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Northern Ireland Conflict-Religion vs Politics
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The conflict in Northern Ireland is likely one of the most closely watched and
hotly debated disputes of our time. Spanning now for over a century, what
remains at the root of the conflict is unclear. Many theories have developed
over time, yet no one theory seems to adequately describe the complex struggle.
The conflict has been divided down many lines; ethnically between the British
and the Irish, geographically, between the North and the South of Ireland, and
religiously between Protestants and Catholics. Theories that have emerged have
pointed to causes such as land claims and a nationalist ideology, ethnicity and
culture, and perhaps most frequently, religion when attempting to define the
conflict. In fact, what is more likely is that elements of all of these issues
lie at the root of what is commonly referred to as "The Troubles".
The history of this contemporary conflict is detailed, but impossible to ignore.
While different factions of the dispute would argue that the problem began
centuries ago, I will examine briefly the history of the "troubles" from the end
of the 19th century forward. For much of its history, Ireland has lived under
British rule. As the 19th century drew to a close, Britain became aware of a
rapidly growing sense of Irish Nationalism. In 1870, the Irish Protestants
placed the notion of Home Rule on the front burner in an attempt to separate
Ireland from the rapid secularism that was occurring in Britain. Very quickly
the movement was picked up by Irish Catholics who saw Home Rule as a truly
nationalist ideal, and by 1874 they had dominated the movement. This pushed the
Protestants back towards Unionism and was one of the many strikes against the
idea of a united Ireland.
Feeling tremendous pressure to grant Ireland Home Rule, Britain began to talk
about making efforts to "pacify" Ireland, implying that it would indeed grant
their wish. Talks of Home Rule were then delayed. The Irish saw the delay as a
further political tactic of a British parliament who had no intention of
granting them autonomy. The British struggled with the question of who would
run this complex society that was so heavily rooted in imperialistic tradition,
and who at best had a shaky industrial and political structure. This delay
further divided Irish nationalists. New radical forms of nationalism emerged,
such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Sinn Fein, whose leaders were
willing to use violent means if necessary to secure Irish independence.
A further divide between Protestants and Catholics also developed at this time,
particularly in the northern province of Ulster. Unionists groups, who were
Protestant by religion and British by tradition, were opposed to Home Rule
because they believed that Ireland should maintain her ties to Britain. In an
effort to resist the Home Rule movement, they began to organize. They created a
Provisional Government of Ulster, complete with a constitution and raised an
army to defend it. Further to that, in 1912 they created what was called the
`Solemn League and Covenant' which bound their followers to use any means
necessary to resist Home Rule. They gathered over a half a million signatures,
some of the Unionists even signing in their own blood.
The debate over Home Rule was put on hold when World War I broke out. The
Dublin Easter Rising of 1916 served as a reminder to the British that the
question of Ireland's independence would need to be answered when the war was
over. Over 220 people were killed and over 600 more injured when Irish
Republican Brotherhood rebels took hold of Dublin. The British, outnumbering
the rebels 20 to 1, eventually took back the city six days later. In the face
of what could have been a political victory for the British, they made the error
of executing the surviving Irish rebels, martyring them and instilling anger and
determination in the minds of many Irish Nationalists.
The dilemma of Home Rule as the British saw it was how to given the Irish
Catholics what they wanted while still providing for the Irish Protestants of
Ulster. Their answer was the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which created
two separate parliaments, one in the North and one in the South. These
parliaments were charged with their own domestic affairs, but all foreign
affairs and income tax collection remained in the hands of the British.
Further resistance and guerilla warfare eventually led to the Anglo-Irish Treaty
of 1921, which outlined the creation of the Irish Free State, now known as the
Republic of Ireland. It was made up of the provinces of Munster, Leinster and
Connaught, as well as three of the nine counties of Ulster - Donegal, Monaghan,
and Cavan. Northern Ireland, now a legal entity made of up the six remaining
counties of Ulster - Fermanagh, Armagh, Tyrone, Londonderry, Antrim and Down -
remained under British rule. The division created an almost entirely Catholic
population in the South of Ireland and a substantial Protestant majority in the
North.
