Plato (428BC-348BC)

A. Introductory remarks

B. Some moral (or affective) prerequisites for being a true Philosopher rather than a Sophist
C. The Philosopher and death
D. From moral vision to metaphysics: arguments for immortality: 2. The first argument; 3. An interlude: the conditions for a good argument; 4. The second and third arguments; 5. Objections and replies
E. Three notes on argumentation and the limits of philosophical reasoning

A. Introductory remarks

The term philosophy comes from two Greek words, philos, which means friend or lover, and sophia, which means wisdom. So philosophy is the love of wisdom and, more importantly, the philosopher is the friend or, better, lover of wisdom.

What is wisdom? The ideal for the philosopher is the attainment of a comprehensive and systematic elaboration of the first principles of being that provides definitive answers to fundamental questions about the origins, nature, and destiny of the universe and about the good for human beings and the ways to obtain it. And such wisdom is meant to be action-guiding. In the Republic Plato's injunction is in effect: "Become wise yourself, or if you are incapable of it, let yourself be guided by one who is truly wise."

The intellectual component of philosopher's quest encompasses ethical, metaphysical, and epistemic questions of the sort Plato discusses in his dialogues:

ETHICAL or MORAL	METAPHYSICAL	EPISTEMIC
virtue (the good)	being/becoming	truth
law (the right)	appearance/reality	knowledge
justice	power	certitude
friendship	causality and freedom	perception
courage	the nature of God	explanation
love	space & time	philosophical method
piety	the soul and immortality	dialectical argument

But perhaps the more important question is: Who and what is the philosopher? And here the notion of singleminded love becomes important. For it is love for wisdom and the ideal of an intellectually, morally, and spiritually integrated life that drives the true philosopher. This is why Socrates and Plato insist that there are affective, as well as intellectual, prerequisites for being a philosopher. This is crucial for understanding both the motivation and the method of the philosopher. And, indeed, this will be one of the main themes of this course. See Apology, 38A.

With this in mind we can understand the early dialogues of Plato as exhibiting philosophy in a state that is defective in various ways--e.g., in Socrates's coming across as simply a smart aleck in conversations with those who are not motivated by love of wisdom and, perhaps more significantly, in the motivations of the young men (like Plato) who are attracted to Socrates. This is counterfeit philosophy as practiced by the sophists, those who may look and sound like philosophers on the surface, yet whose motivation is not the love of wisdom and truth, but simply the desire to expose the intellectual shortcomings of their interlocuters or to persuade those who are led by their passions. When philosophical argumentation is carried on in such an atmosphere, it will be barren and unable to proceed very far. More on this later. The Apology and Phaedo are excellent 'middle' dialogues for raising these issues, since it is in the middle dialogues that the portrait of the true philosopher emerges. (The forbidding 'later' dialogues are only for those who have passed the first test and are equipped to handle the intellectual challenges, i.e., philosophy majors!)
Even if philosophy as so described doesn't sound attractive to you, there is yet another, less ennobling, purpose for being exposed to the great philosophers, viz., to get to know yourself better. Each of us operates by a set of 'first principles', i.e., basic assumptions that we take for granted without question. The problem is that often we do not even realize that we have such principles; further, even if we do realize it, these first principles remain unexamined in the sense that we do not understand where they come from or what their consequences are. We do not ask whether it is good to have such-and-such as a first principle. In this sense, we do not know ourselves. Good philosophy is meant to help us identify and examine our own deepest assumptions. In that sense it helps us at least to know ourselves. This is at least a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for being wise.

B. Some moral (or affective) prerequisites for being a true Philosopher rather than a Sophist

Detachment from worldly goods (not tempted by wealth, reputation and fame, good connections, creature comforts, social standing, etc.) (Phaedo, 64D-65A and Apology, 29D-E & 36B-E).

Singleminded and singlehearted devotion to the truth and wisdom (unity or integrity of life) (Apology, 41D-E).

Willingness to stand in opposition to the "common wisdom" (courage) (Apology, 28B-31C)

Intellectual humility (docility but not gullibility) (Apology, 23B)

Sense of being called (vocation) to the practice of a way of life (Apology, 37E-38A)

C. The Philosopher and death (Phaedo, 61C-69E)

The startling claim: Death is a blessing for the true Philosopher!!

The argument:

(2) The body is a hindrance to the pursuit of wisdom in the following ways:

b. The bodily senses do not help and can even hinder the pursuit of wisdom

c. To care for bodily needs takes time away from the pursuit of wisdom

d. The body becomes diseased and deteriorates with age, again detracting from the search for wisdom

preparation for death.

D. From moral vision to metaphysics: arguments for immortality

1. Introductory remarks:

Philosophy is a search for truth as well as for a challenging or inspiring vision. Socrates has put forth what many take to be an inspiring vision of human perfection. Now he is asked to dig deeper and defend this view against objections. (It is worth asking, though, whether Socrates should abandon his convictions about the meaning of his life if he can't come up with compelling answers to the objections raised by Simmias and Cebes. What, after all, are the alternatives?--it is always important to ask this question. More below.)

Arguments and their contexts: norms of plausibility and the pitfall of the detached argument. It's one thing to raise objections; it's another thing to propose an alternative comprehensive account and to explain why someone might have been misled by the argument in question. For a true philosopher, the two are intimately connected.

