to catalog the various ways in which the University might be harmed by the President's action--if, but only if, the President made a bad decision. I, of course, concur in these observations. It then recommends as conclusions various courses of action, none of which follows if the Committee's premises are without factual support, as they are in my view. I need not, therefore, discuss them, as I disagree with their necessary, first premises.
The Investigation Not Undertaken
I would prefer to take no position on this troubling matter. Because the Committee is moving ahead on an insufficient basis, I feel compelled, however, to offer an alternative view based on the information available to me. I emphasize that it is my present position. If additional evidence were made available to me, I would readily modify any aspect of my present position in light of it, if that is what would be indicated. Until that time, the alternative view is compelling for me.
Justice Frankfurter put it well: "the right answer usually depends on putting the right question." Estate of Roberts v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943).
I view the issue of qualification, not procedure, as crucial, in the present posture of the matter referred to the Committee; it is the Rosetta stone that can be used to decipher the meaning of the less than complete information that is available to us.
If the candidate is, in fact, not qualified, the harms identified by the Committee will be inflicted on the University--largely independently of the "true" motivation for his rejection by the Department.
"Bad" people can do "good" things for "bad" reasons.
Primarily, I care here about what was done, only secondarily
why or how it was done.
If the candidate is, in fact, not qualified, the President, too, was mistaken, whatever his motivation or the manner of his action in appointing the candidate.
On the other hand, if the candidate is, in fact, qualified, and the Department rejected him, why did it do it?
Neither the Committee nor I can answer that question with a high degree of confidence in our judgment. Nevertheless, if the candidate is qualified, the inference is likely that the Department acted out of the sort of reasons that were reflected in the allegations made against it.
Without an opportunity to review and confirm the investigation of the Dean that purported to clear the Department of improper conduct, a finding that the candidate was qualified also undermines the reliability of the Dean's investigation. Was it, too, neither full nor fair, as was this Committee's?
It is not possible to conclude with a high degree of confidence that the Dean's investigation was adequate or inadequate. Nevertheless, if the candidate is qualified, the inference is likely that his investigation was, in fact, inadequate.
Finally, if the candidate is, in fact, qualified, the actions of the President are cast in a radically different light. It can with confidence then be concluded that he acted properly. After all, he did about all that he could be expected to do, consistent with the best interest of the University, by seeking a compromise with the Department: a visiting position to test out the performance, not the promise, of the candidate, or the predictions of his supporters or his detractors. The President had conflicting recommendations before him. Inside experts said the candidate was unqualified. Outside experts said he was qualified. Allegations were made that the processes that had led to the candidate's ejection were tainted. Why not make a visiting appointment and find out if he is qualified? The compromise course promised to be fair to the candidate and not prejudicial to the Department. When he was sharply rebuffed by the Department, the President acted with courage in doing the right thing, despite the conduct of the Department. Short of giving the Department its way--an unjust act, if the candidate was qualified--what should he have done?
I turn to the question of qualification.
The Committee found that it lacked a mandate to determine qualification and that it lacked competence to judge qualification. If, in fact, the Committee lacks both, I fail to see how it has a mandate to review the actions of the President, or that it is any more competent to judge the performance of the President than it is that of the candidate. Once it assumed the one power, it had a duty to reach a judgment on the other issue--or reach no judgment at all.
The Committee should have talked to the candidate. It did not. I did.
The Committee should have reviewed the candidate's writings. It did not. I did.
The Committee should have reviewed the report of the Chair of the Theology Department on the candidate's thesis. It did not. I did.
Am I competent to conduct a review of the candidates qualifications?
An identification is required of the candidate's project: an examination of the relation between Caesar and the people of God in context of the history of the United States.
My education here at Notre Dame was solidly in the neo-scholastic tradition from which the candidate so eloquently dissents and to which he seeks an alternative.
My graduate education here at Notre Dame was focused on Caesar's sword.
I am a member of the bars of three states, the United States Supreme Court, and numerous courts of appeal.
I have, however, not only studied Caesar's sword, I have wielded it, as a prosecutor for the United States Department of Justice.
