Global player wins
N Korea's only JV bank article for
Asia
Times Online 20 May 2004
Washington offers 'chance
for redemption' article for Asia
Times Online 24 Feb 2004
North Korea talks: why now?
article for Asia
Times Online 10 Feb 2004
Japan prepares sanctions
noose article for Asia
Times Online 5 Feb 2004
Pessimism on the 2nd
round 4 Feb 2004
The DPRK announcement on 3 February 2004 that it has agreed to
resume the 6-way talks in Beijing on 25 February is a welcome development,
but there is no indication that either Pyongyang or Washington are
ready for the significant concessions necessary to make progress
on a solution for the nuclear crisis.
The 6 parties have failed to agree on a pre-talks statement to
determine the scope of this round, as the DPRK had insisted in December,
and it seems the scope is minimal: the DPRK will present details
on its proposal to freeze its nuclear program, and the other parties
will have a chance to put their positions forward. As the US, South
Korea, and Japan are closely coordinating their strategy, and China
and Russia's only concern seems to be to avoid a military confrontation,
the game will be played between Washington and Pyongyang.
We share the pessimism voiced by Jack Pritchard, former US negotiator
for North Korea on 21 January 2004 after his visit to Pyongyang:
'I am concerned that the next round of six-party talks will fail
and Pyongyang will withdraw from the diplomatic process.'
Elusive talks 15
Jan 2004
This article was published by Asia
Times Online on 24 January 2004 in the Speaking Freely section.
On the first anniversary of the DPRKs withdrawal from the
NPT there are few reasons to be optimistic about a solution of the
nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang has vowed to further
build-up its military force while claiming to be in favour of a
negotiated peaceful resolution, and in fact Washington is doing
exactly the same. As Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Losyukov put
it last week 'mistrust and excessive demands on each other' by Washington
and Pyongyang are the reasons for the continuing delay of the second
round of 6-way talks.
As a sign of frustration, South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon admitted
he is hoping the talks can be held in the first half of this year.
South Korea, Russia, and Japan seem to be less and less involved
in the preparations for the talks; the conditions are set in Pyongyang
and Washington, and both think they have Beijing on their side.
Seoul and Tokyo are kept in the loop to foot the bill if economic
assistance is ever going to be provided, as they did for the KEDO
project. Japan and South Korea have paid a total of US$1.3b, or
70% of the total, while the US with only 21% seems to be firmly
in charge of the consortium.
After the US hinted it is willing to provide security assurances,
Pyongyang has specified its additional demands in exchange for refreezing
the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. In fact these demands are similar
to what Pyongyang should have gotten out of the Agreed Framework
of 1994: delist the DPRK as a sponsor of terrorism, lift political,
economic and military sanctions, and supply heavy oil and other
energy resources to the DPRK. The US will not accept a mere freeze
of Yongbyon; it is prepared to provide security assurances, but
only in return of a DPRK promise to dismantle all its nuclear facilities,
irreversibly, because as US Secretary of State Powell says, we
do not want to see this movie again.
Over the last few weeks there has been intensive diplomacy to come
to an agreement on the scope of the first step to be taken by both
sides. The DPRK has been demanding such a pre-talks agreement because
it does not want to participate in a useless talking session like
the first round back in August. It looks extremely unlikely that
the US will offer any economic assistance or improved political
relations in addition to a security guarantee in this first phase.
Another issue that will inevitably complicate negotiations is the
alleged DPRK uranium enrichment program, which was in fact the trigger
of the current crisis. The US will of course want to include this
program in a DPRK promise to end its nuclear activities, but last
week it became clear that even China is not convinced the DPRK actually
has such a uranium program. Chinese officials reportedly said the
US government briefing provided to them had not been sufficient
to convince China that the DPRK had such a program. In the current
climate, no country will indeed easily accept US intelligence on
the existence of WMD facilities in an axis-of-evil member country.
