A major factor influencing the recommendation of assigning this project to this Army agency was the availability of facilities at Redstone Arsenal. There was a complete static test building consisting of twin vertical test stands of 500,000-pound-thrust capability, a horizontal test stand, a cold calibration stand, a block-house, and related buildings that were near completion and expected to be in operation by the early part of 1956. Development shops and assembly buildings were capable of fabricating complete missiles the size of the REDSTONE missile at the rate of two per month. There were well equipped laboratories, a large computation laboratory, facilities for all types of mechanical component development, airplane design, and structural testing facilities. Along with world-class support facilities, Redstone boasted having the highest-trained and most technologically up-to-date staff of scientists and engineers in the Free World. Besides Von Braun's rocket team, Redstone Arsenal had over 1,600 personnel who were experienced in this type of work. The educational background of these employees was indicative of the developmental possibilities centered in one spot. Nineteen employees had received their doctorates; 78 had their masters degrees; and 424 held bachelors degrees in various scientific fields.
When ABMA was established in 1956, Secretary Brucker delegated to the Commanding General of ABMA (through the Chief of Ordnance) specific powers and authorities covering nearly every legal authority in the development and procurement field which could legally be delegated. The ABMA Commanding General could deviate from established Army procurement procedures and regulations, use other Ordnance installations and activities on a priority basis, and issue instructions directly to other Army agencies to accomplish his assigned mission. In addition, he could directly contact the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army when deemed necessary. These delegations were to be used in those critical instances when they were necessary to prevent delay in accomplishing ABMA's priority missions-at that time, the REDSTONE and JUPITER IRBM programs. By early 1958, the growing need for centralized control of the development of a variety of missile weapon systems of all types made it apparent that the management and development workload had grown to the point that an ordnance materiel command was necessary. For this reason, the Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) was established on 31 March 1958. General Medaris became the Commanding General of that organization. ABMA was also designated as a subordinate agency of AOMC and no longer required the specially delegated powers. These were transferred to the Commanding General of AOMC for application to all Special Priority Programs assigned to the Command. The NIKE ZEUS Program had the highest Army and national priority by that time in 1958. The Commanding General had resources and authority far above the normal field commander. In contrast, a Class Determination and Finding given to field program managers for use as authority to negotiate contracts at that time was completely limited in nature. Limitations included the length of effective life, the number of contracts that could be negotiated, and the aggregate funds that could be obligated through negotiation of contracts under the authority of that Determination and Finding. The Class Determinations and Findings made available to the ABMA Commanding General by the Secretary of the Army had none of these limitations. Under them, authority was available to negotiate contracts without dollar limitations, or limitations on the number of contracts, or time expiration limitations. To a large extent, the frequency or infrequency of use of these specially delegated powers provided data to higher authority on these regulations that unnecessarily restricted procurement actions. As later shown by AOMC, the prompt and proper use of the "Charter of Delegations" resulted in a striking reduction in procurement lead-time. Moreover, during almost five years of experience--two at ABMA and almost three at AOMC--no serious questions were raised by higher authority as to use on a legal, operational, or policy basis. One of the key items of the delegation of powers was the phrase "subject to the availability of funds." There were definite statutory and program limitations on funds designated for particular programs that the Commanding General could not exceed, nor could these limitations be relinquished. These programs already had been studied by the BMC and had been approved before ABMA could operate. Such line item approval itself constituted a limitation. The Joint Army-Navy Committee's approval also authorized such actions and acted as a limitation. Higher authority maintained a close check on the special delegations and powers. For example, when such action under ABMA special regulations became necessary, the Commanding General had to wire a message to the Secretary of the Army at least 24 hours before a contemplated action could begin. Then, monthly, he had to provide the Secretary with a summary of all actions under the delegations granted to him by the Secretary. All requests were directed to the Chief of Ordnance through that establishment's Guided Missile Commodity Coordinator. The Coordinator also received information copies from ABMA of documents or letters placing requirements on or giving authorizations to field installations. In the normal course of operations, the various regulations dealing with Army or Armed Services procurement were used by the ABMA Commanding General as limitations and as a basis for his own policy limitation on exercise of the Special Delegations. Even when deviations were necessary, the activity requiring the special assistance had to provide documentation justifying that the use of the special powers was the only recourse available. Each such request was required to be carefully scrutinized by the ABMA's General Counsel and receive his concurrence before being presented to the Commanding General for his critical review. The Agency primarily operated within the limitations of the appropriate procurement regulations. In view of the urgent need to develop the JUPITER, it would appear that the Commanding General might have authorized his contracting officers to use letter contracts extensively as an expedient as opposed to negotiating definitive contracts. Such was not the case. Army procurement procedures discouraged the use of such means first, and was the basis of the restrictive policy on the ABMA Commanding General on the use of letter contracts. If letter contracts were used, the policy was very specific: he required justification for such action and the means by which it would be accomplished. Such contracts were to permit expenditure of funds only to 50 per cent of the total estimated amount of the definitive contract. Under normal Army procurement procedures, if an amount beyond the cited 50 per cent were necessary, review would have had to be made by and approval received from the Contracts Branch in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. Such cases under ABMA programs required the approval of the Commanding General who used his delegation to authorize a deviation from regulation. |