Question
49: The intrinsic nature of habits
-
49,1: Ontological category = quality,
i.e., a way of being conditioned
or, better, a determination of a substance's potentiality with respect
to accidental (as opposed to substantial) esse.
- 49,2: The four species
of quality, where a quality is a determination of
a substance's potentiality with respect to accidental esse:
-
first species:
habit and
disposition = determinations by
which a substance is well-disposed or ill-disposed with respect to the
very nature of the substance and/or with respect to its operation and
final
end (perfection). These qualities can be (1) either (a) good
(health,
beauty, strength, arts and skills, moral virtue, intellectual virtue)
or
(b) bad
(sickness, ugliness, weakness, moral vice, intellectual
vice), and (2) either (a) easy
to change (dispositions: health,
sickness, etc.) or (b) hard to
change (habits: virtues, vices,
arts).
- second
species: determinations that
follow upon the form: active
powers
- third
species: determinations that
follow upon the matter: passive
(or sensible) qualities (hot,
cold, color, smell, taste, etc.)
- fourth
species: determinations that
follow upon quantity = shape
and figure
Habits, unlike dispositions in the most proper sense (e.g., health and
sickness), are not easily acquired or lost. (In a second sense and less
proper sense, a disposition can be said to be an inchoate and imperfect
habit, since as we see later, habits, like certain other qualities, can
be had more and less perfectly.) [50,1: "A habit is a sort of
disposition
belonging to a subject that is in potency to an operation."
- 49,3: A habit is
itself a certain being or actuality, since it is a real
quality, i.e., an accidental determination of a substance; but it is
also
part of the nature of a habit which inheres in a power (as well as of
the
power which is its primary subject) that it be ordered toward a
relevant
sort of operation, in such a way that it is a principle or cause of
that
operation. Such a habit is thus a middle element between a mere
potentiality
(or power or faculty), on the one hand, and the actuality or end toward
which that potentiality (or power or faculty) is ordered, on the other
hand. In technical terminology, the habit is a first
act relative
to the operation (the second
act) which it facilitates.
- 49,4: There are three
things required in order for it to be true that habits
are necessary for a given entity with respect to a given end of
operation:
-
1. The thing which is disposed
by the habit must be in potency with
respect to the end or actuality toward which the habit is ordered.
Hence a being with no unrealized potentiality does not need habits, and
so God does not need habits (or, hence, virtues). In general, a power
or
faculty admits of habits only insofar as it is passive and hence able
to
"formed".
- 2. That
which is in potency to the given end must be such that it can
be determined in many ways and to diverse objects.
So a certain diversity
with respect to ways of achieving or falling short of the end must be
present.
- 3. There
must be many things that dispose the subject to that with respect
to which it is in potency; and it must be that these many things can be
present in different measures, so that the thing in question is either
well or badly disposed toward the form or operation in question.
This
is why the primary qualities of the elements are not habits.
Ad 1: "... The
(substantial) form is ordered to an operation which is
either the end or a path to the end. And, to be sure, if the form has
in
a determinate way just one determinate operation, then no disposition
other
than the form itself is required for its operation. However, if the
form
is such that, like the soul, it is able to operate in different ways,
then
it has to be disposed to its operations by certain habits."
Question
50: The subject of habits
-
50,1: the body:
-
With respect to the
operations of the body: The body
of a living
thing is subject to habits in a secondary way, insofar as the body is
disposed
by habituation to promptly subserve the operations of the soul. (Think
of the difference between a constant involuntary twitch and an habitual
bodily movement just like it; or think of the finger movements involved
in typing or playing a musical instrument.)
- With
respect to the nature of the body:
dispositions such as the
health, beauty, etc. can be called habits or habitual dispositions in a
broad sense.
-
50,2: the soul:
The soul cannot have habits that are ordered toward its own nature, since the soul just
is that which makes the nature what it is. "However, if we are speaking
of a higher nature in which a human being is able to participate ...
then
in this sense nothing prevents there being some habit, viz., grace,
that
is in the soul according to its essence." This is habitual
(sanctifying)
grace, which modifies the soul's very essence and from which are
derived
the theological virtues [(informed) faith, hope, and charity], which
are
themselves ordered to operations that exceed the natural powers of our
intellect and will. (On the distinction of the essence of the soul from
its powers or faculties see Summa
Theologiae 1, q. 77, a. 1.)
-
50,3: the sentient part of the
soul: The sentient powers
sometimes
operate by an "instinct of nature" and in such operations they are not
subject to habituation. However, "insofar as they operate at the
command
of reason they can be ordered to diverse effects, and in this sense
there
can be habits in them by which they are well-disposed or badly disposed
to something." This applies mainly to the sentient appetitive powers
and,
to some lesser extent, to the interior
sentient apprehensive powers
of memory, imagination, cogitation. (Note that animals can be trained
by human beings, and to this extent their trained actions are habitual
in an extended sense.)
- 50,4: the
intellect: the passive (or
possible) intellect of a human
being is by nature merely in potentiality with respect to every object
it cognizes. Therefore, it requires habits (e.g., concepts
with
respect to simples, propositions
with respect to complexes, intellectus
with respect to first principles of demonstration, scientia
with
respect
to conclusions, and wisdom
with respect to ultimate causes.)
