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Nuclear disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Report on Government Consultations with Civil Society
on Selected Nuclear Issues
Ottawa, 3-4 February 2000

Background

In its April 1999 response to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT)'s report Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century, the Government agreed to hold annual consultations with non-governmental organizations and other representatives of civil society on Canada's nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) policy. The Government's goal was to hold an informed exchange of views on pertinent global questions, to provide a briefing on the Government's approaches and to seek external analysis and ideas on ways forward.

Following informal consultations initiated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)'s Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, a Steering Group of NGO, academic and government representatives was formed in November 1999 to set dates, draft an agenda and generate a list of participants for the inaugural round of these annual consultations. Members of the Steering Group include David Dewitt (York University), Albert Legault (Université Laval), Brian Job (UBC), Dr. Jennifer Simons (Simons Foundation), Ernie Regehr (Project Ploughshares) and Debbie Grisdale (Physicians for Global Survival), as well as representatives from DFAIT and the Department of National Defence (DND).

The Steering Group (SG) agreed that it would be best to have small-scale and focussed consultations. It was recognized that a group of this limited size would facilitate a free and frank exchange of ideas in a single plenary format. Accordingly, on the basis of the SG's recommendations, invitations were issued to (and accepted by) twenty academic and NGO representatives, making for a total (with government representatives) of approximately thirty participants (see Appendix). The consultations were held at the Government Conference Centre in Ottawa on 3-4 February 2000.

The format of the consultations combined thematic and fora/topical approaches, with Day One focussed thematically on broad nuclear issues (disarmament, non-proliferation, the international security context) and Day Two focussed on specific fora and issues (the NPT, NATO, ballistic missiles, verification and control mechanisms). The Honourable Bill Graham, the chairman of SCFAIT, addressed participants at lunch on the first day; later that same day the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, participated in a roundtable discussion.

As agreed by the Steering Group, this report is a record of the views expressed on various issues as well as the main recommendations that emerged from the discussions. With the exception of Minister Axworthy's and Mr. Graham's remarks, the report follows " Chatham House" rules (non-attribution of statements). As agreed by the Steering Group, this report is not a negotiated document. It was drafted by DFAIT in consultation with the members of the Steering Group who participated in the 3-4 February meeting.

Introduction

The opening session touched briefly on the main issues at stake and on participants' expectations of what these Consultations might accomplish.

It was noted that the substantive focus of the two-day session could be characterized as a " promise unfulfilled" : what had drawn the participants together was the fact that, ten years after the end of the conflict that spawned the most lethal arsenals humankind had ever known, progress on reducing those arsenals was effectively stalled. Indeed, far from looking forward to a post-Cold War world free of nuclear weapons, we found ourselves in a situation where some military planners were dreaming up new missions for nuclear weapons, would-be proliferators had carried out nuclear tests, and some of the non-nuclear-weapon states who had renounced nuclear weapons were having second thoughts.

Why hold consultations? Policy making could benefit from dialogue between interested individuals within and outside government. More importantly, it was recognized that in an era of ever-diminishing resources, all those with an active stake in nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues - whether government, academics, NGOs or concerned individuals - needed to support one another and work together. This was especially relevant for a country like Canada, whose international reach often tended to exceed its increasingly constrained grasp. Choices had to be made and limited resources had to be pooled and leveraged effectively; a good consultative process was essential.

Following these introductory remarks, there was a motion from the floor to suggest that the title of the consultations be modified to reflect the fact that not all nuclear-related issues - for example, nuclear energy - would be covered during the two-day session. It was agreed that the meeting would be re-titled " Government Consultations with Civil Society on Selected Nuclear Issues" .

Session I: The International Security Context

A prominent theme was the degree to which Canada - by virtue of its membership in NATO and association with that Alliance's nuclear policy, actions in Kosovo and what some view as a " provocative" expansion to the East - was itself contributing to an international environment which made others feel less secure. Several participants attributed recent disquieting trends in Russian behaviour - above all, the dramatic lowering of the nuclear threshold in Moscow's new military doctrine - to Russia's perceived need to compensate for the " humiliation" NATO had dealt it over Kosovo.

Russia, it was observed by some speakers, remained a crucial actor on the international scene and a major challenge because of its desire to command the respect and influence of bygone superpower days without the real clout to demand it. Engaging Russia was crucial to global stability, yet a number of speakers feared that the " window of opportunity" opened by the end of the Cold War had been missed.

Some participants asserted a growing gap between the internationalist norms that have traditionally underpinned Canada's conception of a just and stable world order and the " unilateralism" practised by our closest neighbour and ally. One speaker asserted that, whether one liked it or not, Canada's security during the Cold War era was founded on Western deterrence, hence our alliance with the USA, but that today, US policies - such as the pursuit of National Missile Defence and the Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty - were contributing to a less stable international environment that was not in Canada's security interests.

Some suggested that Canada had nothing to lose and much to gain by acting together with like-minded countries independently of the US, with a number of participants arguing forcefully in this regard that, where nuclear weapons were concerned, Canada ought to adopt " a pure and simple abolition policy." Others noted that Canada's ability to distance itself from US positions appeared to be determined in an entirely " arbitrary" manner, suggesting the need for greater transparency in the process by which the government established how far a given security interest could be distanced from the range of other Canadian interests with the USA.

