Outline of the Treatise on Cardinal Virtues


Preliminary note: St. Thomas distinguishes three sorts of "parts" of the cardinal virtues by analogy with the sorts of parts he posits in metaphysics:

  1. integral parts: These are related to the cardinal virtue in question as the roof, the foundation, and the walls are related to a building. The integral parts are such that they must all be present for any complete or perfect act of the virtue.

  2. subjective parts: These are related to the cardinal virtue in question as the species of a genus are related to the genus. That is, they fully satisfy the formal definition of the cardinal virtue and differ from one another in being ordered toward distinct ends or goods. For instance, the subjective parts of prudence are prudence with respect to oneself and prudence with respect to a multitude (e.g., a household or army, etc.). Again, the proper parts of justice are commutative justice, which has to do with the relations between private individuals, and distributive justice, which has to do with the relation between the whole community and the individual.

  3. potential parts: The cardinal virtue in question is related to these parts in the way that the rational soul is related to the operations of its own vegetative and sentient powers, i.e., the form of the whole is the principal of operation for the potential parts, but those operations in some way fall short of the operations of the principal form. So the potential parts of a cardinal virtue share something in common with that virtue but fall short of fully satisfying its formal definition. For instance, the potential parts of justice (e.g., religion, filial piety, truthfulness, gratitude, affability, etc.) all involve, as does justice, our relations with others. But whereas justice, strictly speaking, is the rendering of what is legally due to one's equals, the potential parts are concerned with relations between unequals and/or with demands that are moral rather than strictly legal. Again, in the case of prudence the potential parts are good inquiry (eubilia) and good judgment both in matters that conform to ordinary rules (synesis) and in matters that call for exceptions to ordinary rules (gnome). For inquiry and judgment fall short of the principal act of prudence, which is to command or give precepts for action. In general, then, potential parts are virtues which "are adjoined to the cardinal virtue and are ordered toward certain secondary acts or subject matters; they do not have the full power, as it were, of the principal virtue."


PRUDENCE (prudentia) (47-56)


I. Prudence in itself (47)

II. The parts of prudence (48-51)

    A. The parts of prudence in general (48)

    B. The integral parts of prudence (49)

    C. The subjective parts of prudence (50)

    D. The potential parts of prudence (51)

III. The gift of counsel (52)

IV. The corresponding vices (53-55)

    A. Imprudence (imprudentia) (53)

    B. Negligence (negligentia) (54)

    C. The related vices that bear a similarity to prudence (55)

V. The precepts pertaining to prudence (56)



JUSTICE (iustitia) (57-122)


I. Justice in general (57-60)

    A. Right (ius) (57)

    B. Justice itself (58)

    C. Injustice (iniustitia) (59)

    D. Judgment (iudicium) (60)


II. The parts of justice (61-120)

    A. The subjective parts of justice: commutative justice and distributive justice (61)

      1. Commutative justice and its act, restitution (restitutio) (62)

      2. The vice opposed to distributive justice: favoritism (acceptio personarum) (63)

      3. Vices opposed to commutative justice (64-78)

        a. Vices opposed to commutative justice through deeds (64-66)

          i. Murder (homicidium) (64)

          ii. Other injuries commited against the person (65)

          iii. Theft (furtum) and robbery (rapina) (66)

        b. Vices opposed to commutative justice through words used in court (67-71)

          i.. Injustice on the part of a judge (67)

          ii. Unjust accusation (iniusta accusatio) (68)

          iii. Injustice on the part of a defendant (69)

          iv. Injustice on the part of a witness (70)

          v. Injustice on the part of a counsel (71)

        c. Vices opposed to commutative justice through words used outside of a court (72-76)

          i. Contumely (dishonoring another) (contumelia) (72)

          ii. Detraction (backbiting aimed at another) (detractio) (73)

          iii. Tale-bearing (malicious gossip) (susurratio) (74)

          iv. Derision (mocking another) (derisio) (75)

          v. Malediction (cursing another) (maledictio) (76)

        d. Vices opposed to commutative justice through buying and selling and making loans (77-78)

          i. Fraud (cheating) (fraudulentia) (77)

          ii. Usury (usuria) (78)

    B. The integral parts of justice: Declining to do evil and doing good (79)

    C. The potential parts of justice: religion (religio), piety (pietas), respectfulness (observantia), gratitude (gratitudo), vindication (vindicatio), truthfulness (veritas), friendliness (amicitia), liberality (liberalitas), equity (epieikeia) (80-120)

      1. Religion: in itself, its interior and exterior acts, and the opposed vices (81-100)

        a. Religion in itself (81)

        b. The interior acts of religion (82-83)

          i. Devotion (devotio) (82)

          ii. Prayer (oratio) (83)

        c. The exterior acts of religion (84-91)

          i.Adoration (adoratio) (84)

          ii. Sacrifices (sacrificia) (85)

          iii. Oblations (oblationes) and first-fruits (primitia) (86)

          iv. Tithes (decimae) (87)

          v. Vows (promises to God) (vota) (88)

          vi. Oaths (invoking God as a witness to confirm the truth of a declaration or promise) (iuramenta) (89)

          vii. Taking God's name by way of adjuring another (adiuratio) (90)

          viii. Taking God's name by way praising Him (91)

        d. The vices opposed to religion (92-100)

          i. Superstition (superstitio) (92)

          ii. Superstition that involves worshipping the true God (93)

          iii. Idolatry (idolatria) (94)

          iv. Divination (Fortune-telling) (divinatio) (95)

          v. Superstitious observances (96)

          vi. Tempting God (tentatio Dei) (97)

          vii. Perjury (periurium) (98)

          viii. Sacrilege (sacrilegium) (99)

          ix. Simony (simonia) (100)


