

⁹¹ By science here is meant knowledge. See Glossary.

⁹² *Ed. cit.*, fol. 183rb.

⁹³ *In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck, in *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, vol. I (Berlin: Reimer, 1891), pp. 483-484 and 516-517.

⁹⁴ Bk. VII, Ch. II, 1137a30; *Junctas*, vol. III, fol. 193ra.

⁹⁵ 1005bl; *Junctas*, vol. III, fol. 72rb.

⁹⁶ The "Commentator" was Averroes. He was known by that title because his commentaries on Aristotle's works became a constant source of interpretative information for the later Middle Ages. It should be noted, however, that Averroes was not considered "the Commentator" for all of Aristotle's works. Eustratius of Nicaea, for example, was "the Commentator" for the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

⁹⁷ The most common formula is "*per se subsistens*," subsisting by itself. The formula used here is "*per se consistens*," which makes sense only if one keeps in mind that Suárez is emphasizing the composite character of accidents, which are "things in other things."

⁹⁸ Disp. XXXIV, "On the Primary Substance or Supposit and Its Distinction from the Nature."

⁹⁹ *Ed. Vaticana*, vol. VII, p. 505.

SECTION III

WHETHER DESIGNATED MATTER IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IN MATERIAL SUBSTANCES¹

1. We omit the divine substance, since, as we said, it is individual by itself and essentially; whence, there is no more reason to look for a principle of individuation in it than [for a principle] of its essence or existence.

The Sense of the Question

2. Now, in order to understand the sense of the question, it should be taken from what has been said in the preceding Section² that in this sort of created substances one can consider a metaphysical composition, conceptually composed of the specific nature and the individual difference. For just as what the species adds to the genus is, according to metaphysical consideration, the divisive difference, that is, [the difference] contractive of the genus and constitutive of the species, so likewise, what the individual adds to the species is rightly called the contractive difference of the species and the constitutive and distinctive [difference] of individuals, which are truly and properly said to differ in number. Indeed, for this reason the species is said to be predicated of many numerically different [things]. Again, we show that what the individual adds to the species, although only conceptually distinct, nevertheless, is real and positive, founding the negation or indivision proper to the individual, because it is by itself incommunicable and distinct from others, that is, incommunicable to other individuals. Hence, [when] added to the species, it constitutes [together] with it an individual, one by itself, under the species. Therefore, it lacks nothing in order to have a true nature (*rationem*) of difference. For this reason some think this is to be identified as the

principle of individuation, and that no other is to be searched for, as it can be seen in Scotus, *On II [of the Sentences]*, dist. 2, q.6,³ and Fonseca, Bk. V, [*Commentary on the Metaphysics*, Ch. 6, sect. 1.⁴ But this sense of the question is not under dispute, nor is there truly a diversity of opinion on that [question] among those who dispute concerning the principle of individuation.⁵ Therefore, the sense of the question concerns what basis or principle the individual difference has in reality. For these metaphysical predicates are usually taken from real constitutive principles of reality, in the same manner in which the genus is usually said to be taken from matter and difference from form.⁶ And substantial predications (*denominaciones*) are taken from matter sometimes, as when man is said to be material, sometimes from form, as when [man] is said to be rational, [and] sometimes from the whole composite nature, as when [man] is said to be man. Therefore, in accordance with this, we inquire presently what the principle of this individual difference is.

From this statement, it is clear we are not looking here for extrinsic causes or principles of individuation, or rather, of individuals, such as are the final and efficient causes. For these do not cause individuation except [insofar] as they cause the individual entity, that is, by furnishing the intrinsic principle of individuation. Therefore, it is the latter that we look for. And although the general question [of individuation] concerns all created substances, nevertheless, because material [substances] are better known to us, we shall discuss them first, and then it will be more easily determined what we can conclude concerning spiritual [substances]. Moreover, since there are several opinions concerning this matter which require detailed consideration, we shall discuss them one by one.

3. There is a famous view which affirms designated matter to be the principle of individuation.⁷ This is the view of St. Thomas, [*Summa theologiae*] I, q.3, a.3, ad 3, and q.50, a.4, III, q.77, a.2, and *On IV [of the Sentences]*, dist. 12, q.1, a.1, *quaestiuncula* 2, and *Opuscle* 29, [*On the Principle of Individuation*],⁸ and *On Being and Essence*, Ch. 2, where Cajetan discusses and defends it in detail;⁹ and Capreolus. *On II [of the Sentences]*, dist. 3;¹⁰ Soncinas, [*Questions on Metaphysics* VII, q.33 and 34;¹¹ Ferrara, [*Commentary on Contra gentiles* I, Ch. 21,¹² and others to be cited below. It is believed as well that this is Aristotle's view; for in several places he holds that numerical distinction and identity is to be attributed to prime matter. Whence, in Bk. V, *Metaphysics*, Ch. 6, text 42, he says that "[those things] are one in number of which matter is one."¹³ And, in Bk. VII, Ch. 8, text 28, he says that "the form in these fleshs and bones is Socrates and Callias."¹⁴ And in Ch. 10, text 25, he says: "The singular is already Socrates, owing to the last matter."¹⁵ And concerning this principle he con-

cludes in Bk. XII, *Metaphysics*, Ch. 8, text 49: "The first mover cannot be but one in number, because it lacks matter," holding as necessary that those [things] that agree in species and differ in number have matter and differ by matter.¹⁶ Similarly, in *On the Heavens* I, Ch. 9, he proves that there cannot be another world, because this world comprises all the matter of natural things.¹⁷

From these texts it appears, therefore, that this was Aristotle's view, according to which, consequently, it must be said, — as the aforementioned authors say —, that in immaterial substances there is no positive principle of individuation or proper individual difference, but only the nature incommunicable of itself.

4. If we follow reason, I find almost no basis [given] for this view that does not recall the authority of Aristotle, namely, that matter is the principle of multiplication and distinction of individuals within the same species, as Aristotle states in the cited places. But what is the principle of numerical distinction is the principle of individuation; therefore, [matter is the principle of individuation]. Second, because what is incommunicable to inferiors similar [to itself] is individual. But matter is the primary foundation of that incommunicability; for form, since it is act, is communicable of itself, while matter, since it is primary potency, is incommunicable of itself, and form then is limited and determined when it is contracted to this matter. Third, because the individual is the primary subject in metaphysical coordination; for all [things] superior [to it] are predicated of it, but it [i.e. the individual] is not [predicated] of others. Therefore, the first principle and foundation of the individual as such must be that which is the primary subject among physical principles, and matter is such; therefore, [matter must be the principle of individuation].

The Arguments for the Stated View are Examined

5. But before we proceed further. [note that] these arguments, apart from authority, do not have great weight. The first can be easily answered by denying the major: for what is a principle of distinction is more a principle of multiplication [than of individuation].¹⁸ Moreover, the principle of distinction is not matter, but rather form, for, as the common saying goes, "act is what distinguishes." Whence, St. Thomas, in *Contra gentiles* II, Ch. 40, explicitly proves that matter is not the primary cause of the distinction of things.¹⁹ And although he is primarily concerned with essential distinction [there], nevertheless, the arguments he gives seem to apply also to numerical distinction, [and] in particular what he says in the second argument, that "form does not follow the disposition of matter as first cause, but rather, and conversely, matter is so disposed in order that a particular

form may follow." Again, what he says in the same place, that "those [things] related to matter as to a first cause are outside the agent's intention and are produced by chance." If, therefore, matter were the primary cause of the individual, the individual as such would be produced by chance and outside the agent's intention. Again, what he says in the same place in the fourth argument, that "one matter requires something distinct from itself in order to be distinguished from another matter;" therefore, it is not the primary cause of distinction, as it was taken in the argument given.

For this reason, having been convinced by these and other arguments, many of the authors who follow the aforementioned opinion acknowledge that, since there are two [things] which belong to the notion of individual, namely, to be incommunicable to inferiors and to be distinct from other individuals, matter is the principle of individuation with respect to the first, and quantity is [so] with respect to the second, for [quantity] is what distinguishes the matters themselves. We shall examine later the truth and consequence with which this is said.²⁰ For now we shall consider only the force of the stated arguments.