- 50,5: the
will: as regards those objects
which the will is not determined
to by its nature, it needs habits in order to operate promptly with
respect
to diverse objects.
- 50,6: angels:
to the extent that angels are in potency with respect
to given intelligible objects, they require intellectual habits. The
extent
of this need varies from one grade of angel to another, each knowing
certain
things by nature (through its essence) rather than by means of habitual
operations. All angels, in addition, need habits in order to
participate
by grace in God's wisdom and goodness.
Question
51: The cause of habits
-
51,1: nature:
-
with respect to the
nature: beauty, sickliness, etc.
can be thought
of as natural habits or, better, dispositions.
- with
respect to operation: there are
certain habits that come partly
from nature and partly from an exterior principle; some of these habits
are common to all human beings, e.g., grasp of truth of first
principles
once they are understood; others of these habits are peculiar to
individuals,
e.g., different levels of intelligence and natural temperaments which
make
certain virtues easier or harder to acquire.
-
51,2-3: acts:
to the extent that an agent is capable of immanent action,
i.e., of acting
on itself, its acts generate habits within itself insofar as it is in
potentiality
to such qualities. For example, habits are generated by repeated acts
in
the appetitive powers. And habits are generated in the apprehensive
powers
insofar as they act as moved by other apprehensive and appetitive acts;
in the case of the apprehensive powers, habits (e.g., concepts) can
sometimes
be generated by a single act.
-
51,4: infusion by God:
the (supernatural) habits by which we are well disposed to our ultimate
end, the clear knowledge and attainment of which exceeds our natural
powers,
must be infused by God and cannot (obviously) be acquired by nature or
acts.
Questions 52 and 53: On
the augmentation, corruption and diminution
of habits
St. Thomas points out that certain habits and dispositions are
susceptible
to augmentation or diminution in
themselves insofar as they can
extend to more or fewer things (knowledge is an example); this sort of
augmentation is augmentation by
addition, whereas the
corresponding
diminution is diminution by
subtraction.
Habits and dispositions
are also susceptible to augmentation according
to the subject's participation,
insofar as their subject can possess
or participate in them to a greater or lesser degree, i.e., more or
less
perfectly or intensely. However, whether any given act augments one's
participation
in a habit depends on the relative intensity of the habit and act. An
act
that is equal to or greater than the habit in intensity will augment
the
habit, whereas an act that is less than the habit in intensity will not
augment it and may even diminish it. Also, one with a habit might not
use
(exercise) it or might even act contrary to it, and in both cases the
habit
is diminished. So the question comes down to how the habit is
voluntarily
used by the subject.
Question 54: The
distinctions among habits
There are three parameters along which habits differ from one another
in species:
-
active principles:
i.e., their efficient causes--e.g., faculties
and acts of those faculties relevant to the habit in question; it is in
this way that opinion with respect to a given proposition is
distinguished
from scientific knowledge with respect to that proposition.
- the
nature to which a habit is ordered:
-
(i) a habit may be either consonant or not consonant with the thing's
nature
(good and bad)
-
(ii) a habit may be either consonant with a lower nature or consonant
with
a higher nature (natural virtue vs. supernatural or heroic virtue).
-
the object to
which the habit's operation is ordered:
this includes
the ends as well as the objects in the narrower sense. For instance, an
act of giving money might be motivated either by love of God, in which
case it pertains to the virtue of charity, or by the fact that I am in
debt, in which case it pertains to the virtue of justice.
Look at a. 4 and also q. 57, a. 6, ad 4, on the three different senses
in which habits have parts:
-
integral parts:
These are related to the habit in question as the
roof, the foundation, and the walls are related to a building. The
integral
parts are such that they must all be present for any complete or
perfect
act of the habit.
- subjective
parts: These are related to the
habit in question as
the species of a genus are related to the genus. That is, they fully
satisfy
the formal definition of the habit and differ from one another in being
ordered toward distinct ends or goods. For instance, the subjective
parts
of prudence are prudence with respect to oneself and prudence with
respect
to a multitude (e.g., a household or army, etc.). Again, the proper
parts
of justice are commutative justice, which has to do with the relations
between private individuals, and distributive justice, which has to do
with the relation between the whole community and the individual.
- potential
parts: The habit in question is
related to these parts in the way that the rational soul is related to
the operations of its own vegetative and sentient powers, i.e., the
form
of the whole is the principle of operation for the potential parts, but
those operations in some way fall short of the operations of the
principal
form. So the potential parts of a habit share something in common with
that habit but fall short of fully satisfying its formal definition.
For
instance, the potential parts of justice (e.g., religion, filial piety,
truthfulness, gratitude, affability, etc.) all involve, as does
justice,
our relations with others. But whereas justice, strictly speaking, is
the
rendering of what is legally due to one's equals, the potential parts
are
concerned with relations between unequals and/or with demands that are
moral rather than strictly legal. Again, in the case of prudence the
potential
parts are good inquiry (eubilia)
and good judgment both in matters
that conform to ordinary rules (synesis)
and in matters that call
for exceptions to ordinary rules (gnome).
For inquiry and judgment
fall short of the principal act of prudence, which is to command or
give
precepts for action.
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