CHAPTER VI: THE DIVISION OF ANALOGY

How many kinds of analogous name are there? If we should put this question to Cajetan, the answer received could be that there are four kinds, or it could be that there is but one. Recent interpreters have often proposed different types than Cajetan; some even tend to treat every instance of analogous name as a special type. The texts of St Thomas, at first reading, give us a straightforward answer to our question. In the majority of texts, we find a twofold division of analogous names. however, on one occasion,^{1} St Thomas gave a threefold division and, as it happened, it is that division which forms the structure of Cajetan's De nominum analogia. Indeed, when the threefold division is considered together with Quaestio Disputata de veritate, question two, article eleven, the interpretation of Cajetan seems to command assent; we find ourselves disposed to accept his way of treating the twofold division which is to relegate it to the status of a subdivision of what is not really analogy at all, namely, "analogy of attribution." In this chapter, we shall first examine the texts in which the two fold division is given; the other two texts will then be taken up as difficulties to be resolved in the light of the twofold division. The result of this analysis should make it clear that Cajetan has based his opuscle on texts which adopt a very special point of view and do nothing towards calling into question the fact that, for St Thomas, there are but two kinds of analogous name.

1. MULTORUM AD UNUM, UNIUS AD ALTERUM

Things are named analogically when they have a common name which signifies neither the same ratio nor wholly diverse rationes as said of each of them. Analogous signification is said to be as it were midway between univocal and equivocal signification, participating something of each.^{2}

Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in vunivocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum de urina dictum significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.^{3}

    It can happen that what a name properly signifies is not one of the things which are said to be named analogically. For example, if urine and food are said to be healthy, they receive the common name because of their reference to a third thing, to that which "healthy" signifies per prius and most properly. So too, quality and relation are named being because of their proportions to what that term signifies per prius and most properly, namely, substance. This type of analogy is called that of several to one (multorum ad unum). Sometimes, on the other hand two things receive a common name because one has a proportion to the other. For example, when food and animal are said to be healthy, this is because food has a proportion to the health of the animal. Animal, of course, is not called healthy with reference to some other thing. So too when substance and quantity are named being; quantity has a proportion to substance. This type of analogy is called that of one thing to another (unius ad alterum)^{6}

    This twofold division of things named analogically does not go beyond the logical doctrine of signification. What is important here is not the examples, but what they exemplify. We name things as we know them and sometimes things have a common name which is neither univocal nor purely equivocal. If we ask what the name means, we sometimes find that the different notions include a reference to a third thing, sometimes that one notion refers to the other. It is difficult to envisage any other type of analogical community. Doubtless this is why, in the texts with which we are now concerned, St Thomas seems so emphatic in saying that things can be named analogically in either of two ways. He clearly intends the division to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, there is a series of difficulties to be faced before the exhaustiveness of this division can be accepted, difficulties which arise from other texts of St Thomas.

    St Thomas often speaks of the proportions of things named analogically as ad unum, ab uno or in uno.^{7} Is this a division of the analogy of names? Cajetan seems to feel it is a division of "analogy of attribution."^{8} But if this were a division of the analogy of names, it would have to introduce some differences into what is proper to that mode of signifying. And this it does not do. A cursory examination of a text where this division of what can be the per prius of the analogous name is used suffices to show this.

    The listing of the various causes which can serve as the primary analogate of an analogous name is in function of showing that the unity of analgous names is not a oneness of ratio, as is the case with univocal names. "Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur."^{9} Things named being which do not perfectly save the ratio propria of that term are referred to what does, "quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura." So too with urine, food and medicine when they are called healthy; they are referred to one end. "Nam ratio sani secundum quod dicitur de diaeta, consistit in conservando sanitatem."^{10} Sometimes several things are referred to one efficient cause: the doctor is said to be medical, and when instruments and potions are called medical, it is by reference to the doctor as efficient cause. (Notice that the efficient cause to which the things secondarily signified refer is not here their efficient cause,^{11}) Sometimes many things ae referred to one subject, as in the case of "being."

    That this division of the various causes which can be the per prius of an analogous name does not divide the logical notion itself is clear from the fact that as analogous names they are all explained in the same way. Whether it is a material, efficient or final cause to which other things are proportioned, their notions will include it insofar as they share a common name with it. Thus, no difference in the logic of analogy is generated. Moreover, the two fold division already discussed can be exemplified no matter what kind of cause is the per prius. For example, "medical" said of scalpel and aspirin gives us an instance of multorum ad unum, whereas said of Doctore Kildare and the scalpel it give us an instance of unius ad alterum.

2. PROPORTION AND PROPORTIONALITY

The texts presenting the two fold division of things named analogically are emphatic and clear. Yet the knowledgeable reader will be annoyed by the prominence we give this division; must we not distinguish between proportion, which can be divided in the manner discussed, and proportionality, which seemingly cannot? As soon as one moves from the Summa theologiae to the texts which play a priviledged role in Cajetan's opuscle, the clarity of the twofold division begins to blur and one becomes sensible of the attractiveness of Cajetan's schema. That succumbing o this attractiveness can be fatal is revealed by a close exegesis of the main texts. We want now to examine them, first Quaestio Disputata de veritate, question two, article eleven, and then the exposition of Sentences, Book One, distinction nineteen, question five, article two, the reply to the first objection. Let it be understood that the cogency of our interpretation is intended to be cumulative and cannot be fully assessed until the end of Chapter X.

    In the Summa theologiae, St Thomas introduces the twofold division we have discussed in order to make a precision about names common to God and creatures. These names are said to involve an analogy unius ad alterum.
Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque pure univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic hoc quod dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones.^{12} There is no third thing to which God and creature could be referred in receiving a common name, for whatever is not a creature is God, whatever is not God is a creature.^{13} Let us turn now to Quaestio Disputata de veritate, question two, article eleven.

    St Thomas is asking whether "science" is predicated univocally of God and creature. In the body of the article, he rejects the possibility on grounds that the result would be pantheism. Whatever is in God is identical with his existence, something which would be true of his knowledge or science, and creatures could only attain "ad eamdem rationem habendi aliquid quod habet Deus" if they were identical with God's existence. Terms common to God and creature need not be equivocal, however; if there were no similarity (convenientia between God and creature, we could neither know nor name God. The only possibility remaining is that such names as "science" are common "secundum analogiam, quod nihil est aliud dictu quam secundum proportionem." But he adds immediately, "Convenientia enim secundum proportionem potest esse duplex: et secundum hoc duplex attenditur analogiae communitas." Mathematical examples exhibit this division.

Est enim quaedam convenientia inter ipsa quorum est ad invicem proportio, eo quod habet determinatam distantiam vel aliam habitudinem ad invicem, sicut binarius cum unitate, eo quod est eius duplum: convenientia etiam quandoque attenditur duorum ad invicem inter quae non sit proportiom, sed magis similitudo duarum ad invicem proportionum, sicut senarius convenit cum quaternio ex hoc quod sicut senarius est duplum ternarii, ita quaternarius binarii.

