St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
- A. Faith and Reason
- 1. Wisdom and the Christian faith
- 2. Preambles vs. mysteries
- 3. Four natural questions
- 4. Five theses about faith and reason
-
B. The Structure of Natural Theology
- 1. Part One: Proof of the existence of a
First Efficient Cause
- 2. An Interlude: The dangers
- 3. Part Two: Via remotionis
- 4. Part Three: Via affirmationis
-
C. Human Happiness
- 1. The structure of a (classical) moral
theory
- 2. Is there an ultimate end for human beings?
- 3. What object(s) must we possess to be
fully happy?
- 4. How must we possess the infinite good in
order to be fully
happy?
- 5. What are the requirements for attaining
happiness?
- 6. Can we attain happiness?
7. The Saint and the Philosopher
A. Faith and Reason
- 1. Wisdom and the Christian faith
- Remember Simmias in the Phaedo: "One should
achieve one of these things: learn the truth about these things or find
it for oneself, or, if that is impossible, adopt the best and most
irrefutable of men's theories, and, borne upon this, sail through the
dangers of life as upon a raft, unless someone should make that
journey safer and less risky upon a firmer vessel of some divine
doctrine."
Well, St. Thomas (like Fr. Sorin, say) believes that the journey has in
fact been made more safe upon the firmer vessel of God's
self-revelation in Jesus Christ, conveyed to us by Catholic doctrine
and sacramental life. (Of course, the journey might be more safe
intellectually, but pretty perilous affectively and morally, especially
if the stakes are really high--and St. Thomas, like Socrates before
him, thinks that they are.)
- Christianity and secular wisdom: This raises the issue of
just how Catholic seekers after wisdom should think of their relation
to the morally and intellectually well-disposed non-Christian
philosophers. (Another way to pose the issue is this: how is the ideal
of the philosopher proposed to us by the likes of Socrates and Plato
related to the ideal of the saint proposed by the likes of St. Thomas?
More on this below.)
- The first nine chapters of the Summa Contra Gentiles
constitute the heart of St. Thomas's answer to this question, which is
that the classical search for wisdom is intrinsically valuable, but can
find its fulfillment--even by its own standards of success--only in
Catholic doctrine and practice. His answer thus differs both (a) from
those Christians who claim that philosophy has no intrinsic value but
is now simply replaced by Christian doctrine and practice (the
so-called fideists) and (b) from those--Christians or
non-Christians--who claim that philosophy is a wholly autonomous
discipline that is not replaced by Christian doctrine and practice and,
in addition, does not find its fulfillment in them (the so-called rationalists).
- Aside: we should distinguish the comprehensive and
coherent articulation of a claim to wisdom from the defense
of such a claim against alternatives. St. Thomas's systematic
articulation of the Catholic claim to wisdom is found in his Summa
Theologiae, of which we will be reading one little part. In
contrast, his task in the Summa Contra Gentiles
is to show his intellectually and morally well-disposed non-Christian
predecessors that Christian wisdom is even by their own lights a
plausible candidate for the wisdom they are seeking. (Imagine St.
Thomas paying a visit to the first circle of Dante's Inferno --
populated by, among others, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the great
Muslim philosophers Avicenna and Averroes (aka
The Commentator) -- and saying, "Ok, boys, let's talk!") In the process
he means to show both the inherent power and the inherent limitations
of natural reason.
-
Absolute wisdom = firm cognitive grasp of
(a) God in Himself (first principle of being in itself) [metaphysics]
(b) creatures insofar as they come from
God (origin of all beings, including human beings) [metaphysics]
(c) creatures insofar as they are ordered to
God as their
end (destiny of all beings, including human beings) [moral theory]
In the first three books of the Summa Contra Gentiles, St.
Thomas tries to show how much of this wisdom the great non-Christian
philosophers either (a) have succeeded in establishing or (b) could
have succeeded in establishing if they had done better by their own
methods and standards, without any overt appeal to divine revelation.