Asia was flagged as the region that represented the greatest danger of a conflict either involving nuclear weapons (eg. India-Pakistan) or threatening to draw in nuclear weapon states (NWS) (eg. China-Taiwan). Here again the perils of US " unilateralism" were argued by some participants, with one underlining how US pursuit of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in the region was viewed by China as a direct threat to its fundamental national interests. Another speaker mused about the potential for " de-coupling" between the Asian regional and the larger international security systems, wondering out loud whether we in the West had any idea what we would do if the India-Pakistan conflict in fact went nuclear: would we help to clean up? Would we have the capacity to do so?

On the question of broader approaches to security, it was argued by one speaker that the Canadian peace movement had always favoured a holistic approach that underlined how factors such as environmental degradation and inadequate development assistance contributed to insecurity; when dealing with the security challenges posed, for example, by the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK), " more than their missiles" needed to be addressed. Canada's " human security" agenda was a step in the right direction but could not, others asserted, be considered a success so long as Canada continued to export military goods to states violating human rights or undermining human security and kept its international development assistance at unacceptably low levels.

The issue of " double standards" came up repeatedly. A number of participants wondered why Kosovo and East Timor were deemed worthy of " humanitarian intervention" while other long-suffering regions were not. The point was made in reply that just because the international community was incapable of intervening everywhere did not mean it should intervene nowhere; Canada had to do what it could under the circumstances.

Condemnation of India's and Pakistan's nuclear ambitions was also deemed by some to be hypocritical: how could these two countries be told to renounce nuclear weapons when the five NWS had not done so and when the Alliance of which Canada was a member embraced them? It was argued in reply that while a contradiction might exist, it diminished when one factored in the element of time, that is, the fact that all parties to the NPT were committed to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The NPT could be seen as discriminatory in that it permitted the five NWS a status denied all others, yet the fact that 187 states had agreed to accept this state of affairs in order to enjoy the broader benefits of the regime suggested that the flaw was not fatal. It was suggested that to accept India and Pakistan's arguments was to adopt an " NRA approach" to arms control, i.e. to advocate that " everyone" should have nuclear weapons.

Luncheon Address by the Honourable Bill Graham

The Honourable Bill Graham, chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, delivered a luncheon address which drew its title from the December 1998 SCFAIT Report, " Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons."

Mr. Graham contended that the current strains on the NPT regime - from the South Asia nuclear tests to the lack of progress on START - served to reinforce the central message of the SCFAIT Report: that the major challenge of nuclear weapons, in addition to preventing their further proliferation by strengthening the NPT regime, was to work to reduce their perceived political value in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination. Minister Axworthy's initial request that SCFAIT undertake the study that led to the December 1998 Report, Mr. Graham suggested, was testimony to the energy and engagement of the NGOs represented at these first annual Consultations. The Consultations themselves, Mr. Graham noted, were a welcome outcome of the SCFAIT Report.

Some had been disappointed, Mr. Graham recalled, by the SCFAIT Report's failure to recommend that NATO adopt a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Graham held that while it had been appropriate for SCFAIT to urge that NATO review its nuclear weapons policy to take into account dramatic changes in the post-Cold War security environment, it had not been the Committee's place to tell NATO what conclusions to reach. Mr. Graham welcomed the commitment to a policy review agreed at the NATO Ministerial in December 1999, and suggested that hard lobbying by Canadian M.P.s of their NATO country counterparts at the earlier Istanbul Summit had helped pave the way for this outcome.

There was a lesson here for participants in the Consultations, he continued. Canadian NGOs should maintain close contacts with NGOs in other countries and get them to press their politicians the way Mr. Graham and his colleagues had pressed in Istanbul. The US was key, given its unique ability to lead on disarmament questions from a position of strength; unfortunately these questions tended to play in a manner that put the US against everyone else, with the failure of the CTBT a case in point.

What was needed was to engage the Americans in a different way, to show them how action to strengthen the NPT regime would be in their own best interest. US opinion, Mr. Graham recalled, was not monolithic. The CTBT was voted down in the US Senate for purely partisan reasons, not on its merits. Many of Mr. Graham's American counterparts were still wrestling with these issues; we were not without allies south of the border. Mr. Graham looked forward to continuing to promote support for the NPT at the next meeting of the Canada-US Parliamentary Group in May 2000, and whenever else the occasion rose to do so.

During the question and answer session that followed Mr. Graham's remarks, one speaker lamented the fact that NACD issues ranked so low among the US public's concerns, and suggested that this in effect freed Congress to act however it saw fit on such important issues as the CTBT and NMD. Another questioner pointed out that, according to polls, popular American support for the U.N. is higher than support either for Congress or for NATO. Mr. Graham noted that Members of Congress still play a key role and it was our job to try to help to push them in the right direction.

Session II: Nuclear Disarmament

While many participants characterized the current state of nuclear disarmament efforts as one of " crisis" , views were not unanimous in this regard. One speaker suggested that the failure to achieve reform of the UN Security Council was more worrisome than the rate of progress on Article VI of the NPT. That said, the main elements of the " crisis" perspective received a thorough airing.

The United States Senate's failure to ratify the CTBT - which represented decades of work - was singled out by many speakers as a particularly hard blow to the disarmament cause. The doubts about verifiability that had helped to sink the Treaty were seen as a further manifestation of a growing distrust of multilateralism in the US.