Referring to Libya, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement
saying the US should not expect Pyongyang to follow the example
and renounce its weapons. The Workers Party newspaper recently
argued Iraq made a big mistake accepting the weapons inspections
and not preparing for war. How an international inspection mechanism
beyond the Yongbyon facilities will ever work in the DPRK remains
a key question. Indeed as UN inspector Hans Blix noticed, it is
hard to prove that something does not exist. If the US insists on
nationwide inspections while the DPRK continues to deny having a
uranium program, negotiations will get stuck, and the Kim dynasty
will remain in war-mode as it has been since it established the
DPRK 55 years ago. The imperialist threat might well become a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
No moral high ground in
Beijing 20 Aug 2003
This article was published by Asia
Times Online on 23 August 2003 in the Speaking Freely section.
Next week all eyes will be on Beijing while the six powers will
sit down to start negotiating a solution for the North Korean nuclear
crisis. A sort of mini-United Nations session, with the three heavyweights
of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the
three local stakeholders: Japan, and North and South Korea. A year
ago, while Pyongyang's bilateral ties with Seoul and Tokyo were
blossoming after Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang, this seating arrangement
would have made some sense.
However, since the start of the nuclear crisis after the visit
of US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to Pyongyang in October
2002, old alliances have been reinforced, and at least in the mind
of the DPRK the three (ex)communist states will be on one side of
the table, facing the US and its allies, who none of them has official
diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, on the other side. But the
Cold War divisions have blurred; both Moscow and Beijing have close
economic ties with their three former capitalist foes. They have
also stated that they will not accept the presence of nuclear weapons
on the Korean peninsula. As the regional nuclear powers, it is in
both their interest to maintain this strategic status quo.
The two old comrades did suggest that they can play a role in guaranteeing
the DPRK's security, as Washington has clearly stated it will not
offer the formal non-aggression treaty Pyongyang is demanding. The
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Losyukov said that it is only logical
that Pyongyang seeks a security guarantee; Moscow and Beijing are
ready to offer a collective security guarantee if what the US is
prepared to offer does not satisfy the DPRK. Pyongyang has already
replied that this is beside the point, it has never considered either
Russia or China to be a threat.
One of the more worrying comments made over the last few weeks
was a statement by former US Ambassador Robert Grey in the Washington
Times of 14 August, which indicates that the US has come to regard
the principle of pre-emptive action as international law:
North Korea must understand that absent a diplomatic solution,
the international community is prepared, however reluctantly, to
use force to put an end to North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons.
It is unclear who Grey has in mind when he speaks of the international
community; in any case after Iraq it is rather unlikely that the
UN Security Council would allow the use of force to attack a sovereign
country that is no imminent threat to world peace. For months the
US has been pushing for a UN Security Council statement condemning
the DPRK for its nuclear program, but Russia and China have blocked
this move, knowing that it would only complicate a solution.
Of the six parties involved in the talks, only the US is stressing
that the military option remains on the table. The closest the US
has got to a 'coalition of the willing', is its Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), a group of 8 European countries plus Australia,
Japan, and the US. They are looking at the interdiction of DPRK
ships exporting alleged WMD, and at meetings in Madrid and Brisbane,
they have so far agreed to exchange information and hold interdiction
training exercises, starting next month off the Australian coast.
The priority of all six countries around the table next week will
be to defend their own national security. None of the participating
countries should put itself on the moral high ground and claim to
represent the international community. In order to make progress
and make the world a safer place, they will all need to give in
order to receive. Washington's declared reluctance to negotiate,
despite its verbal support for a diplomatic solution, will be the
key issue.
Panmunjom circus
27 July 2003
This article was published by Asia
Times Online on 1 August 2003 in the Speaking Freely section.
On 27 July 2003 it was exactly 50 years ago that the Korean War
came to an end with the signing of the Armistice Agreement by the
DPRK, China, and the US-led United Nations Command (UNC). In the
DPRK mass celebrations were held to commemorate the victory in the
fatherland liberation war. On the South side as well, US General
LaPorte stated in Panmunjom that the armistice represents nothing
short of victory. These claims illustrate that during 50 years of
non-war, nothing much has changed. Or has it?