    In the Summa theologiae, St Thomas spoke of names common to God and creature in terms of a proportion of one to the other. Is he denying
this is the text before us? This conclusion has sometimes been drawn and it leads in turn to a strange issue. We might be told in the present case, for example, that the analogous word "science" means that "as our science is to our intellect, so is God's to his." To this may be added, "-only proportionally," a curious addendum to the statement of a similarity of proportions. Now this does not seem to be a particularly enlightening statement, anymore than "as sight is to the eye, so is understanind to the mind" seems to say what the common word "sight" means. What is lost sight of when such statements are taken to give the meanings of analogous names is that one proportion is the means of knowing and naming the other. God's knowledge is known and named from ours just as, when we speak of understaning as seeing, we are moving from something obvious to something less so, a movement which should be revealed in the notions signified by the common name. In other words, where there is a similarity of proportions, one is very often the per prius with respect to the signification of a common name. But we shall return to this.

    Why is there no conflict between the proportion of the Summa and the proportionality of the De veritate? We must notice, first of all, that proportion is an analogous name. According to its first signification, it means a determinate relation of quantity to another, e.g. double, triple, equal. Secondly, it signifies any relation among things, and in this extended sense we can speak of a proportion of creature to God.^{15} Since neither the relation of accident to substance nor that of creature to God are quantitative ones, neither is a proportion in the first sense of the term. Moreover, the extended meaning of "proportion" is any relation of one thing to another (quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum); given this, the phrase "secundum proportionem" in the Summa theologiae covers both determinate and indeterminate proportions. There is surely no contradiction in saying that in names common to God and creature, there is a community "secundum proportionem" and that this community is "non secundum proportionem, sed secundum proportionalitatem." Proportion in the common sense cannot be divided against its subjective part. It is very much like saying on one occasion, "Man is an animal" and, on another, "Man is not an animal." The first statement is true when "animal" is the name of the genus; the second is true when "animal" is the name of the species opposed to man.^{16} But of course this is clear from the De veritate itself. We are told that "science" is said of God and creature according to analogy "quod nihil est aliud dictu quam secundum proportionem." Only then is proportion subdivided into proportion and proportionality. What St Thomas is getting at is that between some things named analogously there is a finite distance or other determinate relation while between others there is not. It is interesting that he manifests both determinate and indeterminate relations by quantitative, numerical relations. In a numerical proportionality, however, 4 can be like as astronomical a number as you wish, not because there is a determinate distance between them, but because the astronomical number, like 4, is double another number. Thus 4:2 :: 2,000,000,000: 1,000,000,000.^{17} Of course there is a determinate distance between four and two billion, but the point is that no determinate relation between them is envisaged when both are called double. Are they called double univocally?^{18} St Thomas seems to suggest that "double" is an analogous term. On this basis, when 2 and 6 are called double in 2:1 :: 6:3, we have an analogy unius ad alterum and in 6:3 :: 4:2, the example of the text, we have an analogy multorum ad unum, since 6 and 4 receive the name "double" by reference to 2.

    A similarity of proportions whereby one thing is referred to another is not as such the explanation of an analogically common name. "As seeing is to the eye so is understanding to the mind" expresses a similarity of proportions which permits us to say we see the answer to this question, nor does adding "- only proportionally" help, since our question is posed on the assumption of the proportionality. What we must decide is the meaning or ratio of "seeing" as applied to understanding. We may find a common notion shared per prius et posterius by the activity of eye and intellect, or we may decide that the similarity of proportions gives rise to only metaphor. Or both, depending on our point of view;^{19} even, let it be conceded, neither, for we may want to allow the view of one who feels there is no difference. In any case, it is not the similarity of proportions alone which decides the signification of the common name.

    The text of the De veritate does not deny that there is a proportion unius ad alterum in names common to God and creature. Rather it stresses that some things named analogically are separated infinitely, something clearly the case with God and creature. Yet, even here, one is known and named from the other: could we explain what we meant by the divine science without appeal to human science? It is just this that St Thomas seems to deny in the text before us. The sixth objection maintains that "in omnibus analogicis" it is the case that one enters into the definition of the other or some third things into the definition of both (our twofold division). "Sed creatura et Deus non hoc modo se habent, neque quod unum ponatur in definitione alterius, neque quod unum ponatur in definitione utriusque, eo quod sic Deus definitionem haberet." The concluding phrase is not unimportant. The objection ends by denying that "science" is analogically common to God and creature. here is St Thomas' reply.

Dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de communitate analogiae quae accipitur secundum determinatam habitudinem unius ad alterum: tunc enim oportet quod unum in definitione alterius ponatur, sicut substantia in definitione accidentis; vel aliquid unum in definitione duorum, ex eo quod utraque dicuntur per habitudinem ad unum, sicut substantia in definitione quantitatis et qualitatis.^{20}

    Now we must face a further difficulty in the text before us, a dificulty which will lead us into our discussion of I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1. We have in mind an apparently flagrant contradiction between the Summa theologiae and the De veritate. In the former, st Thomas writes:

dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et picto, non dicitur pure aequivoce; and Philosophus largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod analogice dicitur, quandoque dicitur aequivoce praedicari de diversis praedicamentis.^{23}

dicendum quod hoc nomen animal imponitur non ad significandam figuram exteriorem, in qua pictura imitatur animal verum, sed ad significandum naturam, in qua pictura non imitatur; et ideo nomen animalis de vero et picto aequivoce dicitur; sed nomen scientiae convenit creaturae et Creatori secundum id in quo creatura Creatorem imitatur; et ideo non omnino aequivoce praedicatur de utroque.^{24}

    Let it be said, first of all, that the difference between the texts just cited brings out in an unmistakable fashion the difference between the treatment of analogy in the Summa, question thirteen, and this article from the De veritate. In the former, St Thomas gives us the characteristics of the logical intention of analogical signification, an intention discussed formally on the level of the diverse rationes signified by a word. From this vantage point, it is clear that when "animal" is said of the picture because it is a representation of the real animal, its ratio will include the ratio propria of the name. Thus the term is analogous and based on the relation unius ad alterum. Now, if we ask what in fact the similarity is between Peter and his portrait,the similarity which founds the analogy of the term "animal" as common to them, we must admit that it is an imperfect similarity.^{25} The picture resembles Peter via his shape, which is a sign of his nature (since their various shapes enable us to distinguish species of animal.)^{26} The picture resembles the man in that which is only a sign of the form which is the id a quo of the word.^{27} It is this similarity at third remove which is stressed in the answer to the eighth objection of article eleven, question two, De veritate. "Science," on the other hand, is common to God and creature because of a similarity in that from which the name is imposed to signify.^{28} In the case of the animal, then, St Thomas is stressing the dissimilarity between the image and the imaged, something which can also be done with respect to human and divine science.^{29} Moreover, St Thomas can be said to be more concerned here with the esse horum rationum^{30} than with the rationes themselves when he says that "animal" is said purely equivocally of the animal and its picture. On the level of rationes, there is no doubt that "animal" is an analogous name in the use in question. It is only when attention is shifted from rationes to their foundation in reality that the community can seem so tenuous as to evaporate completely. The significance of this shift of attention is something we shall be discussing at great length later in this chapter. This being the case, we can leave the present analysis, recognizing its incompleteness. Some things, however, seem already clear. There is no need to see an opposition between proportion and proportionality. Names analogically common to God and creature involve a proportion unius ad alterum. What St Thoms is after in the De veritate is the recognition that such a proportion does not put us in possession of determinate knowledge of God. Furthermore, when the analogical community of the name is based on one thing's imitation of another, this similarity can be more or less perfect depending on whether the imitation is in terms of id a quo nomen imponitur in the rich sense, or a sign of the form from which the name is imposed. This is not constitutive of a gradation of analogous names nor, as we shall point out later, can it be said that in names common to God and creature, both God and creature save the ratio propria of the name. Cajetan maintained this and then tried to show, unsuccessfully we think, that this does not make such names univocal. Nonetheless, as we shall see, there are extenuating circumstances for his attempt. As for proportionality, we shall attempt to put its role in the divine names into a new perspective in Chapter VIII, section 4.