The partitioning of Ireland was viewed by the South as a temporarily solution to
the `Protestant' problem in the North. They maintained that not an inch of
Irish land would be given up to the British. In 1937, the creation of the Irish
Constitution in the South laid claim to the six counties that remained under
British rule and acknowledged that they were being held temporarily and
illegally.
Population divisions had always existed in the two major cities of what was now
Northern Ireland. Belfast, the largest city and center of economic activity had
a largely Protestant population, where as Derry, a key center for the shipping
industry had a largely Catholic population. Both cities also boasted a
concentrated minority group, yet conflict was not always inherent, as the
minority did not pose a threat to the majority's way of life. With the rise of
industrialization, there was a rapid migration of people to Belfast,
predominantly in search of work and housing. The majority of the people
migrating were Catholic, which began to present a problem for the Protestant
community. Not only were they competing for housing and employment, but the
percentage of Catholics in Belfast was not only rising, but they were beginning
to organize. As they learned how to use political institutions to wield
influence, the Protestants became more resentful of their presence. To the
Catholics, their eventual control over Belfast was inevitable. As Bernard
Hughes, the only Roman Catholic representative on the Belfast City Council in
1857 stated, "This town (Belfast) is governed by Protestants, but the bone and
sinew of the town is Roman Catholic."(Brewer & Higgins 1998). What was born was
a conflict between the working class members of society, while the middle and
upper classes struggled to maintain peaceful control. The peace was not to
last.
The decades to follow would be wrought with violence. Battles would be waged
between the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Ulster Defense Association and
British paramilitaries. Thousands of innocent people would be killed in bomb
blasts, riots and sectarian killings. Even law abiding citizens lend support to
these groups, because the battle for the "Cause" on either side is paramount.
What is it that turns these common citizens into killing machines? What
prevents any kind of peace agreements from taking hold in this conflict ridden
nation? The answer is perhaps more complicated than the conflict.
Theorists have struggled over a solution to "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland
for a number of years. Yet in seeking this solution, few have truly gotten
inside the conflict. Northern Ireland's battle has produced not only an
enormous human cost but also a unique population that has been raised in
violence. Understanding that population is key to any sort of peace agreement.
That understanding lies in examining what motivates both sides of the conflict.
The battle over land is one of the most common sources of conflict in history.
It is not surprising then that it plays a role in this conflict. To the Irish,
their identity was rooted in the Church and the Land. British imperialism saw
the implementation of land lordship in Ireland. Protestant landlords rented
land to Catholic tenants, turning an economic system into one wrought with deep
religious animosity. This represented not only conquest but religious
persecution to the Irish. (Hickey 1984)
The Famine of 1845-1849 was a significant set back in Anglo-Irish relations. It
represented a failure of the British government to provide for the basic needs
of the Irish. It was also seen by some as an attempt to pacify the Irish
through starvation. The relief offered to Catholics during the famine also
furthered the divide between Protestants and Catholics, as it was often offered
on the condition that they attend a Protestant church. It was becoming clear
to Irish Catholics that the root of their hardship lay with the British and
Irish nationalism gained momentum.
Another one of the theories that have been presented is that the conflict is
rooted in ethnic or cultural difference. The obvious critique to this idea is
that the Protestant and the Catholic groups have one major thing in common -
they are all Irish. Yet, these two groups would tend to differ in that belief.
The label Protestant has come to signify the Irish of the North that identify
themselves with British tradition. They pledge allegiance to the British Crown
and fight to maintain ties to Britain. Despite the fact that they were likely
born in Ireland, they tend to associate themselves with being British. They are
also referred to as Unionists, Loyalists or Orangemen. On the flip side of that
are the Catholics. The population that falls under this label is considered
ethnically Irish. They fight for a united Ireland, free from British rule.
They attempt to maintain the Irish language of Gaelic, and although there are
few places left that use it pre-dominantly, it is still taught in Roman Catholic
schools. These people are often referred to as Nationalists or Republicans.
The Irish argument then is that there is a distinctly `Irish' culture that is
being stifled by a `British' majority in Northern Ireland. The two keys
elements of the `Irish' culture that make co-existence near impossible are that
it is rooted in a nationalist ideology and that Catholic beliefs are intertwined
with that ideology. Their belief is that harmony can only exist when all of
Ireland is united and the assimilation of the non-Irish is complete.
