Treatise on Beatitude
Question 1: The ultimate end of a human
being
Question 2: The thing such that human
beatitude
consists in possessing it
Question 3: The way in which the
highest good
must be possessed for beatitude
Question 4: The prerequisites for
beatitude
Question 5: The attainment of beatitude
- Question 1: The ultimate end of a human being
- 1,1: Explanation of the notions of act, object, and end
as they apply
to
all agents, natural and voluntary. Roughly, the object of an act
is what is done, and the end
is that for the sake of which (or
why) it is done.
Later on we will see that an action may derive its species both
from what is done (finis operis)
and from the motive or end for which it is done (finis operantis). (Acts are
complicated, eh? We will see more of this below.)
Note the distinction between
(a)
a human act and (b) an act belonging to a human being; and also the
distinction,
among voluntary human acts, between (i) acts elicited by the will (elicited
acts) and (ii) acts commanded by the will (commanded acts).
(This
is a little more complicated than St. Thomas lets on here, since one
possible
end I might have is to be the sort of person who elicits certain acts
of
will in certain circumstances. That is, it is possible for elicited
acts
of intellect and will to be the ends--and perhaps even the
proximate
ends or objects--of elicited acts of will. However, all elicited acts
of
will have objects that are distinct from themselves.)
- 1,2: Acting for an end is not peculiar to human beings,
since all
substances
are agents, rational or non-rational, that act for an end. (This is a
fundamental
thesis that St. Thomas takes over from Aristotle and that he would not
relinquish even if he were around today.) If an agent were not
ordered
toward some determinate effect, it wouldn't do this rather than that.
What
is peculiar to voluntary actions is that this ordering is accomplished
through a rational appetite rather than through natural
appetite--so
that rational agents qua rational move themselves toward
determinate deliberated
ends that they themselves intend, whereas non-rational agents are moved
by another toward either an
apprehended but undeliberated end (brute animals) or a non-apprehended
end (agents that lack cognition).
- 1,3: We can construe actions by analogy with substances.
Just as a
substance
receives its species from its form, which makes it to be an actual
member
of that species, so human acts receive their species from that which
makes
them actual. Motions in general--and human acts in particular--can be
thought
of as both actions and passions, i.e., instances of
acting
(on the part of the agent) and of being acted upon (on the part of the
patient). An action receives its species from the actuality which is
the principle
of the motion, whereas the passion receives its species from the
actuality
which is the terminus of the motion. For instance, heating
proceeds
from the heat of the agent (principle) and terminates in the heat of
the
patient (terminus). In the case of human acts, in which the agent moves
himself and is moved by himself, the proximate end [or: object
or finis operis]
(see ad 3) is both the principle and the terminus, though in different
ways. (This is analogous to a case of natural generation, in which the
form of the species is both the principle and the terminus.) The
proximate
end is the principle because properly human acts proceed from a
deliberated act of will that has the proximate end as its object; it is
the terminus because properly human acts tend toward the
realization
of the object (proximate end) that the will deliberately intends. So a
human act has the (proximate) end or object it intends as its form and
it aims at realizing that form or object in reality. Also, we must
distinguish
an act's natural species from its moral species. These
types
of species may be related to one another only incidentally.
Specifically,
acts of the same "natural" species (e.g., raising one's hand) may have
different moral species, depending on the variety of ultimate ends or
motives (e.g., making
a contribution to a discussion, signalling the beginning of an
assassination
attempt, changing the play at the line of scrimmage, etc). So we must
be
careful in discerning an act's per se moral terminus.
Also,
the reply to the last objection presupposes a distinction between the
action
itself, as specified by its object or proximate end, and further ends
that
the agent might direct the action, so constituted, to. The
scholastics
sometimes call the first of these ends the finis operis (the
end
of the act itself) and the finis operantis (the end of the
agent).
This raises the possibility that an act might have a bad object
independently
of the good intentions of the agent. More on this below.
Also, an action may have more than one species; this leads to
some interesting questions to be taken up below.