The first argument, however, concerned only individuation with respect to the distinction of one [thing] from another, about which the already aforementioned authors acknowledge that it does not originate from matter. Notice, moreover, that the arguments given are not convincing with respect to every distinction. For, as I shall state below, matter has its own way of distinguishing one [thing] from another, insofar as it has some entitative act. They do prove, however, that there is no [reason] why the primary reason of all numerical distinction should be attributed to it [i.e. matter] rather than to some form.

6. The second argument deals with the primary root of incommunicability, in which the notion of individual consists first [of all], as was stated above; for distinction from another is rather a consequence [of it], as was stated above concerning unity in general. Hence, if the argument were effective, it would be sufficient to prove that matter is the principle of individuation. But, if one considers this [argument] carefully, there is an obvious equivocation committed in the reasoning. For, when matter is said to be the principle of the incommunicability of the individual because it is the primary subject, incommunicable of itself in the highest degree, either the word 'incommunicable' is taken equivocally or something false is assumed in the proof. For matter can be understood to be incommunicable in many ways: First, as incommunicable to something, such as a physical subject which it may inform or in which it may inhere.²¹ And this sense is most true, and it is rightly proven from the fact that

matter is the primary subject. This, however, has nothing to do with the topic under discussion, both because to be incommunicable to another as to a subject does not belong to the notion of individual as such, — since accidents are individuals and yet they may be communicated in this way, and so too are substantial forms —, and also because that incommunicability is not sufficient for the notion of individual. For matter is incommunicable in this way in virtue of its species and, nevertheless, it is not an individual in virtue of the species, but common to many numerically different matters. Therefore, that incommunicability is not the primary root of individuation, even in matter itself; therefore, much less could matter be the primary principle of individuation of substance by reason of this incommunicability.

Matter can be said to be incommunicable in another way as well, either in the manner of a cause, in the manner of a part, in the manner of a nature to a supposit, or in the manner of a superior to inferiors. But all these ways are false. For matter is communicated to form in the way in which it is its cause and sustains it. Again, matter is communicated to the composite as part to whole and also as cause to effect, which it does not cause otherwise than by intrinsically communicating its entity to it. Again, matter as part of a nature is communicated only to [its] proper supposit, if we speak naturally. Supernaturally [speaking], however, [matter is communicated] also to another [supposit], as one may see in the [case of the] humanity of Christ. But none of these ways [of understanding the incommunicability of matter] is pertinent to the present case, as is intuitively (*per se*) obvious.

Moreover, the last way — in which alone the terms used in the aforementioned argument would be taken univocally — is clearly false, as the argument given above convincingly shows, because matter as such, by virtue of its species is communicable to many inferiors, which can stand under [it] in the order of predication but cannot be subjects of inherence. And if you say that matter as such is common, while the designated matter about which the statement is made is incommunicable, [then] against this there is [the fact] that designated matter, whatever it may be, does not have incommunicability from the notion of primary subject on which the argument given was based. If, therefore, designated matter is incommunicable, it will be so on account of another cause, which could be common to forms or to other things, as we shall see in what follows. Wherefore, the notion of primary subject does not pertain to the incommunicability belonging to the notion of an individual; for angelic forms and God himself are incommunicable in that way, even though they are completely acts and not potencies. Hence,

when form is said in that same place to be communicable of itself, this is also irrelevant. For form as form is communicable to matter as to a subject, not as to an inferior; it is also communicable to distinct forms according to its own specific notion, and thus it is not individual according to that notion. Nevertheless, this form is as incommunicable as this matter. Therefore, in this respect there is no better reason for one [to be principle of individuation] than for the other. 7. Now, it is evident from these [considerations] that the third conjecture is not effective, because the notion of the subject of inherence and [that] of the subject of predication are very different (*diversa*). For, although it may be possible to think of a certain proportion between these two subjects, since the superior is compared to the inferior [which is] its subject as the form that gives [it] being, nevertheless, they simply do not have the same notion, nor is one founded on the other. Whence, in simple substances, there is subjection or subordination of inferiors to superiors without subject of inherence or of information.

It should be added that what is the subject of predication is not of itself more imperfect than its superior predicate, as matter, which is the primary subject, is inferior to form. And thus it is not necessary that what is a primary subject in the order of generation and imperfection be the first principle and foundation of the individual, which is the primary subject in the order of predication, containing in itself all the perfection of the superiors and adding something proper whereby it, as it were, completes and perfects that [perfection].²²

Many Objections are Raised against the Stated View

8. But we must see whether this view, although not demonstrable (*convinci non possit*) by reason, may [still] be suitably defended and maintained, for this will be [reason] enough for us, at least because of the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas, to defend it.²³ The first source (*ratio*) of difficulty concerning it [i.e. this view] can be that matter is common of itself not only insofar as it, according to specific notion, is common to many individuals of matter,²⁴ but also that the numerically same matter can be under many forms, whether specifically distinct or only numerically diverse, at least successively. In that way, therefore, can matter be principle of individuation? For the principle of individuation must be particular (*proprium*) in the highest degree and in no way common to many individuals, whether simultaneously or successively. Because of this difficulty, the view adds that not matter in just any way, but [rather matter] designated by quantity is the principle of individuation. But what is signified by the term ['designated matter'] is so obscure that the defenders of this

view differ among themselves greatly in the way they try to explain it. It is necessary, therefore, to refer and examine their various interpretations in order to assess more clearly the suitability of this view.

The First Way of Explaining Designated Matter is Rejected

9. The first interpretation is that matter designated by quantity is nothing other than matter with quantity or matter affected by quantity. For they hold that the principle of individuation is, as it were, composed of these two, so that matter may give incommunicability and quantity distinction, as we said above. Thus states Capreolus in *On II [of the Sentences]*, dist. 3, q.1, a.1, concl. 5, and in a.3, in the answer to the arguments against it²⁵; again, Ferrara, [*Commentary on Contra gentiles* I, Ch. 21,²⁶ and Soncinas, [*Questions...*],²⁷ Bk. VII, q.34. St. Thomas favors it in *On Truth*, q.2, a.6, *ad* 1, where he explains that natural designated matter is matter "with the determination of these or those dimensions."²⁸ And in *On Evil*, q.16, a.1, *ad* 18, he says that "matter subject to dimensions is the principle of numerical distinction in those [things] in which many individuals of one species are found."²⁹ And commenting on Boethius' *On the Trinity*, q.4, a.2, he says that "quantity distinguishes material things."³⁰ This seems to be based on Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* III, Ch. 3, text 11, where he holds that specific distinction is the result of form, while numerical [distinction is the result] of quantity.³¹ And in Bk. X, Ch. 3, text 4, he posits only two types of division, namely, according to form and according to quantity.³² And in *Metaphysics* V, Ch. 13, he attributes to quantity to be principle of division, whence he says that "a quantum is what can be divided into those [things] each of which is born to be this something."³³ And in *Physics* III, Ch. 7, text 78, he says that "number is born from the division of a continuous quantum."³⁴ In fact, the reason can be that in order for matter to be the principle of individuation, it is necessary that something distinguish this matter from that [one]. But this [something] is not matter itself, since the distinction must be made by an act. Nor is it form, for rather this form is distinct from that [one] because it is made and received in a distinct matter. [Therefore, it must be quantity.]