I have not only wielded Caesar's sword, I have forged it, as a committee counsel in the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, as well as numerous state legislatures.
I have not only wielded it, and forged it, I have fought against its abuse, as a defense counsel in federal and state criminal proceedings.
The candidate--rightly--argues, as a matter of fact, that aspects of the American society are, not only corrupt, but violent, radically at odds with the gospel of Christ. I know first hand the truth of which he speaks.
I have investigated corruption and violence in the United States, not only in a library, but as a prosecutor and as a committee counsel, particularly the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
I have studied and taught, in short, the wielding, forging, and abuse of Caesar's sword for more than thirty years--at the Cornell Law School, and now at the Notre Dame Law School.
My subjects include Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure and, for the
past ten years or so, Jurisprudence. Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure,
but most particularly, Jurisprudence, deeply implicate history, philosophy,
and ethics. These disciplines, too, are mine. He who would learn law well
must learn much else. Judge Learned Hand put it aptly--
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books which have been specifically written on the subject. For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the questions before him. The words he must construe are empty vessels into which he can pour nearly anything he will. Men do not gather figs of thistles, nor supply institutions from judges whose outlook is limited by parish or class. They must be aware that there are before them more than verbal problems; more than final solutions cast in generalizations of universal applicability. They must be aware of the changing social tensions in every society which make it an organism; which demand new schemata of adaptation; which will disrupt it, if rigidly confined.
The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand 63 (I. Dilliard ed. 1960).
Hand echoes Justice Holmes:
If your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology, the science of man, to political economy, the theory of legislation, ethics, and thus by several paths to your final view of life. It would be equally true of any subject. The only difference is in the case of seeing the way. To be master of any branch of knowledge, you must master those which lie next to it; and thus to know anything you must know all.
Homes, Collected Legal Paper 29-30 (1920).
Given the character of his project, I am, in short, uniquely positioned to judge the candidate's qualifications to teach here at Notre Dame.
Is the candidate young, brash and irreverent toward his intellectual elders?
Is the candidate bright, well-read, and articulate?
Does he not only have, but live a theology?
Yes--read his resumé.
Does he promise, for that reason alone, to make, as a priest and scholar, a substantial contribution to theology--to life--at Notre Dame?
Yes--read his resumé.
I cannot be sure why my judgment is not in accord with that of the
senior people in the Theology Department. I am told young people in the
Department welcome the prospect of his presence. It is simply false to
leave the impression that the Department, rather than its senior leadership,
is "overwhelming" against him.
Impressive people from impressive institutions outside the university also support his candidacy. Read his resumé. Their judgment corroborates mine, and it fortifies me in my confidence that I am not mistaken.
The most solid piece of evidence that I have, which the Committee did not seek or review, is the analysis done by the Chair of the Theology Department of the candidate's thesis. Making due and ample allowance for the "very brief period of time" within which it was completed--after, I might add, not before, the Department's negative vote--I find it, nevertheless, superficial and unpersuasive. It would be no credit to anyone to make it public, for it manifestly confuses "disagreement" with "disqualification." Most damning is its ultimate conclusion:
The supreme irony, of course, is that [the candidate] wants an appointment in our institution that is the embodiment of the Americanist tradition. How does [the candidate] hope to be a member of a community which holds as its ideal: God, country, and Notre Dame? ... Finally (and the influence of his major professor is clear here) his vision is one of either/or... while the Catholic tradition is both/an (sic)... He also shows traces of his mentor's habits of pugnaciousness and bombast but in conversation pulls back when challenged.
Because I find the candidate qualified withour regard for his status as a priest in the Holy Cross Order, I do not need to reach the question of the "special relation" between the University and the Order, which, evidently, played a significant role in the President's action. Nevertheless, if I take into consideration this factor, my decision to reject the action of the Department follows as a matter of course. It becomes, too, all the more serious a breach of proper conduct by the Department. Denying the candidate his just due as a person is, therefore, compounded by denying the community here at the University the services of this able priest.
The Department's conduct is not only unjust, it is shameful.