- 1,4: Note that the question here is, in effect, whether
there is at
least one ultimate end of human life. (In fact, what the argument
seems
to show is only that each human act must have an ultimate or
last
end.) Even if the answer is yes, St. Thomas does not take himself to
have
shown that there is just one end for any particular human being or,
better,
human life (this is shown in art. 5) or just one (or the same) end for
all human beings (this is discussed in art. 7 and again at the very end
of q. 5). His point here is simply that every complete human action
presupposes
some ultimate end, the desire for which gets the action started.
If there were not such an end, we would never even begin to deliberate
about the
means
to that end. Note also the distinction between the order of
intention
and the order of execution with respect to ends. The ultimate
end
is first in intention and, as it were, the principle that moves the
appetite,
thus initiating action; but it is the last in execution, since it is
effected
by the effecting of the proximate ends that precede it. (I intend to
take
a vacation and this initiates a series of acts ordered toward my being
on vacation, which itself occurs last in the series.) By contrast, the
most proximate means to the end is the first in execution and the last
in intention, since the resolve to effect it is arrived at
intentionally
only at the end of a process of deliberation about how to achieve the
ultimate
end.
- 1,5&6: Art. 5 has to be read carefully. St.
Thomas is arguing
only
that each human being has a single ultimate end, but he is not saying
anything
about the precise character of that end. The point he is making is in
this
sense a purely formal one: "Each thing desires its own perfection
(completion,
fulfillment) as an ultimate end .... Therefore, it must be the case
that
the ultimate end fulfills all of a human being's desires in such a way
that there is nothing beyond it left to desire." So the ultimate end is
one's own perfection or fulfillment, and under this description it is
unitary--even
if, concretely, what one strives for in the attempt to bring about this
fulfillment is a whole host of goods. So every human act has or
presupposes
the intention of attaining perfection or fulfillment--which is the
claim
of art. 6. Notice, though, that the reply to obj. 1 suggests that the
relation
of an action to the ultimate end is not always direct. For instance,
rest
and relaxation are in given contexts seen as good for the one resting
and
so contribute to that person's attaining his perfection in an indirect
way, e.g., as an enabling condition for or a necessary condition for,
rather
than a constituent of, perfection. Notice, too, that it is much
too
early in the game to characterize this position as 'egoism', in the way
that many writers do. This is at least very misleading if we take
into account St. Thomas's later claim (in ST 2-2) that our fulfillment
entails loving God more than ourselves and our neighbors as ourselves
by
means of the supernatural habit of charity--and that a paradigm
instance
of an act ordered to our true ultimate end is Christ's passion and
death
for the salvation of the whole human race. That is, true
self-love
is not only compatible with, but demands, transcending oneself.
By the way, to
call this 'egoism', even 'rational egoism', and to contrast it with
'altruism',
is to import a later Scotistic and Kantian distinction and thereby
obliterate the distinctively
Thomistic account of human fulfillment. Scotus claims in effect
that instead of one fundamental desire for beatitude, we have two
independent fundamental desires, the affectio
commodi (something like the desire for beatitude -- or, better,
what Scotus perhaps thinks the desire for happiness amounts to, viz.,
being a 'decent' person with lots of pleasant and useful external
and internal goods) and the affectio
iustitiae (the desire for
moral uprightness), which is identified with the inclination to obey
God's law. (In Kant this becomes the desire to obey the law that
I give myself as a rational being.) The Scotistic distinction
raises the possibility, realized in his own treatment of the second
tablet of the Ten Commandments, that human flourishing as defined by
the affectio commodi might
conflict with obedience to God's law. St.
Thomas explicitly denies the possibility of a genuine conflict
between our desire for true human flourishing and obedience to God's
law. On this matter and
related issues, see Christopher Toner's excellent dissertation,
"Flourishing and Self-interest in Virtue Ethics."