10. But this view is false and can be attacked with serious arguments. We can proceed in two ways: First, assuming the other view held by the aforementioned authors, that quantity is not in prime matter but in the whole composite, and that it is destroyed when the substance is corrupted, and that it is newly acquired for the generation of substance. From which it is concluded that, absolutely (*simpliciter*) speaking, numerically this substantial form is first introduced in this matter and [then] quantity follows. Whence the argument is

completed, because this form, when it is first understood to be received in this matter, is also understood to be received in a matter distinct from the others. Therefore, it is not made formally and intrinsically distinct by quantity. Again, this substantial individual results from matter and form conceived with precision and as preceding quantity. Therefore, that [i.e. the substantial individual] as such is one, not with conceptual unity, but with real, singular and transcendental unity.³⁵ Therefore, just as it is undivided in itself in virtue of its substantial entity, so also it is substantially and entitatively distinct from all others. Therefore, it does not have distinction through quantity. Nor is it relevant if you say that quantity is prior in matter in the order of material cause, both because that cannot be said to follow properly from that view, as will be discussed below, and also because at least it cannot be understood according to a true inherence of quantity in matter, because, according to that principle, quantity may never inhere in matter in real duration, but [only] in the composite. Therefore, [quantity] cannot agree with it [i.e. matter] in some sign of priority, because what does not agree in reality and in real duration can neither agree in prior nor posterior. Moreover, quantity does not divide a thing or [render it] distinct from others, except by inhering in and informing [it]. Therefore, quantity does not have in any way (*signo*) this effect primarily in matter, but [only] in the whole composite. Therefore, [quantity] presupposes it [i.e. matter] as already individual, and, consequently, as distinct by another prior division. Finally, also because for the argument's force it is enough that matter, as it precedes quantity, be distinct of itself in some kind of causal role (*causa*) that is absolutely (*simpliciter*) prior. Finally, the argument can be concluded thus: Form is received in matter without quantity; therefore, this form [is received] in this matter, because generation takes place in the singular; therefore, this individual results from these [i.e. this form and this matter] before the advent of quantity. Indeed, that [i.e. quantity] comes to the already constituted individual, which God could preserve as distinct from all others without quantity. Therefore, quantity does not intrinsically and formally enter into the principle of individuation, whether of the whole composite substance or of each of its parts, namely, form and matter.

11. Second, we can proceed to the other view, that quantity is in prime matter and remains the same in what is generated and corrupted. And then an argument no less effective is taken from another place, because not only this matter in itself, but also [matter] as affected by this quantity, can be under diverse forms and, consequently, in numerically distinct individuals. Therefore, [matter designated by quantity] can no more be the principle of individuation

than matter alone [can]. It will be said, perhaps, that matter with indeterminate dimensions can be under diverse forms, and as such is not the principle of individuation, but, on the other hand, matter with these determinate dimensions is proper to this individual and that as such is the principle of individuation. But I ask what these determinate dimensions add to quantity. For dimensions can be called indeterminate only because they do not express a fixed limit of length or width etc., and so a determinate quantity will only add fixed dimensional limits. But this is not enough for the present [purpose], because the same matter, existing in this way under the same fixed and determinate quantity, can be under distinct forms, as it is clear from [the case of] the same branch, first green, later dry, and in similar [cases].

In another manner, that quantity can be called indeterminate which is not affected by fixed dispositions, such as a particular rarity or density or by other qualities by which matter is determined to this form rather than to another. In this sense it can be admitted that matter, affected by quantity or dimensions so determined, that is, [matter] so immediately (*proxime*) disposed, is so proper to this individual that it could not be in another.

The mentioned authors, however, cannot be speaking in this sense, nor is this part of their true view. The first is clear, because they say that quantity distinguishes one individual from another by its proper notion and formal effect. Therefore, this [i.e. that quantity distinguishes...] does not agree with that [i.e. that matter, affected by fixed dispositions...] by reason of the other qualities or dispositions. Otherwise, not matter designated by quantity, but [rather] matter insofar as it is designated by qualities must be said to be the principle of individuation. The second is clear, because otherwise it would follow that the accidents by which matter is disposed to form are intrinsically included in the principle of individuation of substance. But the consequent is false.³⁶ Therefore, [this cannot be their true view]. What follows is clear, because designated matter, according to this view, intrinsically and formally includes these accidents as inhering in itself and determining it to a particular form. Now, the minor is proven, first, because the substantial individual is one by itself [and] directly placed under the species in the category of substance; therefore, it does not intrinsically include accidents, although it may, nevertheless, intrinsically include the principle of individuation. Second, because it was shown above that the individual difference in reality is not distinct *ex natura rei* from the substantial nature, and that, therefore, it is the individual substance itself. Therefore, its intrinsic principle cannot be an accident, but the substance.

12. These arguments can be effective also against the other view, that quantity is not in prime matter, but [rather] in the whole composite, because quantity is an accident. Therefore, in whatever subject it may be, it cannot intrinsically enter into the constitution of the substantial individual. Therefore, it cannot cause its distinction.

Hence, leaving these views aside, we can argue thirdly that, although a thing's being one in itself is by nature prior to its being distinct from others, nevertheless, the latter follows intrinsically from the former without any positive addition being made to the thing itself that is one, but only by negation, by which, having posited the other term, it is true to say that this is not that. Accordingly, the same positive [thing] that is the foundation of unity with respect to the first negation or indivision in itself, is subsequently the foundation of the later negation of distinction from another. In this sense it is usually said with great truth that a thing is distinguished from others by that by which it is constituted in itself, because it is distinguished by that whereby it is.

Almost in the same sense St. Thomas says, [*Summa theologiae*] I, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2, that "each thing has unity in the same way in which it has being."³⁷ This is clear in [the case of] specific unity, for the same difference which constitutes the species one in itself, renders it distinct from other species. Hence, what is a principle of such a difference is also a principle not only of unity, but also of specific distinction. Therefore, likewise in [the case of] individual unity, what is a principle of the individual with respect to its constitution and its incommunicability or indivisibility in itself is also a principle of its distinction from others; and, conversely, what is a principle of distinction must also be a principle of constitution. If, therefore, matter by itself and separated from quantity constitutes the individual as incommunicable and one in itself, it also distinguishes it from others, or [alternatively], if distinction is impossible, so is the incommunicability of individuality (*individuationis*). This is confirmed: For that is called "incommunicable" in this way, which is so one in itself that it could not be divided into many [entities] similar [to itself]. Moreover, what is such is distinguished from others precisely in virtue of this—provided others exist. And conversely, the same argument can be made concerning quantity, because if that [i.e. quantity] is what distinguishes substantial individuals, it [i.e. quantity] must constitute them as well. And, conversely, if it cannot constitute [them], — which is more true, because, being an accident, it is outside the whole realm of substance, presupposing rather the individual subject—neither can it distinguish them.

13. Some answer that this argument rightly proves that quantity does not cause the first distinction among substantial individuals,

but it does not prove that it does not cause any distinction, such as the numerical and quantitative, which is enough for quantity to be able to pertain intrinsically in this respect to the principle of individuation.

But this answer falls into an equivocation, for if quantity does not cause the first distinction, but [rather causes] another, I ask, which is the one it presupposes [and] which is the one it causes? Surely the former cannot be any other but the entitative distinction, whereby this matter is not that [one] or this substance is not that [one], both because [1] no other prior distinction can be thought, and also because [2] this [distinction] is the most intrinsic to each entity. For, just as nothing more intrinsic to any being can be conceived than its entity, so no distinction or separation from another being is prior to that which is stated by this negation: "This being is not that [one]." Hence, it is unintelligible that one entity be distinguished from another entitatively and primarily by something other than itself.

14. Whence it follows also—[something] which is a new and sufficient argument against this whole view—that to distinguish entitatively one matter from another, or a part of matter from [another] part of matter, is not a formal effect of quantity, because just as quantity presupposes matter as subject, so does it presuppose its individual entity, which by itself is entitatively distinct from another similar entity. Therefore, distinct quantities presuppose distinct subjects in which they are received and distinct parts of quantity [presuppose] as well entitatively distinct parts of a subject. For here Cajetan's argument is relevant, that a singular act presupposes a singular potency, which is especially true in [the case of] a really distinct act and a potency. This is particularly so because, since quantity is a thing distinct from the matter in which it is, it cannot make it really distinct from itself. Therefore, [quantity] presupposes in it [i.e. matter] an entity which can be distinguished by itself from its quantity. Therefore, by the same [entity, matter] will be distinguished from all other [things] which are not itself. Therefore, this [distinction] is not a formal effect of quantity.

Finally, the same can be confirmed *a posteriori*. For, if God, abstracting from quantity, preserved the substance of Peter's body, for example, the partial entities of matter which are in the hands, the feet, the head, etc., would always remain entitatively distinct, whether they remained united or not. The reason for this is that although one entity could be united or separated from another, nevertheless, it would be openly incompatible for one to become the other or for both to be united into one indivisible [entity] which preserved its entity, because they would be both distinct and not distinct.

