PROPOSITION LXIV.

All Distinction of Being is either real or logical.

PROLEGOMENON.

In all things that are anywise distinct from one another, there is a double element; to wit, the things themselves which are considered as distinct, and the Distinction which subsists between them. The former may not inappropriately be called the material part; the latter, the formal part, of Distinction. Now, the material part of Distinction, or the entities themselves, may be logical or real. If they are logical; the formal part, or the Distinction, may be after a manner real, or it may be logical. It is said, after a manner real; because, though there could not be an absolutely real Distinction between two or more merely logical entities, yet the Distinction may be such that, if the entities were real, it would be real. It may be said, therefore, to be imitatively real. Thus, the Distinction between Species and its Definition is logical; that between two Species under the same Genus, real in the sense explained; for the reason that they are mutually exclusive of each other. By some Doctors, when the material part is logical, the logical Distinction is called an extrinsic logical Distinction; when the material part is real and the formal part logical, an intrinsic logical Distinction. According to the doctrine already established when we were occupied in determining the proper subject-matter of this Science, it is not the part of a metaphysician to concern himself with logical entities; save so far forth, as their investigation may conduce to a more complete and accurate knowledge of real Being. Accordingly, the question of extrinsic logical Distinctions will find no place in the present Article.

And now for the DECLARATION of tbe Proposition. One real entity is not another real entity, either properly and in its own nature independently of any intellectual operation, or improperly and denominatively, by virtue alone of different concepts representative of that entity. In other words, the Distinction exists either in the nature of things between two or more entities physically separated or separable, such as is to be found between James and Henry, or between the human soul and body; or merely in the mind, which is capable of conceiving the same real entity under the form of different concepts, either logically or conceptually distinct. In the former case, the Distinction is real; in the latter, logical. (It would be as well to notice, that logical is used here generically, as including conceptual, -- where there is a real foundation for the Distinction, -- as well as logical specific, or merely logical, -- where there is no such foundation.) Furthermore, there is no middle term. For either the entities, considered as distinct, are physically separable, at least by the absolute Omnipotence of God; or they are not. If the former, the Distinction is real; if the latter, it is logical.

NOTE I. There is a peculiar kind of Distinction, which has been called by Doctors of the School real negative Distinction. It is supposed to exist, -- to repeat that which has already found a place in these pages, -- between two terms, of which one is a real entity, the other a negation; whence the name. Thus, the Distinction between Being and not-Being is said to be real negative Distinction. It is said to be real, because it is metaphysically impossible that any thing could be one with its own simple negation; it is called negative, for the reason already assigned. If, however, such Distinction is attentively considered, it will be found to be a mere logical Distinction. For two supposed entities cannot be physically separable, unless they are real entities. Where one term is logical, the Distinction itself cannot be real.

NOTE II.

Formal Distinction, as it is called, or the Distinction of Form from Form, is sometimes real, sometimes conceptual. By Form is here understood some essential characteristic which determines a given entity; though such essential characteristic may be only partial. Thus, -- to illustrate the explanation, -- the Animality in William is really distinct from the Animality in Henry. So, Animality in a man is really distinct from Animality in a worm. But Animality in William is only conceptually distinct from Intelligence in the same. In like manner, the intuitive faculty, the faculty of memory, the reasoning, the abstractive faculty, are in man only conceptually distinct. In like manner, in God, Intellect and Will, Wisdom and Goodness, Essence and Existence, are all individually one; and are, consequently, only logically distinguished.