- Multi-Cardinal Phenomena in Stable Theories. A copy of my mathematics dissertation. Not for the notationally faint of heart.
- Some Two-Cardinal Results for O-Minimal Theories. (
*JSL*63: 543-548.) This paper proves some admitting cardinals theorems and some Chang's Conjecture-style theorems for o-minimal structures. - Partitioning Subsets of Stable Models. (
*JSL*66: 1899-1908.) This paper proves some combinatorial results relating to Chang's Conjectures for stable models.

- Reflections on Skolem's Paradox. An abstract of my philosophy dissertation. The full dissertation is available here.
- On Putnam and His Models. (
*JPhil*XCVIII: 331-50.) I show that (one version of) Putnam's model-theoretic argument rests on an outright mathematical mistake, and I discuss some of the philosophical ramifications of this mistake. I also argue that, even if Putnam could get his mathematics to work, his argument would still fail on purely philosophical grounds. - On Tarski on Models. (
*JSL*66: 1701-1726.) My take on the great "logical consequence" debate. I argue that Tarski employed a fixed-domain conception of models in his 1936 paper on logical consequence, but that this non-standard conception of models causes fewer problems than most commentators have supposed. I also make a few comments concerning Tarski's discussion of omega-inferences in the 1936 paper. - The Fruits of Logicism. (
*NDJFL*41.4: 415-421) Some remarks I read at the end of our*Logicism and the Paradoxes*conference (March, 2001). They concern the history of logicism in the 20th century and the prospects for neo-logicism in the 21st. - On Floyd and Putnam on Wittgenstein on Godel. (
*JPhil*CI.4: 197-210) Recently, Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam have tried to rehabilitate Wittgenstein's remarks on Godel's first incompleteness theorem. I don't think their rehabilitation works, and this paper explains why. - The Mathematics of Skolem's Paradox. (In Dale Jacquette (ed),
*Philosophy of Logic:*485-518) A brief tour through some of the mathematical issues involved in Skolem's Paradox. I pay particular attention to the role quantifiers can and cannot play in explaining this paradox. - More on Putnam's Models: A Response to Bellotti. (
*Erkenntnis*67.1: 119-135) Recently, Luca Bellotti has taken issue with some of the mathematical arguments in 2 above. This paper responds to Bellotti's concerns, and makes a few, somewhat more general, remarks about the mathematical side of Putnam's model-theoretic argument. - The Problem with Charlie: Some Remarks on Putnam, Lewis and Williams. (
*Phil Review*116.3: 401-425) Some remarks on Robbie Williams' nice new paper, Eligibility and Inscrutibility. - Two Arguments Against Realism. (
*Phil Quarterly*58: 193-213) Another paper on the model-theoretic argument. I explain why several recent defenses of this argument fail, and I issue some challenges for Putnam's future defenders. - Skolem's Paradox. An entry on Skolem's Paradox in the
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* - Beth's Theorem and Deflationism. (
*Mind*118: 1043-1059) Argues, contrary to claims by Jeffrey Ketland, that there's no problem with viewing the T-schema as an "implicit definition" of the truth predicate. - Floyd, Putnam, Bays, Steiner, Wittgenstein, Godel, Etc. In a recent issue of
*JPhil,*Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam criticize the arguments given in 5 above. This paper responds to their criticisms.

- Hudson on Receptacles. (
*AJP*81: 569-572) Some brief comments on the mathematics in Hud Hudson's paper "The Liberal view of Receptacles." - Review of David Corfield's
*Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics*. (*NDPR:*January 2004). - Review of Michael Potter's
*Set Theory and It's Philosophy: a Critical Introduction*. (*NDPR:*March 2005). - Review of John Burgess'
*Fixing Frege*. (*NDPR:*June 2006).

Tim Bays / timothy.bays.5@nd.edu / September, 2012