15. Therefore, the distinction that quantity presupposes in substance is an entitative and substantial distinction, and it is one that pertains by itself to the individual unity we are discussing. For through this [distinction] the individual is understood to be distinct from all others, whether under the same species if it is compared with [individuals] similar [to itself], or also under the genus or under any common predicate if it is compared with all other [individuals]. Therefore, if quantity confers any distinction, it will be accidental to the notion of individual and coming to it from outside; therefore, it is not for this reason that quantity will pertain to the principle of individuation presently under discussion. This is explained by [the nature of] the thing itself [i.e. quantity], for since quantity gives quantitative unity to substance, it can only give [to it] either a quantitative or a place distinction. The former of these consists only in this, that one substance is under diverse limits of quantity from another, and so that it is not continuous with the continuity proper to quantity. And the latter consists in this, that one substance is outside the place or location of the other. Hence, [the fact] that quantity distinguishes in the way it constitutes is also preserved. For, first, it makes substance extended in itself, quantitatively united and determined and to have this corporeal mass, but, as a result, it makes it to occupy local space; and similarly, it first distinguishes [it] quantitatively and then locally. This whole distinction, however, is outside the notion of individual substance, and [it is] accidental to it, as is [the case] with quantity itself.

16. Surely this is evident in [the case of] the place distinction, because [the place distinction] is exceedingly extrinsic and mutable, and however much the quantified thing may change place, it remains numerically the same. Indeed, by the power of God, the numerically same corporeal substance can be preserved without place, whether without quantity or with it, in the manner in which the body of Christ is [preserved] in the Eucharist. Similarly, the same quantified thing can be constituted in two places by the power of God, as I showed extensively when discussing the mystery of the Eucharist,³⁸ and two distinct bodies can be located in the same place, — this is often done by God, as it has been demonstrated in the matter of the resurrection.³⁹ Therefore, the place distinction has nothing to do with numerical unity and distinction. The same can be affirmed, moreover, concerning the quantitative distinction as concerning the very quantity and unity arising from it, which we showed above to be accidental to the intrinsic and entitative unity of material substance. Hence, although it [i.e. the quantitative distinction] naturally follows in the manner of a property, nevertheless, in the order of nature, it [i.e. the quantitative distinction] presupposes

it [i.e. the unity of material substance], and it is rather caused by it than causes it. Finally, material substance could be preserved by absolute power as numerically the same without its quantity, and consequently, [it could] retain the whole individual unity with substantial incommunicability and distinction without quantitative unity or distinction.

17. Wherefore even Soncinas and Ferrara finally acknowledge that material substance does not have transcendental unity from quantity, although [they insist] that it is numerically one through quantity. But it is astonishing that they should depart so easily from the true sense of the question and use terms equivocally. For, as we have often warned and everybody assumes and they themselves—I believe—know, when we discuss numerical unity here, we do not take number as a species of quantity, but as it can be found in any entity, as St. Thomas points out in *Opuscle 16, [On the Unity of the Intellect against Averroists]*,⁴⁰ the last chapter, where he says thus, that “even immaterial substance is numerically one.” Likewise Aristotle also distinguished numerical, specific, generic and analogical unity in *Metaphysics V*.⁴¹ Therefore, this numerical unity is transcendental in each thing, just as the specific or formal unity is transcendental in its own manner with respect to the common nature. Therefore, if material substance has transcendental individual unity, and [this is] not through quantity, quantity does not intrinsically pertain to the principle of individuation of substance. [To this] it must be added that in the same way in which substance is categorically one in number through quantity, [it is] not only distinguished, but also constituted and made in itself undivided and quantitatively incommunicable by the same quantity. For quantity could not make something one in its genus unless it also made [it] undivided, since the notion of one consists in this [indivisibility]. Therefore, if they speak consistently and univocally concerning the incommunicability and distinction of the same genus, they badly distribute these functions, assigning one to matter and another to quantity. If, however, they speak at one point of substantial incommunicability, [and] afterwards of quantitative distinction, they do not preserve the true sense of the question and equivocate in the use of words.

The Second Way of Interpreting Designated Matter is Rejected

18. The second interpretation is that matter, designated by quantity, does not intrinsically include quantity itself, but [rather it includes it] as the term of the relation of matter to it. For matter is capable of quantity by its nature, but as such it cannot be the full principle of individuation, because it is indifferent to any quantity,

just as to any form. Moreover, by the agent's action prior to generation, it is determined to have a capacity for this quantity, and not for another, and as such it is said to be the principle of individuation. Moreover, in this place we understand by quantity not only mathematical quantity, if I may call it so, but physical [quantity], that is, [quantity] affected by physical qualities and dispositions. Cajetan explained this point thus in [his commentary to Thomas'] *On Being and Essence*, Ch. 2, q.5.⁴² He is followed by Iavellus, [*Questions on the Metaphysics* V, q.15,⁴³ and before them, Egidius, *Quodlibet* I, q.5, a.1.⁴⁴

This view, however, displeased Cajetan himself, [in his commentary to the *Summa theologiae*] I, q.29, a.1,⁴⁵ because of the argument to which I shall refer below, and thus he found another manner of speaking, if indeed it is different. For he says that matter is the principle of individuation not [insofar] as it is in potency to this quantity, but [insofar] as it virtually pre-contains this quantity or is the root and foundation of this quantity. Nevertheless, I do not understand sufficiently what is signified by these words "distinct a priori," because matter—particularly in the view of Cajetan and other Thomists—does not pre-contain quantity as an efficient cause, but [rather quantity] is caused by an extrinsic agent or results from form. Therefore, [matter] can only pre-contain it [i.e. quantity] as a material cause. But this is nothing other than to have it in receptive potency, or what is the same, to have a potency for it. [For] just as matter, [insofar] as it pre-contains form, can be nothing other than matter as it is in potency toward form, or rather, as it is [in] receptive potency toward form, because it does not pre-contain [it] otherwise than as material cause, so likewise with the present [case], for the same reason. Therefore, all those words, matter as "foundation," as "root," as "cause," amount to the same, because matter is not the foundation of quantity, except in a material and in a passive [way]; nor is it the root except as the primary subject, nor the cause, except the material [one], which consists in the nature (*ratione*) of receptive potency from which form is educed. Therefore, under all those words there can lie nothing other than the potency of matter itself. Wherefore, the argument of Cajetan himself and those which we shall give go equally against this view, which for this reason need not be given separate consideration.

19. To these must be added another [view] as well, which holds that designated matter is nothing other than matter immediately (*ultimo*) disposed to this form, because it is not disposed except by quantity affected by particular qualities. This view, however, can be stated in two ways: First, understanding that quantity and other dispositions inhere and remain in matter and absolutely (*simpliciter*) precede in

the order of nature the introduction of form. And thus, matter, disposed and designated to form, can be rightly understood. However, to posit designated matter as principle of individuation in this way is to fall back into Capreolus' earlier view, because this designated matter intrinsically includes quantity and accidents, which, as we showed, cannot be included in the principle of individuation. If it is said that these dispositions, although inherent in matter, nevertheless, are not intrinsically and formally included in the individual, but are, as it were, required conditions, against this is [the fact] that from this follows that the principle of individuation is intrinsically and formally only something common to many individuals, namely, matter itself as such. But this is impossible, as we argued above. Hence, this would not be to point out what in itself and in reality is the principle of individuation, but, at most, what can be a sign of individuation for us, or an occasion of the production of a particular individual with respect to an agent. We shall speak about these matters later.

This view can be taught in another way, presupposing that quantity and other dispositions are not in matter, but in the composite, and that, as they produce the last disposition, they follow form. In this sense it is the same [thing] for matter to be disposed as to have an order or determined potency to this quantity with these dispositions; and thus this manner of speaking coincides in this with the second interpretation given.