But the problems went well beyond the US. The West as a whole, it was suggested, was not pulling its weight to give Russia the financial assistance it needed to carry out arms control commitments made since the end of the Cold War. The continued attraction of nuclear deterrence was a major factor in the view of some participants; whether justified or not, countries such as India and Israel felt safer with nuclear weapons than without. Prestige - the perception that possessing nuclear weapons gave you a place " at the high table" of international politics - played a role as well.

On the way ahead, it was proposed that Canada simultaneously pursue incremental approaches and outright abolition, on the grounds that incrementalism on its own was pointless without a clear sense of the final destination, but also that it was important not to force others to choose between the two because this would simply lose Canada allies. It was also argued that there was something to be said for measured - as opposed to " speedy" - progress, in the sense that the existing infrastructure for dismantling weapons was already going full tilt and that plutonium poorly secured in a warehouse might be more dangerous than plutonium remaining in a warhead.

This view was countered by a vigorous appeal from other speakers for Canada to adopt the more ambitious approach of the " New Agenda" Coalition (NAC), specifically the NAC's call on the NWS to undertake an " unequivocal commitment" to accomplish the " speedy and total elimination" of their nuclear arsenals " without delay." Canada, these speakers argued, was already well down this road; the fact that it had abstained on the " New Agenda" resolution at the past two UN General Assemblies should not prevent Canada from working with the NAC to achieve the " unequivocal commitment" it sought. According to this view, the positions Canada had adopted at the last NPT Preparatory Committee, while praiseworthy, fell short of what was required to meet the current " crisis" . NAC representatives were reportedly putting out the word that adoption of an " unequivocal commitment" to disarmament along the lines of their UNGA resolutions was the " minimum" requirement for a successful NPT Review Conference this spring.

On the implications of such a move for our relations with the United States, one participant suggested that many American officials would welcome Canada's full endorsement of the NAC platform as a way to help them press US decision-makers to take stronger action on disarmament. The broader issue of how best to reinforce those American constituencies which favour disarmament was also addressed. One participant underlined the need for a " two-pronged strategy" of engaging both the government and NGOs, it being most important, in the US context, that lobbying for a more forthcoming policy on NACD issues be seen to be domestically generated rather than a result of outside pressures. Another speaker lamented the general lack of US awareness of these issues, rooted, this speaker suggested, in the fact that most Americans read USA Today, not the New York Times or Washington Post.

The problem of apathy - the fact that the general public seemed to have forgotten the danger of nuclear weapons following the end of the Cold War - was discussed at some length. It was noted that while biological and chemical weapons are seen as abhorrent, the same standard did not seem to apply to nuclear weapons. The nuclear disarmament drive's loss of steam could be attributed in part to post-Cold War developments: the prospect of nuclear annihilation not only seemed increasingly remote, but had also understandably paled in a world that had witnessed mass murder with machetes and the re-appearance of concentration camps in Europe.

Engaging youth was underlined as a key imperative, with one participant proposing a " youth Prep Com" in the run-up to the NPT Review Conference as one way to educate the younger generation on the issues at stake. As far as the contribution NGOs could make to raising awareness among youth and the broader public, severe financial constraints were flagged as the major limiting factor. At the diplomatic level, it was noted that the current deadlock in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) inhibited substantive discussion of important NACD issues even among officials; this suggested a need to think creatively about ways to break the logjam, for example by forging new coalitions (on the NAC example) to put the outdated groupings of the Cold War behind us.

Session III: Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Picking up on a number of themes raised earlier in the day's discussions, this session focussed on the causes of nuclear proliferation and on the practical steps Canada could or should be taking to combat it. As the world's largest exporter of uranium, one speaker argued, Canada had a special responsibility to be active in this area.

A short historical overview of proliferation was offered to counter the impression that the problem had emerged only in recent years. India's nuclear capability dated back to 1974, one speaker noted and linked this development to fissile material derived (illicitly) from a Canadian-supplied research reactor. Pakistan had reportedly been nuclear capable since the late 1980s, others noted; Israel's unacknowledged nuclear weapons program appeared to date to the early 1970s; and the DPRK and Iraq's nuclear aspirations had been known for some time.

Why go nuclear? Several categories of incentives were identified: conflictual relationship with a NWS; desire for " great power" status; the quest for regional hegemony; or, in the case of " rogue" states, a desire to make great powers think twice about intervening. As to the reverse - why some states had given up the nuclear option - it was suggested that the overriding factor was a significant lessening or elimination of the enduring rivalry with another state that had triggered pursuit of the option in the first place.

In this regard, one participant suggested that the " high moral ground" Canada had adopted with respect to India and Pakistan was not that effective. The two countries' decision to test nuclear devices could be seen as a response to genuine security concerns, it was argued, in which case Canada would be better off to engage them in ways that might see these concerns addressed.

Several speakers noted that another lesson taught by the South Asia nuclear tests was that it was impossible to have non-proliferation without disarmament: the NWS's continued attachment to their arsenals offered India and Pakistan a rich source of justification. It did not follow, however, that the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT had been a mistake; the argument was forcefully made that the world was much better off with an indefinitely extended NPT than it would have been without it.

