PROPOSITION XXXVII.

Haecceity does not add anything really distinct from the specific Nature, considered actually as it is in the Individual, so as to form anything like real composition with that Nature.

PROLEGOMENON. A clear understanding of the meaning of the Enunciation here given, is absolutely necessary to a due appreciation of the proofs that will be offered; and, perhaps, an example will explain it most easily. Take the case of some particular dog. In the preceding Proposition it has been shown, that its Haecceity is a real addition to the specific nature of a dog. But, in the present, it is further asserted, that if that specific nature be considered as it is actually in Carlo, (to give the dog a name), there is no real distinction between it and the Haecceity by which it is individually one. Nor should it reasonably afford matter for surprise, that two entities should in the abstract be really distinct from each other, and yet should lose all such real distinction in the concrete. For the instances are so numerous, that the student of Philosophy soon gets habituated to the fact. Thus, for instance, who will deny that vegetable, animal, and spiritual or intellectual, life are really distinct from each other? As a fact, they are physically separate. For a plant has vegetable life, and no other. A brute has vegetable and animal life, but not spiritual. An angel has spiritual life, but neither vegetable nor animal. There can, therefore, be no doubt that, in themselves, they are really distinguished from one another. Yet, in the soul of man, according to the more received opinion, they are all three really one and, consequently, only admit of conceptual distinction. Subsequent discussions touching the nature of Distinctions will throw additional light on this subject.

I. The first argument in proof of the present Proposition is based on the inconsequences that would follow from any other hypothesis. For, if Haecceity does add anything really distinct from the specific Nature existing in the Individual; it follows, that there is a real distinction between the principle of individuation in the Individual and his actual specific Nature. The Haecceity, for instance, of John Smith will be a distinct entity from his manhood. There will therefore be two distinct entities, to wit, the Haecceity of John Smith and his human nature. But, if his human nature be a real entity, as distinct from his individuation; it follows that this human nature will be one. But, if one; then either of individual or of universal unity. The former it cannot be; because, according to the hypothesis, it is denuded of its Haecceity will appear more clearly hereafter), universals, as such, cannot really exist.

II. The preceding argument is further developed and confirmed in this wise. Anything like a real distinction between the individuation and actual nature of a given individual, is simply impossible. For, if there were a real distinction between these two; either they would be two distinct entities, or the Haecceity would be a Mode of the specific Nature. But both suppositions are untenable. To begin with the former: -- If they are two distinct entities in themselves, they must afterwards become one by composition. But real composition between two distinct entities presupposes, at least in order of nature, the constitution of each entity in its own individual Nature; because a thing must first be in itself, before it can be joined to, or united with, another. Therefore, the specific nature must be individual, before it receives its individuation. Besides, each entity would be, apart from the other, individually one; and the question would arise as to these two Haecceities, and so on for ever. Take now the other supposition, viz, that the Haecceity is a Mode of the specific Nature in the Individual. In this case again, the specific Nature must be individually one, to admit of its real composition with its Mode. In other words, either its individuation is essential to that Nature, and then it is not a Mode; or it is not essential and, in that case, it presupposes the specific Nature constituted in its own individuality.

This argument is further confirmed and illustrated by a practical example. Take two men, William and Henry. Now, the human nature in William, apart from its Haecceity, is either distinct from the human nature in Henry, apart from its Haecceity; or it is not. If it is not, then the human nature in both is identical; so that body and soul, apart from thisness of body and soul, are really one and the same in both. Such a hypothesis is palpably absurd. But, if there is a real distinction between the two natures, then each nature, independently of its Haecceity, is already individually one; for the two, as being included under one and the same Species, can only differ numerically.

III. The third argument is based on the insufficiency of the presumed foundation for a real distinction between the Haecceity of an individual Being and the specific Nature. The whole of such supposed distinction is due to the fact, that there are some things in which individuals are like each other, while there are some other things by which they are distinguished from one another; which gives occasion to the intellect of forming one concept that embraces the points of similarity, and another distinct concept representative of the element, or elements, by which the individuals are mutually distinguished. But, that, in any given individual, there are some notes which are similar to those belonging to other individuals and other notes peculiar to itself, distinguishing it, consequently, from all other individuals of the same Species, -- is no sufficient reason for establishing a real distinction between these two classes of notes themselves, as existing in the same individual. For that which proves too much, proves nothing. But, if this were sufficient ground for admitting a real distinction between the Haecceity and the specific Nature in an individual; it would have equal force to introduce a real distinction between specific and individual Haecceity. For it seems impossible to deny that there is a similarity between the Haecceity of William and that of Henry, which does not exist between the Haecceity of William and that of a geranium or of a stone. Whence it would follow, by parity of reason, that there is a real distinction between the specific and personal Haecceity of William.

IV. The last argument in favour of the present Proposition is derived from the absolute inseparability of the two. For, in the case of an individual, the Individuation is inseparable de potentia absoluta from the specific Nature; and the specific Nature is inseparable de potentia absoluta from its Individuation. But, wherever there is this mutual inseparability de potentia absoluta; anything like a real distinction is clearly inadmissible. For to God all things are absolutely possible, which do not involve a contradiction in terms. But, if there he a real distinction, either greater or less, there is no contradiction involved in the separation of the two elements; and, therefore, such separation would be possible, at all events to God.