The major problem with this plan is two-fold. Firstly, Protestants have a
culture which they believe in and defend and do not wish to sacrifice.
Secondly, Northern Ireland has existed as an independent state for over 80
years, and has likely developed a kind of culture that is unique and that may
not blend well with the culture of the Republic of Ireland.
Religion seems to be the element that ties many of the theories on the conflict
together. Under the above pretense, the labels Catholic and Protestant are used
to convey cultural and political connotations. Yet religion remains an integral
part of ones culture. In the battle over land, religion maintains its tie
through the battle between Protestant landlords and Catholic tenants. Religion
even has political links, as many nationalists, such as D.P. Morgan, the founder
of the Leader newspaper, believe that the two ideas are inseparable:
"When we look out on Ireland we see that those who
believe, or may be immediately induced to believe, in
Ireland as a nation are, as a matter of fact, Catholics...
If a non-Catholic nationalist Irishman does not wish to
live in a Catholic atmosphere let him turn Orangeman." (Hickey 1984)
It is important then to look seriously at the role that religion plays in the
conflict in Northern Ireland.
There are two sides to the religion debate. One the one hand, some believe that
the labels Protestant and Catholic are just that - labels used to define two
warring factions of the conflict in the absence of a real ethnic divide. Given
that one can point to ideas of territorial dispute, nationalism and culture as
potential sources of conflict, it is easy to see where this opinion is formed.
Yet when examined more closely, there is merit in the argument that there are
dogmatic differences in the two religions which keep the conflict at a
stalemate. While both Protestantism and Catholicism are forms of Christianity,
the beliefs surrounding how society should be structured can lead to political
conflict.
Catholicism is a very closely knit religion. One of the key elements of the
belief is in the emphasis placed on prayer and sacraments. The individual who
administers these sacraments becomes of the utmost importance, which results in
the creation of the priesthood. This suggests a social order where the leaders
have significant control over the systems of a society.
Protestantism in contrast is based much more loosely. It is composed of several
forms of Christianity, including Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist and
the Church of Ireland. The appeal is much more direct - one where the minister
prepares parishioners to meet God directly. This poses a direct threat to the
structured organization of the Roman Catholic faith. Likewise, Protestants fear
that if Ireland is united, their faith will be consumed by Catholicism.
Ultimately, the result is that the religious divide between these two groups is
not merely in symbolic membership, but also in the interpretation of the
Christian faith. As indicated by Professor John Hickey, "it is more a question
of religion inspiring politics than of politics making use of religion." (Hickey
1984) Religion is often downplayed as a cause of the conflict in Northern
Ireland because Western pluralistic societies do not place as much emphasis on
the importance of religion in daily life.
The question then becomes how does one find a solution to a conflict that
is so multifaceted? Belfast child psychologist Morris Frazer indicates
that what Northern Ireland is now faced with is "a generation of children
who have lived with fear, have been taught to hate and who now aspire to
kill." (Morrissey and Smyth 2002). Here in lies the starting point to
resolution - education. It has become clear that in order to implement
a peace agreement between Protestants and Catholics, and to make positive
progress towards a bi-national state, a bottom-up approach must be used.
There are a few key things that must be taken into consideration by all sides.
The first is that violence is not now, nor will it ever be, a successful
bargaining tool. Further to that is the idea that a peace agreement cannot end
at the absence of direct violence. Progress must be made towards a model of
positive peace. In order to achieve this, negotiations must consider the
positions of the minority - Catholics in Northern Ireland and Protestants in
Ireland as a whole. No one groups' rights can be infringed upon. This would
lead almost naturally to the idea of a bi-national state. Coexistence is the
best chance that Ireland has at unification. It is the only real way to obtain
positive peace and a stable infrastructure.
Peace Process
Bombings, shootings and countless other acts. Will the violence ever end?