20. Therefore, I think this whole interpretation is false. In the first place, it is assumed in it that matter does not have quantity and other dispositions inhering in itself, which, although defensible (*probabile*), nevertheless is not perhaps as defensible (*probabile*) as the contrary [view]. Next, assuming this view,—Cajetan argues in [his commentary to *Summa theologiae*] I⁴⁶—, the potency of matter for the reception of quantity falls in the genus of quantity, since potency and act are in the same genus, as Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* X.⁴⁷ Therefore, the potency toward quantity cannot intrinsically belong to the principle of individuation of substance, otherwise the substantial individual would not be one by itself, for it would be made up of things belonging to different categories. This argument, however, taken by itself is not effective. For, as Iavellus correctly answers,⁴⁸ potency belongs to the genus of its primary act, toward which it is primarily ordered by itself, and from which it takes the species in its own way. Matter, however, is not in potency to quantity in such a way that it may be primarily ordered to it by itself, but [it is so in potency] to substantial form, and thus it is not necessary that [its potency] belong to the category of quantity. Moreover, what Fonseca adds in Cajetan's favor in [*Commentary on*] *Metaphysics* V, Ch. 6,

q. 4,⁴⁹ that although the potency of matter may not belong to quantity absolutely (*simpliciter*), even though it belongs to that category as receptive of quantity, this — I say — is not a serious difficulty. For the reduplication of matter as receptive of quantity does not add a real potency to matter itself, but explains that potency only according to our manner of conceiving and speaking by relation to a secondary term, that is, quantity, and thus, it is not necessary that for that reason it should belong to the category of quantity. Therefore, Iavellus' answer is good with respect to the force of the argument based in the maxim, "act and potency are in the same genus," as we shall point out more extensively later, when discussing the material cause of accidents.

21. However, an effective argument against this very opinion is taken from the same answer. For if the potency of matter is related to substantial form prior to [being related to] quantity, then it also determines its potency to this substantial form prior to [determining its potency to] this quantity. Therefore, [matter] is not designated or determined to this form by a potency to this quantity. The first consequence is clear, both because [1] potency is determined to act in a way proportionate to it [i.e. act]. If, therefore, potency itself is substantial and is not related to accidental act except by means of a substantial [act], it is not determined except by the same relation and proportion. And also because [2], according to the view of these authors, matter does not receive this quantity in reality, except by means of this form, and because it receives this form, therefore it receives this quantity. Therefore, similarly, its capacity [i.e. of matter] for this quantity is not determined in potency, except insofar as it is determined to this form.

The same argument applies to Cajetan's other manner of speaking about matter as "pre-containing quantity," because matter does not pre-contain quantity except insofar as it pre-contains the form which is followed by quantity. Therefore, neither does it pre-contain this quantity with dispositions, except insofar as it pre-contains this form, after which this quantity and these dispositions follow. Therefore, [matter] cannot be designated to this form by the fact that it pre-contains this quantity.

Finally, the same form of argumentation can be used against the other manner of speaking about matter as "disposed with an immediate (*ultima*) disposition," because matter is not determined to such an immediate (*ultima*) disposition except by means of form. For we assume that [the immediate disposition] is not received in it [i.e. matter], but in the composite. Therefore, matter cannot be designated either by the relation to such a disposition, or by the very disposition as actually received, since in either case the determination

of this matter to this form absolutely (*simpliciter*) precedes both the relation and the actual reception. This argument is effective, on the one hand, for the last (*ultima*) disposition which is present in the instant of generation and follows form. If, on the other hand, someone contends that matter is designated by immediately preceding dispositions, another argument must be found.

22. Hence, I argue in a second principal [way] against this whole interpretation,⁵⁰ because matter is of itself indifferent to this quantity and these dispositions, and to others. But in the instant of generation, according to this view, naturally prior to the reception of substantial form, [matter] is left bare of all accidents and without any entity added to it. Therefore, it remains equally indifferent as it exists of itself. Therefore, its potency is not determined to this quantity, since it is unintelligible that potency, indifferent of itself, be determined without any addition or change made in it. Therefore, [matter] is not designated by such an indeterminate potency. The major is self-evident from the nature of matter. The minor is also self-evident in the principles of the view we oppose, because nothing else substantial can be preconceived to be added to matter before substantial form. For, what would that be, or by what would it be made, or on what basis, or what would its purpose be? Not even something accidental [can be understood to be added] because no accident precedes substantial form in matter and, according to every view, no accident precedes quantity itself in matter.

Some say that a certain real mode, distinct *ex natura rei* from matter, is added to matter in the instant prior to the introduction of the substantial form with its quantity and other dispositions, and that matter is designated by this mode. Some call this mode substantial, others accidental. But all of these speak gratuitously, nor can they explain or give a reason for what they say, which is [something] foreign to the true nature (*ratione*) of philosophizing. For I ask, first, what this mode is for. They say: So that matter may be determined to this form. [But], on the contrary, it [i.e. matter] is indifferent to this mode, and to an infinite [number] of others. Therefore, by what is matter determined to receive this mode in that instant rather than any other? For, if you say that it is determined by another mode, we proceed to infinity. But, if you say that it is determined by immediately preceding dispositions, it would be better to say that matter is immediately determined to form, and thus this mode is superfluous. Besides, the arguments by which we shall show at once that matter cannot be determined to form by preceding dispositions prove in the same way that [matter] cannot be determined by them to the reception of such a mode. Finally, if it is said that matter receives this mode by virtue of the agent, without any prior determination, why

not may the same be said of form? Therefore, this mode is introduced without reason or basis.

23. Second, I shall inquire when and by what this mode is produced. For either [1] it is produced gradually while matter is being disposed, or [2] it is produced in one instant, whether [a] prior to generation or [b] in the very instant of generation. None of these, however, can be appropriately understood or explained. For, if [1] it is said to be produced successively and gradually with the dispositions, it will be subject to intensification like them; therefore, it will be an accident and as such it will be corrupted at the instant of generation.⁵¹ Again, for this reason, the principle of individuation will be subject to intensification and remission, and matter will also be designated in itself and modified toward form before it receives it [i.e. the form] in time. Consequently, since this mode is immediately incompatible with the other mode of determination, which matter has with respect to the form under which it exists, it follows that matter also loses it gradually. For the same reason it could be inferred that it gradually and successively loses the union with such a form, all of which is absurd and improbable.

The same [things] follow more clearly if [2a] this mode is posited as produced all at once in an instant before the instant of generation. For, then, matter would be all at once under one form and immediately (*ultimo*) designated by another. Besides, no reason can be given why it may be made in one instant rather than another, when speaking about those [things] in which matter is not apt for the reception of form. If, however, [2b] it is said to be produced all at once at the instant of generation, it follows that, naturally prior to the reception of such a mode, matter is left bare, and consequently, no resistance is offered to the agent, which acts in matter as much as it can. Therefore, just as it is said that it produces such a mode immediately, it would be much better to say that it produces its [i.e. matter's] form immediately.

24. Third, I shall inquire what this mode is. For it is not substantial, first, because what it may be is inconceivable, since it is neither a nature nor part of a nature, subsistence or existence. Or, next, it is completely separate (*absolutus*) even according to transcendental relation, and this could not be said to follow, both because matter is said to be determined by it to this form or quantity, and also because matter is said to be designated by it. If, therefore, it [i.e. the mode] is wholly separate (*absolutus*), designated matter will be something wholly separate (*absolutum*) from quantity and from a relation to quantity, [something] which contradicts the stated doctrine.

Almost the same argument is made if the mode is posited with some kind of transcendental relation. For, in order for the mode to

be substantial, it is necessary that the primary term of the relation be the substantial form and not quantity, and so also, in no way will a relation to quantity pertain to the principle of individuation. Moreover, if the mode is posited as accidental, what it is or the category under which it falls cannot be explained. Moreover, [the fact] that accidents are not in prime matter is inconsistent with that view. It follows also that the principle of individuation is an accidental being composed of substance and accident, and that the individual adds an accidental mode distinct *ex natura rei* from substance to the species, which is [something] completely false.

25. For these reasons, others answer that the potency of matter is determined to this quantity in that instant by the agent itself, without any thing or intrinsic mode added to it. But this involves an open contradiction. For, if the expression refers to the agent as preconceived in first act before its action, — and in this way it is impossible that the intrinsic potency and capacity of matter be determined by it, since they are wholly distinct things and the one as such does not actually change the other, — hence, if in that instant the agent were annihilated before it acted in matter, and another were applied, it would induce in it a different form, proportioned to itself.

If, however, the expression refers to the agent in second act, that is, to its action, it is necessary to understand that the agent determines matter by its action and that it puts nothing intrinsic in it in order to determine it, because such an action of the agent is in the patient (*passio*) in which it necessarily has some end.

26. The answer to this can be that the agent determines matter by its action, not by the one it has in the instant of generation, but by the one it had immediately before that instant. This answer coincides with the view which holds that the dispositions preceding immediately before leave the potency of matter determined, even though they leave nothing real in it. [But] this cannot be understood by any means about an intrinsic and positive determination on account of the argument given, that the capacity of matter is universal and indifferent of itself. Therefore, [matter] cannot be intrinsically limited unless something be added to it or it be changed in itself somehow. But nothing of this sort happens to it. Moreover, the relation to preceding dispositions is only a sort of conceptual relation or extrinsic determination.