On the basis of the evidence available to me, I believe--as does the President--that the candidate was unjustly rejected--for reasons having nothing to do with qualification. I add that the President had available to him for more evidence than I had available to me.
The candidate was, I conclude, rejected for non-conformity and an association with another, who is not one of the favored few of the senior leadership of the Department.
That is not my Notre Dame. Nor should it be the Senate's. My Notre Dame has no narrow intellectual orthodoxy. Faith, yes: petty sectarianism, no. Is the senior leadership of the Department so afraid of controversy that it cannot admit a dissenter into its camp? A faith afraid of a fight is a faith already moribund. My Notre Dame is a house with many mansions, of many perspectives, of a skeptical attitude toward easy generalizations, of varying experiments, of vigorous efforts at accommodation between those who disagree on ultimate issues, but remain close friends, of ever-vigilant self criticism, and of piecemeal, but constant reform, in its pilgrimage in this tragic life--toward a God that we know only by knowing what He is not--save through His revelation. Apparently, my Notre Dame is not that of the Theology Department's senior leadership.
We are, as a faculty, blessed that the views of the President of Notre Dame are closer to mine than that of the senior leadership of the Theology Department.
When a department in a university seeks to clone itself and its intellectual life blood begins to coagulate, it is time for the university's president to intervene. Such intervention threatens no other department in the university. Indeed, it strengthens them by assuring the renewal of the institution of which they are a part.
If I am right--and I act reluctantly on the basis of incomplete information--then the President deserves the strong support of the Senate and the faculty, not its condemnation or an expression of its lack of confidence.
More is at stake here, too, than a single appointment, or a misguided Resolution that seeks the Senate's involvement in the internal affairs of a Department, or its relationship with the President. The Senate's credibility is also on the line. The Senate, if it adopts this unwise Resolution, will rightly earn, not the respect of thoughtful members of the University community, or elsewhere, but their disdain--for a waste of time and energy that should be devoted to far more profitable endeavors.
I cannot support the Resolution reported by the Committee.
I urge its rejection by the Senate.
Conduct of Executive Committee
This Resolution should not have been brought to the attention of the Senate, when it could have been reasonably foreseen that a full and fair investigation could not be conducted. The members of the Theology Department who sat on the Executive Committee should have recused themselves when matters that reasonably call into question their own conduct came before it. Those members of the Executive Committee that presented the original Resolution without disclosing the July letter of the President--if they knew of it--acted without that degree of candor that the Senate has a right to expect of its members; if they did not know of it, their conduct fell well below the standard of care in conducting an investigation of the facts that the Senate has a right to expect of its members before they bring a matter to its attention.
Conduct of A Member of the Academic Affairs Committee
The member of the Academic Affairs Committee that publicly voiced his one-sided opinions in a campus newspaper deserves strong condemnation. He spoke out and spread more widely matters that were best left confidential. His uncalled for remarks were mean-spirited and vindictive; they were out of place for any member of the University community, much less for someone who was both a member of a committee that had not yet concluded its investigation and of the Department of Theology.
The following ought not to have been said:
In the opinion of most of those present the candidate's oral presentation was very unsatisfactory, the vote of the Appointment-Tenure Promotions Committee was unanimously negative, and the Department Chairman also recommended against the appointment after submitting an eight-page, largely negative evaluation of the candidate's dissertation.
While this information was, of course, unwisely and improperly revealed at a "public" meeting of the Theology Department, its circulation was limited. Most members of the Senate--or the Notre Dame community--did not know of it in September. Even on the member's professed view of the facts, publicizing this information further was detraction, that is, disclosing another's faults and failings to persons who did not know them without an objectively valid reason.
If I am right about the facts, on the other hand, the publication was, in fact, calumny, that is, remarks contrary to the truth, that harm the reputation of another and give occasion for false judgment.
Detraction/calumny; the choice is not attractive.
Judge Learned Hand once described Justice Cardozo:
He never disguised the difficulties, as lazy judges do who win the game
by sweeping all the chessmen off the table: like John Stuart Mill, he would
often begin by stating the other side better than its advocate had stated
The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand 131. (I. Dilliard ed. 1960).