3. EXTRINSIC DENOMINATION AND ANALOGOUS NAMES

The first condition of what Cajetan calls analogy of attribution is that it is according to extrinsic denomination only.^{31} That is, the per prius of the name realized the perfection formally and the others have it only by extrinsic denomination. We have seen in our first chapter that Cajetan wants this rule to be understood "formally," a counsel which turned out to be somewhat baffling, since "healthy" and "medical" only happen (accidit)^{32} to involve extrinsic denomination, a curious way to speak of what is supposed to be a condition of "analogy of attribution" formally as such. We want now to point out that intrinsic and extrinsic denomination are accidental, not to a putative type, but to the analogy of names formally as such.

    First of all, a brief recalling of what is meant by these two kinds of denomination. Being is divided into the ten categories not univocally, "sed secundum diversum modum essendi."^{33} But modes of being are proportional to modes of predication and it is according to the latter that the genera of being are distinguished. St Thomas distinguishes three major types of predication in this connection, the first being had when the predicate expresses the essence of that of which it is said; the second is had when the predicate pertains to the essence. "Tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alicuius denominationis: sic enim et accidentia extrinseca de substantiis praedicantur; non tamen dicimus quod homo sit albedo, sed quod homo sit albus."^{34} Extrinsic denomination, in things other than man, is of two kinds. "Communiter autem invenitur aliquid denominari ab aliquo extrinseco, vel secundum rationem causae, vel secundum rationem mensurae; denominatur enim aliquid causatum et mensuratum ab aliquo exteriori." St Thomas argues that the effect is denominated only from efficient cause and that the exterior measures are place and time.

     It should be noticed that extrinsic denomination is here spoken of only as it applies to substance. Properly speaking, denomination is based on the relation of accident to substance.^{35} That is, denomination is extrinsic denomination. In a wide sense, however, we can speak of intrinsic denomination, something involved in the id a quo ex parte rei. St Thomas has distinguished two ways in which something can be denominated by reason of a relation to another. First, when the relation itself is the cause of the denomination. It is in this way that urine is said to be healthy, i.e. it is the sign of the health of the animal and a sign is in the genus of relation.^{36} Thus, urine is not denominated healthy from any form inherent in it.^{37} Secondly, when it is not from the reference to the other, but from the other as cause that a thing is denominated.^{38} Here there must be a similitude of effect to cause, so there will be an inherent form whereby the effect is denominated from its cause. In this second case, Cajetan denies that there is extrinsic denomination and claims that, in fact, we have an analogy not of "attribution" but of "proper proportionality."{39)

    The striking thing about Cajetan's treatment of the analogy of names is that he interprets in terms of extrinsic denomination the statement that, in things named analogically, the ratio propria of the name is saved in one alone. Let us look again at the text involved. Is there but one truth in terms of which every being is said to be true? Well, yes and no, St Thomas replies. In things named univocally the ratio propria of the name is found in each of them.

Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominatur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illus significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit, illud autem significat sanitatem.^{40}

    What we are suggesting is that the intrinsic possession of the perfection is irrelevant to the intent of the phrase that something said analogically of many is found in only one of them with respect to its proper notion. Cajetan, speaking of "analogy of attribution," holds that only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally while the others have it by extrinsic denomination. But what are we to make of an analogous name which applies to its per prius by extrinsic denomination? Place is an extrinsic measure of body; consequently to say of a body that it is located is to denominate it extrinsically.^{46} But to be in place is analogically common to bodies and angels: "angelo convenit esse in loco: aequivoce tamen dicitur angelus esse in loco, et corpus."^{47} the ratio propria of "located" will be saved only by bodies; in an extended sense, intelligible only by reference to the proper signification of the name, the angel is in place. Surely this example does nothing towards diminishing or changing the formal rules of the analogy of names; neither do the examples of "being," "good," "true" and "science" said of God and creature.

    In his commentary on Aristotle's Ethics,^{48} St Thomas says some things which have always been of interest to students of his doctrine of analogy, particularly because the text in question is one of the few which figure explicitly in Cajetan's De nominum analogia. Aristotle is making the point, against Plato, that if the good is separated as Man is supposed to be, "good" would signify univocally whatever it is said of.^{49} But that cannot be, nor can "good" be a purely equivocal term. So it would seem to be a name signifying many as from one cause or ordered to one cause or, better, things which are one according to analogy.^{50} Let us look at St Thomas' commentary.

    He begins by pointing out that a name is said of many things according to diverse rationes in two ways, either according to wholly diverse rationes (and then we have pure equivocation and things so named are aequivoca a casu), or the rationes are not wholly diverse but agree in some one thing.^{51} He goes on to subdivide this last possibility. (1) Sometimes several things are referred to one principle, e.g. "military" as said of weapons and armor refers them to him who has the art of making war. (2) Sometimes several things are referred to one end, e.g. "healthy." (3) Sometimes according to proportion, and this either (a) by diverse proportions to the same subject, e.g. quantity and quality to substance in the case of "being," or (b) by one proportion to different subjects, e.g. sight to eye, understanding to mind.

    This division is reminiscent of those we found in the commentary on the Metaphysics and in the De principiis naturae.^{52} The primary analogate may be either an efficient, final or material cause. As we have seen, this is not a division of the analogy of names as such, since it introduces no difference into the common doctrine. In any case, the ratio propria of the common name is saved in one alone and others are denominated from it. There is, however, an added note in the text before us, namely that of similar proportions to different subjects. Since the other subdivisions do not alter the common doctrine of the analogy of names, that is, are not types of analogous name, it is unlikely that this added note will do anything different. Now what is added is precisely the similtudo proportionum and it is exemplified here, as it was in the De veritate, by seeing and understanding, but now insofar as both can be called good. When they are so named, the one is not referred to the other as to its efficient or final cause. So it is, in the text of Aristotle, that, having rejected the Platonic separated good from which all things might be denominated good as from their efficient or final cause, Aristotle prefers to stay in the order of things more accessible to him (and more relevant to ethics); concern with things existing separately in the manner of the idea of good belongs to another branch of philosophy.^{53} The similarity of proportions, as we have seen and will see again, does not involve another doctrine of the analogy of names: if "good" means one things  with reference to sense, and another with reference to mind, and these meaning are not wholly diverse, they will be related per prius et posterius. It is very important to notice that St Thomas makes the phrase secundum analogiam common to every nonchance equivocation, something Aristotle does not do with the phrase κατ᾿ ἀναλογίον.^{54} The text of the commentary hardly provides a basis for the claim that "good" is common to God and creature according to a similarity of proportions. On the contrary, it is only when that community of the name has been set aside that the question of similarity of proportions, of similar proportions to different subjects, comes into the picture. And this, note, both in the text of Aristotle and in the commentary of St Thomas.

