PROPOSITION XXXV.

Every being, either existing or immediately capable of existence, is individually one.

I. This Proposition is first of all proved by an appeal to the testimony of common sense, which no philosophy, worthy of the name, can afford either to ignore or to hold cheap. Nobody can close his eyes to the universal fact, which is now as it ever was before, that everything existing is one thing, undivided in itself, and divided off from everything else, even from such things as are specifically identical with it; so that it is not, in its actual individual nature, communicable to others. Thus, Coriolanus is one, Tullus Aufidius is another; and another of them is, or can be, the other. Nor can there be many Coriolanuses, or more than one Tullus Aufidius. In like manner, the red which inheres in this particular damask-rose, is one in itself and is, naturally at least, incommunicable to any other rose or any other thing in the world. So, the position in which a man is sitting is incommunicable to any other man throughout all time. There may be many other men who may adopt a similar position, in the course of time; but that entitatively identical position is absolutely untransferrible. Furthermore: the mind fails in the attempt to conceive a thing as existing, which is not invested with this singularity of Being. The idea of a Universal, existing apart in and by itself carries with it an inevitable sense of self-contradiction. Hence, the Philosopher in his Nicomachean Ethics introduces the Platonic ideas, as he understood them, merely to indulge in a quiet laugh at their expense; as though they were practically unworthy of serious consideration, because antagonistic to the common judgment of mankind.

II. The Thesis is further proved on philosophical principles. For whatever exists, or is immediately capable of existence, necessarily has a certain and determined Entity. But such certain and determined Entity must be undivided in itself and divided off from every other determined Entity, by virtue of its own Transcendental Unity. Therefore, it is incommunicable, as such Entity, to any other; or, in other words, is individual. The reason for this conclusion is, that since it is undivided in itself it is incommunicable. For, if it were communicable to another, it would be in itself and it would be also in another; so that its Entity would be divided in itself. Hence it follows, that it cannot conceivably be otherwise than incommunicable; because, if a real existing Entity be not individually one, it must be at once one and many by virtue of the same real Entity. This, however, is repugnant to reason.

III. The above argument is confirmed by the following dilemma. Existing Being must be either Individual or Universal: But it cannot be Universal. Therefore, it must be singular or individual. And why cannot it be universal? Because Universals cannot exist as distinct from individuals. The evolution of the argument in proof of this Antecedent will be more clearly and easily understood, if presented under a concrete form. Let Plant, therefore, be a Universal, and this fuchsia and this particular chrysanthemum be two singulars. If Plant existed as a Universal, it would either exist also in the fuchsia and chrysanthemum, or it would exist entirely distinct and separate from both. In this latter hypothesis, it would ipso facto not be a Universal, but an individual entity incommunicable to any other. Besides, the fuchsia and chrysanthemum would not be plants; seeing that they would be entitatively distinguished from Plant. It is necessary, therefore, to take refuge in the other hypothesis, and to suppose that it exists also in the fuchsia and in the chrysanthemum; in which case Plant will either be really and entitatively the same in the fuchsia and chrysanthemum, or it will be entitatively distinct in each. Suppose the first member of the dilemma; then the fuchsia and chrysanthemum will not be two plants, but one. Take the second horn of the dilemma; the consequences are equally fatal. For then, Plant will either be an Entity distinct in each, or it will be the same Entity in each. In the former case, it ceases to be a Universal; in the latter it is divided in itself and is, consequently, no longer Being, but beings.

II. WHAT IS THIS INDIVIDUAL UNITY? WHAT DOES IT ADD TO THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL NATURE, AS ABSTRACTEDLY CONCEIVED BY THE HUMAN MIND?

There is one point in this question, upon which all are agreed. It is impossible to doubt, that Haecceity adds to the essential or specific nature negation of communicability to any other, after the manner which has heen already explained. Indeed, one may proceed further, and say that Haecceity adds this negation or privation not only to the common nature, but to the singular entity itself considered not as singular, but purely as positive Being. For this entire entity is not considered as singular or individually one; till it is conceived as incapable of communicating itself to any other, in the manner aforesaid. The whole difficulty is to be found in determining what that special something is, which is at the root of this negation; for all real negation is founded in some reality. That something cannot be discovered in the specific or common. Nature; for this is of itself indifferent to Individuation and cannot, therefore, (so to say), individuate itself. The following Propositions are directed to the solution of this question.