CHOICES, STUDY SHEET

DECISION THEORY (P. xi)
RAWLS, HARSANYI (P. xi)
DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE (P. 3)
DECISION THEORY (P. 3)
JUST DISTRIBUTION (P. 5)
IDEALLY RATIONAL AGENTS (P. 3)
GAMES (P. 5)
PERSONAL INTERESTS (P. 5)
RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN (P. 4)
RATIONAL AGENT (P. 6)
THREE COMPONENTS (P. 7)
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS (P. 5)
STATE (P. 7)
DECISION TABLE (P. 7)
MATHEMATICAL EXACTNESS (P. 6)
NONE OBTAIN (P. 8)
PROBLEM SPECIFICATION (P. 8)
DECISION, ACTS, OUTCOMES (P. 6)
RIGHT CHOICE (P. 10)
DOMINANCE PRINCIPLE (P. 9)
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS (P. 8)
INFINITE REGRESS (P. 11)
PRINCIPLE APPLIES (P. 10)
DECISION PROBLEM SPEC. (P. 11)
IRRATIONAL TO USE (P. 11)
AVOID INFINITE REGRESS (P. 11)
RIGHT, RATIONAL DECISIONS (P. 12)
CERTAINTY (P. 13)
DECISION UNDER RISK (P. 14)
DECISION UNDER IGNORANCE (P. 14)
INDEPENDENT STATE (P. 15)
DECISION TREE (P. 17)
PHILOSOPH. CONTROVERSIAL (P. 14)
DECISION NODES (P. 17)
R.D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA (P. 19)
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY (P. 15)
STRATEGY (P. 18)
CHANCE NODES (P. 17)
UNCONDITIONAL PROBABILITY (P. 15)
AGENT INDIFFERENT (P. 22)
DILEMMA, PREFERENCES (P. 22)
ORDERING CONDITIONS (P. 22)
ASYMMETRIES (P. 23)
INDIFFERENCE CLASSES (P. 24)
ORDINAL UTILITY FUNCTIONS (P. 25)
CONNECTIVITY (P. 23)
UTILITY FUNCTIONS (P. 25)
ACT DOMINATES (P. 25)
TRANSITIVITY (P. 23)
TRANSFORMATION (P. 25)
SLIGHT LOSSES (P. 27)
MAXIMIN (P. 26)
MINIMAX REGRET (P. 28)
REGRET NUMBERS, REGRET TABLE (P. 28)
REGRET (P. 28)
REFINED PREFERENCE (P. 31)
MINIMAX REGRET, SAME ACT (P. 29)
INSUFFICIENT REASON (P. 35)
ADDITION OF AN ACT (P. 31)
SITUATIONS INAPPROPRIATE (P. 31)
PROBABILITIES EQUAL (P. 35)
INSUFFICIENT REASON (P. 36)
ORDINAL UTILITY SCALE (P. 36)
BAD RESULTS (P. 37)
STATES EQUIPROBABLE (P. 37)
IRR. EXPANSION CONDITION (P. 39)
VOTING PARADOX (P. 38)
DIFFERENT SITUATIONS (P. 40)
OBJECT TO IRR. EXPANSION COND. (P. 40)
RAWLS, HARSANYI (P. 40)
DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE (P. 41)
HARSANYI, INSUFFICIENT REASON (P. 42)
UTILITARIANISM (P. 41)
CONFLICT IN PRACTICE (P. 41)
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS (P. 43)
NO GROUNDS (P. 43)
CONSEQUENCES (P. 43)
WEALTH OR POWER (P. 43)
PROPERTY OF REALITY (P. 47)
PROBABILITY CALCULUS (P. 47)
EXPECTED MONETARY VALUE (P. 46)
STRENGTH OF BELIEFS (P. 47)
OUTCOMES INDEPENDENT (P. 49)
ABSOLUTE PROBABILITY STMTS. (P. 48)
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE (P. 49)
NATURAL UPPER BOUND (P. 49)
COND. PROBABILITY STMTS. (P. 48)
EQUIVALENT (P. 50)
P(p OR q) (P. 51)