Several recommendations were made with respect to Canadian policy, most premised on the argument that Canada should distance itself from the US and seek coalitions of more like-minded multilateralists. With respect to NATO's current review of policy options on verification, confidence and security building measures, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, for example, some participants urged Canada to do more by " divorcing" itself from the Alliance's nuclear policies and pushing for a policy of No First Use by all NWS. It was also suggested that Canada support calls to amend the NPT to specify a timetable for disarmament under Article VI; indefinite extension, it was argued, should not mean indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. The government was encouraged to hold a conference to support a Nuclear Weapons Convention, as well as to throw its support unreservedly behind the New Agenda Coalition.

One speaker's remark to the effect that nuclear disarmament was a critical precondition for enjoying the positive benefits of nuclear power launched a vigorous discussion of Canadian nuclear energy policy. One participant called for separate consultations devoted exclusively to nuclear energy issues, including government policy on plutonium and the export of uranium. The central argument was that Canada's non-proliferation efforts had no credibility given our alleged failure to oppose the use and stock-piling of plutonium. Assurances were offered that Canadian policy in this sphere was entirely consistent with our NPT obligations, that all separated plutonium was under IAEA safeguards and all evidence suggested that this non-proliferation regime was working exceedingly well.

Session IV: Roundtable with Minister Axworthy

Minister Axworthy was briefed at the outset on the principal themes that had emerged during the three preceding sessions. The core issue, it was suggested, was a genuine concern about Canada's place in the nuclear world, and about whether we were pursuing the best policies possible. There appeared to be a contradiction between Canada's strong support for the NPT and our consistent rejection of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and our continued membership in an Alliance that embraced them. The concerns that had been expressed about US unilateralism were summarized, in particular how Canada's close relations with the US were perceived to constrain our ability to be as forceful on nuclear NACD issues as we might otherwise be. We were perhaps missing opportunities to build coalitions with other countries and with those who shared our views in the US itself; Canada should be promoting the benefits of multilateralism more aggressively. It was also important to challenge the logic that attracted states to the nuclear option, in part by addressing such states' underlying security concerns.

The Minister observed that at times it was tough to find " like-minded" allies on nuclear issues. Canada, he pointed out, was the only major country to have conducted a comprehensive review of nuclear NACD policy since the end of the Cold War. Other issues had captured international attention; traditional allies were otherwise occupied; Canada had become a " nuclear nag" , urging discussions others were reluctant to undertake.

At the same time, it had to be recognized that our own resources were limited. The message the Minister took from the December 1998 SCFAIT Report was that Canada should focus its efforts on changing policies within NATO, and that is what we were doing. In that regard, our " first round" efforts had been successful: against considerable initial resistance, Canada had secured a commitment to an important, senior-level Review with a timetable for reporting to keep it high on the agenda.

This did not mean that the rest of the nuclear NACD agenda was being ignored, however. The Minister reported on his recent discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov in Moscow, where he had expressed concern about Russia's new military doctrine. That doctrine's apparent increased reliance on nuclear weapons was " not helpful" to efforts to reinforce an NPT regime already battered by the nuclear tests in South Asia, the US Senate's failure to ratify the CTBT, and continuing deadlock in the Committee on Disarmament.

Canada was working with all the like-minded countries it could find to identify ways to strengthen the NPT regime. Minister Axworthy was just back from Latin America, where he had useful consultations in this regard. Acknowledging the potential dilemma between Canada's NATO membership and its support for the New Agenda Coalition, the Minister reported broad concurrence with his view that Canada was better off trying to foster change from within NATO.

The Minister turned to the future of the ABM Treaty, which he characterized as an important element in the NPT regime. He reported telling both FM Ivanov and US Secretary of State Albright in Moscow that the ABM Treaty was crucial, that if we lost it, we lost another chink in the armour of the NPT. Without downplaying the significant political challenges involved, the Minister was encouraged by the seriousness of US-Russian discussions on the future of the ABM Treaty.

Following his opening remarks, the Minister was asked whether Canada would support a call for an " unequivocal commitment to disarm" at the NPT Review Conference as a way to further shore up our position in pushing the NATO Review forward. The Minister noted that a key objective must be to get others to acknowledge that the issue of nuclear weapons " remains real" . Talk of " weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) had become a code for " let's not talk nuclear" . It was difficult to find a place for nuclear weapons on an increasingly crowded international agenda. The Minister decried attempts to downplay the importance of the NPT and upcoming Review Conference; we needed to work to counter this.

It was suggested that Canada take advantage of its Security Council presidency in April 2000 to make a Presidential Statement in support of the NPT. The Minister thought this was an interesting idea. Cautioning that Canada already had a full plate of issues it wanted to see addressed during its presidency, the Minister said he would nevertheless consider a recommendation along the lines suggested.

Asked whether Washington would seek a Canadian commitment to participate in NMD as part of NORAD's next renewal, the Minister replied that this was not the case, that NORAD extension would be considered on its own merits.

Asked about the possibility of civil society engaging NATO at an institutional level, the Minister observed that while this was unlikely, SCFAIT chair Bill Graham was committed to bringing Canada's nuclear NACD concerns to the attention of his colleagues in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The Minister added that Canada was prepared to host a meeting including experts from NATO countries to discuss issues related to the NATO review process, though neither a timetable nor a format for this event had yet been established.

The Minister was asked why Canada was unwilling to engage India and Pakistan. Noting President Clinton's upcoming visit to India, it was suggested that, by taking the " high moral ground" , Canada was losing out economically to others. The Minister pointed out that we were in fact engaged; he and India FM Singh had met several times, and the Indian Minister of the Environment would be visiting Canada shortly. But we did not agree on security issues, and we strongly disagreed with their nuclear policy, which we thought was dangerous. If other countries were prepared to water their wine in this regard that was their business; Canada would not. When another speaker later argued that Canada should stand firm, that India's anger at not having its nuclear status recognized was a measure of our success, the Minister observed that it was becoming increasingly hard to hold the line as others backed off on the issue.