      2. Piety (101)

      3. Respectfulness (reverence for those in positions of dignity) (102-105)

        a. The parts of respectfulness and an opposed vice (103-105)

          i. Respect for those in a higher position (dulia) (103)

          ii. Obedience (obedientia) and the opposed vice, disobedience (104-105)


      4. Gratitude and the opposed vice, ingratitude (106-107)

      5. Vindication (108)

      6. Truth (truthfulness) and the opposed vices (109-113)

        a. Truthfulness (109)

        b. Lying (mendacium) (110)

        c. Dissimulation (simulatio) and hypocrisy (hypocrisis) (111)

        d. Boasting (iactantia) (112)

        e. Belittling onself (ironia) (113)


      7. Friendliness (affability) and the opposed vices (114-116)

        a. Affability (affabilitas) (114)

        b. Flattery (adulatio) (115)

        c. Quarreling (litigium) (116)


      8. Liberality and the opposed vices (117-119)

        a. Liberality (117)

        b. Avarice (covetousness) (avaritia) (118)

        c. Prodigality (prodigalitas) (119)


      9. Equity (120)


III. The gift of piety (121)

IV. The precepts pertaining to justice (122)



FORTITUDE (fortitudo) (123-140)


I. Fortitude: in itself, its highest act, and the vices opposed to it (123-127)

    A. Fortitude (123)

    B. The highest act of fortitude: martyrdom (martyrium) (124)

    C. Fear (timor) (125)

    D. Fearlessness (intimiditas) (126)

    E. Daring (audacia) (127)


II. The integral and potential parts of fortitude and opposed vices (the same virtues count as both depending how they are considered) (128-138)

    A. Magnanimity (magnanimitas) and its opposed vices (129-133)

      1. Magnanimity (129)

      2. Presumption (presumptio) (130)

      3. Ambition (ambitio) (131)

      4. Vainglory (inanis gloria) (132)

      5. Pusillanimousness (pusillanimitas) (133)


    B. Magnificence (magnificentia) and its opposed vices (134-135)

      1. Magnificence (134)

      2. Vices opposed to magnificence (135)


    C. Patience (patientia) (136)

    D. Perseverance (perseverantia) and its opposed vices (137-138)

      1. Perseverance (137)

      2. Vices opposed to perseverance (138)


III. The gift of fortitude (139)

IV. The precepts pertaining to fortitude (140)



TEMPERANCE (temperantia) (141-170)


I. Temperance: in itself and the vices opposed to it (141-142)

II. The parts of temperance (143-169)

    A. The integral parts of temperance: shame (verecundia) and moral decorousness(honestas) (144-145)

      1. Shame (inclination to be ashamed at what is shameful) (144)

      2. Moral decorousness (inclination to do what is honorable for its own sake) (145)


    B. The subjective parts of temperance (146-154)

      1. The subjective parts of temperance having to do with the pleasures of food and drink: abstinence (abstinentia) and sobriety (sobrietas) (146-150)

        a. Abstinence (146-148)

          i. Abstinence in itself (146)

          ii. The act of abstinence: fasting (ieiunium) (147)

          iii. The vice opposed to abstinence: gluttony (gula) (148)

        b. Sobriety (149-150)

          i. Sobriety in itself (149)

          ii. The vice opposed to sobriety: drunkenness (ebrietas) (150)


      2. The subjective parts of temperance having to do with the pleasures of sex: chastity (castitas) and its part, virginity (virginitas) (151-154)

        a. Chastity (151)

        b. Virginity (152)

        c. The vices opposed to chastity: lust (luxuria) and the species of lust (153-154)


    C. The potential parts of temperance: continence (continentia), kindness (clementia), meekness (mansuetudo), modesty (modestia) (155-169))

      1. Continence and the vice opposed to it (155-156)

        a. Continence in itself (155)

        b. The vice opposed to continence: incontinence (156)


      2. Kindness and meekness and the opposed vices (157-159)

        a. Kindness and meekness in themselves (157)

        b. The vice opposed to meekness: anger (iracundia) (158)

        c. The vice opposed to kindness: cruelty (crudelitas) (159)


      3. Modesty, in itself, its subjective parts, and opposed vices (160-169)

        a. Modesty (160)

        b. The subjective parts of modesty and their opposed vices (161-169)

          i. Humility (humilitas) and the opposed vice (161-165)

            a. Humility in itself (161)

            b. Pride (superbia) (162)

            c. Appendix: the sin of the first parents (163-165)

          ii. Studiousness (studiositas) and its opposed vice, curiosity (curiositas) (166-167)

          iii. Modesty as affecting words and deeds (168)

          iv. Modesty as affecting outward appearance (169)


III. The precepts pertaining to temperance (170)