Will peace and stability ever come? These were the questions that
for most of Northern Irelands history best described prospects for a
solution. For generations unionist and nationalist communities had been
separated as well as isolated from each other, turning to demonstrations
of community strength to meeting with each other in negotiation and
cooperation. For the most part, the earliest attempts at peace attempted
to make only mechanical political solutions. These only reinforced
the already opposing relationships. Relative calm followed the Ireland
Act of 1949, which created the Republic of Ireland in the south. By the
1950s, even Catholics in the North, still securely tethered to Britain,
seemed ready to accept equality rather than pushing for securing a more
united Ireland, scholars note. But that changed after Northern Ireland's
Catholics organized a large demonstration protesting discrimination
in voting rights, housing and unemployment in 1968. A police crackdown
followed, sparking months of violence and a reemergence of the Republican
movement. The subsequent bloody riots between Protestants and Catholics
marked the beginning of The Troubles, the euphemism for the period of
violence that would continue for years in Northern Ireland.
Both the Irish Republican and British sides experienced breakthroughs in the
1980s that would help to prepare the ground for the peace process. The
propaganda campaign around the hunger strikes started the Sinn Fein involvement
in electoral politics and community action. It was this event that started a
transformation. This was the beginning of Sinn Fein's ascendancy over the IRA.
This was the beginning of a shift in emphasis from a military strategy to a
primarily political one, and a lowering margin of victory on which the
Republican outlook was focused, from the absolute principle of the right of the
Irish people as a whole to self-determination towards ensuring that the
immediate interests of their core base of support were sufficiently represented
in and by British state institutions. This move into party politics would end
up leading Sinn Fein to end their commitment to not take their seats in the
Dail, a commitment which had been a key principle for Republicans since as far
back as the 1920s. In taking their seats in the Irish Parliament and later in
local councils in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein was explicitly recognizing
institutions set up under partition and thus implicitly recognizing the
partition of the country itself.
When Republicans did engage in a peace process contacts like nationalist John
Hume were to be important. With the additional support from sections of
Irish-America this cooperation with 'constitutional' nationalism became the
pan-nationalist alliance. This connection acted as the go through which
Republicans were able to ease their movement from a confrontational approach to
a placatory one. The role of intermediaries was to become very important in the
peace process. During the late 1980s contacts were made and a network of
connections developed. But at this stage the contacts were largely secret and
unfruitful, a reflection of both the pariah status of Republicans and the
distance between their stance and that of other political actors
It was not until these existing relationships were challenged, most crucially in
the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and subsequently in several other initiatives
jointly determined by the British and Irish governments, that the main parties
began to participate in efforts to create a democratic peace. The search for
peace had always been overwhelmed by the violence that reinforced separation.
The British government's negotiation and signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement
with the government of the Republic of Ireland in 1985 marked some developments
that were to be important for the peace process. The Agreement brought the
British government closer with the government of the Republic of Ireland. This
was also significant for moving away from viewing Northern Ireland as a purely
domestic matter for the British government. The introduction and maintenance of
the Agreement was achieved against the express wishes of Ulster unionists. This
was an indication of the declining power of the Unionists in Northern Ireland.
Unlike the Power-sharing Assembly of 1974, Unionists failed in their attempts to
wreck the Agreement. Such a failure also indicated that the British government
was prepared to face down Unionist opposition.
The current peace process began in April 1993 when John Hume, leader of the
SDLP, and Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, met to discuss the future of
Northern Ireland. An idea of determination for the people of Ireland was a
major priority. And they hoped these discussions would lead to a historical
agreement between the British and Irish governments. A key element of this
discussion was that Britain should be willing to allow the people of Ireland to
decide their own political future. This meant that they had to accept the
possibility of a united Ireland. Furthermore, they were to call on Britain to
declare it had no selfish, political, strategic, or economic interest in
Northern Ireland.
SF in past years had shown some signs that they wished to peacefully and
democratically reach a political settlement in Northern Ireland. Through their
coming together, Hume and Adams signaled a change in the Nationalists approach
to the Northern Irish situation which would, eventually, entail Republicans
being willing to abandon violence. In this approach, Nationalist leaders hoped
to appeal to a much larger percentage of the nationalist community and to the
Irish people of the Republic. Violence had reduced support for the Nationalist
cause in the Republic of Ireland. The task of SF would be to convince the IRA
that they could achieve their political aims without the use of paramilitary
force.
The discussions between Hume and Adams would be the driving factor to talks
between the British and Irish governments. In June 1993 both governments came
together to discuss the future of each governments relationship to Northern
Ireland. For six months, both governments would try to reach a compromise. The
main debate focused on the question of self-determination. In the end the
British government could not accept self-determination for the people of Ireland
as a whole. On 15 December 1993 the Joint Declaration on Peace was released.