4. ALIQUID DICITUR SECUNDUM ANALOGIAM TRIPLICITER

While moving from "analogy of inequality" through "analogy of attribution" to "analogy of proportionality," Cajetan pauses at each step to discuss the terminology of St Thomas with respect to these three, which are and are not, according to Cajetan, types of analogous name. In each case, it is the same text of St Thomas to which appeal is made, a text in which we are told that something is said according to analogy in three ways.^{55} Now, as it happens, the text in question is the answer to an objection and consequently must be read in terms of that objection, the more so because the division given is to be found nowhere else in St Thomas. The objection occurs in an article which asks a question St Thomas often poses, viz. whether all things are true by uncreated truth.^{56} The first objection is an attempt at an affirmative answer.

Videtur quod omnia sint vera veritate, quae est veritas increata. Sicut enim dictum est (I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1), verum dicitur analogice de illis in quibus est veritas, sicut sanitas de omnibus sanis. Sed una est sanitas numero a qua denominatur animal sanum, sicut subjectum ejus, et medicina sana, sicut causa ejus, et urina sana, sicut signum ejus. Ergo videtur quod una sit veritas qua omnia dicuntur vera.

    And yet St Thomas begins his answer with the observation that "aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter." What we must come to grips with is the significance of the couplet in terms of which this division is made, secundum intentionem, on the one hand, secundum esse, on the other. Furthermore, much will depend on our identification of the logicus of the second member of the division, for it is he who is at work in the objection.

(a) Secundum intentionem, non secundum esse

Ad primum igitur dicendum quod aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter: vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse; et hoc est quando una intentio refertur ad plura per prius et posterius, quae non habet esse nisi in uno; sicut intentio sanitatis refertur ad animal, urinam et dietam diversimode, secundum prius et posterius; non tamen secundum diversum esse, quia esse sanitatis non est nisi in animali.

(b) Secundum esse, non secundum intentionem

Vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omnia corpora parificantur in intentione corporeitatis. Unde logicus qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit, hoc nomen, corpus, de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicari: sed esse huius naturae non est ejusdem rationis in coroporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus, ut patet in X Metaph.

    Let us look closely at the verb, parificantur. There is equality on the level of the intention or ratio when things are named univocally. Now this is not true of things named analogically: they are not equalized in a common notion, but share in it per prius et posterius, unequally. Thus, in things named analogically, there is inequality on the level of the common intention or notion. In the second division of the text before us, we are faced with an example of things named univocally. That is, they are made equal on the level of the common intention: if there is analogy or inequality, if in some way they are related per prius et posterius, this will not be according to the common intention. Their inequality is said to obtain in the esse hujus rationis, and not on the level of the intention, that is, the common intention, itself.

    What does it mean to say that things named univocally are analogous because "illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus"? Does this mean that bodies are named both univocally and analogically? Not that such a claim would in itself be surprising. Things can be named univocally with respect to one name and analogically with respect to another. for example, man and herb are named univocally with respect to "substance" and analogically with respect to "healthy." But we are not at present asking if several things can be called "body" univocally and be named analogically with respect to some other name. Rather we must ask if the text before us says that bodies are named  "body" univocally and analogically, depending on our point of view.

    The logicus says that the name "body" is univocal; it satisfies the definition of things named univocally. Will the observation that the notion signified by "body" enjoys a different mode of existence in celestial and terrestial bodies, following Aristotle's hypothesis,^{60} lead to the view that the same word "body" is analogous? St Thomas, we see, refers us to the tenth book of the Metaphysicsi for light on the subject.

    In the text referred to it is again a question of celestial and terrestial bodies being named body univocally. We will be returning to the context of the discussion, but right now we want to cite a passage which clarifies the distinction made in the second division of our text in the Sentences. Contrariety is sometimes the cause of specific diversity, sometimes of generic diversity.

...corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt genere diversa. Manifestum est enim quod contraria quae sunt in uno genere, non sunt de substantia illius generis. Non enim rationale et irrationale sunt de substantia animalis, sed animal est potentia utrumque. Quodcumque autem genus accipiatur, oportet quod corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt de intellectu eius. Unde impossible est quod communicent in aliquo genere. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Name corruptibilium et incorruptibilium non potest esse materia una. Genus autem, physice loquendo, a materia sumitur. Unde supra dictum est, quod ea quae non communicant in materia, sunt genere diversa. Logice autem loquendo, nihil prohibet quod conveniant in genere, in quantum conveniant in una communi ratione, vel substantiae, vel qualitatis, vel alicuius huiusmodi.^{61}

(1) Genus logice loquendo

Since we have already discussed the manner in which genus is a second intention, a logical relation, it will seem redundant to speak of the genus logice. Let us recall what the logical relation of genus is. We saw that second intentions are accidents which accrue to natures as they exist in our mind. We say, for example, "Animal is a genus." What is the meaning of this predicate? A genus is that which is said of many things which differ in species and which expresses what they are.^{62} Obviously, in order to be thus predicable, the nature must be in our mind.^{63} To be generically common is something which belongs to animal as it is known by us; to be a genus does not belong to "animate sensitive substance" as such, nor to this animal or that. In the De ente et essentia, where he is interested in showing the relationship between essence and such intentions as genus, species and difference, St Thomas distinguishes carefully between the nature as such, the natura absolute considerata, and the accidents which accrue to it as it exists in singulars or in our intellect. Thus, it is not of the essence of animal to be a genus; nevertheless, it is the nature, not the logical intention, which is predicated of many.^{64}

    Since we name things as we know them, it is the nature as known that is named. What is immediately signified by the word "animal" is, as we have seen, the ratio of the name. And, again, things are said to be named univocally when the name they have in common signifies the same ratio as applied to each of them. Thus "animal" as applied to man or brute signifies "animate sensitive substance." This notion expresses something of the essence of quiddity of those things to which the name is applied. It is of the essence of genus to signify univocally.{65)

    Those things which are in the same genus are said to be made equal thanks to an intention or concept of something common. Man and brute are made equal thanks to the common notion, "animate sensitive substance." All bodies are made equal in the common intention of corporeity. We might wonder why the genus is singled out for attention here, for the same thing would seem to be true of species. Are not all men made equal in the common intention signified by the term "man?" There is, however, an important difference between genus and species in this regard, if by species we mean the species specialissima, the common notion which is not further divisible by formal differences.^{66} Obviously "animal" is a species with respect to "living body," but it has in common with its genus that the things signified by it are made equal thanks only to the intention of something common. The species specialissima has a greater unity than the genus because it is based on something which is absolutely one in nature.

