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Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation

October 2006

  • Most countries participate in international initiatives designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  • The international safeguards system has since 1970 successfully prevented the diversion of fissile materials into weapons. Its scope is being widened to address undeclared nuclear activities.
  • The IAEA undertakes regular inspections of civil nuclear facilities and audits the movement of nuclear materials through them.
  • Safeguards are backed by diplomatic and economic measures.

Over the past 35 years the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success in curbing the diversion of civil uranium into military uses. It has involved cooperation in developing nuclear energy while ensuring that civil uranium, plutonium and associated plants are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely. Its scope is also being widened to include undeclared nuclear activities.

Most countries have renounced nuclear weapons, recognising that possession of them would threaten rather than enhance national security. They have therefore embraced the NPT as a public commitment to use nuclear materials and technology only for peaceful purposes.

The NPT Origins and Objectives

The successful conclusion, in 1968, of negotiations on the NPT was a landmark in the history of non-proliferation. After coming into force in 1970, its indefinite extension in May 1995 was another. At present, 187 states are party to the NPT. These include all five declared Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs): China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA.

The NPT's main objectives are to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons, to provide security for non-nuclear weapon states which have given up the nuclear option, to encourage international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA was set up by unanimous resolution of the United Nations in 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements. This provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honouring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The IAEA therefore undertakes regular inspections of civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories and undertakes sampling and analysis of materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers' Group.

Scope of safeguards

Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.

Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material . Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.

The aim of traditional IAEA safeguards is to deter the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximising the risk of early detection. At a broader level they provide assurance to the international community that countries are honouring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. In this way safeguards are a service both to the international community and to individual states, who recognise that it is in their own interest to demonstrate compliance with these commitments.

The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on;

  • Material Accountability - tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, review and verification of operating records.
  • Physical Security - restricting access to nuclear materials at the site of use.
  • Containment and Surveillance - use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.

All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records.

The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.

See also IAEA Safeguards Overview.

Iraq and North Korea illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of international safeguards. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.

The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities concerned were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed safeguards arrangements. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement.

Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process, but North Korea posed possibly the most intractable situation confronted by the IAEA. But significant compensation in the promised provision of commercial power reactors eventually helped resolve the situation, at least until 2002.

So, while traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared, outside the known materials flows and facilities.

Undeclared nuclear activities

In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system was initiated, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:

  • The IAEA is given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded) and nuclear-related imports and exports.
  • IAEA inspectors have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (eg. two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
  • States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.

All these elements focus on nuclear materials. They enhance the IAEA's ability to provide assurances that all nuclear activities and material in the country concerned has been declared for safeguards purposes. As of mid 2006, 76 countries plus Taiwan had Additional Protocols in force, 38 more had them approved and signed.

Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.

Where states have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and an Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA is able to say each year not only that declared nuclear material remains in peaceful activities, but also that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities.

Limitations of safeguards

The greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation lies with countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India, Pakistan and Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.

A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT it is likely to be reported by IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions are then likely.

IAEA safeguards together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely.

The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.

By mid 2004 a total of 57 countries plus Taiwan had ratified the Additional Protocol. However, of 71 countries with significant nuclear activities, 25 have yet to bring it into force.

However, of 71 countries with significant nuclear activities, four NPT parties have not yet signed the Additional Protocol and another ten have not fully ratified it (another four of the 71 are outside the NPT).

Other IAEA developments

In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty agreed in 1996 and to codify commitments made by USA, UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification.

Another initiative relates to plutonium (Pu) and spent fuel. For uranium, safeguards take account of its nature: natural, depleted, low-enriched or high-enriched (above 20% U-235) and the corresponding degree of concern regarding proliferation. A similarly differentiated approach is being considered for Pu. Two or three categories are possible: degraded Pu (eg in high-burnup fuel), low-grade Pu (eg separated from spent fuel of normal burnup) and high-grade Pu (eg from weapons or low-burnup fuel). The first two correspond to what is generally known as a reactor-grade Pu, sometimes defined as having more than 19% non-fissile isotopes.

Additional arrangements

There are also several other treaties and arrangements designed to reduce the risk of civil nuclear power's contributing to weapons proliferation.

Implementation of IAEA safeguards in the non-nuclear weapon states of the EU is governed by a Verification Agreement between the country concerned, EURATOM and the IAEA. Safeguards activities are carried out jointly by the IAEA and EURATOM. A revision to earlier arrangements, the New Partnership Approach (NPA), was agreed in April 1992. The NPA enables the IAEA itself to deploy more of its resources in member states where independent regional safeguards systems are not in place.