To Republicans, the declaration was not seen as a solution to the conflict
between the two communities. The document claimed to create a structure in
which a peaceful political settlement could come about.
Both British and Irish governments knew that no democratic process could be
influenced by violence. It was also known that if the talks were to produce any
lasting settlement the process would have to be as inclusive as possible. The
absence of political parties that represented the various paramilitary groups
was seen as a drawback to the possibility of a permanent settlement. Therefore,
it was considered essential that Loyalist and Republican paramilitary groups
should be encouraged to enter into cease-fires.
While politicians had struck a compromise, paramilitary groups had not.
Republicans spent some time seeking clarification on the Joint Agreement. Only
when they felt the agreement would allow them to pursue their objectives
politically would they consider a cease-fire. Loyalist violence was a response
to Republican violence, but it was also a sign of their insecurity regarding
their relationship with the British government. Although unionists were in the
majority in Northern Ireland and the document would only allow a united Ireland
to be achieved by majority consent from the Northern Ireland population,
unionists no longer felt they help the power.
The SF put a lot of effort into the process that eventually was to bring about
an IRA cease-fire. SF was convinced that the IRA's objectives could be achieved
better through democratic means. The SF argument clearly influenced the leaders
of the IRA. On 31 August 1994 the IRA announced their cease-fire. Though it was
a victory for peace, it was not an all-inclusive Republican cease-fire. There
were other less known groups such as the Irish National Liberation Army and
Republican Sinn Fein that did not consider themselves bound by the IRA's
cease-fire. A long and violent six weeks had past before the CLMC announced a
cease-fire of their own.
In 1995 both governments introduced a new Framework for Agreement. Peace in
Northern Ireland helped the British and Irish governments find a new confidence
in their dialogue. Not only was the document a continuation of issues discussed
in The Joint Declaration for Peace, it also introduced new ideas for future
governmental structures. Not everybody in the nationalist community rejected
the framework. Some believed the agreement would be beneficial for the common
good, the proposed structures had the potential to benefit both communities
economically. However, the unionists did not see it in the same way. They felt
threatened and betrayed by the document, particularly by the proposed
North/South structures. In their opinion, a North/South institution with any
kind of political power was a sure sign of a step towards Irish unity.
The decommissioning of paramilitary arms became an important issue as Northern
Ireland moved towards multi-party talks. It became apparent that some of the
participants would only accept those parties, who were linked to paramilitary
organizations, into a talk's process if weapons were first handed over.
Opposing parties saw this not only as unrealistic but also as an unfair
precondition on the entry to talks. Despite the Mitchell report, the British
decided a separate committee should be formed on the question of decommissions.
This didn't go over well with Sinn Fein or the IRA. On February 9th, the IRA
ended their cease-fire. The process was to go on.
Talks opened June 1996. The UDP and PUP were allowed to remain in talks because
the CLMC Cease-fire had held under difficult circumstances. As expected, SF was
not allowed to enter the talks because the IRA had not resumed its cease-fire
before the talks began. It would stay without Sinn Fein and be overshadowed by
IRA violence most of the time. As September 1997 grew closer, and SF recognized
the British government's desire to include them in the talks or else proceed
without them, the Republican movement reassessed its political situation. John
Hume argued that a resumption of the cease-fire was once again within reach of
the government. On July 18th Hume and Adams released a joint statement that
said lasting commitment would only be achieved if it is based on principles of
democracy and equality and has the allegiance of both traditions. Two days
later, the IRA resumed its cease-fire. Both governments reacted with reserved
hope and waited to see if the cease-fire was genuine. If it were clear the IRA
had abandoned all paramilitary activity for six weeks, then SF would be allowed
to enter the talks in September. The cease-fire held, SF was admitted into the
talks, and not surprisingly, their arrival marked the departure of the DUP and
UKUP. After a sincere effort by both governments to make the multi-party talks
all inclusive, the talks still lacked representation from all parties.