Et huius ratio est, quia species sumitur a forma ultima quae simpliciter una est in rerum natura, genus autem non sumitur a forma aliqua quae sit una in rerum natura sed secundum rationem tantum: non est enim aliqua forma ex qua homo sit animal praeter illam ex qua homo sit homo. Omnes igitur homines, qui sunt unius species, conveniunt in forma quae constituit speciem, quia quilibet habet animam rationalem; sed non est in homine, equo aut asine aliqua anima communis quae constituat animal, praeter illam animam quae constituit hominem, vel equum vel asinum: quod si esset, tunc genus esset unum et comparabile, sicut et species; sed in sola consideratione accipitur forma generis per abstractionem intellectus a differentiis. Sic igitur species est unum quid a forma una in rerum natura existente, genus autem non est unum: quia secundum diversas formas in rerum natura existentes diversae species generis praedicationem susipiunt. Et sic genus est unum logice et non physice.^{67}

    This statement is to be found in a commentary on Boethius^{71} where the question is raised as to whether accidental differences are the cause of the numerical distinction of substances. In addressing himself to that question, St Thomas discusses generic, specific and numerical diversity. The composite which falls in the genus of substance involves three things: form, matter and the composite itself, and it is in these that we must seek the causes of the various kinds of diversity. "Sciendum igitur quod diversitas secundum genus reducitur in diversitatem materiae: diversitas vero secundum speciem in diversitatem formae, sed diversitas secundum numerum partim in diversitatem materiae, et partim in diversitatem accidentis."^{72} It is the widening of the question to include the cause of generic diversity which makes this article relevant to our inquiry. The assignment of matter as the cause of generic diversity raises a serious problem. The genus is a principle of knowing, a sign of which is that it is the first part of the definition of anything. Matter, however, is said to be unknowable in itself. Nevertheless, St Thomas states, matter can be known, and in either of two ways.

    First of all, matter can be known by analogy; in another way, it can be known through the form which makes it to be in act.^{73} It is the second way of knowing matter which gives rise to a hierarchy in the genus of substance.

Alio modo penes materiam sumitur generis diversitas, secundum quod materia est perfecta per formam. Et cum materia sit potentia pura, et Deus sit actus purus, nihil alius est materiam perfici in actu, qui est forma, nisi quatenus participat aliquam similitudinem actus primi, licet imperfecte; ut scilicet id quod est iam compositum ex materia et forma, sit medium inter potentiam puram et actum purum.^{74}

Sicut ex hoc communi materiali quod est habere vitam, sumitur hoc genus quod est animatum corpus; ex perfectione vero superaddit, haec differentia, sensibile: ex imperfectione vero haec differentia, insensibile: et sic diversitas talium materialium inducit diversitatem generis, sicut animalis a planta. Et propter hoc dicitur materia esse principium diversitatis secundum genus.^{77}

    It must not be thought that, because the generic notion does not express the full perfection of the things it signifies, it signifies only a part of these things. If this were the case, the genus could not be predicated of them,^{79} surely a strange pass for something of whose very nature it is to be predicable. The species does not differ from the genus by signifying the whole as opposed to a part. We can say both, "Socrates is man" and "Socrates is animal." Both predicates signify the whole, but they differ in that the genus is indeterminate, confused, non signatum, and the species is determinate, distinct, signata.^{80} The genus "body" signifies the whole of that of which it is said.

    Or does it? St Thomas has said that the genus cannot signify a part because no integral part is predicated of its whole. He has in mind the fact that we are unlikely to say, "The house is lumber" or "Man is bone." However, though we do say, "Man is a body," we can also say, "Man is composed of body and soul," and we would mean composed as of integral parts. Doesn't this make the genus an integral part? Furthermore, the genus enters into the definition of a thing, but shouldn't the parts of the definition relate to the parts of the thing defined as the whole definition relates to the whole definitum? This last question is raised in the Metaphysics,^{81} and it receives a decisively negative answer. When he comments on the Metaphysics, St Thomas remarks that it is patently false that the parts of the definition are the parts of the thing defined. His reason is again that the integral parts of a thing cannot be predicated of it as a whole; but genus and difference, the parts of the definition, are predicated of the whole thing: Man is animal, Man is rational.^{82}

Sed dicendum est quod partes definitionis significant partes rei, inquantum a partibus rei sumuntur partes definitionis; non ita quod partes definitionis sint partes rei. Non enim animal est pars hominis, neque rationale, sed animal sumitur ab una parte et rationale ab alia. Animal enim est quod habet naturam sensitivam, rationale vero quod habet rationem. Natura autem sensitiva est ut materialis respectu rationis. Et inde est quod genus sumitur a materia, differentia a forma, species autem a forma et materia simul. Nam homo est quod habet rationem in naura sensitiva.^{83}

Unde dicimus hominem esse animal rationale, et non ex animali et rationali, sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore. Ex corpore enim et anima dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quaedam tertia res constituta, quae neutra illarum est. Homo enim nec est anima neque corpus. Sed, si honmo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali dicatur esse, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus intellectibus.^{86}

Si enim in intellectu corporis intelligatur substantia completa ultima forma, habens in se tres dimensiones, sic corpus est genus, et species eius erunt substantiae perfectae per has ultimas formas determinatas, sicut per formam auri, vel argenti, aut olivae, aut hominis. Si vero in intellectu corporis non accipiatur nisi hoc, quod est habens tres dimensiones cum aptitudine ad formam ultimam, sic corpus est materia.^{90}

(2) Genus physice loquendo

    Of the four meanings of "genus" distinguished only two have philosophical importance, as St Thomas points out.^{94} Genus as the connected generations of things having the same form (as in genus humanum), or the closely allied meaning of family or clan, are the less important ones. although they reflect more closely the etymology of the word. The two remaining meanings contribute to our discussion. "Genus" sometimes means subject matter, as surface is the genus or subject of figures.

Genus autem hoc non est quod significat essentiam speciei, sicut animal est genus hominis; sed quod est proprium subiectum specie differentium accidentium. Superficies enim est subiectum omnium figurarum superficialium. Et habet similitudinem cum genere; quia proprium subiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis, sicut genus in definitione specie. Unde subiectum prorium praedicatur de accidente ad similitudinem generis.^{95}

    The proper subject enters into the definition of its accident in a way similar to that in which the genus enters into the definition of the species. This puts one in mind of the second mode of predication per se, and if we turn to St Thomas's discussion of that doctrine, we find him speaking of two ways in which the subject is put in the definition of its proper accident, directly or obliquely.

Cuius quidem ratio est, quia cum esse accidentis dependeat a subiecto, oportet etiam quod definitio eius significans esse ipsius contineat in se subiectum. Unde secundus modus dicendi per se est quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati, quod est proprium accidens eius.^{98}

    Depending on whether "genus" is taken as the genus subiectum or as the genus praedicaabile, there will be a twofold meaning of "generically different" or "differing in genus." Moreover, things can be one in genus in the second sense and differ in genin the first.