This is confirmed [thus]: For, if preceding dispositions determine matter, [they determine it] either efficiently or formally. For those accidents can have no other kind of causality in matter. For, although by comparison with form they may be said to concur materially, nevertheless, with respect to matter [they do not do so] in any way, because they are not compared to it as potency, but as act.

Therefore, they can determine it only formally or efficiently. But [they can] not [determine it] formally, because the form which does not exist has no real formal effect. Hence, just as matter lost those accidental forms in that instant, it lost all their formal effects. Nor [can they determine it] efficiently both for the same reason, that what does not exist does not have effects, and also because matter receives nothing before form, as has been shown. Therefore, the potency of matter cannot be understood to be in any way intrinsically determined to this quantity, so that it could be the principle of individuation in this way.

This whole argument can be used against Cajetan's latter manner of speaking, because matter of itself does no more pre-contain this quantity than another; nor is it more the root of this [one rather] than of another. I ask, therefore, what determines it, so that in the instant of generation it may pre-contain more this quantity than another or be root of this [one] rather than of another; and the whole argument is reproduced.

This is effective in the same way against the other way of interpreting designated matter, [that is], that matter is disposed by preceding dispositions – for about the [dispositions] that follow enough has already been said in the first argument and in the arguments given against Capreolus' view. For those dispositions leave nothing in matter, since, as it is supposed, they are wholly corrupted. Therefore, they cannot leave it [i.e. matter] intrinsically and positively disposed, as is convincingly shown by the arguments given; for it makes no difference whether you say "disposed" or "determined," since these words stand for the same thing.

27. Moreover, I always say "intrinsically and positively," because negatively, in virtue of preceding dispositions, matter is left without incompatibility to the introduction of this form, which is rather to remain indifferent than determined. On the other hand, extrinsically, [matter] can be said to be here and now, naturally determined to receive this form, because, perhaps with a certain natural consequence this agent here and now, with respect to this subject, is determined to the introduction of this form immediately after this alteration in the natural order. But, in truth, this is rather a determination of the agent than of matter, and thus, this determination cannot cause matter to be the intrinsic principle of individuation, since [this determination] is an extrinsic principle from the part of the agent. And especially so also because, according to this mode of determination, the agent is understood as determined to the introduction of this form before [it is determined to the introduction of] this quantity and other dispositions. For it induces this form by itself, but this quantity and the dispositions as results of this form, according to the view under discussion.

Hence, finally, a general argument can be given, because matter is not disposed or determined primarily by itself, except to this form and on account of this form, and because of it, it receives these accidents. Thus, in itself and in the order of nature, form cannot be "a this" on account of these accidents, or on account of a relation to them, and consequently, neither [can it be "a this"] on account of matter designated by a relation to some accidents. Therefore, designated matter, interpreted this way, cannot be the principle of individuation.

Third Way of Interpreting the Same View Concerning Designated Matter

28. The third interpretation is that we can speak about the principle of individuation in two ways: First in itself, that is, insofar as it is truly the principle constituting the individual such as it is in reality, and [insofar as] it is the root or foundation from which the individual difference is taken. Second, we can speak of the principle of individuation with respect to the production or multiplication of individuals, which is to ask what the principle and root is whereby substantial individuals are multiplied, or why this individual is produced rather than another, that is, why it is produced distinct from the rest. On the other hand, in either case, it may be inquired [1] what the principle of individuation is by itself and in itself, or only [2] what the principle is whereby one individual is distinguished from another with respect to us, or [3] only what the occasion of such distinction is.

First, therefore, speaking about the principle constituting the individual in reality, and from which the individual contractive difference of the species and constitutive of the individual is truly taken, this opinion denies that matter designated by quantity is the principle of individuation, because the arguments given seem to conclude this.

29. Second, this opinion states that matter is the principle and root of the multiplication of individuals in material substances. The proof of this is that [matter] is the origin of generation and corruption whereby the multiplication of individuals is accomplished. Again, because [what is] composed of such matter is corruptible by reason of it, and, from it, it has that it cannot be preserved forever; and thus, the multiplication of individuals is required for the preservation of the species. Therefore, matter is the root of this multiplication.

It can also be added that this root is matter affected by quantity, because matter without quantity would not be capable of physical alteration and change owing to various and contrary dispositions, from which this variety and multiplication of individuals is born.

This function, however, does not belong to matter as designated and determined to a certain form or quantity, but absolutely in itself, because hitherto we have not discussed the root of this individual in particular, but absolutely the root of the multiplication of individuals within the same species. And matter is not the root of this multiplication absolutely insofar as it is determined to one form or quantity, but rather, insofar as it is determinable to many.

[But] you will say: In this way too matter will be said to be root of multiplication of the species in substances subject to generation and corruption. For, indeed, they can be multiplied from the same matter, because it [i.e. matter] has a capacity for all forms, and [it is] in itself indifferent to them and to their various dispositions.

The answer to this is that the case (*rationem*) is not similar. For, although that property of matter may be necessary for the multiplication aforementioned, nevertheless, properly [speaking], it is not the first root of that variety. [And this] both because, [1] since all that matter is of one species and its parts or portions are distinguished in themselves only numerically, that [matter], insofar as it exists of itself, is contained in numerically distinct forms; and also because [2] the specific distinction is [found] by itself in things, and, thus, it in the end comes from form, which by itself provides the species. Thus, this distinction is without doubt found in material and in immaterial, corruptible and incorruptible [things], [something] which is not the case with the numerical distinction, nor does it seem so necessary.

30. Third, this opinion states that matter, designated by quantity, is the principle and root, or at least the occasion, of the production of this individual as distinct from the rest. This is explained because this individual can be compared either to the remaining existing individuals or to other possible [ones] which can be produced from the same matter, even by the same agent. In the first way, the first and sufficient reason why this individual is produced as distinct from the rest is that it is produced from numerically diverse matter, because, since the numerically same form could not be in numerically diverse, whole matters, [therefore], for the very reason that matter is numerically diverse, it is necessary that form at least be numerically diverse. Hence, it is not necessary for this distinction that other dispositions or another designation of matter be added, because [for this] is sufficient the numerical distinction of matter in itself, or [of matter] with its quantity, which, nevertheless, is not sufficient for this matter to be the root of the distinction of this individual from the rest that do not exist or that are made or can be made from the same matter. Hence, some say that Aristotle did not point out the principle of individuation whereby the individual is distinguished from all [those individuals] that do not exist, since these are sufficiently

distinguished by contradiction alone, but that he pointed out only a principle which distinguishes in the aforementioned way one individual from other existing [individuals]. This was taught by Fonseca in [*Commentary on Metaphysics*], Bk. V, Ch. 6, q.4, sect. 4.⁵² And he took it from Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* V, q.9,⁵³ and Cajetan, [in his commentary to Thomas] *On Being and Essence*, Ch. 2, q.5.⁵⁴

It must be added, moreover, that by matter, considered in the aforementioned way, the individual is not only distinguished from other existing [individuals], but also from all other possible [individuals] whatever, even non-existing [ones], which can be generated from other numerically distinct matters. [This is so] especially in those [individuals] whose forms are educed from matter, because it is very likely that the numerically same form cannot simultaneously, or even successively, be educed from numerically diverse matters. However, in individuals that can be generated from the numerically same matter, there is no place for a distinction between one existing individual and another existing [individual], because many individuals, having the numerically same matter, cannot exist simultaneously, and thus, such a distinction is always between an existing thing and a non-existing [one].