- The fruits of philosophy as a way of life whose
intellectual goal is to attain as much evidential certitude as possible about the
components of absolute wisdom:
- intrinsic fruits: perfection, sublimity,
usefulness, joy
- extrinsic fruits: resource for engaging
philosophers who do not accept Christian revelation (apologetics)
- 2. Preambles of the faith vs.
mysteries of the faith
- Definitions:
- Preambles of the faith: Propositions, revealed
by God, that human
reason could in principle come to knowledge of without the aid
of
revelation.
(Question: why does St. Thomas think that there are many such
truths? Answer: because he's read his philosophers and been impressed.)
- Mysteries of the faith: Propositions, revealed by
God, that human
reason could not even in principle come to knowledge of without
the aid of revelation.
- Representative examples (according to St. Thomas):
Preambles
|
Mysteries
|
God exists |
Creation in time |
There is one God |
Fall of Adam |
God is eternal |
Call of the Patriarchs and Moses |
God is immaterial |
Trinity |
God is simple |
Incarnation of the Son of God |
God is good |
Atonement: Life, death, & resurrection of Christ |
God is just |
Coming of the Holy Spirit |
God is merciful |
The Church: Sacraments and Teaching |
God is provident |
The last things: Final Judgment, Heaven, Hell |
|
- 3. Four natural questions
- Is it likely that there are truths about God that exceed
our natural cognitive
abilities? [Chapter 3] (The
main argument here is that our natural knowledge of God is limited to
what is involved in his causing and acting in the world; hence, the
"inner" life of God (e.g., as revealed in the Christian doctrine of the
relations among the three divine persons) is wholly hidden from us.)
-
Wasn't it pointless of God to reveal the preambles? [Chapter 4]
(For
various reasons, only a few are capable of becoming philosophers, and
even they would not have secure wisdom; but everyone needs this
knowledge in order to live the best kind of life for a human being.)
-
Isn't it wrong for God to demand that we accept the mysteries of the
faith,
given that they exceed our natural cognitive abilities? [Chapter 5]
(Without cognition of the mysteries, we cannot understand clearly
what our ultimate end is or how to live so as to achieve it.)
-
Isn't it in any case stupid, foolish, and irresponsible for us to
assent to the mysteries
of the faith, given that they exceed our natural cognitive abilities? [Chapter
6] (Notice
here that St. Thomas answers not by trying to prove the
mysteries--that's impossible according to him. Rather, he answers by
giving reasons for thinking that the authority that stands behind the
mysteries is reliable.)
- 4. Five theses about faith and reason
(Chapters
7-9)
- There can be no genuine conflict between the
deliverances of faith
and the deliverances of reason (vs. both (a) enlightenment rationalism
(or modernism), which separates reason from faith and gives
exclusive preference to reason, and (b) fideism,
which separates reason from faith and gives exclusive preference to
faith).
- Apparent conflicts are in principle resolvable by
us, though this demands that we get very clear about just what the
deliverances of faith are and just what the deliverances of reason are.
(Side note: with regard to the mysteries, we can at least show by
natural reason that they are not self-contradictory or intrinsically
incoherent--this is the burden of book 4 of the Summa Contra Gentiles.)
-
Philosophical or scientific objections to the faith can and should be
answered
on their own terms--this is an important task for Christian
intellectuals
(vs. fideistic tendencies).
-
Reason, while not so corrupted by sin that on its own it yields
falsehoods
as certitudes, nonethess needs the guidance of faith to do its
best
(vs. rationalist tendencies).
-
Philosophical reason is an important tool in spreading and maintaining
the faith.
- Note: These theses apply to both
metaphysical doctrines and moral
doctrines.