A similar remark could be made of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Summa is so constructed that the objections to St. Thomas' own position are set out first, often in a better form than that of those who espoused them. Search in vain in the piece published by the member for one word that reflects the position of the President--or even reviews in order to refute the serious allegations made against the Department. Only one view is manifest in the essay: his own self-referential reflections. He praises himself, for example, by describing the Department of Theology as twelfth, yet he does not tell us that the "unqualified" candidate received his PhD from a fourth ranked university or that he was a visiting research fellow at a third ranked university. Everything revolves around his narrow-gauged view of the world. The member may have had a "summer of discontent," but what possible positive contribution to the life of the Department--or the University--did he expect his essay to make? The decision to hire the candidate had been made. Did he hope irretrievably to poison the well of personal relationships with other faculty members or students? What justification can be offered for his petty diatribe?
Only he can tell us.
What will he say?
The preparation of these dissenting remarks was as distasteful a task as I have had to perform since I have been at Notre Dame, now these sixteen years. I pray that the occasion never arises again. I will not speak of this matter in the future. This book is, for me, now closed, as it should be for all of us. As a University community, we must quickly move to heal, not further divide ourselves. The candidate is one of our number. He ought to be lovingly accepted as one of us--and given a fair opportunity--free of this unfortunate controversy--to prove himself--in his scholarship and his teaching.
Charity requires no less.
G. Robert Blakey
William J. & Dorothy O'Neill
Professor of Law
Candidate's Letter to the Department
March 22, 1996
Professor Lawrence Cunningham
Department of Theology
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Dear Professor Cunningham:
This letter is a cover letter accompanying the material pertaining to my application for a full-time, tenure track position in Ethics in the Department of Theology of the University of Notre Dame. Please find in this packet my c.v., my dissertation, and two other samples of my written work. Letters of recommendation from Professors Stanley Hauerwas, George Marsden, James Buckley, Thomas Ferraro, William Portier, Terrence Tilley, and Sandra Mize are forthcoming, either directly from them or from the Credential Office of Duke University. My major field of study at Duke was in Theology and Ethics, and my minor fields were in the History of Christianity in America and Political Theory. I believe I would make a strong contribution to the Department of Theology at Notre Dame for the following reasons.
First, I am already active in scholarship. As is indicated in my c.v., I am currently a Visiting Research Fellow at Princeton University. Last year, I was chosen by the College Theology Society to receive their Graduate Essay Award. The year before that, I was awarded the Charlotte W. Newcombe Dissertation Fellowship. I have four articles published in review journals at this point, plus two more which have been accepted and will probably be published in 1996. In addition to publishing, I have presented papers over the past couple of years at several conferences, including the Society of Christian Ethics, the College Theology Society, the American Catholic Historical Association, and the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities. I served on the planning committee for a conference on En-Gendering American Catholic Studies at the Cushwa Center for the Study of American Catholicism at Notre Dame held in the fall of 1995. And I have recently been chosen to serve on the editorial board of the American Journal of Jurisprudence. This activity will be continuing in the months ahead. I have been invited to present a paper at the annual meeting of the College Theology Society in June. I have also been asked to serve on a panel at the Annual Meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America. And in the next few months, I will be turning in book reviews to the editors of Modern Theology, Pro Ecclesia, and The Thomist. These accomplishments, I believe, indicate a good start in scholarship and the promise of continued professional activity in the years to come.
Second, I have had extensive experience in teaching. Dating from my first teaching assistantship in 1982, while an M.Div. student at Notre Dame, I have been regularly involved in teaching in some form: as a high school teacher (1983-84); as the director of a youth ministry program which concentrated heavily on catechetical work among teenagers (1984-86); as a teacher for a diocesan liturgy training program (1986-88); as a teaching assistant in the Duke Divinity School where I had full responsibility for making up and grading papers and tests (1990-92); as an instructor for the University Writing Program of the English Department at Duke (1991-92); and as an instructor of an undergraduate course on Catholicism for the Department of Religion at Duke University (1992). Moreover, throughout this entire period, in connection with my pastoral work, I have regularly given adult education classes, weekend workshops, and retreats, all of which have involved the skills entailed in teaching. In the context of this experience in teaching, I have developed a philosophy of teaching and my own pedagogical style. In short, I am not a beginner in teaching. At the same time, I realize that teaching at Notre Dame would present a fresh challenge for me. It is a challenge to which I would look forward and in response to which I believe I would flourish.