Patet autem ex dictis quod aliqua continentur sub uno praedicamento, et sunt unum genere hoc modo secundo, quae tamen sunt diversa genere primo modo. Sicut corpora caelestia et elementaria, et colores et sapores. Primus autem modus diversitatis secundum genus consideratur magis a naturali, et etiam a philosopho, quia est magis realis. Secundus autem modus consideratur a logico, quia est rationis.^{101}

    Things which are equal from the point of view of the common notion which is the genus can be unequal in that one is more perfect than the other. "Si quis enim diligenter consideret, in omnibus speciebus unius generis semper inveniet unum alia perfectiorem, sicut in coloribus albedinem et in animalibus hominem."{102) The inequality at issue here is taken from the differences which are related as act and privation. The division of the genus into species which are related as prior and posterior does not mean, of course, that the name signifying the generic notion is predicated analogically of them. Their inequality has to be explained in terms of something else, for in terms of the generic notion and the name signifying it the species are univocals; the name of the genus does not cease to be univocal when the species are discerned. An analogous name, on the contrary, signifies a common notion which is common per prius et posterius. That is why the inequality among the species of a genus must not be confused with the inequality of the common notion of an analogous name,

Dicendum quod quando genus univocum dividitur in suas species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei una species sit principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sed quando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius; tunc nihil prohibet unum esse principalius altero, etiam secundum commun rationem, sicut substantia principaliter dicitur ens quam accidens.^{103}

Sicut patet quod lapis in materia, quae est in potentia ad esse, pertingit ad hoc quod subsistat; ad quod idem pertingit sol secundum materiam quae est in potentia ad ubi et non ad esse, et angelus omni materia carens. Unde logicus inveniens in his omnibus illud ex quo genus sumebat, ponit omnia haec in uno genere substantiae; naturalis vero metaphysicus, qui considerant principia rerum, omnia non invenientes convenientia in materia, dicunt ea differre genere, secundum hoc quod dicitur in X Metaph., quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt generic et quod illa conconveniunt genere quorum est materia una, et generatio ad invicem.^{107}

    From the point of view of the natural philosopher, who considers the principia rerum those things are of one genus which have a common name expressing ratio found in the same kind of matter in each of them^{108} We want now to examine the context of the remark quoted earlier from the commentary on the Metaphysics.^{109} Having shown that contraries are in the same genus and that they constitute the species of the genus, Aristotle goes on, St Thomas observes, to touch on two exceptions. Some contraries pertain not so much to the species as to the individual and consequently do not constitute specific differences. For example, white and black are contraries, but they do not found the differences of the species of animal.^{110} If it is true to say, "Animal is black," this is because a particular animal happens to be black. But black/white is not a contrariety within the genus of animal, since things not falling in this genus can be white or black. Thus, white and black are accidents of the individual, reducible to matter in the same way that individuality itself is. But the contraries which sonstitute species of a genus pertain to form.

    It also happens that contrariety can be constitutive of generic and not merely of specific difference. The example is corruptible/incorruptible. Such contraries are opposed in terms of potency and non-potency, for the corruptible is that which can not-be, whereas the incorruptible lacks this potency. Why should this contrariety found a generic difference? "Et hoc ideo, quia sicut forma et actus pertinet ad speciem, ita materia et potentia pertinent ad genus. Unde sicut contrarietas quae est secundum formas et actus, facit differentiam secundum speciem, ita contrarietas quae est secundum potentiam, facit generis  diversitatem."^{111} Although this second qualification of the general position also involves appeal to matter, it is important to see how corruptible/incorruptible differs from black/white although both agree in not being the type of contrariety which constitutes specific difference. White and black are accidents of individuals and thus, though we cannot say "Socrates is white and black," we can say, "Man is white and black." The truth of the statement about the universal nature is founded on the different individuals Alcibiades and Othello. But is it possible truly to say of any universal nature that it is corruptible and incorruptible?^{112} The reply is negative: corruptible and incorruptible are not predicated per accidens as are white and black.

Non enim corruptibile inest secundum accidens alicui eorum de quibus praedicatur;quia quod est secundum accidens contingit non inesse. corruptibile autem ex necessitate inest his quibus inest. At si hoc non sit verum, sequeretur quod unum et idem sit quandoque corruptibile et quandoque incorruptibile: quod est impossibile secundum naturam.^{113}

    The natural philosopher is concerned with the principia rei,^{116} and physical things are composed of matter and form as of integral parts of their substance. The logical genus expresses the essence of the thing suo modo, but as a whole; it does not express merely a part. The physical genus is based on the matter which is part of illud materiale whence the logical genus is taken, the material notion which is subject to further perfection and imperfection expressed by the contraries which divide it. Things will be said to be in the same physical genus when they are linked by the substratum of absolute change.^{117} Contraries of the physical genus will be those things one of which can be the term from which, the other the term to which of a physical change: they thereby have a common subject.^{118} To be in the same physical genus is to be one in matter^{119} - and not merely one in a "material" notion. And, since the matter from which the physical genus is taken is a component of physical things, it can be predicated of them as part of whole, i.e. denominatively, in the way discussed earlier.^{120} Thus the common notion, "illud materiale unde sumitur genus," logice loquendo, can be considered as a form which can be found in different kinds of matter or in things which are in no wise material. "...corporeitas secundum intentionem logicam univoce in omnibus corporibus invenitur; sed secundum esse considerata, non potest esse unius rationis in re corruptibili et incorruptibili: quia non similiter se habent in potentia essendi, cum unum sit possibile ad esse et ad non esse, et alterum non."^{121}

    Just as genus logicum and genus physicum differ, so too difference naturaliter loquendo is not the same as what satisfies the logician's demands. For the natural philosopher, differences are the contrary forms which are terms of change thanks to their common subject matter: there is generatio ad invicem. The differences dividing the logical genus need not be contraries in that sense: "...dicendum quod naturaliter loquendo de genere et differentia, oportet differentias esse contrarias: nam natura, super quam fundatur natura generis, est susceptiva contrariarum formarum. Secundum autem considerationem logicam sufficit qualiscumque oppositio in differentiis, sicut patet in differentiis numerorum, in quibus non est contrarietas; et similiter est in spiritualibus substantiis."^{122} The species of number are not contrary to one another, nor is there contrariety, properly speaking, in the genus of number: to maintain otherwise would imply the absurdity of a greatest number.^{123}

(3) Univocal or analogous?

We must now return to the question with which we began: does the division "secundum esse sed non secundum intentionem" mean that things are named body univocally from the logical point of view and named body analogically from the natural point of view? If this question seems paradoxical, this is because things are said to be named univocally which have a common name which signifies the same ratio as said of each of them, whereas things are said to be named analogically which have a common name which does not signify exactly the same ratio, but different rationes related per prius et posterius. How can things, the same things, be named by the same name in both ways? The answer is found in the distinction between the abstract notion which satisfies the logicus and the ratio concreta of the philosopher. We have seen that the material notion which is the genus contains form and matter and that the logical genus expresses only the form. Thus, logically speaking, "body" means "that in which three dimensions can be designated," saying nothing about the kind of form this is due to, whether that of stone, plant, star or man, and without saying anything about the matter which is actuated by the form. It is thanks to this indifference to matter that "body" can be taken to signify terrestial and celestial bodies univocally. The concrete notion which answers to the philosopher's use of "body" involves a determinate statement about the matter in which the form is found. This gives rise to two different rationes of "body" when it is question of terrestial and celestial bodies. The notion of terrestial body expresses a matter which is in potency to another substantial form: thus the body of which such matter is a component can cease to be; on Aristotle's hypothesis, celestial bodies could not thus cease to be (i.e. corrupt) and if they are to be said to have matter, this will be in a different sense of the term. Thus, the two concrete rationes render the common name equivocal, i.e. analogical. "Et sic non est eadem materia corporis caelestis et elementorum, nisi secundum analogiam, secundum quod conveniunt in ratione potentiae."^{124} A similarity of proportions is set up so that celestial bodies are spoken of in terms of what we know to be the case with terrestial bodies. These latter are composed of matter and form (a position arrived at by observation of substantial generation and corruption). Celestial bodies, since long observation has revealed no substantial change (the ground of Aristotle's hypothesis), if they are bodies are not bodies as are terrestial things. And, if we want to speak of matter in celestial bodies, setting up a proportion between their form and their matter, we will manifest the meaning of "matter" in this proportion by appealing to its meaning as applied to terrestial things. And we will negate of it the potency to non-being which follows on prime matter, since it is matter's potentiality to forms other than that presently actuating it which explains the corruptibility of terrestial bodies. The matter of celestial bodies was said, consequently, to be the root of the potentiality involved in local motion. Thus, since "matter" does not mean the same thing and the ratio concreta of the philosopher expresses the matter determinately, "body" is not said univocally of terrestial and celestial bodies, but analogically, signifying different bodies per prius et posterius. The same thing can be seen in terms of a ratio communis which could be formed with the aid of "potency."

