Question 90: On the essence of law
90, 1-4: St. Thomas here delineates the four defining characteristics
of law:
(i) a dictate of practical reason,
(ii) ordered toward the common good,
(iii) made by one who has care for the community, and
(iv) promulgated.
Question 91: On the types of law
91,1: Eternal Law = the order of divine providence as
promulgated from eternity by God, according to which each rational and
non-rational creature is ordered toward the good of the universe.
91,2: Natural Law = a certain participation in eternal
law insofar as we have providence over ourselves and others and can order
ourselves and others toward the good of our nature; the light of natural
reason whereby we discern what is good and evil--which pertains to natural
law--is nothing other than the imprint of the divine light in us.
(The precepts of the natural law are best studied in connection with Question
100 on the moral precepts of the Old Law.)
91,3: Human Law = particular statutes instituted in accord
with human reason for the good of civil society.
91,4: Divine Law = revealed law, which leads us toward
our supernatural end, gives us certitude with respect to what is to be
done and what it is to be avoided, governs our interior acts as well as
our exterior acts, and guarantees that no sin at all is unprohibited and
unpunished. Divine law is divided into the Old Law and the New Law, which
are related as child (imperfect) to adult (perfect). They differ with respect
to end (sensible and earthly goods vs. intelligible and heavenly goods),
subject matter (exterior acts vs. interior acts), and motivations for obeying
the law (fear vs. love).
91,5: Law of the fomes: In us the fomes peccati--i.e.,
the inclination of sensuality, which is natural to brute animals--is a
punishment for sin and thus falls under the notion of law.
Question 92: On the effects of law
92,1: It is an effect of law to make us good, since obedience
to law causes acquired virtue, both disposing us toward infused virtue
and helping us conserve and promote already possessed infused virtue.
92,2: The four effects of law are:
(i) precept (command)
(ii) prohibition
(iii) permission, and
(iv) punishment.
Question 93: On eternal law
93,1: The notion of divine wisdom has two aspects with respect
to the created world:
Creation: with respect to creation God is an artist and so his
wisdom has the character of an art or exemplar or idea, through which the
world is created as God's artifact.
Governance: with respect to governance God is the ruler of the
movements of things and so his wisdom has the character of an eternal law
according to which he directs the world.
93,2-3: This eternal law is known to all rational creatures at least
to some extent through its effects, and it is known in itself to God and
the blessed. What's more, because of its primacy, eternal law is such that
all other law (natural, divine, human, and even the law of sin insofar
as it is a form of punishment) derives from it.
93,4-6: As for the contents of eternal law, only what could have
been but need not have been, absolutely speaking, is subject to eternal
law, and so eternal law does not include metaphysical necessities or impossibilities.
But all contingencies are contained in eternal law. God directs contingent
beings by impressing on them the principles of their own acts and (in the
case of rational creatures) an understanding of divine precepts. So human
beings participate in eternal law in two ways: (i) through cognition and
(ii) through action and passion (i.e., through moving principles). The
former is distinctive of rational creatures, whereas the latter pertains
to rational and non-rational creatures alike. Further, the virtuous, who
are aided by faith and grace, participate in eternal law in a more perfect
way than the vicious, in whom both the inclination to virtue and the knowledge
of good and evil are obstructed.
Question 94: On natural law
94,1: Natural law consists of precepts that are the object of
a natural habitual cognition (synderesis), which is to the practical
order what the understanding of first principles (intellectus) is
to the speculative order.
94,2: The natural law is founded on the first principle of law,
viz., Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided, which
plays a role in the practical sphere similar to that of the principle of
non-contradiction in the speculative or theoretical sphere.
All the material precepts of natural law have to do with what practical
reason naturally apprehends as human goods--the conservation of individual
existence, the conservation of the species (e.g., sexual intercourse and
the education of offspring), and the good of reason (e.g., knowledge of
the truth about God and living together in society). In the section
on the moral precepts of the Old Law St. Thomas distinguishes three levels
of the precepts according to the level of evidentness they have.
First level: love of God and neighbor; second level: precepts of the Old
Law (Ten Commandments), which specify the first level; third level: precepts
discerned by the wise that specify the second level.
94,3: Since reason naturally apprehends as a human good a life
led in accordance with reason, all acts of virtue pertain to natural law.
This is not to say, however, that natural law prescribes every particular
act of virtue, since not every act of virtue is such that we are naturally
inclined to it by our primary inclination to the human good. Rather, inclinations
to such acts result from our knowledge of natural law and our inquiry into
alternative ways of living well as human beings within the parameters of
the law. (This is where third-level precepts are especially important.)
94,4: Natural law has to do with those things to which man is
naturally inclined, and among these inclinations is the inclination to
act according to reason. Reason proceeds from the more general to the more
particular. Practical reason descends from quasi-necessary general
principles to more and more particular considerations--this is why certain
general rules are subject to exceptions. So even though the general practical
principles are right and true and equally known by everyone, it is not
the case that with respect to particulars the same thing is practically
true or right in all situations or that what is right is equally known
to everyone. And even for those for whom the same thing is right with respect
to particulars, what is right is better known to some (the wise) than to
others. For instance, everyone knows that in general what has been borrowed
ought to be returned. But it takes practical wisdom to recognize situations
in which it would be contrary to reason--and hence wrong--to return what
has been borrowed (recall the Republic). For it takes wisdom to
distinguish between circumstances that are and circumstances that are not
morally relevant. And such wisdom is acquired in part through living well.
More generally, in question 100, on the moral precepts of the Old Law--which
precepts St. Thomas takes to be a revelation of the natural law--he distinguishes
three levels. First are the two fundamental precepts of the natural
law: (a) to love God above all other things and (b) to love one's
neighbors as oneself. The second-level precepts are the specification
of these two precepts in general principles, as revealed by the Ten Commandments.
The third-level precepts are not as evident as the first two and demand
wisdom and experience in order to be known and prudently applied.
(The above example is relevant here.)
"So one should say that with respect to the first general principles,
the natural law is the same for all, regarding both what is right and knowledge
of what is right. But with respect to certain particulars, which are quasi-conclusions
drawn from the general principles, the natural law is the same for all
in most cases, regarding both what is right and knowledge of what is right.
But in a few cases [these conclusions] can be wrong, because of some particular
impediments (just as generable and corruptible natures have defects in
a few cases, because of impediments), or even unknown (and this because
some have a reason that has been corrupted by passion or bad habit--e.g.,
as Julius Caesar reports in The Gallic Wars, among the Germans theft
was at one time not considered wrong, even though it is expressly contrary
to the natural law.)"
94,5-6: Natural law cannot change by subtraction, although it
can be added to in accordance with divine and human laws which, while not
violating natural law, prove useful for human life. Also, no matter how
corrupt an individual or society becomes, the most general principles of
natural law cannot be erased from the human heart--even though, as we have
seen, reason can be impeded by passion from applying these general principles
in particular situations. But other, secondary, precepts can be erased
from the human heart by bad but persuasive arguments and also by depraved
customs and corrupt habits. (Here St. Thomas refers to Romans 1.)
|