While the US forces did their utmost best during the various ceremonies
to stress the UN alliance against the 'communist aggression', actually
most of the 21 nations that came to defend South Korea under the
UN flag have fundamentally altered their relationship with the DPRK
over the last 50 years. Most of them now have diplomatic relations
with Pyongyang. Prime Minister Helen Clark of New Zealand, which
established diplomatice relations with the DPRK in 2001, was allowed
to make a speech at the ceremony in Panmunjom, but her call for
a peaceful solution to the present nuclear crisis contrasted sharply
with LaPorte's memories of the glorious past and a confident future.
When General LaPorte presented a UN flag to Prime Minister Clark
and South Korean General Paek as a gift, Pyongyang must have been
outraged. The simple fact that the Soviet Union was absent from
the Security Council in 1950 in protest against the exclusion of
communist China, has allowed the US to continue to use the UN cover
for 50 years. This has generated the strange contradiction that
countries part of the Armistice Agreement, and thus still technically
at war with the DPRK, already have established diplomatic relations
with Pyongyang. This paradox proves that the only countries that
really matter in the UNC are the US and the ROK. Ironically the
DPRK has also been a member of the UN since 1991, when it joined
at the same time as the ROK
But of course these ceremonies were all about the war veterans,
aged 70+ nowadays. They feel proud for having contributed to prevent
the third world war, and enabled the Republic of Korea to become
what it is today: a thriving democracy respected around the world.
To their convenience they often forget that for many years after
the war, South Korea was much poorer than the North, and that Seoul
only started to catch up economically during the 18 years of military
dictatorship of Park Chung-hee. Hundreds of South Koreans died in
their struggle for democracy, while the UNC was guarding the country
against the communists.
The truce village of Panmunjom reminds some visitors
of an amusement park, and it certainly looked like one during
the ceremonies on 27 July 2003. American rock music and stalls
selling armistice merchandise welcomed us in the Joint Security
Area. US veterans and their family members dressed in all colours
of the rainbow were in the majority. After the speeches we were
offered a lavish buffet in the main building at 20 meters from
the Military Demarcation Line, and some US soldiers encouraged
us to take food outside so the North Korean soldiers could watch
us eating. 'Only the elite serves here', the US sergeant had
proudly told us on the bus. |
|
Whereas the exact circumstances of the start of the Korean War
53 years ago will remain a point of discussion, it is clear today
that a peace treaty, as recommended in the original Armistice Agreement
within 3 months, is long overdue. It is sad that celebrating 50
years of status-quo has not been an incentive to the other UNC members
to urge the US to negotiate such a peace treaty with Pyongyang,
or in case Washington continues its confrontational stance, to formally
withdraw from the UNC.
Awkward anniversaries
2 June 2003
This article was published by Asia
Times Online on 4 June 2003 in the Speaking Freely section.
On 27 July this year it will be exactly 50 years ago that the DPRK,
the PRC, and the UN signed the armistice that brought the Korean
War to an end. On both sides of the DMZ there will be ceremonies
to commemorate this event: communist groups around the world will
celebrate the North's victory over the imperialist forces, while
the 16 nations that came to defend South Korea under the UN flag
will remember how they rolled back the communist aggression. Celebrating
these old alliances will underscore the division of the Korean peninsula
and it should in that sense be a painful affair for both Koreas.
However, Pyongyang has managed to turn its memory of the Korean
War into resistance against the US imperialists, which continues
until today and is in fact the main legitimising force of its regime.
With the arrival of the crab catching season, the North and South
have also started accusing each other again of violations of their
territorial waters. On 1 June the South Korean navy even fired warning
shots at North Korean fishing boats. Last year similar incidents
led to a naval clash with 4 deaths on the South Korean side. If
the issue of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) acts as a barometer for
Inter-Korean relations, we can surely expect more fireworks soon.
