Thomas A. Gresik
Professor of Economics
Biographical Information, Publications, and Working Papers


Department of Economics(574) 631-9341 (office)
720 Flanner Hall
University of Notre Dame tgresik@nd.edu
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Born February 24, 1959 in Chicago Heights, Illinois
Married, 2 children

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University, 1987
M.S., Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 1982
B.A., Mathematics and Economics with Departmental Honors, Northwestern University, 1981

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

May 2012         Instructor, Fourth GIST Summer School: Mechanism Design and its Applications to International Trade and Investment, University College Dublin and CEPR
May/June 2010 Visiting Professor, Joint Graduate Instruction Centre, University of Warsaw and Warsaw School of Economics
2004 -               Professor of Economics, University of Notre Dame (Department name from 2003-2010 was Department of Economics and Econometrics)
2003 - 2004     Concurrent Professor of Economics and Econometrics, University of Notre Dame
2000 - 2004     Professor of Finance, Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame
1991 - 2000     Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University
1985 - 1991     Assistant Professor of Business Economics, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis

PUBLICATIONS

"The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," with Mark A. Satterthwaite, June 1989, Journal of Economic Theory (48):304-332. Reprinted in Bargaining with Incomplete Information, edited by P. Linhart, R. Radner, and M. Satterthwaite, Academic Press, 1992.

"The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions," February 1991, Journal of Economic Theory (53):173-184. Reprinted in Bargaining with Incomplete Information, edited by P. Linhart, R. Radner, and M. Satterthwaite, Academic Press, 1992.

"Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs," February 1991, Journal of Economic Theory (53): 199-205.

"Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade," February 1991, Journal of Economic Theory (53): 131-145. Abstract printed in Zentralblatt für Mathematik, 1991. Reprinted in Bargaining with Incomplete Information, edited by P. Linhart, R. Radner, and M. Satterthwaite, Academic Press, 1992.

"Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction," October 1991, Journal of Economic Theory (55):41-63.

"Incentive compatible regulation of a foreign-owned subsidiary," with Douglas R. Nelson, May 1994, Journal of International Economics (36):309-331.

"Incentive-efficient equilibria of two-party sealed-bid bargaining games," January 1996, Journal of Economic Theory (68):26-48.

"Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach," with Eric W. Bond, January 1996, Journal of Public Economics (59):33-54.

"Competition between asymmetrically informed principals," with Eric W. Bond, September 1997, Economic Theory (10):227-240.

"Arm's-length transfer pricing and national welfare," in Advances in Applied Microeconomics, volume 8, edited by Michael R. Baye,1999.

"The strategic effects of batch processing," with Edward C. Mansley, August 2001, International Economic Review (42):697-728.

"The taxing task of taxing transnationals," September 2001, Journal of Economic Literature (39):800-838.

"Rationing rules and European Central Bank auctions," November 2001, Journal of International Money and Finance (20):793-808.

"Tax competition and foreign capital," with Ronald Davies, March 2003, International Tax and Public Finance (10):127-145.

"Transfer Pricing in Vertically Integrated Industries," with Petter Osmundsen, June 2008, International Tax and Public Finance (15):231-255.

Separate Accounting vs. Formula Apportionment: A Private Information Perspective, January 2010, European Economic Review (54):133-149. dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.06.008

The Effects of Statistically Dependent Values on Equilibrium Strategies of Bilateral k-Double Auctions, May 2011, Games and Economic Behavior 72:139-148, dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.002.

Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal, with Eric Bond, Fall 2011, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 20:887-924.

"Assessing the normative differences between formula apportionment and separate accounting," in Fundamentals of International Transfer Pricing in Law and Economics, W. Schön and K. Konrad, eds., Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.

WORK IN PROGRESS AND UNPUBLISHED WORKING PAPERS

Allowing firms to choose between formula apportionment and separate accounting taxation, November 2013.

R&D investment, asymmetric costs, and research joint ventures with Alejandro Montecinos, October 2013.

Optimal compensation with earnings manipulation: managerial ownership and retention with Keith Crocker, December 2012.

Optimal profit allocation mechanisms for economic unions under adverse selection and moral hazard, June 2011, under revision.

"The number of traders required to make a market competitive: The beginnings of a theory," with Mark A. Satterthwaite, CMSEMS Discussion Paper No. 551, Northwestern University, February 1983.

"Competitive vs. regulatory cost containment: Fundamental prospects and problems," Mark A. Satterthwaite, Edward F.X. Hughes, Mark V. Pauly, Thomas Gresik, Jack Joyce, and Andrew Melczer, Working Paper No. 59, Center for Health Services and Policy Research, Northwestern University, July 1981.

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