- 1,7: Here St. Thomas makes some helpful
clarifications. We can speak of
the ultimate end in two ways: (a) according to the intension or meaning
of the concept ultimate end and (b) according to that which the
concept ultimate end
applies to concretely--or to put it another
way, according to the good or goods that satisfy, or are thought to
satisfy,
the definition of the ultimate good. Everyone desires his own
perfection
and beatitude as such; so as far as (a) is concerned, there is one
agreed
upon ultimate end for all human beings, viz., their own perfection or
beatitude.
But human beings disagree about what concretely constitutes their
perfection
or beatitude. Some desire, say, riches or comfort or power, etc., or
some
combination thereof, as their ultimate end; others desire to dedicate
their
lives to others or to God; still others desire other things, e.g.,
something akin to absolute autonomy, or a relatively thoughtless desire
for a suitable cluster of internal and external goods. But from
such
disagreement it does not follow that there is no truth of the matter
about
what goods are truly perfective of us or about what sorts of life are
best--or,
perhaps better, it does not follow that there are no objective
constraints
on what sorts of lives are aimed at or lead toward the true ultimate
end for human beings. We must take our cue here from what someone "with
well-disposed affections" desires. But what is that? Stay tuned for
questions
2 and 3. Still, we are not starting in a vacuum--we will be successful
in moral inquiry only to the extent that our own affections are already
well-disposed or at least on the way to being well-disposed.
- 1,8: This question is important mainly for drawing our
attention to the
fact that it is not only possession of a certain good (or
goods)
but the manner in which it is possessed that constitutes
beatitude.
In question 2 we will identify the good in which beatitude consists and
in question 3 the relevant mode of possession. So it is only at the end
of question 3 that we will understand the true ultimate end for human
beings,
and only at the end of questions 4 and 5 that we have a better idea of
what is involved in attaining true beatitude and what our chances are
of
attaining it.
- Question 2: The thing such that human beatitude
consists
in possessing
it in the right way
- 2,1-4: Our inquiry here is aimed at identifying the good
or set of
goods,
the possession of which in the right way constitutes human
beatitude--or,
as Aristotle puts it, "the complete and sufficient good that excludes
all
evil and fulfills all [well-ordered] desire." What St. Thomas will try
to show is that no finite good or set of goods can satisfy Aristotle's
own definition of human fulfillment. The first four articles focus on
"external
goods" such as wealth, power, honor, fame (or reputation), glory and
their
concomitants.
In art. 4 St. Thomas gives four general reasons why the good for human
beings cannot consist just in the possession of one or more of these
external
goods: (1) human fulfillment rules out all evil, whereas each of the
external
goods can be found in both good and evil people and can be used to do
either
good or evil; (2) beatitude is a sufficient good that does not
lack
any good necessary for a human being, whereas the external goods leave
out many necessary goods, e.g., wisdom, bodily health, love and
friendship,
etc.; (3) beatitude is a complete good from which no evil can come to a
person, whereas all of the external goods can lead to evil for their
possessors;
(4) a human being is ordered to beatitude by internal principles, since
each of us is naturally ordered toward our own perfection, whereas the
external goods come to us from without and in large measure
fortuitously
and by luck. (Shades of the Republic.)
- 2,5-6: The next two articles focus on those internal
goods that are
"goods
of the body". Think of health, longevity, good looks, bodily pleasures
of various kinds, bodily strength and fitness, athletic prowess,
comfort,
and by extention things like good food and drink, nice houses, hot
cars,
silk sheets (silk sheets?), etc. St. Thomas simply points out something
that anyone
with
well-ordered affections will immediately see to be true, viz., that the
goods of the body are ordered toward the goods of the soul. The goods
of
the
body are not in themselves sufficient and perfect. (Even though it is
in
some respects unfair to animals to say that so-and-so lives like an
animal,
still, you get the point.) The discussion of pleasure (or delight) is
very
instructive. Delight is a consequence of the possession of a
good
rather than its essence. And in the case of bodily pleasure, it is
evident
that our desire for such pleasure is great but just as evident (at
least
to those whose affections are well-ordered) that beatitude as defined
by
Aristotle does not consist solely in such pleasures and that, indeed,
the
obsessive thirst for such pleasures is one of the signs of a disordered
and unhappy life.