Before we get to the armistice celebrations in July, another Korean
anniversary will pass: on 15 June 2003 it will have been three years
since the Inter-Korean summit between Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae-jung
in Pyongyang. The result of this historic meeting was the 15 June
Joint Declaration, in which they agreed to improve economic cooperation
and promote reunification. Since then, some progress has indeed
been made: South Korean tourists were able to cross the DMZ by bus
for the first time last February to visit the Mount Kumgang resort
in the North, but that road was closed again after two weeks.
Reconnection of the railway lines in the East and the West has
been delayed so many times that the latest agreement at the difficult
economic talks at the end of May to hold the ceremonies on 10 June
this year seems far too optimistic. The same goes for the announcement
that the Kaesong Industrial Park will finally have its ground-breaking
ceremony at the end of June 2003. Pyongyang and Seoul have allowed
their workers, women, athletes, and families to meet each other,
share their sadness about the national division and issue nationalist
statements calling for reunification; nevertheless on a government
level trust remains thin. As a result of the nuclear crisis, today
both sides are using the Joint Declaration merely to criticise each
others behaviour.
Pyongyang recently claimed Seoul was violating the Declaration
by 'hurling mud at the dignified system of the DPRK' when the South
Korean National Security Adviser Ra Jong-yil said about Inter-Korean
cooperation that the North's regime should be distinguished from
its residents. When chief North Korean delegate Pak Chang Ryon threatened
with an 'unspeakable disaster' at the economic talks last week if
the South would turn to confrontation, Seoul suspended the talks
saying that such a statement went against the Declaration. Then
after two days of impasse, they suddenly managed to agree on yet
another optimistic timeframe for some cooperation projects. These
two examples show that even without outside powers involved, the
two Korean governments do not easily find common ground.
Pyongyang does not miss a chance to bring up the Declaration whenever
it gets the impression that Seoul is getting too close to Washington,
as with president Roh Moo-hyun's US visit and joint statement with
president Bush on 14 May. The North Korean regime is aiming at nationalist
and anti-US feelings in the South with its mantra of 'achieving
reconciliation and reunification by our nation itself under the
banner of the June 15 Joint Declaration'. President Roh has a hard
time aligning his strategy for the nuclear crisis with Washington,
without damaging Inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang keeps waving
the Declaration accusing Seoul of pro-US servile diplomacy, while
it is further building up its military under the 'Songun' army-first
policy. With all that artillery aimed at Seoul no half-working Joint
Declaration should reassure anyone in South Korea.
Anti-imperialism recycled
8 May 2003
There must have been extremely little to discuss at the recent
trilateral talks in Beijing. The DPRK put forward what it calls
its bold new proposal, and the US repeated it will not negotiate
before Pyongyang abandons its nuclear weapons programs. The US administration
agrees with Russia, South Korea, Japan, and China to work on a peaceful
solution based on dialogue, but it is clear that the word dialogue
has a different meaning to the governments involved.
Meanwhile Pyongyang is stepping up its war rhetoric, making South
Korea and Japan nervous. The standoff with the imperialist superpower
adds legitimacy to the regime of Kim Jong Il, who continues in his
father's footsteps protecting the country against the US and Japan.
This anti-imperialist struggle is the essence of the Pyongyang regime,
and indeed of the DPRK as a state. The current crisis justifies
years of army-first policy and strengthens the leadership of Kim
Jong Il. Over the last 50 years, the DPRK propaganda has not changed
at all, but if it sounded a bit out-of-date ten years ago, unfortunately
today it seems to make sense again. The US doctrine of pre-emptive
strikes has allowed the DPRK to recycle half a century of propaganda,
and puts Kim Jong Il in his favourite role, preparing for a war
to defend the country against the US imperialists.