The Minister was pressed vigorously by one participant on Canada not having a policy prohibiting the reprocessing of spent fuel from nuclear reactors. It was suggested that establishing a policy banning this practice would be welcomed in the US, which has prohibited the re-processing of spent civilian reactor fuel since the Carter Administration. A Canadian government official assured the questioner that Canada does not reprocess its spent fuel, a process which results in the separation of plutonium. And while Canadian uranium is reprocessed by other countries and the plutonium burned again as mixed oxide fuel, verification measures and policies were in place to ensure that such spent fuel was used solely for peaceful purposes. That is to say, all of these countries are signatories to the NPT, have all of their nuclear facilities under fullscope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and there are no indications that this civilian plutonium is being diverted for military purposes. Given that safeguards are working well on civilian spent fuel, the focus of attention should be on bringing military plutonium under IAEA safeguards. That is why the Canadian government is considering the use of MOX fuel in CANDU reactors as a way of potentially disposing of Russian weapons-grade plutonium, a process which will be under IAEA safeguards.

The same participant asked the Minister to consider holding consultations with civil society at an early date on Canadian policy with respect to such issues as plutonium and the dispositioning of Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX), where, it was alleged, government policy had been characterized by a lack of transparency. The Minister pointed out that related questions had been answered in the House of Commons and before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Where MOX was concerned, the Minister reminded participants that Canada had only agreed to undertake a feasibility test; any further steps would be taken only following a formal invitation by other countries for Canada to participate, negotiation of a commercially viable arrangement with a Canadian utility (no government subsidies) and meeting of all the federal and provincial regulations regarding health, safety, and environment, a process which would include an opportunity for full public consultations.

Session V: The NPT and Related Agreements

This session reviewed Canadian options for the upcoming (April 24-May 19) NPT 2000 Review Conference, as well as other approaches to nuclear disarmament such as a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

The outcomes of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) were reviewed. The point was made that the three NPTREC Decisions - on indefinite extension, principles and objectives, and a strengthened review process - and the NPTREC resolution on the Middle East must be seen as a complete package whose relevance and integrity had to be supported in their entirety. Contrary to the view of some states that these documents had been " cast in stone" , however, it was argued that the decisions on principles and objectives and on the strengthened review process had been conceived as " works in progress" , to be clarified and updated to meet changing circumstances.

Against this backdrop, it was suggested that Canada's goals at the 2000 Review Conference should be (1) to promote and protect the universality of the Treaty; (2) to enhance the strengthened review process further, and thereby ensure the " accountability" promised in 1995 as an integral part of the extension package; (3) to reach agreement on a new Principles and Objectives (P&O) document to establish concrete benchmarks against which accountability could be measured during the next review period (2000-2005) and (4) to achieve the political-level engagement necessary for success by promoting public awareness of the Review Conference and the NPT in general. On this last point, government funding was requested to enable NGOs to attend the Review Conference and to participate in lobbying and educational activities. It was also requested that Canada call for a seat for an NGO observer at the Review Conference, and that a Canadian NGO be permitted to fully participate in the Canadian delegation.

On the need to enhance the strengthened review process, it was noted that although France in 1999 had circulated a booklet detailing its disarmament efforts and although there were indications that the US planned to do the same in New York this spring, the NPT community had yet to agree on a way to record this progress officially. One participant submitted that what was needed was not merely a " review" but a " real assessment" , article-by-article, against measurable criteria, with an emphasis on disarmament under Article VI.

It was stressed that any " P&O 2000" document should be seen as a complement to, not a replacement for, the P&O agreed in 1995. It was also important to remember that the NPT represented a three-part bargain - disarmament, non-proliferation, and cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy - that had to be complied with in its entirety, not " a la carte" . Further progress on bringing about entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) - which was the leading objective in the 1995 document - was essential if any new set of objectives for 2000-2005 was to have any credibility.

Canada's May 1999 Working Paper proposing language for a P&O 2000 document was criticized for not going far enough: what was needed, it was asserted, was an " unequivocal commitment" on the part of the NWS to do away with their arsenals without delay. The argument that the unequivocal commitment was already there - in Article VI of the NPT - was not accepted by all participants. Several speakers argued that Canada should take the lead in efforts to negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), either via an Amendment Conference under Article VIII or outside the NPT process altogether. It was further suggested by some speakers that, by supporting NATO's nuclear policies and not voting in favour of the New Agenda Coalition at the UN, Canada was disregarding the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the requirement to negotiate nuclear disarmament. The government was further accused of never having declared itself in favour of an outright ban on nuclear weapons.

It was asked whether Canada might not seek to act as a bridge between those who sought immediate progress towards an NWC and those who were reluctant: commitment to a step-by-step process would fit this bill, it was argued, provided it were in the context of an unequivocal commitment to " get to zero [nuclear weapons]" . It was suggested in reply that Canada was already playing such a role, for example through its work with members of the New Agenda Coalition in the UNGA First Committee.

