As all the questions handed in to the lecturer (with the exception of four that had no bearing whatever upon the subject of the lecture, and are consequently omitted here) were anticipated in the substance of the lecture, the answers given may here be recorded very briefly.
I. "A First Cause: If we seek for a cause of phenomena, are we not looking for a change to explain 'change'?"
No; the lines of reasoning that lead to a rational explanation and unification of phenomena by concluding in the existence of a First Cause, also lead to certain concepts of that cause which absolutely preclude the idea of change of any kind. What many people take to be the most convincing of the proofs of the existence of God -- the argument from the contingent to necessary being -- takes the mind to an utterly changeless, spiritual being, self-existent and, though of course not so to the limited intelligence of man, self-explanatory. "Change" is only conceivable in the case of the composite; and the very conception of God as the uniquely simple (i.e., non-composite) plenitude of being excludes its possibility. Further, creation is not, strictly speaking, "change" at all. For a "change" to take place, something must exist to be changed. Consequently, if the rational explanation of phenomena leads us to a theory of creation, the apparently scientific difficulty vanishes in a metaphysical problem; for creation is a production of being out of nothing; and such a production does not imply change.
II. "To assume the existence of a First Cause is to assume the coming into being of a new consequent without the introduction of a new antecedent."
In the first place, the existence of the First Cause is not assumed, but rigidly demonstrated from its effects. Moreover, the objection is a misleading and captious one. A new consequent does undoubtedly come into being; but a sufficient antecedent cause, since it is infinite, is there: and thus no further antecedent is necessary, nor need one be postulated. But if the question means, as it seems to imply, that there is "change" in, or a new modification of, the eternal antecedent cause when the new effect is produced, three points may be observed. 1. The First Cause is proved to be absolutely immutable. 2. There can be no succession, and consequently no change, until composite beings are brought into actual existence. The change, consequently, is on the part of the created, not of the Creator. 3. The modification (if the misleading expression may be allowed for the sake of clearness) by which the Absolute is determined to create is immutable. Creation comes into being with time, which is dependent upon it; whereas eternity and God are left changeless and absolute.
III. "Does not Science contradict Catholic Theology on questions such as (a) the statement of biologists that man has risen from a lower form of life?"
Statements of biologists are not necessarily science. The theory of evolution is not scientific but philosophical. It has never been proved; nor is it susceptible of direct scientific proof. Catholic theology, in company with sane philosophy, teaches that man, at any rate as far as his soul is concerned, is the result of direct and individual creation on the part of God.
(b) "As to the age of man, and also the age of the earth? Theology has never authoritatively defined either; nor is it quite clear as to how it could do so directly; and the results of scientific observation are exceedingly uncertain and contradictory. Though it may be conceded that the question is scientific in its bearing rather than theological, it is difficult to see how any very precise knowledge can be obtained, and still more difficult to realise how it could affect the teaching of revelation.
(c) "Does not psychical research dispose of the theological idea of the resurrection of the body?" No. What is the meaning of "body"? What are the certain, accredited, and indisputably true teachings of "psychical research" upon this point? What is the doctrine of revealed theology? And can psychical research be, strictly speaking, called science at all?
IV. "Is not the true method of science: 1. observation, 2. hypothesis, 3. verification?" Undoubtedly so, In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to show how the method of science is not properly applied in those dogmatic assertions that are made against revelation and revealed truth. The observations may be correct enough; with them, at any rate, we have no quarrel. The hypotheses may or may not be well founded. But unless the verification is possible, the method of science cannot be followed up. And it is precisely where the actual is left for the hypothetical, the phenomena for the reality, the appearances, measurable, ponderable, calculable, for the essences, that the boundaries of science are overstepped and the territory of metaphysics entered.
V. " 'Every inference of the Rationalist Philosopher must lead direct to God as First Cause.' Why stop there?" Because, if it really leads to the First Cause, no further progress is possible. To attempt to get behind the absolute First Cause would be to attempt what is a contradiction in terms. It is quite true that the mind asks more than mere First Cause; but it asks more in the idea, not outside it. It is in an examination of the nature of the First Cause, spiritual, infinite, self-existent, and self-explanatory, that the further answer is found. And though, to the limited capacity of a human intelligence, such a nature must always remain obscure by reason of its very brilliance and perfection, the mind can remain satisfied with what it has found, as explanatory of all created natures, and possessing in itself its own explanation.
VI. "Can we explain phenomena save in terms of other phenomena?" Obviously so. The very words matter, force, energy, essence, etc., denoting realities or quasi-realities as non-phenomenal, are evidence in point. That we think at all, is due to the fact that we can abstract from the phenomenal. Otherwise, we should imagine in sense-pictures, and not think. This distinction is made clear in the text of the lecture.
VII. "Can we explain anything in terms of ultimate reality?
We can, and must, explain everything in terms of ultimate reality, if we would explain it at all. Until the depths of its nature are reached, there is no true knowledge of anything. As shown in the lecture, the essence of contingent beings points at once the ultimate and necessary reality.
VIII. "Can we conceive any reality, ultimate or otherwise, without feeling the psychological necessity of explaining that in terms of some reality more ultimate still?"
Yes; and we do so when we conceive, in our human and limited manner, the absolutely necessary being, and in no other case. There is no necessity, psychological or otherwise, felt of explaining what is proved to be simple and infinite spirit. To explain would be to dissect and piece together, which, in the very nature of the case, is impossible. The mind rests content in the perfection of the necessary and immutable First Cause.
IX. "If we solve the problem of the world by positing a God, does not God become a problem?"
We do not solve the problem of the world by positing a God, but by proving His existence. Undoubtedly, to our minds, God becomes a problem, and one which, we realise, we shall never solve. But the fact that we can never solve it confirms our estimate of God as pure and infinite being.
The question does not take into consideration that then only have we solved problems when we possess an adequate and comprehensive conception of the natures concerned in them. To possess an adequate and comprehensive conception of God, the unlimited and absolute, is possible only to an unlimited and absolute being, in other words, to God Himself alone. It follows from this that, though the existence of God is a truth that solves all other problems, God Himself must forever remain infinitely unknown to us; though, at the same time, even our finite intelligences can understand that He is, and that He is of necessity self-explanatory. It is this natural and necessary conception of God reached by them that most confirms the certainty of the rational arguments proving His existence and adumbrating His nature, and makes the obvious possibility of revelation become a strong probability. For it is only by information received from Him that we can ever penetrate further the luminous darkness of His infinite nature.