Third, my approach to Catholic social ethics offers a distinctive alternative to the usual approach taken in the field. In my years of study, I have come to appreciate the fundamentally theological character of moral reflection. A major interest of mine has been to place ethical issues within a theological context. It has become my intellectual habit to analyze ethical issues not only on the basis of insights gained from the natural and human sciences and the humanities, but also on the basis of christology, ecclesiology, eschatology, liturgy, and so forth. In my dissertation, for example, I have traced the development of the discourse of Catholic social ethics in the United States from the twenties to the sixties in order to show how certain key theological themes were marginalized. And in this year at Princeton, I am beginning work on a related project that will attempt to retrieve what I consider to be an alternative tradition of Catholic Ethics in the United States, as articulated by such figures as Paul Hanley Furfey and Virgil Michel and embodied in the Catholic Worker Movement. My overall purpose is to bring substantive theological resources to bear on the discourse of Catholic social ethics in a way that can lead to different ways of construing the social mission of the Catholic Church. This approach, I believe, will prove to be a fruitful complement the work already being done by others in the field.
Fourth, I have been personally involved in the practical aspects of the scholarship I am undertaking. As is indicated in my c.v., I have had extensive pastoral experience in parishes and with youth groups, and have been deeply involved in works associated with the social mission of the church. Specifically, I have had a long-standing involvement in the Catholic peace movement and in the Catholic Worker Movement. Moreover, I was a founder and director of Andre House, a house of hospitality for the homeless and poor of Phoenix. We welcomed about ten or so homeless people into our home and to our table, and also served an evening meal to the many other homeless people who lived on the streets (about 600 meals a night). In my four years at Andre House, I had close contact with people in college or recently graduated from college who were involved in our work either as volunteers or staff members. This has given me solid experience in conveying to young people a concrete, realistic, unsentimental, and spiritual vision of Catholic social teaching. As a result, I am able to bring a significant amount of hands-on, practical experience to my theoretical interests in theological ethics.
For these reasons, I ask you to consider my application. If there is something that needs to be added to my application, or clarified in any way, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you for your consideration.
Center for the Study of American Religion
Princeton, NJ 08544
Ph.D. Duke University, 1996 (Theology and Ethics, History of
Christianity in America)
Thesis: "In Service to the Nation: A Critical Analysis of the
Formation of the Americanist Tradition in Catholic Social
Ethics 'Catholic Social Ethics' in the United States"
M.Div. University of Notre Dame, 1983 (Theology)
B.A. Allegheny College, 1977 (Political Science and
History) Cum Laude
Visiting Research Fellow, Center for the Study of American Religion, Princeton University, 1995-96
Graduate Essay Award, College Theology Society, 1995
Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, 1993-94
Pi Gamma Mu (Social Science Honor Society), 1976-77
Alden Scholar (Dean's List), Allegheny College, 1973-77
Instructor, "Roman Catholic Tradition," Department of Religion, Duke University (Spring Semester 1993)
Instructor, "University Writing Course," Department of English, Duke University (Fall Semester 1992, Fall Semester 1991)
Teaching Assistant, "Christian Theology," with Professor
Philip Kennison, The Divinity School, Duke University (Spring Semester
Teaching Assistant, "Christian Theology," with Professor Thomas Langford, The Divinity School, Duke University (Spring Semester 1991)
Teaching Assistant, "Christian Ethics," with Professor Stanley Hauerwas, The Divinity School, Duke University (Fall Semester 1991, Fall Semester 1990)
Guest Lecturer, Corpus Christi Institute, Phoenix, Arizona. Classes on liturgical theology and theology of sacraments (1986-1988)
Teacher in Religion and Director of Social Service, Bourgade Catholic High School, Phoenix, Arizona (1983-1984)