- 2,7: The next article focuses on those internal goods
that are goods of
the soul, e.g., intelligence, aesthetic enjoyment, artistic and
intellectual
accomplishment, friendship, virtue, relaxation, etc. As for the thing
that is our highest good, this cannot be any one or more of the goods
of
the soul, since these goods are not the complete good which wholly
satisfies
our desire. Rather, we desire a universal good, something that is good
in every way and has no defect or downside associated with it. Every good of the
soul
is, by contrast, a participated and hence limited good, one that,
however
good it might be, does not give us complete fulfillment. Also, as we
will
see later, permanence is one of the conditions of beatitude, and the
prospect
of death effectively means that we cannot achieve complete beatitude in
this life, even if we enjoy a high degree of the goods of the soul. On
the other hand, the manner of the possession of the highest
good
will obviously involve the soul, since it is in some way through the
soul
that we will possess the highest good.
- 2,8: Only God can be a sufficient and complete good for
us, since we
have
the universal good as an object of our will. Later St. Thomas will
distinguish
complete (or 'perfect') beatitude from incomplete (or imperfect)
beatitude.
A crucial question will be how these two sorts of beatitude are related
to one another.
- Question 3: The way in which the highest good must be
possessed for beatitude
- 3,1-2: God is the good we must attain to. But our
attainment or
possession
or enjoyment of God must be of a certain sort in order to be human
beatitude
or fulfillment. Not just any way of being related to God is sufficient.
In particular, beatitude must be a certain operation of our soul--an immanent
as opposed to transeunt operation--that has God as its object.
(And,
as well shall see, only a soul that is well-disposed in a special way
is
capable of having this operation.) Hence, because in this life we
cannot
have any such operation without interruption, we cannot have perfect
beatitude
in this life--though we can have a beginning of it under fortuitous
circumstances
to be spelled out later on. Look carefully at art. 2, ad 4: "In
man's
present state of life, his ultimate perfection is in the activity
whereby
he is united to God, but this activity cannot be continual ..... [and
so]
men cannot have complete beatitude in this life." This is
imperfect
or incomplete beatitude. Question: where and how is it
realized
in this life?
- 3, 3-5: The next three questions try to narrow down the
immediate
subject
of the operation in question--or, to put it another way, to determine
which
part or power of the soul is the relevant subject of this operation.
The
alternatives are: the sentient part, the will, the practical intellect,
and the speculative intellect. In art. 3 St. Thomas makes a useful
distinction
among (a) what is essential to--or part of the essence or
definition
of--beatitude, (b) what is [necessarily] antecedent to
beatitude,
and (c) what is [necessarily] consequent upon beatitude. In
other
words, we have to distinguish the essence or definition of beatitude
from
things which pertain to beatitude as either leading up to it (and/or
accompanying
it) or following upon it. (Remember the claim above that delight is not
part of the essence of beatitude but is instead consequent upon
beatitude.)
- Since beatitude consists in our being conjoined to God
in some way, and
since we cannot be joined to God through sentient operations, beatitude
cannot consist in possessing God through sentient operations (art. 3).
However, such operations do pertain to beatitude both as antecedents
(since the imperfect beatitude we can attain in this life depends on
sentient
operations) and as consequences (assuming that we will have
bodies in
patria), since our beatitude will spill over to the senses as well.
But the very operation by which we are joined to God will not depend on
the senses.
- But what about operations of the will, such as love and
delight (art. 4)?
We have already talked about delight. As for love, loving God is in
some
way superior to knowing God. To be sure, St. Thomas insists that
the essence of beatitude is knowing God (in some way); still,
it
turns out that loving God both precedes this knowledge as a necessary
prelude
and follows upon this knowledge as a necessary consequence. I emphasize
the role of love here in order to counter the objection that St.
Thomas's
notion of complete beatitude is excessively intellectualist. On
St.