Violence had a direct impact on multi-party talks as the early months of 1998
brought the suspension of two parties from the process. The UDP and SF, after
both governments concluded that they had breached the Mitchell principles. The
UDP is considered as the political wing of the paramilitary group the UDA / UFF
which had been linked to many killings. It was made clear that they would be
allowed back into the talks after a period of time if they remained committed to
the Mitchell principles. In late February 1998, SF was also suspended from the
talks. Both governments believed those two killings, that of a Loyalist
paramilitary and a Catholic drug dealer, was the work of the IRA. As the talks
were nearing the May 1998 deadline, the two governments set an exclusion of two
weeks provided there were no further breaches of the Mitchell principles. A
little less than a month after the UDP walked out of the talks, they rejoined
them on 23 February 1998. Despite Unionist claims that the IRA was linked to
recent bombings, SF also were allowed back in the talks on 23 March 1998.
In an effort to overcome the political gridlock, the independent chairman of the
multi-party talks set a deadline for agreement as the 9 April 1998. The
deadline did give the process a new sense of urgency and had been a good idea.
During the last week of March and the first week of April serious problems still
lay in the path of a political. Not surprisingly, Unionists and Nationalists
were divided over how power would be shared in the proposed Northern Ireland
Assembly, and the extent to which the Irish government would have influence over
Northern Ireland under the proposed North-South structures.
In retrospect, the tensions that were apparent between the various groupings
were an indication of the historical compromise that was being asked of all
sides. The midnight deadline, of 9 April 1998, was not achieved but parties and
governments stayed at the Stormont castle until an agreement was reached. The
imminent arrival of the Easter weekend, and the prospect of a collapse of the
talks, gave the process and participants a last push. The news of the
Agreement was reported in the late afternoon on Good Friday. Amazingly all the
parties involved in the talks attended the final session in which George
Mitchell announced that an agreement had been reached and that the multi-party
talks were at end. Those involved in the process were careful not to claim it
as a victory for any particular party, but rather as the best agreement that
could be achieved in the circumstances.
Is this a complicated process? It most definitely is, but it is not impossible.
Some people feared that these events would derail the peace process. Others were
determined not to let that happen. After the 1998 Omagh bombing incident, a
spokesman for British Prime Minister Tony Blair said, What the last few days
actually have shown is that the Agreement and the peace process have survived
and have emerged strengthened from the process.
It is unclear yet whether this sentiment is true, or is merely wishful thinking.
In the past, there have been agreements reached that subsequently fell apart.
Will this one be different? Maintaining this agreement will require tremendous
willpower on both sides. People who have traditionally resolved disputes through
the use of guns and bombs will have to learn the art of compromise. On the day
the agreement was reached, President Clinton said:
"All friends of Ireland and Northern Ireland know the task of making the peace
endure will be difficult. The path of peace is never easy. But the parties have
made brave decisions. They have chosen hope over hate, the promise of the future
over the poison of the past. And in so doing, already they have written a new
chapter in the rich history of their island -- a chapter of resolute courage
that inspires us all."
It seems clear that the majority of people are ready to undertake this challenge
in return for a peaceful existence. Will their leaders be able to follow their
wishes? Only time will tell.
Bibliography
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Ireland, 1600-1998. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
Dixon, Paul: Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace. New
York: Palgrave, 2001.
Eames, Robins Dr.: "Protestant Perceptions of the Peace Process in
Northern Ireland." The Religious Factor, (Chapter 4.) Limerick: University of
Limerick. 2000.
Geraghty, Tony. The Irish War: The Military History of a Domestic
Conflict. London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000.
Halliday, Fred. "Irish Nationalism's in Perspective". Belfast:
Democratic Dialogue. 1997.
Hickey, John. Religion and the Northern Ireland Problem. New Jersey:
Gill and MacMillan, 1984.
Lambkin, B.K. Opposite Religions Still? Brookfield: Avebury, 1996.
McGarry, John: Northern Ireland and the Divided World. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001.
Morrissey, Mike and Marie Smyth. Northern Ireland After the Good
Friday Agreement: Victims, Grievance and Blame. London: Pluto Press, 2002.
O'Farrell, Patrick. Ireland's English Question. London: B.T. Batsford
Ltd., 1971.
O'Malley, Padraig. The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1997.
Wolff, Stefan. "The Road to Peace?" World Affairs Spring 2001.
by Anonymous Student
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