A fruitful piece of philosophical dialectic can take place only between people who have both moral and intellectual excellence. In the Phaedo, it is only the two visitors from Thebes, Simmias and Cebes, who qualify. The others seem to be morally good, but not very gifted or very well trained intellectually. They are, after all, Socrates's friends and admirers who have come to console him. In Plato's Republic, on the other hand, there is a character, Thrasymachus, who is intellectually gifted but morally corrupt, and his conversation with Socrates is flawed because he has no self-control. To make the point, Plato later puts the strongest argument for Thrasymachus's position into the mouth of two characters who qualify as philosophers but do not even believe the position they argue so well for. (Remember this later in the course when Mill claims that only a person who accepts a given position can argue really well for it.)

2. The first argument: The argument from opposites (70B-72E)

(2) Every change involves a movement from one opposite to another [premise]

being dead

being alive

(2b) Dying involves a change from being alive to being dead

(3) So after dying there is a change from being dead to being alive [from (1) and (2a) and (2b)]

3. An interlude: The conditions for a good philosophical argument

An argument is a good (or sound) argument just in case:

valid

(2) the premises are true; and

(3) the premises are better known to us than the conclusion; and

(4) the premises are relevant to the conclusion.

Some representative bad arguments, each keyed to one of the above conditions:

Re: Condition 1

(1) Janet has blue eyes

(2) Ed has brown hair

Therefore, someone has both blue eyes and brown hair

Re: Condition 2

(1) Eating seven bags of potato chips a day is fun

(2) Whatever is fun is conducive to good health

Therefore, eating seven bags of potato chips a day is conducive to good health

Re: Condition 3

(1) God exists

Therefore, God exists

Re: Condition 4

(1) 2 + 2 = 4

(2) 2 x 2 = 4

Therefore, the sum of the interior angles of a Euclidean triangle is 180 degrees

Some 'formal' properties of good philosophical inquiry: clarity of expression; subtlety in interpreting the work of others; insight in drawing distinctions, as well as in constructing and presenting arguments for one's own positions; fairness in representing the positions of others or the objections of others to one's own positions; straightforwardness and intellectual honesty in answering objections, even if this involves the admission that one cannot at present respond satisfactorily

In arguments of philosophical importance, the most important issue is the assessment of the truth or falsity of key premises. And here there is no easy method. In fact, such "assessments of plausibility" in the long run depend on the first principles or basic assumptions of the assessor. (As we will see later on, Descartes tries to give us a method nonetheless.) This is important to remember, because it is precisely certain basic assumptions of the Athenians that Socrates got into trouble for questioning. Further, it is always dangerous to assess arguments in isolation from the bigger philosophical context which gives rise to them. Philosophers must constantly have clearly in mind their own basic assumptions and the worldview built upon those assumptions. This is a step on the way to wisdom and reflective self-knowledge--and it is also, in part, why Plato insists on the moral and affective prerequisites for philosophy. The character of a philosopher affects his or her basic judgments of plausibility. That is, your character affects your ability to see truth clearly. (This is a theme we will return to with Aquinas, Nietzsche and Augustine.)

4. The second and third arguments

The argument from recollection (72E-77A)

Note: Simmias accepts this argument to the extent that he accepts the theory of Recollection.

The argument from the likeness of the soul to the Forms (77A-84B)

5. Objections and replies

Simmias: The soul is a harmony of the bodily elements and not an independent thing.

Socrates: If so, then there is no recollection--but you have already accepted recollection. Also, if so, then there is no difference between wickedness and righteousness.

Cebes: The soul may not outlast an indefinite number of bodies; it might wear out.

Socrates: The soul is not the sort of thing that can have intrinsic principles of deterioration or corruption.

E. Three notes on argumentation and the limits of philosophical reasoning

Note Simmias's remark at 85C-D. The limits of dialectical argumentation.

This gives rise to the oration against misology (i.e., the hatred of reasoned discourse or argumentation) at 89D-91C. This section of the dialogue raises some questions:

(a) What prompts Socrates in the first place to construct arguments for the immortality of the soul? That is, why does he engage in this discussion and what are his goals? Why does he need philosophical argumentation in order to accomplish those goals?

(b) How important is it to him in this context that his arguments should be successful? More specifically, will he--or should he--give up his belief in immortality if his arguments do not succeed? Why or why not? More generally, is his belief in the immortality of the soul based on the arguments he gives?

(c) What counts as success here, anyway? That he should convince Simmias and Cebes? That he should convince himself? Or is it at all relevant whether anyone is convinced by his arguments? If not, then what is relevant to success here?

(d) More generally, what, if anything, distinguishes Socrates here from those sophists whose main goal is to teach others merely how to be persuasive? (After all, Socrates spends all of the Gorgias and a good deal of the Republic trying to distinguish the true philosopher from the charlatans.) So how is he different? How can he prevent his own followers from becoming misologists?

(e) What exactly is wrong with misology? Socrates himself realizes that his arguments for immortality are subject to tough objections, and that those objections are themselves not immune from criticism. So why not just dismiss philosophical argumentation as inconclusive and thus useless for getting at the truth? How, if at all, would one be worse off by adopting this attitude? (You might here reflect on Socrates's analogy between the misologist and the misanthrope.)
(f) Well, what's the alternative to reasoned discourse? Following our passions? Following the crowd? Following some guide? But what is it that distinguishes reliable guides from unreliable ones?

Notice that at the end of the dialogue Socrates "breaks out" into a myth about the afterlife and the judgment and disposition of souls according to their merits. Plato often uses myth (or a likely story) to mark the limits of philosophical reasoning. But the fact that philosophical reasoning and argumentation have their limits does not dispense us from the necessity of deciding how to live our lives and what commitments we should make. The alternative seems to be simply to follow whatever desires we happen to have without asking whether or not we should have them.