- For more on chapters 1-9 see my The Necessity for Revelation: A Primer on Summa Contra Gentiles 1, Chaps. 1-9
B. The Structure of Natural Theology
- 1. Part One: Proof of the existence
of a First Efficient Cause (FEC) [chapter
13]
- Definition of an FEC:
- An FEC is an agent that acts (causes, moves) but is not
acted upon (caused,
moved, changed)
- Form of the proof:
- From effect to cause ["cosmological" proof] and not
from the mere
concept of a most perfect possible being ["ontological"
proof]
- Conclusion of the proof:
- There is at least one First Efficient Cause, and so it
itself is uncaused and not changed by anything. [Important
Note: This argument does not prove, and is not meant to prove, that the
world has a beginning in time. Rather, it is meant to show that if any
change is occurring now, then there must be a presently acting First
Efficient Cause of that change.] [Second Important Note: You do
not have enough background to understand this argument deeply, and in
some Intro courses the argument is dismissed out of hand. I guess the
instructors are not up on the latest stuff being done by Edward Feser,
among others. For explanations of the argument that you might be able
to handle, see Feser's The Last Superstition and Aquinas (A Beginner's Guide)]
- 2. An interlude: The dangers
- Anthropomorphism: The position according to
which God is a being
who has perfections proportionate to those of creatures, only to a much
higher degree (God as superman)
- Obscurantism: The position according to which God
is so utterly
different from creatures that none of the perfections belonging to
creatures
in any way resembles any perfection belonging to God (God as wholly
incomprehensible)
- 3. Part Two: Via remotionis [= the method of removing
or denying]
- Explanation: [chapter 14]
- We have no positive quidditative or
natural-kind concept
of God
-
The preceding proof yields a being which falls under the concept First
Efficient Cause
-
We have to begin by determining how a First Efficient Cause differs
from the things we do have positive quidditative concepts of. This
is accomplished by arguing that various features of such things must
be denied of a First Efficient Cause.
- Execution:
- An FEC does not have a beginning or an end (= is
eternal) [chapter 15]
-
An FEC is not intrinsically measured by time (= is intrinsically
atemporal)
[chapter 15]
-
An FEC does not have does not have passive potency and so cannot become
more perfect or less perfect [chapter 16]
-
An FEC is not the matter or stuff out of which the material universe is
composed [chapter 17]
-
An FEC does not have any sort of composition (= is simple). The types
of
composition denied of an FEC are these:
- composition of bodily parts [chap. 20]
- composition of substance and nature [chap. 21]
- composition of being and essence [chap. 22]
- composition of substance and accident [chap. 23]
- composition of genus and difference [chap. 24]
- An FEC does not belong to a natural kind [chapter 25]
-
An FEC is not the form or structure of the universe or of any material
thing [chapters 26-27]
- Conclusion: The FEC is a perfect being, unlimited in
perfection and utterly weird, i.e., unlike any object of our ordinary experience of [chapter 28] [check against anthropomorphism]
- 4. Part Three: Via affirmationis [=
the method of affirming]
- Foundation: the similarity of effects to causes.
The result is that
some names are predicated of God literally and not just metaphorically
[chapter 29] [check against obscurantism]
- Constraint: The FEC is an utterly transcendent
perfect being. The result is that those
names which are predicated literally of God are predicated of him via analogical
rather than univocal predication [chapter 28] [check against
anthropormorphism]
- Literal and metaphorical predication:
- Names that are literally predicated of God:
- Those which signify pure perfections: 'wise',
'good', 'intelligent',
'provident', 'merciful', 'just', etc.
-
Those which signify preeminence in perfection: 'First Efficient
Cause', 'Unmoved Mover', 'Unlimited (Unparticipated) Being', 'Pure
Actuality',
etc.
-
Names that are metaphorically predicated of God:
- Those which signify a perfection but express a
mode that can belong
only to a creature: 'rock', 'mighty fortress', 'lion', 'paper
towel'.