Shortly after entry into force of the NPT, multilateral consultations on nuclear export controls led to the establishment of two separate mechanisms for dealing with nuclear exports: the Zangger Committee in 1971 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975.

The Zangger Committee, also known as the Non Proliferation Treaty Exporters Committee, was set up to consider how procedures for exports of nuclear material and equipment related to NPT commitments. In August 1974 the committee produced a trigger list of items which would require the application of IAEA safeguards if exported to a non Nuclear Weapons State which was not party to the NPT. The trigger list is regularly updated. The Zangger Committee now has 31 member states.

The NSG, also known as the London Group or London Suppliers Group, was set up in 1974 after India exploded its first nuclear device. The main reason for the group's formation was to bring in France, a major nuclear supplier nation which was not then party to the NPT. It included both members and non-members of the Zangger Committee. The group communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The NSG began with seven members - the USA, the former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan - but now includes 35 countries.

AUSTRALIAN SAFEGUARDS POLICY

Australia's uranium is sold for exclusively peaceful purposes, namely electric power generation and related research and development activities. The main components of Australia's safeguards policy are:

(1) Careful selection of those countries eligible for the supply of Australian uranium:

  • In the case of non-nuclear-weapons States, sales are made only to countries which are parties to the NPT. These have renounced the nuclear weapons option and accept full-scope IAEA safeguards applying to all their nuclear-related activities;
  • In the case of nuclear weapons States, which must also be parties to the NPT, sales require an assurance that uranium will not be diverted to military or explosive purposes and that it will be subject to IAEA safeguards.

(2) Countries wishing to import Australian uranium must conclude a bilateral safeguards agreement with Australia. Provisions include:

  • prior Australian consent to any Australian obligated nuclear material (AONM) being transferred to a third party, enriched beyond 20% uranium-235, or reprocessed. Transfers are permitted only within Australia's network of bilateral safeguards.
  • fallback safeguards (contingency arrangements to ensure the continued safeguarding of material already present in an importing country in case safeguards under the NPT ever cease to apply);

(3) Strong support for the NPT and IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, with IAEA monitoring to apply.

When adopted in 1977, this was a more rigorous safeguards policy than that of any country supplying uranium to world markets. However, the approach is very similar to that of the USA and Canada.

Australia has 14 bilateral safeguards agreements covering 24 countries (the Euratom agreement covering several). It has always taken the position that rigorous bilateral safeguards are an important and effective complement to the international safeguards system.

Australia's position as a major uranium exporter is influential in the ongoing development of international safeguards and other non-proliferation measures, through membership of the IAEA Board of Governors, participation in international expert groups and its safeguards research program in support of the IAEA.

AUSTRALIAN SAFEGUARDS OFFICE

The Australian Safeguards & Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) operates the system of bilateral safeguards applying to Australian uranium exports based on customer countries being parties to the NPT. It also administers the domestic safeguards system required by Australia's own NPT agreement with the IAEA.

In addition, ASNO keeps account of nuclear material and associated items in Australia through its administration of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. ASNO provides information to the IAEA on the small amount of nuclear material in Australia which is subject to safeguards, and on uranium exports. It also facilitates IAEA inspections, including those under the Additional Protocol.

Australia has in place an accounting system that follows uranium from the time it is produced and packed for export, to the time it is reprocessed or stored as nuclear waste, anywhere in the world. It also includes plutonium which is in the spent fuel or recovered from it. All documentation relating to AONM is carefully monitored and any apparent discrepancies are taken up with the country concerned. There have been no unreconciled differences in accounting for AONM. This system operates in addition to safeguards applied by the IAEA which keep track of the movement of nuclear materials through overseas facilities and verify inventories.

One aspect of the accounting system is the possibility of obligation exchanges involving equivalent nuclear material held by a single utility or between different utilities. Exchanges are permitted, to simplify accounting and surveillance, provided that they do not result in reducing either the quality or quantity of material subject to Australian safeguards obligations. In low-enriched uranium the focus is on U-235 content.

Each year the ASNO reports to the Australian Parliament on its activities and its accounts of nuclear materials.

Nuclear materials:

Uranium processed for electricity generation is not useable for weapons. The uranium used in power reactor fuel for electricity generation is typically enriched to about 3-4% of the isotope U-235, compared with weapons-grade which is over 90% U-235. For safeguards purposes uranium is deemed to be "highly enriched" when it reaches 20% U-235. Few countries possess the technological knowledge or the facilities to produce weapons-grade uranium.

Plutonium is produced in the reactor core from a proportion of the uranium fuel. Plutonium contained in spent fuel elements is typically about 60-70% Pu-239, compared with weapons-grade plutonium which is more than 93% Pu-239. Weapons-grade plutonium is not produced in commercial power reactors but in a "production" reactor operated with frequent fuel changes to produce low-burnup material with a high proportion of Pu-239.