With respect to calls for a " ban" on nuclear weapons, it was suggested that Canada's support for the unanimous element of the ICJ decision - the legal obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects - amounted to support for a ban, but that excessive talk along these lines was counterproductive. Doubts were also expressed by some participants about the utility of an NWC which, it was argued, sought a commitment on final outcome before negotiations started; other participants were not convinced by this reasoning, however.

Attention was drawn to the regional security problems that lie at the root of key challenges to the NPT regime. According to one participant, inducing India and Pakistan to sign the NPT, for example, would do little to address the real sources of instability in South Asia, yet supporters of the regime lacked a coherent strategy in this regard. It was further suggested by one participant that the real future danger to the NPT regime came less from so-called " rogue" states than from advanced industrial powers who perceived growing regional threats. According to this logic, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea would be cause for concern long before the likes of Iran.

Session VI: Nuclear Weapons and NATO

The session opened with a short review of the evolution in the Alliance's nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War. The close similarity between the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts was acknowledged. Canada, it was explained, had pressed for a more thorough review of the role of nuclear weapons in the 1999 document, pointing out that the image of the most powerful alliance on earth relying on nuclear weapons sent an unwelcome message. Allies had resisted such a review, however, fearing a " divisive debate" that might have " spoiled" the Alliance's 50th anniversary celebration at the Washington Summit in April 1999. Against this background, the commitment Canada had won at the Summit and at the subsequent December 1999 NATO Ministerial to a review of Alliance policy options on verification, confidence and security building measures, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament was significant. NATO Ministers had agreed: 1) to task a top NATO body - the Senior Political Committee - with coordinating the review; 2) that a concrete product - a report - would be prepared; and 3) that this would be done to a specific deadline (December 2000).

Acknowledging that it was still too early to tell how the review process would unfold, a few prognoses were offered. With nineteen Allies, progress was sure to be slow and incremental. A fundamental review of Alliance nuclear strategy was unlikely, some argued; this would be opposed not only by the US but by the UK and especially France as well. Others suggested that Canada's traditional non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) allies could not be expected to take up the charge; all were suffering " fatigue" related to their own domestic and European political developments. The broader political context was seen by one speaker as unfavourable, given difficulties with the Russians over Kosovo and now Chechnya, compounded by Moscow's differences with Washington over the possible deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. The US's perceived drift toward unilateralism and homeland defence was cause for concern but it had not yet altogether given up on international law and multilateralism.

One speaker argued that the increasing US willingness to recognize Alliance nuclear weapons as a deterrent against any Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) would be resisted by Canada and probably others, as would any pressures to expand the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy. On a more positive note, it was observed that the need to re-engage Russia was recognized as a top priority, and suggested that steps toward greater transparency and confidence-building measures - eg. with respect to tactical nuclear weapons - could be an important achievement of the review in this regard. Finally, it was advanced, the very fact that the Alliance had undertaken to have a " real conversation" on why states acquire nuclear weapons and what role NATO's posture played in this was in itself a significant step in the right direction.

The argument that Canada's efforts to push the Alliance on NACD issues lacked weight because we had withdrawn our standing forces from Europe in 1993 was advanced and rejected: Canada's enormous contribution to peacekeeping in post-Cold War Europe was beyond reproach. A more significant challenge, it was argued, was the importance that new and prospective Alliance members in Eastern Europe attached to the US nuclear umbrella, which compounded reluctance to raise the kinds of questions Canada wanted to see addressed. NATO's role in " enforcing" human security, it was suggested, also made some reluctant to re-think the nuclear deterrent.

The Government of Canada was praised for its efforts to play " nuclear nag" within the Alliance, and encouraged to seek more opportunities for input and help from the NGO community. The Strategic Concept's recognition of the " reduced salience" of nuclear weapons was seen as a hopeful " crack in the door" , but why could the Alliance not commit to No First Use? What were Canada's aims going into the review? What would it settle for? How long was it going to keep the New Agenda Coalition at arms length in the interest of working to change NATO " from within" ? Many members of the Non-Aligned Movement, it was observed, saw NATO's embrace of nuclear weapons as yet another example of the West preaching one thing and doing another - which could only have a corrosive impact on the NPT.

At a minimum, it was argued, Canada should work to prevent any development that would make the situation worse, for example any expansion in the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy. A further central goal was to raise awareness within the Alliance of how NATO statements - eg. on the " political value" of nuclear weapons - provided justification to would-be proliferators. NATO's public commitment to undertake a review of policy options in this sphere, it was advanced, sent an important signal that would lend credibility to Canada's role at the upcoming NPT Review Conference. Canada should also, several participants argued, continue to oppose the anachronistic argument that the Alliance's nuclear weapons provided a crucial " link" between its European and North American members.

Session VII: Ballistic Missiles

It was noted at the outset that efforts to come to grips with the challenge of missile proliferation were hampered by the absence of agreed international norms on issues as basic as what distinguished a " good" missile program from a " bad" one. The ideal solution would be a binding international Treaty but the myriad of national and commercial interests that would have to be reconciled in the process rendered this a dubious prospect in the short term. Canada had in fact proposed such a Treaty in the mid-1990s but met with stiff resistance and dropped the idea. This did not preclude progress in the form of smaller steps, however. There were a number of avenues worth pursuing in this regard, from confidence and " norm-building" measures such as launch notification agreements to efforts to engage potential missile proliferators who were outside the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

There was a long discussion of US proposals to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, the demand for which, it was argued, would be diminished by successful efforts to reduce missile proliferation. NMD was decried by some speakers as a " provocative" manifestation of US unilateralism, a quest for absolute security that, by making all other members of the international system feel less secure, was ultimately counterproductive and unsustainable. By seeking a technological " fix" to the alleged challenge posed by " rogue" states, one participant suggested, Washington was overlooking alternative solutions: the $10 billion ear-marked for NMD could be better spent to promote democratization through aid and engagement.