Thomas's view the knowledge that is constitutive of beatitude is the
knowledge
of one who is in love--specifically in this case, in love with God in
the
appropriate way. Another way to say this is that human beatitude
consists in being a saint (and not, pace Socrates and Plato and
Aristotle and the Stoics, etc., a philosopher). In fact, as
ST 1.12.6
makes clear and as St. Thomas says in various places, those who love
God more see God's essence more perfectly because of the greater
intensity of their desire for Him.
- So beatitude consists in an operation of the intellect
with respect to
God. But what sort of intellectual operation? Not, St. Thomas says, an
act of the practical intellect, e.g., deliberation, judgment, command.
For (a) a speculative intellectual operation with respect to God is our
highest and most perfect operation, since it is an operation of our
highest
power with respect to our highest object, viz., God; (b) speculative
understanding
(contemplation) is most sought after for itself, whereas practical
understanding
is ordered toward action; and (c) contemplation emulates God and the
angels,
whereas lower animals partly emulate us with respect to the practical
life.
(Note: Imperfect beatitude consists principally in contemplation and
secondarily
in those operations of the practical intellect by which we order our
actions
and passions--would-be saints must be contemplative souls even in the
midst
of activity.)
- 3, 6-8: But if it is speculative intellectual operations
we speaking of
here, then what sort of knowledge is the best? Knowledge of all the
speculative
[natural and mathematical] sciences (art. 6)? Knowledge of the
separated
substances (art. 7)? Here we begin to see St. Thomas distance himself
from
the ancient philosophical schools.
- Distinguishing perfect beatitude from that
participation in beatitude
that
we call imperfect beatitude, we can say with confidence that perfect
beatitude
does not consist in scientific knowledge, because such knowledge cannot
take us beyond the strength of the first principles of the relevant
science,
viz., what we accept as evident to the senses. Such knowledge is
perfective
of us only to the extent that the forms we come to know through it
participate
in something ("the intelligible light") superior to our own minds.
(Redolent
of Plato.) Our ultimate perfection must consist in knowledge of
something
more perfect than our own intellect--even though we can aver that our
scientific
knowledge gives us a certain participation in true and perfect
beatitude.
Note the reply to 2 in art. 6: "Not only is complete beatitude
desired
naturally, but also any likeness or participation in it."
- As for the separated substances (art. 7), an object of
the intellect is
more perfective of the intellect to the extent that it satisfies the
concept
of the perfect object of the intellect. But what has a perfection
through
its essence is more perfect than what has it through participation.
Since
the object of the intellect is truth, what has truth through its
essence
is a more perfect object of the intellect than what has truth through
participation.
This can only be the highest being, viz., God. So beatitude does not
consist
in knowledge of separated substances, despite the fact that they are
more
perfect than our cognitive powers.
- In the end (art. 8) St. Thomas arrives at the
conclusion that it is knowledge
of God that our beatitude consists in--but not, of course, the sort of
knowledge of God that the natural sciences and metaphysics can yield.
For
such knowledge is not knowledge of God's essence--or, at least,
knowledge
of his whole essence, since we do not start with a quidditative concept
of God. So perfect beatitude requires that we attain cognitively to the
essence of God--something that, as we shall see, is not possible for us
in this life and, more worrisomely, not possible for our natural
cognitive
powers. Notice how understated St. Thomas's conclusion is
here.
One reason is that he has already discussed the metaphysics of the
beatific
vision at ST 1, q. 12.
- Question 4: The prerequisites of beatitude
- 4,1-2: In this question we clarify further some of the
aspects of beatitude,
and this gives us a fuller idea of what is involved. St. Thomas
distinguishes
four ways in which something can be required for beatitude without
being part
of the essence of beatitude: (1) as something preparatory for
beatitude;
(2) as something that completes beatitude; (3) as something
that assists
it from without; (4) as something that is concomitant with
beatitude.
