II. Logic.

282. Logic. -- In the thirteenth century, no less than previously, Aristotle was the undisputed master of dialectic, and the great scholastics considered they could do no better than write commentaries on his teaching (35-38). Logic is only an instrument to be employed in acquiring scientific knowledge, but it is closely allied to metaphysics and psychology. Albert the Great and his successors explicitly formulated the relations between the science of concepts and the science of realities. Logic is the vestibule of philosophy: a scientia specialis, preparatory to philosophy, somewhat as drawing is to painting. Hence we find all sorts of dialectical exercises cultivated in the schools of the thirteenth century, but always as a training for more fruitful controversies later on. The syllogism holds the place of honour. It is supplemented by theories on method and on science, both of which were worked out by scholasticism on Aristotelian lines. The analytico-synthetic method it is that fructifies philosophical researches. Science is of the universal and necessary, scientia non est particularium, singularium, corruptibilium (300).^{1}

During this epoch the value of logic was estimated with all due moderation. Later on, the logical excesses of the decadent scholastics began to make their appearance, but these consequences of degeneration left the doctrinal synthesis of the thirteenth century intact.

{1} ST. THOMAS, In II. 1. De Anima, 12.