Worse, despite doubts on NMD's technical feasibility - which, according to a number of experts, were considerable - Russia and China were bound to take it seriously. Even a primitive NMD, it was argued, would be sufficient to neutralize China's strategic deterrent (20 ICBMs); whatever Washington's protests to the contrary, Moscow and Beijing had every reason to see NMD as part of an effort to seek a pre-emptive, first-strike war-fighting capability, an interpretation reinforced by the Clinton Administration's insistence on keeping its options open for a Phase 2 and Phase 3 following a " limited" Phase 1 NMD deployment. Their likely response - MIRVing the new Topol-M in the case of Russia, an acceleration of long-range missile development programs (possibly in cooperation with Moscow) in the case of China - could, it was suggested, initiate a classic arms spiral resulting in diminished security for all. The implications for regional security in Asia were especially disturbing - Japan, for example, might face increased pressures to " go nuclear" to counter China's growing ICBM force - yet while Washington was working hard to engage Russia on NMD, China was receiving far less attention.

At the same time, it was advanced by one participant, the job of the US President as " Commander-in-Chief" was to protect Americans from harm, and none of the arguments against NMD addressed this basic fact. If a fully deployed NMD system was only 80 percent effective against each stage of an ICBM flight, from launch to re-entry, only 1.6 out of an attack of 1,000 missiles would get through. Arguing against such defensive odds would be a tough sell to the average American. The peace movement, it was argued, was against NMD because it was de-stabilizing, but this did not imply a preference for deterrence. That said, another participant observed, deterrence remained " cheaper and less provocative" than NMD.

One speaker noted that advances in technology (including but by no means limited to NMD) raised the spectre of the " weaponization" of Outer Space. While no state was yet publicly committed to this step, ongoing research and development and loopholes in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction made weaponization cause for concern. Canada had therefore for some time been promoting the negotiation of a Convention for the Non-Weaponization of Outer Space, but the deadlock in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) had so far prevented these efforts from bearing fruit.

Concerns were expressed by some participants about Canada's potential role in any NMD deployment. It was suggested that a US deployment decision might be based on political considerations unrelated to the merits of NMD, and that Canada's response might be shaped by its assessment of the needs of its bilateral relationship with the US. In particular, it was argued, there would be strong pressure from within the Canadian defence establishment to participate to keep Canada on the cutting edge of military technology.

On the relationship between NMD and NORAD, it was noted that while there were those at NORAD who saw it as the logical " home" for a deployed NMD, the question had not been decided and would require Canada's agreement. Some participants suggested that, should it be decided to proceed with NMD without Canada, it would be housed in US Space Command and NORAD's future would be very much in doubt; others pointed out that the relationship between NORAD and US Space Command is in fact more complex, and that it was too soon to draw any firm conclusions about any prospective NMD-NORAD relationship.

Session VIII: Verification and Controls

The importance of verification for the broader NACD agenda was underlined by one speaker at the outset, with reference to " the biggest and most under-appreciated risk in the world today" - the strategic arsenals of the USA and Russia. The merits of the START process were outlined, but it was argued that as the USA and Russia wound down their nuclear rivalry, other problems became relatively more important, including the arsenals of the other nuclear powers (declared, de facto, or otherwise), the continued risk of nuclear proliferation, and the need for other treaties linked to nuclear weapons development, such as test bans.

The fate of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was highlighted. One of the central arguments Treaty opponents used to bring about its defeat in the US Senate, it was recalled, was the alleged ease with which other states could duck its provisions. A brief review of the extensive verification measures being developed to monitor compliance with the Treaty highlighted the shortcomings of this argument. The fact that the CTBT Organization's as yet incomplete system of monitoring stations successfully detected a 0.1 kiloton test explosion in September 1998 spoke for itself in this regard.

It was noted that the approach to verification embodied in the CTBT - in particular, its emphasis on securing multiple sources of data and ensuring overlapping capabilities - traced its origins to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) experience in Iraq. That mission's development of extensive methods - gathering information from a wide variety of sources, use of collateral analysis etc - had led to a " verification revolution" . When speaking of UNSCOM's successor - UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) - the suggestion was made that it might enjoy a closer relationship with IAEA than UNSCOM did, owing to the recent appointment of the former head of IAEA as Executive Chair of UNMOVIC. It was acknowledged by many participants, however, that Iraq's failure to fulfil all its obligations as a party to the NPT had been and remained a significant challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Even with a budget in the hundreds of millions of dollars and a staff of 2200, there were limits to what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could do.