PROBABILITY OF A CONJUNCTION (P. 48)
INDEPENDENCE, MUTUAL EXCLUSIVENESS (P. 52)
NAT. LOWER BOUND PROBAB. (P. 49)
P(p & q) (P. 52)
BAYES'S THEOREM (P. 53)
DEFINITION OF COND. PROBAB. (P. 52)
PRIOR PROBABILITY (P. 54)
POSTERIOR PROBABILITY (P. 54)
INVERSE PROBABILITY LAW (P. 53)
BAYESIANS (P. 55)
PROBABILITY ESTIMATES (P. 55)
APPLYING INVERSE PROBAB. LAW(P. 53)
HOW PROBABILITIES & DECISIONS WOULD CHANGE (P. 57)
STATISTICALLY BASED PROBAB. (P. 56)
SUBJECTIVE PRIORS (P. 60)
USE BAYES'S THEOREM (P. 59)
OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS (P. 61)
LOGICAL OR EMPIRICAL (P.61)
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY (P. 61)
CLASSICAL LAPLACEAN (P. 62)
OBJECTIONS (P. 63)
COURSES OPEN (P. 65)
RELATIVE FREQUENCY VIEW (P. 65)
CIRCULAR (P. 67)
DUBIOUS ASSUMPTIONS (P. 67) DEVOID OF
EMPIRICAL CONTENT (P. 65)
FREQUENCIES TO DATE, LONG-RUN FREQUENCY (P. 67)
INDEFINITE & INFINITE TOTALITIES (P. 67)
SUBJECTIVE VIEWS (P. 68)
DEFINETTI'S REASONING (P. 69)
PROPENSITY INTERPRETATION (P. 68)
FRANK RAMSEY (P. 69)
DEFINETTI CLOSURE (P. 70)
SINGLE-CASE PROBABILITIES (P. 68)
BETTING QUOTIENT (P. 70)
DUTCH BOOK THEOREM (P. 71)
HIGHER BETTING QUOTIENT (P. 70)
RATIONAL PEOPLE (P. 75)
DEFINETTI'S CONCLUSION (P. 75)
BETTING QUOTIENTS VIOLATE (P. 72)
DECISION MAKERS ASK (P. 77)CONVERGENCE THEOREMS (P. 77)BETTING QUOTIENTS COHERENT (P. 75)
ANSWER CHANGED (P. 78)
WHAT WINNING MEANS (P. 78)
AGENT'S SUBJECT. PROB. ASGMT. (P. 76)
SOLE CONDITION (P. 79)
MIDDLE COURSE (P. 79)
COHERENCE STRONG ENOUGH (P. 77)
ASSURANCES ABOUT CONVERG. (P. 78)
DECISIONS UNDER RISK (P. 82)ORDINAL UTILITY SCALES (P. 81)
INTERVAL UTILITY SCALES (P. 81)
RELATIVE LENGTHS (P. 82)
DECISIONS UNDER RISK (P. 81)
FAIL TO BE EQUIVALENT (P. 81)
SACRIFICE (P. 87)
INTER. SCALES SUFFICE (P. 83)
ORDINAL SCALES EQUIVALENT (P. 82)
TRUE VALUE (P. 87)
NO LOGICAL CONNECT. (P. 87)
RATIO SCALES EQUIVALENT (P. 83)
REPRESENT. THEOREM (P. 98) INFO. ALREADY PRESENT (P. 99)
MONETARY VALUES, UTILITIES (P. 85)
UTILITY ADDITIVE (P. 100)
RICH PREFER. STRUCTURE (P. 99)
MONEY NOT AN ORDINAL SCALE (P. 87)
AVID GAMBLER (P. 101)
BETTER-CHANCES COND. (P.101)
VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN (P. 88)
CONTINUITY COND. (P. 101)
ALLAIS'S PARADOX (P. 103)
MEASURING PREFERENCE BY RISKS (P. 89)
GAMBLER'S FALLACY (P. 107)
RESOLUTIONS PARADOX (P. 104)
DEMANDS ON AGENTS' ABILITIES (P. 90)
PREDICTOR PARADOX (P. 109) ELLSBERG'S PARADOX (P. 105)
EXPECTED UTILITY THEOREM (P. 90)
CONFLICT. PRESCRIP. (P. 110)
ST. PETERSBURG PARA. (P. 107)
UTILITY SCALES, TRUE VALUES (P. 99)

REDUCTION-OF-COMPOUND-LOTTERIES CONDITION (P. 101)
UTILITY SCALE UNBOUNDED (P. 108)
RESPOND PARADOXES (P. 118)
ARROW'S THEOREM (P. 186)