For instance, in these articles we find out that pleasure (or better:
delight)
is a necessary concomitant of beatitude, but that it is subordinate to
the beatific vision, since the will rests only because it has attained
the object which it desires and which is such that, having attained
that
object, the will desires nothing else. Again, we find out that
rectitude
of will of the appropriate sort is both preparatory for and concomitant
with beatitude.
- 4,3: Here we delve a bit deeper into the nature of the
vision itself.
Does
the beatific vision involve comprehending God's nature or
essence?
(See ST 1.12.7) St. Thomas first gives us here a rather deep
explanation
of our longing for our true ultimate end. Since God is an intelligible
(vs. sensible) end, we are ordered to Him both (a) through our intellect,
to the extent that we even now have a partial and imperfect cognition
of
our end, and (b) through our will, to the extent that we (i)
love
our end and (ii) bear a real relation of hope to it. (Hope is the
relation
the lover bears to the object loved when that object is absent,
possible
to attain, but not possible to attain easily or immediately.) Now in
the beatific
vision all three of these elements are satisfied. Perfect cognition
(vision)
replaces imperfect cognition (faith and/or natural knowledge); the
presence
of the end (comprehension) replaces hope, and delight in a now present
object of love brings love (charity) to completion. But what does comprehend
mean here, exactly? What sort of immediate presence is it? In ad 1 St.
Thomas distinguishes two senses: (1) x comprehends y
iff y is included in x, and in this sense
whatever is comprehended
by something finite is itself finite; (2) x comprehends y
iff x grasps y as something now possessed. This latter is the
sense
required by beatitude. (Perhaps apprehension is a more accurate
English term.)
- 4,4: This is an important article. Its upshot is that not
just anyone
can
be granted the beatific vision. In particular, rectitude of will (i.e.,
moral uprightness--indeed, supernatural moral uprightness in the form
of
charity) is required as a preparation because without it one is
not appropriately transformed from within and properly ordered toward
the true
ultimate
end. That is, without it we do not love our true ultimate end (see
above)
and hence do not pursue it. And just as matter that is not properly
disposed
cannot receive a given form, so a person who is not properly disposed
to
the ultimate end cannot attain that end--indeed, such a person does not
want
to attain it. (This is to some extent challenged by the objections in
q.
5, art. 7.) By the same token, rectitude of will is required concomitantly
because the will of one who see's God's essence must love whatever God
loves, and loving whatever God loves is what makes a will upright. The
upshot is that (i) God cannot grant the beatific vision to
someone
who lacks rectitude of will and that (ii) someone without rectitude of
will does not love that which his true beatitude consists in. (Such is
the stuff of moral tragedy.) Later, in our treatment of the theological
virtues, we will establish a supernatural framework in which this
notion
of rectitude of will is put into a more general context.
Basically,
moral uprightness of the sort appropriate for the beatific vision
results
from the exercise of the virtues, the chief among which is charity,
since
it motivates the acts of the others.
- 4,5-6: The question of the relation of beatitude to the
body is a
tricky
one for St. Thomas, since he holds to the Aristotelian view that the
soul
is not the human being and yet also holds that the saints are beatified
even now and that they help us by their prayers. Also, in art. 5 he
makes
explicit the distinction between perfect (complete) beatitude
and
the imperfect (incomplete) beatitude that is attainable in this
life. The problem here is what to make of imperfect beatitude, since it
can be interpreted in either a straight Aristotelian sense (what is
attainable
in this life through our natural powers) or a Christian Aristotelian
sense
(what is attainable in this life only with the assistance of divine
grace).
In any case, imperfect beatitude, however it is taken, requires the
body
because we require the body for all of our intellectual operations in
this
life. As for perfect beatitude, St. Thomas denies that the saints will
be happy only after the Last Judgment. Rather, since the intellectual
operation
that constitutes beatitude is wholly independent of the body, it can be
had without the body. Still, the presence of the body perfects
beatitude
in the way that, say, good looks perfect the body--not by adding to its
essence but by enhancing it in a manner that accords with its nature.
And
in art. 6 we find that the body in question must be in some way a
"spiritual"
body, i.e., a body completely subjected to the soul--like Christ's body
after the resurrection.