    It is because the genus is, as we saw earlier, one thanks to our mode of knowing, and not because it expresses one essence in rerum natura^{125} that Aristotle has warned that "iuxta genera latet multa," i.e. that the unity of the genus can make us fail to see many equivocations. This happens, not because of further formal differences expressed by differences, but because a concrete notion takes into account matter as well as form and reveals the inequality. Before turning to St Thomas' comments on this remark, let us seek some initial clarity from his commentary on the Metaphysics.^{126} The text we have in mind is one which will occupy us again in Chapter VII when we discuss univocal and equivocal causes. A generation is wholly univocal when the form of what is generated preexists in the generator "secundum eumdum modum essendi et simili materia." A generation may be partly equivocal and partly univocal when the form exists immaterially in the generator and materially in the generated; e.g. the form of the house in the mind of the artisan and the form of the house realized in lumber and cement and bricks. It is this case which interests us, for it seems to answer to the univocity of the genus logice loquendo where the form alone of the genus is considered. The first type, where both form and matter are considered, seems to answer to the genus physice loquendo. the physical genus reveals the equivocity concealed by the abstract notion.

    St Thomas, commenting on Aristotle's remark that the genus conceals many equivocals, gives a division which is most interesting if somewhat difficult to understand.^{127} To understand it, we must see that he is not enumerating the equivocations which can be hidden by the logical genus (this is one member of the division), but the way in which equivocations can be hidden because a genus, i.e. a physical genus, seems to be invoved. Thus, even pure equivocations enter into his division, although all they have in common with the genus is that one name is applied to many things; pure equivocation, however, has only the unity of the word: inquiry into what that word means in its various uses reveals totally different meanings.

    It is difficut to know whether the remainder of the text contains two or three members. St Thomas ends by noting that either the unity of the logical genus or similarity can conceal the equivocation. And yet there are two types or, if not, two examples of equivocals concealed because of similarity. "Man" is said of Socrates and a painting of him because the latter is like the former. We have encountered this example before, and we saw how it can be said to involve an analogous name although sometimes spoken of as omnino aequivoce. It is analogous because the notion signified by the term as applied to the painting includes the notion signified by it as applied to Socrates. The second similarity, "master" as applied to the head of a household and the teacher in school, is based on a similarity of proportions or functions. Though both are directors (rectores), the one is in the home, the other in school. Is there any univocity involved here as there is in the case of "body"? That is, could we find at leasst a logical genus? Or is magister thought of as transferred from the majordomo to the teacher? The last possibility could render the name analogical and seems the preferable interpretation, for it explains the twofold similarity with physical genus with which St Thomas ends, namely that of the logical genus and similarity. We might add that "being" too has a similarity with the genus, something which can conceal its equivocation.^{138}

(4) Who is the 'logicus'

There remains an important question. We have seen that the genus logice loquendo is distinguished from the genus physice loquendo, that some things are named equivocally from the point of view of the natural philosopher which are named univocally so far as the logicus is concerned. Just who is this logicus? The question gains importance from the fact that univocation and equivocation are logical intentions. If this is the case, what is the point of speaking of logical univocals and physical univocals? What has been called the abstract ratio  which constitutes the genus,  logice loquendo, brings to mind a discussion from the commentary on On the Soul.

Si quis ergo assignet definitionem, per quam non deveniatur in cognitionem accidentium rei definitae, illa definitio non est realis, sed remota et dialectica. Sed illa definitio per quam deveniatur in cognitionem accidentium est realis et expropriis et essentialibus rei.^{129}

Quod autem definitio prima sit insufficiens manifeste apparet. Nam omnis forma quae est in materia determinata, nisi in sua definitione ponatur materia, illa definitio est insufficiens: sed haec forma, scilicet appetitus vindictae est forma in materia determinata: unde cum non ponatur in eius definitione materia, constat quod ipsa definitio est insufficiens. Et ideo necesse est ad definitionem, quod in definitione ponatur hoc, scilicet forma, esse in materia huiusmodi, scilicet determinata.^{130}

    To encounter a logical as opposed to a natural or real definition is puzzling since there is a logical doctrine on definition which presumably has application in any of the sciences. What is the relationship between the logical definition and the logic of definition? Every science is such because it satisfies the canons of logic. What then is the meaning, within the science of nature, of the distinction between logical and natural definitions, between logical and natural arguments?^{132}

    Consider the distinction, within the logic of argumentation, between reasoning which concludes necessarily (demonstration), reasoning which concludes with probability (dialectics), and reasoning which is only apparently conclusive (sophistics), The logical doctrine of each of these types puts us in possession of scientific knowledge of how they proceed.^{133} That is, the logic of sophistical reasoning (sophistica docens) is a science; the logic of dialectics (dialectica docens) is not probable, but necessary, a science. so too is the logic of demonstration. To use dialectics, however, is to argue in such a fashion that only probable knowledge is attained. To use sophistics is to appear to reason validly. This use is spoken of by St Thomas as if it constituted only a modality characterizing arguments about reality (modo adiuncto).^{134} That more than this is involved is clear from his rejection of any distinction between demonstrativa docens and demonstrativa utens.

Sed in parte logicae quae dicitur demonstrativa, solum doctrina pertinet ad logicam, usus vero ad philosophiam et ad alias particulares scientias quae sunt de rebus naturae. Et hoc ideo, quia usus demonstrativae consistit in utendo principiis rerum, de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet, non utendo intentionibus logicis. Et sic apparet, quod quaedam partes logicae habent ipsam scientiam et doctrinam et usum, sicut dialectica tentativ et sophhistica; quaedam autem doctrinam et non usum, sicut demonstrativa.^{135}

    The logicus or dialectician who reasons about things by making use of logical intentions is not the logicus who expounds logical doctrine; if he were, the result would be science. But the result of the efforts of the logicus or dialectician is only probability. The dialectician can be considered as a kind of rival of the metaphysician because of the equal scope, so to speak, of logic and metaphysics. Since all being is the object of reason and logic is concerned with the relations reason sets up among things as known, logical entities comprise as much as the object of reason itself.^{136} It is just this that permits the dialectician to operate. "Dialecticus autem procedit ad ea (i.e. communia accidentia entis) consideranda ex intentionibus rationis, quae sunt extranea a natura rerum. Et ideo dicitur, quod dialectica est tentativa, quia tentare proprium est ex principiis extraneis procedere."^{137}