Obviously Kim Jong Il would have to worry much more about his position
if relations with the US were improving. As soon as North Korea
becomes a normal member of the international community, the Pyongyang
regime will have to re-invent itself, to gain legitimacy in the
absence of any external threats. Maybe this insight could help foreign
governments who want to see change in North Korea to take a more
constructive approach to the Pyongyang regime.
A challenge for China
18 April 2003
It all went rather fast after Pyongyang's indication that it would
not insist on a bilateral format for talks with the US if Washington
was willing to change its hostile policy towards the DPRK. The Bush
administration is very pleased that China has finally decided to
play an active role, proposing trilateral talks in Beijing.
The fact that these three parties have agreed to talk is in itself
a breakthrough, but there is little reason to believe that the Bush
administration will adopt a more constructive approach then it has
until now. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly will demand
that Pyongyang dismantles its two nuclear programs before he will
offer anything in return. Meanwhile he will insist that South Korea
and Japan should join the talks. Pyongyang does not want to involve
Seoul and Tokyo; it has been rather frustrated by the fact that
the current crisis, which Pyongyang insists is only between the
US and the DPRK, has destroyed much of the progress it had made
with South Korea and Japan recently.
From the viewpoint of Pyongyang, the security issue can only be
settled in direct talks. However, a trilateral setting with China
is the next best thing, as Pyongyang probably expects China to support
its basic analysis that the US is a threat to North Korea, and bears
responsibility for this crisis. Once they can agree on the necessary
steps to eliminate the mutual security concerns, such as international
monitoring, a non-aggression treaty etc, maybe Pyongyang will accept
South Korea, Japan, and possibly Russia, around the table to discuss
aid and economic cooperation with the North. However, such a process
requires considerable confidence between the parties, which is currently
non-existant. The question is whether China will be able to build
the necessary trust between Washington and Pyongyang.
Pyongyangs lost friends
21 March 2003
Only 6 months after the historic meeting in Pyongyang between Japanese
PM Koizumi and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, Japan is deploying
its Aegis surveillance ships to monitor North Korean missile operations,
and warns Pyongyang it will scrap their joint declaration if the
North carries out a ballistic missile test. On the Korean peninsula
president Roh, the heir of Kim Dae-jungs sunshine policy,
has put the South Korean army on its highest alert since 1996, for
fear of North Korean provocations during the Iraq war. After major
diplomatic breakthroughs with Seoul and Tokyo over the last few
years, Kim Jong Il is losing his new friends fast.
Washington recently surprised with signals that it is considering
withdrawing its troops from South Korea. The Pyongyang propaganda
machine was probably already preparing victory statements after
50 years of anti-imperialist struggle on the Korean peninsula, but
quite unexpectedly the new South Korean government stated that the
US troops should remain near the DMZ as a tripwire. So much for
Korean reconciliation and the compatriotic feelings that had been
warming since the Kim-Kim summit in June 2000. After 3 years of
sunshine and some slow progress on Inter-Korean projects the relations
across the DMZ are quickly cooling again. The historic overland
route to the Norths Mt Kumgang resort crossing the DMZ for
the first time in 50 years was a major breakthrough in February,
but only operated for 2 weeks. The railway lines that could link
South Korea to China and Russia are still not reconnected. They
can not even agree on the size on the building for family reunions
in Mt Kumgang. Pyongyang and Seoul have allowed their workers, women,
athletes, families to meet each other, share their sadness about
the national division, and issue nationalist statements calling
for reunification; nevertheless on a higher level trust remains
thin. The new Roh government is asking the US troops to stay, meaning
that Seoul despite all the sunshine continues to feel threatened
by Kim Jong Il. Roh has also adopted the Bush line of advocating
a multilateral setting to solve the nuclear crisis. At their planned
meeting next month in Washington, they will align their policies
further. The only matter that seems to divide the long-time allies
is urgency: the South Korean economy is starting to feel the effects
of decreasing investors confidence.
Pyongyangs other new friendship has proven even more superficial.