Canadian policy in this area was reviewed in some detail. Canada, one speaker reported, was working hard to strengthen the nuclear safeguards efforts of the IAEA. It had signed the Additional Protocol to its fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the purpose of which was to strengthen and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. As a member of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Canada was working to strengthen export controls and encourage greater transparency in their application. Canada welcomed the Trilateral Initiative - an undertaking to fulfil US and Russian commitments concerning IAEA verification of weapons-origin fissile material - and was a party to, and strong supporter of, the 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

These efforts, it was suggested, were part of a " global success story" : the DPRK and Iraq were the exceptions in an NPT-based safeguards system that had proved its merits. While one participant argued that the approach was " police-based" , others contended that the strength of the regime lay in its promotion of an international norm which attached a huge stigma to the illicit development of nuclear weapons. Effective controls facilitated peaceful uses of atomic energy, one speaker argued, and every grain of exported Canadian uranium was safeguarded and monitored. While Canada did not reprocess uranium, many countries did so for reasons of cost and limiting waste; the plutonium produced as a result was turned into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and burned again, under full safeguards. Canada's agreement to consider the use of mixed oxide fuel containing US and Russian excess-weapons plutonium in CANDU reactors reflected its commitment to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium under IAEA safeguards and therefore contribute to the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

A number of participants took strong exception to these arguments, which failed to allay their concerns with, for example, Canada's policy on depleted uranium and the absence of a ban on separating plutonium. One speaker dismissed the proposal to burn US and Russian plutonium as MOX fuel as inferior to the alternative of immobilizing plutonium through vitrification; others disputed this position. Some participants drew attention to the huge domestic costs of uranium mining in Canada, in terms of environmental degradation and resulting loss of life through higher cancer rates. Here was a good argument, it was suggested, to use with India and Pakistan: nuclear facilities have made a mess of Canada's lands and water; don't repeat our mistakes. Another participant argued that, to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons, Canada had to eliminate the entire " nuclear system" , i.e. the North American infrastructure built up to produce bombs over the last 50 years. It was further argued that the NPT's promotion of peaceful uses togther with non-proliferation represented a " total contradiction" , given the irreversible decline now underway in the nuclear power industry.

Wrap Up

A brief wrap-up session at the conclusion of the second day provided an opportunity for a preliminary assessment of the consultations.

From the government's perspective, the exercise was seen to be a success. The relatively small size of the group and broad range of constituencies represented had facilitated a good, focussed discussion that related directly to upcoming events on the international agenda. A solid beginning had been made in the effort to build up a common information base among the government, academics and NGOs, an effort that would be continued, in part, through the further development of the DFAIT web site on NACD issues.

Several NGO representatives welcomed the opportunity to engage in genuine dialogue with the government. A number were struck by how prominently the need to promote public awareness of NACD issues had figured in the discussions. NGOs were ready to play their part, and would welcome government support in this regard. The call for official government consultations on Canadian nuclear energy policy was re-iterated.

An academic representative applauded the size, focus, and active involvement by all participants in the two-day meeting, but remarked on how little expertise there had been on some of the issues raised during the course of the discussions, for example on the economics and environmental implications of nuclear power. This suggested the need for outreach to a wider range of academic disciplines and a more comprehensive approach to nuclear issues within the university community.

APPENDIX

Participant List for Government Consultations on Selected Nuclear Issues
February 3-4, 2000

Dr. Mary-Wynne Ashford
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Mr. John Ausman
Senior Foreign Policy Advisor
Privy Council Office (PCO)

Ms. Louise Bellefeuille-Pregent
Director, Directorate of Arms Proliferation Control Policy (DAPC-Pol)
Department of National Defence

Ms. Judith Berlyn
Vice President, Centre des ressources sur la non-violence

Dr. Barbara Birkett
President, Physicians for Global Survival

Ms. Tryna Booth
Canadian Peace Alliance

Ms. Bev Delong
Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Professor David Dewitt / Steering Group Member
Director, Centre for International and Security Studies
Professor of Political Science
York University

Mr. Gordon Edwards
Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility

Mr. Mike Elliott / Steering Group Member
NATO Desk Officer
North-American and Euro-Atlantic Security and Defence Relations (IDR)
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Mr. Francis Furtado / Steering Group Member
Section Head, Directorate of Arms Proliferation Control Policy (DAPC-Pol)
Department of National Defence

Mr. André Guilbaud
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Officer
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Section
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Professor Frank Harvey
Department of Political Science
Dalhousie University

Ms. Heidi Hulan
Policy Advisor
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MINA)

Professor Marc Kilgour
Director, Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies
Wilfrid Laurier University

Professor Albert Legault / Steering Group Member
Directeur de l'Institut québécois des hautes études internationales
Université Laval

Mr. Robert McDougall / Steering Group Chair
Director, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division (IDA)
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Ms. Peggy Mason
Canadian Council for International Peace and Security

Mr Paul Meyer
Director General
International Security Bureau (IDD)
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Professor David Mutimer
York Centre for International and Security Studies
York University

Professor T.V. Paul
Department of Political Science
McGill University

Professor Tariq Rauf
Director, International Organizations & Nonproliferation Project
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Ms. Lorraine Rekmans
Blind River, Ontario

Mr. Ernie Regehr / Steering Group Member
Director, Project Ploughshares

The Honourable Douglas Roche, Senator
The Senate of Canada

Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons / Steering Group Member
President, The Simons Foundation

Professor Joel Sokolsky
Royal Military College of Canada

Professor Michael D. Wallace
Department of Political Science
University of British Columbia

Ambassador Christopher Westdal
Ambassador for Disarmament
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva

Mr. Terry Wood / Steering Group Member
Deputy-Director, Nuclear, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Implementation Agency (IDN)
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade


Last Updated:
2002-10-07

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