31. Moreover, although this contradictory opposition is argument enough for the distinction of such individuals, nevertheless, one can still investigate the principle and root [1] why they are so distinguished, one as existing [and] the other as not existing, or [2] why numerically this form is introduced in this matter rather than another that could be made. For the cause of this cannot be found in prime matter alone, since [prime matter] is successively the same in each individual, which is also true perhaps of the quantity cotemporal (*coeva*) with the same matter. Therefore, other dispositions and circumstances of the action must be added, namely, that this action takes place from this subject thus prepared and disposed at this time by this agent. For it is the case that, although prime or remote matter be the same, nevertheless, from it this individual is made distinct from all others that are made or could be made from it, since the production takes place under diverse dispositions and circumstances. This is confirmed and explained [thus]: Fire, for example, has of itself the potential to produce many forms similar to itself in species and distinct in number, and nevertheless, here and now it introduces numerically this form rather than others in this matter. And this determination cannot come [1] from fire itself, since [fire] is a natural agent and of itself equally potential to the introduction of any form; nor can it come [2] from the form itself to be educed, because that does not yet exist and does not have the means to determine the power of the agent; nor does it come [3] from remote mat-

ter, because that is also equally indifferent of itself. Therefore, it comes either from [4] the dispositions, if those remain in matter, or from [5] the natural order of acting here and now, with these circumstances, for no other natural cause can be easily thought. For, what some think, that this is to be referred to [6] the divine will, although true in relation to the effects which come immediately from God himself, nevertheless, does not seem philosophical when attributed to all natural causes. And in theology it creates a special difficulty, owing to the determination of free acts and particularly of the bad [ones], which we shall discuss when treating God's cooperation (*concursu*) with secondary causes. Therefore, in this way, matter designated and affected by these circumstances is the principle or occasion of such an individuation, because neither matter without circumstances, as has been said, nor circumstances without matter, is sufficient. For, if this [i.e. matter designated and affected by these circumstances] is diverse, its effect will also be diverse.

32. [But] you will say: Therefore, the same matter will be the intrinsic principle constitutive of the individual in its being; for just as a thing is related to [its] production, so is it related to [its] being.

This is answered by denying the consequence, both because [1] it is one thing for this thing to be a particular individual but another thing for this individual rather than another [one] to be produced now, and thus, these can come from diverse roots; and also because [2], according to this interpretation, designated matter is not so much the principle of individuation as the occasion for inducing this form rather than another into a subject. This form, however, is not this because it is produced in this subject, at this time and by this agent. For these things are accidental to it [i.e. the form] in itself and it could be made numerically the same by God without these circumstances—and speaking of dispositions, they are the ones that are ordered to a particular form rather than the contrary. Therefore, matter, designated in the stated way can only be the occasion why this form is produced by a natural agent in the natural order, whereby the power of the natural agent was determined to cause such an effect rather than another in a particular subject attached to and affected by particular circumstances.

33. Fourth, this opinion adds that matter, designated by sensible quantity, is called "principle of individuation" in relation to us, because by it we know the distinction of material individuals among themselves. Thus, St. Thomas, in *Opuscle 32, On the Nature of Matter and Indeterminate Dimensions*, Ch. 3, says, "the substantial individual is made from this prime matter and this form, but it is not shown to be here and now without determinate dimensions; and thus," he says, "matter under fixed dimensions is called a cause of individuation,

not because dimensions cause the individual, since an accident does not cause its subject, but because by fixed dimensions the individual is shown to be here and now, as by an inseparable sign proper to the individual."⁵⁵ And he points out the same in *Opuscle 29, On the Principle of Individuation*.⁵⁶ Hence, when in other places St. Thomas says that the individual adds accidents to the specific nature, as in [*Quodlibet*] I, q.3, and *Quodlibet* II, a.4 and *On Truth*, q.2, a.6, *ad* 1, and in other places cited above, it seems that this is to be interpreted in terms of our knowledge.⁵⁷ For that [i.e. the accident] is the sign whereby we distinguish a *posteriori* one individual from another, not, however, that whereby the individual is distinguished in itself. St. Thomas himself, in other places and opuscles cited, seems to have explained and even to have proven [this] with an excellent argument, namely, "that accidents do not cause their subject," especially when St. Thomas himself, in [*Summa theologiae*] I, q.29, a.1, and *On the Power*, q.9, a.1, *ad* 8, says that substance is individuated by itself and by its proper principles, while accidents are individuated by substance.⁵⁸ Therefore, since in other places he posits accidents, or the relation to accidents, among those [things] that individuate substance, it is necessary to explain [this] either in terms of our knowledge or in terms of the occasion that they offer for the production of a particular individual substance, as it has been stated. Moreover, this is attributed to matter by reason of quantity rather than by reason of quality, because even the numerical distinction of qualities themselves is known to us primarily through quantity. For, if two images are very similar to each other, we do not distinguish them except by numbering them in quantitatively diverse subjects. And in the same sense it seems it must be understood that quantities themselves are numerically distinguished by place. For, that is true with respect to us, since we sensibly distinguish and number them because we perceive them in diverse places. Nevertheless, this is not true in itself, since, rather, quantities occupy diverse places because they are distinct in themselves. Therefore, [this is so] only because quantity is by its nature such that it constitutes a part outside a part in a body outside a body with respect to place, and [because] we lack a more suitable principle to distinguish material individuals with respect to us.

Solution to the Question

34. This whole opinion is indeed probable in itself and it was acceptable to me once. I am afraid, however, that it does not express satisfactorily the thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas, not only because [1] otherwise they would have given us a very deficient and exceedingly equivocal principle of individuation, if having omitted what is

truly and in itself the constitutive principle of the individual, they had given us only either the *a posteriori* signs or the occasions of distinguishing or producing individuals; but especially because [2] they seem to have concluded from this principle that [things] separate from matter are not many individuals since they do not have this kind of principle of individuation. Moreover, many and learned men find hard to believe what was expressed by that view concerning the determination of agents to particular effects and forms from matter with the circumstances of the action, because if the issue is considered carefully, all [circumstances] are reduced to the circumstance of time, which seems too extrinsic in order for this determination to come from it. But I shall discuss in more detail this last point in the following Section.⁵⁹

Concerning the other [matter] relating to the thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas, insofar as St. Thomas is concerned, it is evident that the interpretation is based on other of his writings and words, which cannot be reconciled in any other way. Insofar as Aristotle is concerned, he does not seem to have ever explicitly and metaphysically investigated and explained this principle,⁶⁰ but [rather] to have taught only from sensible [things, and] in a physical way, that one material individual is distinguished from another. However, what the mentioned authors concluded from this, [namely], that in immaterial substances there is no multiplication of individuals within the same species, this can have at most a probable force, namely, that we do not have the reasons and principles to distinguish numerically distinct spiritual substances that we have for material [ones]. Indeed, many extend this also to incorruptible material substances, in which too we do not have as many principles in order to know or to posit a numerical distinction as we have in corruptible substances, to which apply especially everything said. Finally, when Aristotle says, in *On the Heavens* I,⁶¹ that there can be no other world than this one because all matter is in this one, it seems certain that he had in mind either [1] that God created the world from matter but that he could not have created matter itself, or [2] that God acted from a necessity of nature and, thus, that he could not have created more matter than he created, or, indeed, [3] that God was so determined in his way of acting that he could not have fashioned any integral and material substance in time from nothing, as we shall see in the course of this work. And so, from that statement, it can only be gathered for the moment that, according to Aristotle's thought, material substances are not multiplied except through matter. Whatever these authors may think, however, it is clear that this view, so stated, does not give us the proper and internal principle of individual difference even in material things. For the arguments given against other interpreta-

tions of this view plainly conclude that designated matter cannot be a principle of this sort.

NOTES

¹ In Sects. III to VI, Suárez takes up a different issue from those discussed in Sect. I (whether everything that exists is individual) and Sect. II (what the individual adds to the common nature); he seeks to identify the principle of individuation. In Sect. III in particular he discusses and rejects one of the most widespread views on the subject, Thomas' doctrine that it is matter designated by quantity that individuates. Like most other sections of this Disputation, the present one is structured after the fashion of a medieval question, although it is significantly different from the traditional structure in some respects. In the first place, Suárez adds an explanatory part (§ 2) in which he repeats much of what he had stated in Sect. II, § 7, clarifying the nature of the problem at hand and distinguishing it from the problem discussed in Sect. II. This provides a justification (1) for the separate consideration of each of these problems and (2) for the exclusion from consideration of the views of Scotus and Ockham in the problem discussed in Sections III-VI. In §§ 3 and 4 (the *Pro* of the question) he presents what was generally regarded as the view of Thomas and Aristotle and the textual and rational bases behind it. In § 4 in particular, he gives three arguments used generally in support of this view. They are rejected in §§ 5-7, the *Contra*. These arguments, however, do not prove, according to Suárez, that the view cannot be maintained; they only prove that the view is not demonstrable by reason (§ 8). For that further analysis of the notion of "designated matter" is necessary. In §§ 9-33 he provides such an analysis. The discussion is divided into three parts, according to the three traditional ways of interpreting this notion. The first is presented in § 9 and rejected with arguments in §§ 10-17. The second is presented in §§ 18 and 19, where two varieties of the second interpretation are given, and rejected in §§ 20-27. The third is presented and rejected in §§ 28-33. Finally, § 34, entitled "Solution to the Question," summarizes the main reasons why the view that holds designated matter as the principle of individuation is untenable. In particular it rejects the ascription of this view to Thomas and Aristotle by rejecting the textual support for it given at the beginning of the Section, in § 3.