Teaching Assistant, "Introduction to Theology," with Professor Stanley Hauerwas, Department of Theology, University of Notre Dame (Fall Semester 1982)
PUBLICATIONS IN REVIEW JOURNALS
"Let's Do Away with Faith and History: A Critique of H. Richard Niebuhr's False Antinomies," Modern Theology (forthcoming)
"Writing History in a World Without Ends: A Critique of Three Histories of Catholicism in the United States," Pro Ecclesia (forthcoming)
"Eruditio Without Religio?: The Dilemma of Catholics in the Academy," with Frederick C. Bauerschmidt, Communio, 22 (Summer 1995)
"The Non-Catholic Character of the 'Public Church'": A Review Essay of Fullness of Faith: The Public Significance of Theology by Michael and Kenneth Himes, and The Church and Morality: A Catholic and Ecumenical Approach, by Charles Curran, Modern Theology (April 1995)
"'Overall, the First Amendment Has Been Very Good for Christianity' -- NOT! : A Response to Dyson's Rebuke," DePaul Law Review, 43, 2 (Winter 1993): 423-446.
"The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of 'Belief' is Not Enough," with Stanley Hauerwas, DePaul Law Review, 42, 1 (Fall 1992): 107-127.
"Kudos and Questions for Communio Ecclesiology: A Response to
David Schindler's Heart of the World, Center of the Church," Annual
Meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America, San Diego, California,
June 7, 1996
"Americanism, Radicalism, and Blowing the Dynamite of the Church: Towards a Counter-Tradition of Catholic Social Theory," Annual Meeting of the College Theology Society, University of Dayton, May 26, 1996
"Re-Introducing Virgil Michel: Toward A Counter-Tradition of Catholic Social Ethics in the United States," Annual Meeting of the Society of Christian Ethics, Albuquerque, New Mexico, January 5, 1996
Workshop Leader, "Gender Construction and in Catholic Theological Discourse: Critical Differences," Conference on En-Gendering American Catholic History, Cushwa Center for the Study of American Catholicism, University of Notre Dame, September 30, 1995
"The Gospel and Culture: A Dialogue of Life and Death," Major Conference sponsored by the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities," University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota, August 3-6, 1995
"American Catholics to the Rescue: Reading the Murray Project as Comedy, Tragedy, and Farce," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1, 1994
"Theology, History, and 'The Way It Really Was,'" Conference on Recent Developments in American Catholic Historiography, Center for the Study of Religion in America, Princeton University, June 19, 1994
Response to Speaking of Diversity, by Philip Gleason, Annual Meeting of the College Theology Society, St. Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana, May 29, 1994
"Maureen Sweeney on Law and Lawyers," Conference on Stanley Hauerwas on Law and Lawyers, University of Notre Dame Law School, January 31, 1994
"Let's Do Away with Faith and History: A Critique of H. Richard Niebuhr's False Antinomies," Wheaton College Philosophy Conference, October 29, 1993
"Writing History in a World Without Ends: A Critique of Post-World War II Histories of Catholicism in America," Presented at the Annual Meeting of the College Theology Society, St. Mary's College, Miraga, June 6, 1993 (revised from the paper below)
"Writing History in a World Without Ends: The Problem with Post-World War II Histories of Catholicism in America," Annual Meeting of the American Society of Church History and the American Catholic Historical Association, March 28, 1992
American Academy of Religion
Catholic Commission on Intellectual and Cultural Affairs
College Theology Society
Natural Law Forum
Society for Values in Higher Education
Society of Christian Ethics
Review of Love is the Measure by James Forest, Prism (October 1994)
"We Are All Called to be Saints," (Homily for the Feast of All Saints) Markings, November 1, 1994
"Preaching the Need of Repentance -- Plowshares Style" (Homily for the Fifteenth Sunday in Ordinary Time) Markings, July 10, 1994
Review of The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism: A Theological Interpretation by H. Jefferson Powell, Duke Law Magazine, Winter 1994
"Journeying to Moriah, To Jerusalem -- With Christ" (Homily
Second Sunday of Lent) Markings, February 27, 1994
Personal interview, presented in Voices From the Catholic Worker, ed. Rosalie Riegle Troester. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993, xv, 481-82, 510-12, 516-17.