After the Koizumi-Kim meeting last September in Pyongyang, Japan
seemed ready to start serious business with North Korea. Japan is
one of the DPRKs main trading partners, of roughly the same
size as Inter-Korean trade in 2001 (around US$400m). Unfortunately
Koizumi miscalculated the domestic impact of the issue of the Japanese
abductees, and the diplomatic process derailed after Tokyo refused
to send the abductees back to Pyongyang. For Pyongyang the issue
remains a Japanese apology and financial compensation for the past
colonial rule. However, Japan is panicking about North Korean missiles,
and threatens to abrogate the Pyongyang Declaration if the North
would test-fire a ballistic missile. Pyongyang claims Japan is violating
the Declaration with its plans to launch a spy satellite and establish
a missile defence system, and thus reserves the right to resume
ballistic missile tests if Japan carries on with these hostile
acts. In its anti-imperialist rhetoric Pyongyang has even
suggested that hard-line elements in Japan are trying to use the
North Korean missile threat as an excuse to invade Korea again.
Nevertheless the Japanese did mention the idea of preemptive strikes
in case North Korea prepared to launch a long-range missile, and
it will soon launch its satellite with a Japanese ballistic missile.
Until six months ago diplomatic initiatives were well underway
to establish a new regional stability in East Asia less dependent
on the US umbrella. The loss of these two friends brings Pyongyang
back to square one, with Seoul confirming its dependence on Washington,
and Japan unwilling to come clear with its colonial past. Throughout
the nuclear crisis Pyongyang has been calling Japan and South Korea
to continue on the constructive path set out in their bilateral
declarations, but Pyongyangs standoff with Washington has
seriously hurt the new friendships. As Japan and South Korea are
falling back into step with Washington, the difference between bilateral
talks as requested by Pyongyang, and the multilateral approach of
the Bush administration is fading. Pyongyang will get its direct
talks with Washington, but only when the situation will have escalated
far enough for South Korea and Japan to be hiding behind the US.
That moment might be very near, as Kim Jong Il has no reason to
wait. To his own frustrations he has failed to find a way to put
pressure on Washington without hurting his relations with Seoul
and Tokyo. Kim Jong Ils diplomatic initiatives may have been
genuine, but his reputation is haunting him.
Do not fear, they tell each
other 18 March 2003
What an intruiging situation; the US Ambassador in Seoul says that
the DPRK has an 'irrational fear' of the US. On the other side,
a recent official North Korean statement said it was 'quite senseless
and unreasonable' for the US to insist that the DPRK poses a nuclear
threat to the US.
However, the existential fears of Pyongyang seemed a little more
justified when president Bush announced the invasion of Iraq, including
regime change. For its part, Pyongyang should not be secretive about
its alleged nuclear program, leaving the world guessing about the
North Korean nuclear capabilities.
These people would have so much stuff to talk about; if only they
would sit down together.
Postponing diplomacy 14
March 2003
From different sides Americans are urging president Bush to start
negotiations with North Korea. Not only Democrats and academic experts,
but also conservative Republicans are telling the administration
that refusing to talk with Pyongyang carries considerable risks.
US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly claims that North Korea
will soon be able to produce nuclear weapons from its plutonium
and uranium enrichment programs. However, his boss seems in no rush
to sit down and talk with Pyongyang. According to the CIA, North
Korea has been possessing one or two nuclear weapons for many years
already, and indeed a couple more would not change that situation
dramatically.
Conservative opponents of the current policy want the administration
to talk with Pyongyang, to explain Kim Jong Il that he has to dismantle
his programs or else the US will strike. The proposed talks are
very short, and bound to fail because North Korea will not gain
anything substantial in return. In fact the Bush administration
is aiming for a similar outcome by pushing for a UN Security Council
statement that would condemn North Korea's non-compliance with its
IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Pyongyang would label such a narrow approach
to this crisis as unfair and reject any UN interference. The Bush
administration would then use this as a justification for the use
of force against North Korea. For this reason China is at present
blocking such a statement by the Security Council, and urging the
US to have direct talks.