- Types of literal predication:
- Univocal: Same name and same kind of
form or perfection: 'Socrates is wise'
and 'Plato is wise'
- Equivocal: Same name but utterly disparate
forms or perfections: 'Babe Ruth's
bat weighs 37 ounces' and 'A bat is a mammal'
- Analogical: Same name and different but ordered
forms or perfections:
'This animal is healthy' and 'This food is healthy'; 'This person
is intelligent' and 'This paper is intelligent"
- As applied to God: 'Socrates is wise' --- 'God is
wise', but not like Socrates --- 'God is Wisdom'
- Some positive attributions arrived at by means of
the via affirmationis--based
on principle that a perfect being has what it is more perfect to have
than
to lack:
- goodness
- uniqueness
- intelligence
- power
- freedom
- love
- mercy
- justice
- providence
- blessedness ........This is precisely what God offers
us a participation
in = human beatitude
C. Human Happiness (see The
structure of a medieval quaestio)
- 1. The structure of a (classical) moral
theory
1. What is the good or ultimate end for human beings?
2. What is our starting point (the 'human condition')?
3. How do we get from where we are to where we want to be?
4. How do we come by knowledge of the sort that enables us
to answer
questions 1-3?
- 2. Is there an ultimate end for human
beings?
[Question 1]
- From natural inclination to rational desire
-
Human act vs. act of a human being
-
The ultimate end or ultimate good:
- Formal notion: Human happiness (or
beatitude or fulfillment or perfection or
excellence or flourishing)--that which satisfies all our well-ordered
desires.
- Material notion: That which human beings de
facto desire
as their ultimate end.
- The examined life for a human being = A life
whose human actions
are ordered toward the right sort of attainment of that object which those with
well-disposed
affections desire as their ultimate end. [See ques. 5, art. 8, ad 3]
- 3. What object(s) must we possess to be
fully happy?
[Question 2]
- Possibilities:
- External Goods: wealth, honor, fame (glory),
power
- Internal Goods:
- Goods of the Body: longevity; good health;
good looks; strength
and athletic prowess; food and drink; transportation; clothing;
housing;
sensory pleasure (including comfort in general and sensory pleasure),
etc.
- Goods of the Soul: intellectual ability and
accomplishment; moral
virtue; friendship; artistic ability, accomplishment, and appreciation;
knowledge (especially philosophical and scientific knowledge), etc.
- Conclusion: No finite good or set of finite goods
can completely satisfy
our desire for human happiness--only an infinite good (God) can satisfy
this desire.
Note: See the material on "imperfect happiness" or "imperfect beatitude'
- 4. How must we possess the infinite
good in
order to be fully happy? [Question 3]
- Complete human happiness is:
- an activity
-
an activity of the intellectual part of the soul
-
an intellectual activity of the soul by which we apprehend God
directly
[or "face to face"], so that (i) we know God and all other things
in
the way He knows them and, as a result, (ii) we love God and all other
things in the way He loves them. In other words, we share in the inner
'family' life of the triune God. This is called the beatific vision.
- 5. What are the requirements for
attaining happiness?
[Question 4]
- Antecedent requirement: rectitude of the
will (supernatural charity)
- Concomitant requirements:
- Absolute: Love of God, delight in God,
rectitude of the will, love
of whatever real good is present in created things
- Relative: Bodily delight, friendship with others
who share the beatific
vision
- 6. Can we attain happiness?
[Question 5]
- We can attain happiness, but .....
- not in this life [art. 3]
-
not by our natural powers [art. 5]
-
not without rectitude of will [art. 7]
-
not without supernatural grace healing us and elevating us [art. 7, ad
2]
- 7. The Saint and the Philosopher
- The
Philosopher is motivated ultimately by a love of excellence, even in
his or her striving to be fit for friendship. The saint, by contrast,
is motivated mainly by love of God and of others for the sake of God,
but this is possible only by God's own free and gratuitous initiative.
- The
contemplation associated with philosophy is a human achievement that
does not satisfy every well-ordered desire, even though this is the
best we can do by our natural powers.. By contrast, the 'contemplation'
associated with the saint is the loving conversation that is called
prayer in this life and that is perfected by the beatific vision in the
next life. Its intensity depends on the intensity of love.
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