    In commenting on the De trinitate of Boethius, St Thomas distinguishes two modes of logica utens when he is discussing three ways in which we can be said to proceed rationabiliter. "Rational process" can be denominated from logic, the  scientia rationalis, in two ways.^{138} First, because of the principles from which it proceeds, as if someone were to try to prove something about reality from the intentions of genus, species, opposites, analogy, etc. This is to make use of logical propositions in arguing about things. Say we know that love is a passion of the sense appetite and argue that since love and hate are opposites, and opposites are in the same genus, hate must be a passion of the sense appetite. We are using a logical truth to argue about non-logical entities. "Sed hic modus procedendi non potest competere proprie alicui particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur."^{139}

    Secondly, reasoning can be called a rational process from the point of view of the end or term. Science is had when we are able to resolve a conclusion into its principles that we see its necessity. When reason does not achieve this term and is not determined to one of contradictory propositions, opinion or faith is the result, and the argument leading to it only probable. Such a dialectical procedure is legitimate in any science as a preparation for necessary conclusions. It is this second type St Thomas seems to have in mind in commention on the Physics. "Dicuntur autem primae rationes logicae, non quia ex terminis logicis logice procedant, sed quia modo logico procedunt, scilicet ex communibus et probabilibus quod est proprium syllogismo dialectici."^{140} The arguments in question proceed from what is common in the sense of what is commonly held or believed.^{141}

    It would seem to be the first type of rational process which answers most closely to the use of the adjective "logical" in speaking of definitions. To group terrestial and celestial bodies under a common notion which ignores the principia rerum is to depend on a unity which results from our mode of knowing. The definition and genus are logical not as pertaining to logical doctrine, but as using logical entities to speak of real entitites. Logica docesn will mention real things by way of examples, it is dependent on a psychology which teaches how our knowledge attains real entities,^{142} but as such logica docens is not about things as they exist and would have nothing to say about terrestial and celestial bodies. The logic of definition cannot decide what is a proper mode of defining in any science, anymore than the logic of demonstration decides what is the proper mode of this science or that.For this there is required a proper methodology which applies the common mode of logic to the degree this can be done given the subject matter of the science in question.^{143} By the same token, the logic of analogical signification does not decide what in a given science will be considered to be named analogically, any more than logic can decide wht in a particular science will be said to be named univocally. This does not mean that the common logical doctrine is altered by a consideration of what is a good definition or ratio in a given science. And, if one settles for a common or abstract notion in speaking of univocity in a determinate area, he will be proceeding logically in the sense of dialectically. To note the inadequacy of this approach is not to call logica docesn into question, nor to demand further development of the properly logical doctrine.^{144}

By way of conclusion to this lengthy analysis of the way in which things are named analogically "secundum esse sed non secundum intentionem," let us state briefly what we have found. Faced with a situation where things have a common name, we can say they are named both univocally and analogically. They are named univocally insofar as the term signifies an abstract, formal, common ratio which owes its unity only to our mode of knowing. Logice loquendo, they are in the same genus and are named univocally, where logice means "dialectically." If the common name takes into account both the form and the matter of "illud materiale unde sumitur genus," several concrete notions can result, as in the case of "body," and then the name is no longer common univocally but analogically, secundum prius et posterius, insofar as the matter of celestial bodies is made known from what we know of the matter of terrestial bodies and denominated from the latter. All terretial bodies will be named such univocally insofar as the term "body" signifies the appropriate concrete notion; the common doctrine of univocation is saved, just as the common doctrine of analogical signification is saved when "body" signifies the diverse concrete notions appropriate to terrestial and celestial bodies, or a ratio communis formed in terms of potency. By identifying the logicus as the dialectician, we are enabled to avoid the erroneous conclusion that a different logical doctrine of univocation and of the analogy of names is required when it is a question of concrete notions. Rather what we see is a particular science determining, thanks to its proper subject, what will and what will not satisfy the canons of univocity and the analogy of names.

(c) Secundum intentionem, secundum esse

Vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentioni communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habet aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed differens secundum rationem majoris et minoris perfectionis. Et similiter dico, quod veritas, et bonitas et omnia hujusmodi dicuntur analogice de Deo et creaturis. Unde oportet quod secundum suum esse omnia haec in Deo sint, et in creaturis secundum rationem majoris perfectionis et minoris; ex quo sequitur, cum non possint esse secundum unum esse utrobique, quod sint diversae veritates.

We are reading the present text as presenting, not a division of the analogy of names, but as pointing out that the foundation of analogous names is not always the same. In such an example as "healthy," that from which the name is imposed has existence in only one of the things named by it. Various references or proportions to that in which sanitas exists are the foundation for the extension of the word sanum. In the second division, we were apprised of a remote and proper way of looking at things. These different vantage points can give rise to univocity and analogy with respect to the same name and the same things named by it. In the third division, we are told of analogous names which are so founded that that from which the name is imposed exists in each of the things named analogically, but "secundum rationem majoris et minoris perfectionis." Although the text makes its point with particular reference to the divine names, the names common to God and creature, we are not presently concerned with those. But we do want to say a word or two now about the phrase just quoted, a phrase which could be rendered as "unequal participation in a common perfection." This inequality must not be confused with the manner in which species participate in a genus, a contextually important point, since St Thomas teaches that God and creature cannot communicate in a genus, even logice loquendo.

    Greater and lesser possession of a common perfection can be understood in such a way that it is not productive of even specific diversity, or in such a way that it does result in different species, or in such a way that it is productive of generic diversity and excludes all univocation. In the first place, then, we can speak of things as more and less white, but, since it is the same form that is possessed, such a "magis et minus non diversificant speciem."^{145} The term "white" applied to the more and less white signifies the same ratio; nevertheless, their similarity is imperfect.^{146}

    The more and less which diversifies species is read in terms of that which is primary in a given genus. "Diversi enim colores specie sunt secundum magis et minus propinque se habent ad lucem..."^{147} The measure in the genus of color is white, defined as disgregativa visus.^{148} Notice that this magis et minus does not destroy the univocity of the genus, since the per prius et posterius involved is that read in terms of specific differences, something we discussed above; the differences assigned are taken from the effect on our sight because the real differences are unknown.^{149}

    Greater and lesser possession of the form in terms of which things can be called similar sometimes gives rise to generic diversity. St Thomas, following Aristotle, uses the example of the sun as cause of the heat of terrestial things. "Sicut sol ext causa caloris in istis inferioribus; non tamen inferiora corpora possunt recipere impressionem solis aut aliorum caelestium corporum secundum eamdem rationem speciei, cum non communicent in materia. Et propter hoc non dicimus solem esse calidissimum sicut ignem, sed dicimus solem esse aliquid amplius quam calidissimum."^{150} Fire is first in the genus of hot terrestial things; the sun is outside of this genus entirely. The reason St Thomas gives takes us back to the second member of the tripartitie division of the Sentences, something productive of a problem. He sometimes uses this example to show how creatures can be similar to God and yet, as we have seen, between celestial and terrestial bodies there can be similarity secundum genus logicum. Taking this into account, St Thomas writes: "Si igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur, effectus eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad similitudinem formae agentis:non tamenita quod participent similitudinem formae agentis secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus."^{151} While allowing that a logical genus can contain angels and material things, St Thomas will always deny that God can be included in a genus - at least a genus univocum.^{152}
    It will be appreciated that a full commentary on the member "secundum intentionem et secundum esse" at this point would not be in keeping with the order of our discussion. Subsequent chapters will return to the points just mentioned, particularly those concerned with analogical cause and with the divine names.

5. SUMMARY