² Sect. II, § 7.

³ Dist. 3, instead. *Ed. Vaticana*, vol. VII, pp. 480 ff.

⁴ Question 5. *Ed. cit.*, col. 381D.

⁵ The point is not that they agree on this matter. It is clear they do not think they do. The point is rather that, in spite of what they think, their views come down to the same thing, according to Suárez.

⁶ Scholastics generally adhered to this principle. Thomas explains it in *On Being and Essence*, Ch. 2, § 9 (Maurer's trans.): "A genus is not matter, but it is taken from matter as designating the whole; and a difference is not form, but it is taken from form as designating the whole.... The concept 'animal' signifies the nature of a being without the determination of its special form, containing only what is material in it with respect to its ultimate perfection. The concept of the difference 'rational,' on the other hand, contains the determination of the special form."

⁷ Here begins the discussion of the matter of this Section properly speaking.

⁸ *Summa theologiae*, a.2 instead of a.3, *ed. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 19a, 342b, and vol. V, p. 140a. In *quartum...*, p. 292b. *De principio individuationis*, ed. R. M. Spiazzi in *Opuscula philosophica* (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1954), § 428, p. 151.

⁹ Q.5 In de ente..., § 37, pp. 53 ff.

¹⁰ Q.1, a.1, *secunda conclusio*. *Ed. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 200b-202b.

¹¹ *Ed. cit.*, pp. 166b-170a. See also, q.35, pp. 170a-171a.

¹² Com. IV. *Ed. cit.*, vol. XIII, pp. 65b-66a.

¹³ 1016b32; *Junctas*, vol. VIII, com. 12, fol. 114rb.

¹⁴ 1034a5 ff; *Junctas*, vol. VIII, fol. 177vb.

¹⁵ 1035b30; *Junctas*, vol. VIII, com. 35, fol. 185va.

¹⁶ 1074a33; *Junctas*, vol. VIII, fol. 333rb.

¹⁷ 278a26; *Junctas*, vol. V, com. 95, fol. 63va.

¹⁸ The point made here is quite important, for it shows that Suárez distinguished quite clearly between what contemporary writers call "the problem of diversity" and "the problem of individuation." The problem of diversity or "multiplication," as Suárez calls it here, becomes important when the possibility or actuality of many individuals within a species is taken into consideration. But the problem of individuation, i.e. of what accounts for an individual's individuality, is present even if the possibility of multiplication is disregarded. See Introduction.

¹⁹ *Ed. cit.*, vol. XIII, p. 359.

²⁰ That is, not only the truth of what is being said, but also whether it follows from what it is claimed it follows.

²¹ The point is that matter is not communicable, i.e., cannot inform a subject in the way forms do.

²² The individual actually perfects the superior, that is, it completes its perfection because it is the individual that is real.

²³ Scholastics regarded many positions as defensible although not demonstrable (conclusive, convincing). These were positions for which there was some evidence (usually evidence from authority) but not sufficient evidence (demonstrative) to decide the matter conclusively. The non-eternity of the world was, according to Thomas, for example, one such view — it could be maintained on the basis of revelation but outside of faith there was no demonstrative evidence in its support. Consequently, although the non-eternity of the world was more probable than the contrary position, and therefore defensible, it could not be said to be demonstrable, and the contrary view could very well be held without fear of contradiction.

²⁴ This is an odd expression. The point being made seems to be that "matter" is common to many "matters," that is, "individuals of matter," and not to just "material individuals," that is, composites of matter and form. P. Spade called my attention to this point.

²⁵ *Ed. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 205a-206b, and 226b ff.

²⁶ See n. 12 above.

²⁷ *Ed. cit.*, pp. 168a-170a. There is no mention of "*materia signata*" in the text, but Sorcinas does speak of matter and quantity as the principle of individuation.

²⁸ *Questiones disputatae. De veritate* in *Opera omnia*, vol. XIV (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 364a.

²⁹ *Questiones disputatae. De malo*, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. XIII (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 571a.

³⁰ *Ed. cit.*, p. 143.

³¹ 998b20; *Junctas*, vol. VIII, fol. 49va. The text in the English translation is very different from the Latin.

³² Ch. I, 1053a20; *Junctas*, vol. VIII, fol. 253ra. The English translation is very different from the Latin.

³³ 1020a7; *Junctas*, vol. VIII, com. 18, fol. 124vb.

³⁴ 208b1 ff; *Junctas*, vol. IV, com. 68, fol. 117rb-va. Both the Latin of *Junctas* and the English translation differ substantially from Suárez text.

³⁵ For Suárez these are equivalent in reality if not conceptually. Transcendental unity is singular unity conceived as common to all actual beings and therefore to all categories; singular unity is transcendental unity conceived as the unity of the individual; real unity is transcendental and singular unity conceived as having some ontological status.

³⁶ Namely, that the accidents are intrinsically included in the principle of individuation of substance.

³⁷ *Ed. cit.*, vol. I, p. 488b.

³⁸ Vol. III, Part III, Disp. LII, Sect. III. Ed's note.

³⁹ Vol. II, Part III, Disp. XLVIII, Sect. V. Ed's note.

⁴⁰ See Sect. III, n. 79.

⁴¹ Ch. 6, 1016b32; *Junctas*, vol. VIII, com. 12, fol. 114va.

⁴² See n.9 above.

⁴³ *In duodecim libros metaphysices* (Lyon: *Junctas*, 1568), p. 755b.

⁴⁴ *Quodlibeta*, ed. P. D. de Coninck (Louvain: H. Nempaei, 1646; rep. Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1966), pp. 24a-25a. The text is from d.4, q.11: there are no articles.

⁴⁵ *Pars prima...*, vol. IV, p. 329a, com. IX.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ Perhaps Ch. 7; 1057b1 ff.

⁴⁸ Q.15. *Ed. cit.*, p. 756b.

⁴⁹ Sect. 3. *Ed. cit.*, col. 376C-F.

⁵⁰ Berton reads *dispositionem*, which although it makes some sense, since Suárez is rejecting all theories of disposition, does not make as much sense as *expositionem*, interpretation, the reading chosen by other editions.

⁵¹ The instant in which the substance is generated. Being an accident it must be corrupted at the instant of generation of substance, since the matter of a substance has no accidents apart from the accidents of the substance, and those are subsequent to the substance.

⁵² *Ed. cit.*, col. 379D.

⁵³ Rather *Quod*, III, q.9. *Ed. cit.*, fols. 81vb. ff.

⁵⁴ *Ed. cit.*, § 36, p. 52.

⁵⁵ *De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis*, Ch. 3, ed. R. M. Spiazzi, in *Opuscula philosophica* (Turin/Rome: Marietti, 1954), § 378, p. 134.

⁵⁶ See n.8 above.

⁵⁷ *Summa theologiae*, a.3, *ed. cit.*, vol. I, p. 19b. *Questiones quodlibetales*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. XV (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 382b. *De veritate*, Vivès, vol. XIV, p. 364a.

⁵⁸ *Summa theologiae. ed. cit.*, vol. I, p. 204a. *Questiones disputatae. De potentia*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. XIII (Paris: Vivès, 1875), p. 260a.

⁵⁹ Sect. IV. Not much is said about this matter there.

⁶⁰ The point is well taken by Suárez. The problem of individuation was never identified and separately discussed by Aristotle or, for that matter, by any of the Ancients. This problem is, therefore, like many other philosophical issues inherited by the modern world, of medieval origin.

⁶¹ See n.17 above.