"'Unfairness' -- Whose Other Name is Grace" (Homily for the Twenty-Fifth Sunday in Ordinary Time), Markings, September 19, 1993
"Handed On To Us" (Homily for the Seventh Sunday of Easter), Markings, May 23, 1993
"The Third Coming of Christ" (Homily for the First Sunday of Advent), Markings, November 29, 1992
"God As Cast-Iron Hook" (Homily for the Third Sunday of Easter), Markings, May 3, 1992
"Dominion Over All," (Homily for the Feast of Christ the King), Markings, November 24, 1991
"No Times Are Ordinary -- A Homily for the Second Sunday of Ordinary
Time," North Carolina Catholic, February 3, 1991
"Sign of Signs" (Homily for Trinity Sunday), Markings, May 26, 1991
"No Place Like Home," Notre Dame Magazine, Winter 1990
"The Living God -- A Fact" (Homily for the Thirty-Second Sunday in Ordinary Time), Markings, November 12, 1989
"On Bitterness," The Critic, Fall 1989
"The Virtue of Hospitality" (Homily for the Sixteenth Sunday in Ordinary Time), Markings, July 23, 1989
"Welcoming Sinners Home" (Homily for the Fourth Sunday of Lent), Markings, March 5, 1989
"The Grace of Doing Nothing" (Homily for the Second Sunday of Advent), Markings, December 4, 1988
"Give and Live" (Homily for the Twenty-Fifth Sunday in Ordinary Time), Markings, September 18, 1988
"A Welfare Mother's Story" and "Arizona Welfare Rights," Human Development Digest, 11, 5 (September 1984)
"R.O.T.C. and Just War Theory: At Peace at Notre Dame?" The
Observer, May 1-2, 1984
"Faith and Hope in the Nuclear Age," Katallagete, Winter, 1984
Co-Founder and Director, Andre House of Hospitality, Phoenix, Arizona. Staff of eight, $150,000 annual budget, housing and food service for homeless people (1984-1988)
Co-Founder and Board Member, St. Joseph the Worker Job Service, Phoenix, Arizona. Staff of three, $80,000 annual budget (1987-1988)
Associate Pastor and Director of Insight Teen Program, St. Louis the King Parish, Phoenix, Arizona (1985-1986)
Campus Ministry, University of Notre Dame, established and directed Center for Draft and Military Counseling (1981-1983)
Resident Assistant, Old College, University of Notre Dame, first-year residence for college seminarians for the Indiana Province, Congregation of Holy Cross (1981-1982)
CHURCH AND COMMUNITY SERVICE
Holy Cross Associates (Volunteer program), Board Member, 1994-present
Alliance for Catholic Education (Post-collegiate Student Volunteer Program), Duke University Representative, 1994-95
Sacramental Minister, Holy Family Parish, Hillsborough, North Carolina 1989-1995 (in conjunction with the Pastoral Administrator of the parish)
C.O. Support Network, 1990-91 (Support Network for Conscientious Objectors in the Military during the Gulf War.)
Presbyteral Council, Diocese of Phoenix (1987-88) (Consultative body, elected by priests of the diocese)
Prof. Stanley Hauerwas, Department of Religion, Duke University
Prof. George Marsden, Department of History, University of Notre Dame
Prof. James Buckley, Department of Theology, Loyola College of Maryland
Prof. William Portier, Department of Theology, Mount St. Mary's College
Prof. Terrence Tilley, Department of Religious Studies, University of Dayton
Prof. John Colman, Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley, Graduate Theological Union
Assoc. Prof. Sandra Yokum Mize, Department of Religious Studies, University of Dayton
Assoc. Prof. Thomas Ferraro, Department of English, Duke University