The only use for "reactor grade" plutonium is as a nuclear fuel, after it is separated from the high-level wastes by reprocessing. It is not and has never been used for weapons, due to the relatively high rate of spontaneous fission and radiation from the heavier isotopes such as Pu-240 making any such attempted use fraught with great uncertainties.

Further information: see appendices on Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (below) and Iraq, North Korea and Iran, with South Africa and Israel.

Sources:

IAEA
Australian Safeguards & Non-proliferation Office, Annual Reports
Euratom

Appendix: From the 1999 Annual Report of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, DFAT:

Australian Obligated Nuclear Material

A characteristic of the civil nuclear fuel cycle is the international interdependence of facility operators and power utilities. Apart from the nuclear-weapon States, it is unusual for a country to be entirely self-contained in the processing of uranium for civil use - and even in the case of the nuclear-weapon States, power utilities will seek the most favourable financial terms, often going to processors in other countries. Thus it is not unusual, for example, for a Japanese utility buying Australian uranium to have the uranium converted to uranium hexafluoride in Canada, enriched in France, fabricated into fuel in Japan, and reprocessed in the United Kingdom. The international flow of nuclear material enhances safeguards accountability, through 'transit matching' of transfers at the different stages of the fuel cycle.

The international nature of nuclear material flows means that uranium from many sources is routinely mixed during processes such as conversion and enrichment. Uranium is termed a 'fungible' commodity, that is, at these processing stages uranium from any source is identical to uranium from any other - it is not possible physically to differentiate the origin of the uranium. This is not unique to uranium, but is also the case with a number of other commodities. The fungibility of uranium has led to the establishment of conventions used universally in the industry and in the application of safeguards, namely equivalence and proportionality. These are discussed below.

Because of the impossibility of physically identifying 'Australian atoms', and also because Australian obligations apply not just to uranium as it moves through the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, but also to material generated through the use of that uranium, e.g. plutonium produced through the irradiation of uranium fuel in a reactor, the obligations under Australia's various bilateral safeguards agreements are applied to Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM). 'AONM' is a shorthand way of describing the nuclear material which is subject to the provisions of the particular bilateral agreement.

This approach is also used by those other countries applying bilateral safeguards comparable to Australia's, principally the United States and Canada. These countries attach a safeguards 'obligation' to nuclear material which they upgrade, hence giving rise to the situation of 'multi-labelling', for example, AONM enriched in the US will also become US obligated nuclear material (USONM), and its subsequent use will have to meet the requirements of both Australian and US agreements. This is a common situation, that is, a significant proportion of AONM is also characterised as USONM and is accounted for both to ASNO and its US counterpart (the US DOE).

The equivalence principle provides that where AONM loses its separate identity because of process characteristics (e.g. mixing), an equivalent quantity is designated AONM, based on the fact that atoms or molecules of the same substance are indistinguishable, any one atom or molecule being identical to any other of the same substance. In such circumstances, equivalent quantities of the products of such nuclear material may be derived by calculation or from operating plant parameters. It should be noted that the principle of equivalence does not permit substitution by a lower quality material, e.g. enriched uranium cannot be replaced by natural or depleted uranium.

The proportionality principle provides that where AONM is mixed with other nuclear material, and is processed or irradiated, a proportion of the resulting material will be regarded as AONM corresponding to the same proportion as was AONM initially.

Some people are concerned that the operation of the equivalence principle means there cannot be assurance that 'Australian atoms' do not enter military programs. This overlooks the realities of the situation, that uranium atoms are indistinguishable from one another and there is no practical way of attaching 'flags' to atoms. The objective of Australia's bilateral agreements is to ensure that AONM in no way materially contributes to or enhances any military purpose. Even if AONM were to be in a processing stream with nuclear material subsequently withdrawn for military use, the presence of the AONM would add nothing to the quantity or quality of the military material (NB as noted elsewhere in the Annual Report, those nuclear-weapon States eligible for the supply of Australian uranium have ceased production of fissile material for nuclear weapons).

Accounting for AONM

Australia's bilateral partners holding AONM are required to maintain detailed records of transactions involving AONM, and ASNO's counterpart organisations are required to submit regular reports, consent requests, transfer and receipt documentation to ASNO. ASNO accounts for AONM on the basis of:

  • reports from each bilateral partner;
  • shipping and transfer documentation;
  • calculations of process losses and nuclear consumption, and nuclear production;
  • knowledge of the fuel cycle in each country;
  • regular liaison with counterpart organisations and with industry;
  • reconciliation of any discrepancies with counterparts.