On the other side, US Korea experts are urging the Bush administration
to engage in a much more comprehensive dialogue with the Pyongyang
regime. These talks would include the dismantling of nuclear capabilities,
resumed missile negotiations, discussion on a peace mechanism to
end the Korean war and reduce US troops in the South, and support
for the economic development of North Korea. This is perfectly in
line with the North Korean statement that it is 'quite possible
to find a solution for the nuclear issue'. It remains a question
whether the Bush administration would consider a solution that does
not lead to its ultimate objective of regime change.
Pyongyang must have had high hopes when Roh Moo-hyun took office.
South Korean president Roh supports engagement and has excluded
any military action against the North. However, his government is
moving closer to the US position of favouring multilateral talks,
and sees a continuing role for US troops in the South. This is angering
the North and it has warned that Inter-Korean relations might go
back to a state of confrontation. Seoul intends to work with the
US to resolve the crisis, but this will take time: president Roh's
visit to Washington is planned for next April/May.
Meanwhile the alignment of the South Korean and US positions is
further raising military tensions on the Korean peninsula. Bush's
tactical move to involve the UN Security Council seems stuck, and
under domestic pressure, sooner or later the US will talk with North
Korea as Powell has stated. The US attitude towards such talks can
either be constructive, or they can be seen as a necessary prelude
for action. Threatened by the US military buildup and war games
across the DMZ, it is unlikely that Kim will sit back and relax
until Roh and Bush come up with a plan to talk in summer. Expect
some fireworks.
UN Security Council's tough
task 25 Feb 2003
This article was published by Asia
Times Online on 27 February 2003 in the Speaking Freely section.
On February 19 the United Nations Security Council decided to refer
the letter it received from the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to its experts for further consultations before starting
the discussion in the council. Thereby they acknowledged that the
North Korean nuclear issue is a complicated matter, conveniently
oversimplified by the international press into Pyongyang's non-compliance
with the Safeguards Agreement. Meanwhile Pyongyang is arguing that
it no longer has any relations with the IAEA after it withdrew from
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on January 10, and that the agency
therefore should not intervene in North Korea's internal affairs.
This claim is not given any attention in international media, to
the advantage of the United States, which favors multilateral talks
to resolve this crisis.
In March 1993, a year after signing its Safeguards Agreement with
the IAEA, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT, giving
three months' notice. The US persuaded Pyongyang to suspend this
withdrawal one day before it was going to become effective, on June
11, 1993. One year later, in June 1994, North Korea withdrew its
IAEA membership. A couple of months later the nuclear crisis came
to an end with the signing of the Agreed Framework, which specified
that North Korea would remain party to the NPT, and the IAEA would
be allowed to monitor the freeze of certain facilities. However,
North Korea did not rejoin the IAEA, and the agreement linked full
compliance with the Safeguards Agreement to the completion of two
light-water reactors.
Last month North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the NPT
with immediate effect, in fact ending the suspension of its withdrawal
in 1993. Thus North Korea joins India, Pakistan, and Israel, three
countries that are not signatories to the NPT but can get away with
that without having to fear a regime change. Maybe because they
organize elections from time to time.
North Korea is certainly in breach of the Agreed Framework, because
it ended the freeze of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. However,
this commitment was part of a bilateral deal with the United States
in 1994 in which Washington agreed to provide formal assurances
to Pyongyang against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the
US, and normalization of political and economic relations. Whether
the IAEA had the right to declare North Korea in breach of the Safeguards
Agreement, disconnecting the entire matter from the Agreed Framework
as Washington prefers, is a matter the UN Security Council should
examine. Pyongyang has stated that it does not object to the crisis
being discussed in the UN Security Council, as long as the role
of the United States is also brought up.
IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei has said the Safeguards Agreement
remains in force and binding; nevertheless it is clear that Pyongyang
has a different opinion on this, so the matter needs to be discussed
at least. It is not difficult to understand why Pyongyang calls
the IAEA a "political waiting maid of the US" after ElBaradei
started to throw around comments on how to solve this nuclear crisis,
clearly overstepping the technical role of his agency.
The first task of the UN Security Council will be to determine
whether the IAEA-North Korea Safeguards Agreement is still in force,
or whether the IAEA's specific task in North Korea was a component
of the bilateral Agreed Framework. One hopes that the UN Security
Council will thus seize the opportunity to consider the root causes
of the current crisis, and not only focus on the DPRK's strained
relations with the IAEA. Washington will try to take advantage of
the multilateral setting of the Security Council to reduce this
crisis to a non-proliferation issue, in order to alienate Pyongyang
further and hide its own Agreed Framework commitments under a multilateral
cover.
Opportunity for the
UN Security Council 19 Feb 2003
The fact that the DPRK nuclear issue is going to be discussed in
the UN Security Council presents a unique opportunity for the international
community to urge both parties to the Agreed Framework to comply
with their obligations. A nuclear-free Korean peninsula is in everybody's
interest, and there seems to be an international consensus that
the US should allow bilateral talks with the DPRK.
The US has hinted that it will not accept a new freeze of the DPRK's
nuclear facilities, but instead will require them to be dismantled
completely. Certainly this can be acceptable to the DPRK if it can
count on foreign assistance to rehabilitate its energy sector, e.g.
through international financial institutions.
Hopefully the UN Security Council will seize the opportunity to
consider the root causes of the current crisis, and not just focus
on the non-compliance of the DPRK with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.
If it fails to examine the DPRK version of the events, it is not
unlikely that Pyongyang will accuse the Security Council of being
a tool of the US, and it might be right in that case.
The other side of the Agreed
Framework 16 Dec 2002
It should be clear that the DPRK never saw the 1994 Agreed Framework
as a simple peace-for-energy deal, where it would receive an energy
package if it agreed to stop producing nuclear weapons. The US seems
unwilling to accept the view from Pyongyang that it sees itself
threatened by the US, with its large military presence in South
Korea and Japan. In the post-Cold War era nuclear deterrence may
seem out-dated, but the DPRK's efforts do correspond with a real
fear in Pyongyang of being the next target for a pre-emptive US
attack or regime change. Receiving membership of Bush's 'axis of
evil' is not exactly the 'formal assurance that it would not threaten
or use nuclear weapons against the DPRK', as the US agreed to provide
under section 3 of the Agreed Framework.
Even through the current crisis the DPRK keeps calling for a non-aggression
pact with the US. The energy deal can be considered a by-product
of the 1994 nuclear crisis; the essence was that both parties agreed
on how to remove mutual security threats. In the case of the DPRK,
that was easily done by freezing the graphite-moderated reactors
and putting the facilities under IAEA surveillance. But what has
the US done in return to reassure the DPRK? Washington has been
reluctant to normalise economic and political bilateral relations,
as agreed under section 2 of the Agreed Framework, and when Bush
finally sent an envoy to Pyongyang it was not for constructive talks.
As far as the Agreed Framework's energy deal goes, the DPRK already
felt betrayed with the delay of the completion of two KEDO Light
Water Reactors by at least 5 years. Recently the US decided to suspend
Heavy Fuel Oil deliveries, and that leaves the DPRK no choice but
to reactivate its reactors frozen under the Agreed Framework, to
produce much-needed electricity. As nuclear power plants around
the world show, it is possible to produce nuclear energy peacefully.
The DPRK has repeatedly stated it seeks a peaceful solution to the
nuclear issue. The IAEA could reinforce its monitoring programme
to make sure no fuel is used for military purposes. It seems the
DPRK would not refuse such inspections if the US would agree to
sign a non-aggression treaty and finally finish the Korean War.
Tom Tobback
Beijing
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