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 JMC : The Metaphysics of the School / by Thomas Harper, S.J.

PROPOSITION LXII.

The proximate real foundation of the aptitude which a created nature possesses to exist in several Subjects or Individuals, is the essential limitation, at once, and intrinsic perfection of each Nature.

One important and interesting question demands consideration, before the present Article is concluded. It has been seen that there is, in the Natures of actual Beings, a formal Unity, which abstracts from all individuation and consists in Unity of Essence. It has been likewise shown, that Formal, is the foundation of Universal, Unity; forasmuch as it exhibits the Essence as indifferent to this or that individuation, and not repugnant to be in this and in that; whence arises its conceived aptitude to exist in many individuals. Further, it is well known, and has been seen, that, in each specific Nature, there is a similarity with other specific Natures as well as points of dissimilarity; and that the intellect takes occasion from the former, to conceive a wider or more extensive nature which is apt to exist not only in many different individuals, but also in distinct Species. And, though the specific and generic Nature, in the same individual, are really one; yet the Essence, or Quiddity, of the individual affords a real foundation for a conceptual distinction between them. It is only natural, then, to inquire, whence it is that there is this capacity, in every created Nature, of individual multiplication; whence also it comes to pass, that there are higher or generic Unities in which specific Natures agree, so that in a sense one Nature is truly adapted to exist in many Species. Or, -- to put it more plainly in the concrete, -- what is the reason why all of our race are men, and why their number can be indefinitely multiplied? Why is it, or how is it, again, that all men agree with all brutes in being animals?

The answer is to be found in the limitation, at once, and in the intrinsic perfection, of created Beings. The elucidation of this answer will form the declaration of the present Proposition. It will be easy, for the reader, if he so pleases, to throw the declaration into an argumentative form.

If an entity is limited, it does not exhaust in itself all Reality; because there must be some Reality external to itself. For that which is limited by no Reality, is limited by nothing. But that which is limited by nothing, is unlimited. If, however, it does not exhaust all reality, if there is a reality external to itself, there is nothing repugnant in its individual multiplication. If there is one watch, -- to take an illustration from things of art, -- there is no reason why there should not be two. Whereas, conversely, it is quite repugnant that there should be two unlimited or infinite entities; because, in such case, each would be in presence of a reality external to itself, and would, therefore, be necessarily limited. There is evidently, therefore, no a priori impediment to the individual multiplication of a limited nature; but it is conceivable that there may be such an impediment, arising from the nature of the entity in question. Thus St. Thomas asserts, as has been seen, that Angelic Natures, according to the ordinary course of things, are incapable of such individual multiplication; though he admits that the multiplication is absolutely possible. The reason which he assigns for his conclusion is, that an Angelic Form or Nature is sole principle of its own individuation; and, in order to its integral actuation, stands in no need of communicating itself, (so to speak), to any element external to itself, by which it may be determined. Wherefore, it cannot have that indifference which is the foundation of Universal Unity. So again, if, by an absurd hypothesis, we could conceive that individual Beings were entitatively constituted by their Haecceity as being their only real Nature; evidently, no one of them could be capable of multiplication. Once more: if it could be supposed that each individual was nothing but a congeries of Accidents, (a supposition which, though as intrinsically absurd as the preceding, has, nevertheless, been maintained by some), such a Nature would with difficulty admit of individual multiplication; not only because of the natural versatility of Accidents, but likewise, because they admit of indefinite degrees of more and less. Taking, then, into account the Nature of the individual entity in our consideration of the capacity for individual multiplication, it is justly asserted that such capacity is due to the intrinsic perfection of the Nature itself. For the human intellect perceives in each individual amidst the variety of Accidents with which it is clothed, an Essence or essential Quiddity which is the one proper object of its intuition. The essential notes which, as it were, constitute it, are represented by the intellect, or at least can be naturally represented by the intellect, apart from their individual conditions; and, thus free, they are intuitively recognized as capable of indefinite individual multiplication. Thus, that which to each entity is its proper determination and perfection, is the foundation of its being recognized as indefinitely imitable by other individual entities; hence, of the aptitude of its Nature to be in many Subjects.

It is, in like manner, the perfection of each Nature, that is the foundation of that Generic Unity which the intellect conceives as existing in various Species. For not only is there a chain of similarities which joins together the whole creation in one, but in the ascending grades of Being it is impossible to find the distinctness of isolation; for the higher grades virtually include the lower, with the addition of something that is proper to themselves. Thus, the Vegetable includes a material body; the Animal includes vegetative life; Man includes animal life. Hence, that which is proper to the one, (or its Difference), becomes part of the Genus of a higher Nature. But what is all this but perfection? For it is Order; and Order is itself a main element of perfection.


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