- 4,7-8: External goods are necessary for imperfect
beatitude, in much
the
way that Aristotle outlines in the Ethics, i.e., as subserving
and
facilitating the virtuous practical and speculative activities which
lie
at the heart of the beatitude attainable in this life. However, no such
goods--and the same holds for the goods of the body--are required for
perfect beatitude. Note ad 2: "Yet in [the state of] perfect beatitude
there
will
be a gathering together of all goods, since whatever good is found in
these
[external and bodily] goods will be had in its entirety in the highest
source of goods." Likewise, various goods of the soul, such as
friendship,
which are not part of the essence of beatitude, nonetheless contribute
to its "well-being" (bene esse).
- Question 5: The attainment of beatitude
- 5,1: Given our previous discussions, it is an open
question whether and
how beatitude might be attainable by us. According to St. Thomas, the
fact
that we can entertain the notion of a universal and perfect good and
also
desire such a good shows that we are capable (at least in principle) of
attaining beatitude. (See ST 1.12 for further clarification of
what
is involved in a creature's vision of God.)
- 5,2: Is it possible for one beatified person to be
happier than
another?
On the surface it might seem that the answer is no, since the essence
of beatitude is the same for all. St. Thomas, however, demurs.
Individuals
can, he asserts, differ in their enjoyment of the essence of God to the
extent that some are better disposed or ordered toward this enjoyment
than
others. (This, we find out in other places, is a difference in degrees
of supernatural charity.) It is not that they differ in that some
desire
a further good. It is rather that some are able to enjoy the same good
to a greater degree. (There are analogies from our experience.)
- 5,3-4: Here we come face to face with the distinction
between perfect
and
imperfect beatitude. Obviously, with the specter of death confronting
us,
we cannot be perfectly happy in this life, since we desire permanence
as
part of beatitude; but all the other evil conditions of this
life--ignorance,
disordered affections, and the afflictions of the body--are
unavoidable.
[Note art. 3, ad 2 for a further insight into what St. Thomas means by
imperfect beatitude here.] Likewise, imperfect beatitude can be lost,
in
both its contemplative and active aspects. But the same cannot be true
of perfect beatitude.
- 5,5-6: This question is an important one, since it gives
some
indication
of our starting point. Here St. Thomas uses "imperfect beatitude" in a
sense in which it is attainable by our natural powers. Perfect
beatitude,
however, is not attainable by our natural powers, even though we do
have
"free choice, by which we can turn ourselves to God, who makes us
happy."
And in art. 6 we learn that God alone can make us happy. Still,
we are aided by angels and other human beings in our quest for
beatitude,
since they aid us with respect to those things that are preparatory for
beatitude.
- 5,7: Even though God could immediately bestow the right
disposition
(rectitude
of will) on someone who did not have it, "the order of divine wisdom
requires
that this not happen." Note, though, that the principle element here
(see
ad 2) consists in the merits of Christ and only secondarily in the
merit
that we earn by our free choices within the framework of salvation
founded
upon Christ's merits.
- 5,8: It may seem strange for St. Thomas to raise here the
question of
whether
everyone desires beatitude. But it is good for him to do so. What he
suggests
is that even though everyone desires beatitude described generally, not
everyone desires the relevant object (God), the operation by which one
possesses that object in the way required for beatitude (the vision of
God's essence), or all the prerequisites for that operation (e.g.,
especially
rectitude of will). There is a lot below the surface here. First of
all,
it seems that there can be differences in the clarity (or obscurity)
with
which one understands the ultimate end; and, second, it seems that
these
differences can stem from a number of sources, e.g., defects of the
intellect
(voluntary and involuntary ignorance), defects of the will (malice),
disordered
affections (concupiscence), etc. This helps us to begin to see the role
of (i) philosophy as the knowledge of first principles, of (ii) the
moral
and intellectual virtues, and of (iii) the theological virtues and
gifts
of the Holy Spirit. More on this below.
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