PREFACE: This is a labor of love. I am not a good typist, but I have nevertheless spent several hours retyping this journal article so that I may, by permission of Communio, post it on my faculty web page. It is one of the richest reflections on the nature of Catholic higher education that I have ever read. If ever an analysis hit the nail on the head, I think it would be this one.  – Robert Kloska

 

Eruditio without religio?:

The dilemma of Catholics in the Academy

 

Michael J. Baxter and

Frederick C. Bauerschmidt

 

 

What we are losing, and are therefore called to

recover, is an understanding of our vocations

as scholars dedicated to glorifying God.

 

Duke University, where for the past five years we have studied and sometimes taught theology and ethics, has as its motto “Eruditio et Religio.” The university recently inaugurated its thirteenth president, Nannerl Keohane, who took the occasion of her inaugural address to speak about this motto, which, she admitted, left her immediately “uneasy” when she learned about it after taking the job. She noted that, “The motto has an archaic sound if one provides a literal translation – erudition and religion.” But it was not only the archaic vocabulary that made Keohane uneasy. “[T]he emphasis on religion,” she confessed, “seemed hard to square with the restless yearning for discovery, the staunch and fearless commitment to seek for truth wherever truth may be found that is the hallmark of a great university.” Religion, in other words, is hard to square with good scholarship.

 

            Such a view is common in the modern academy- overtly in secular colleges and universities and covertly in many Catholic institutions. However, the best of the Catholic tradition does not share Keohane’s instinctive uneasiness at the thought of putting religio in the same motto with eruditio, nor does it find the “restless yearning for discovery” to be stifled by an “emphasis on religion.” On the contrary, Catholics believe that religion (correctly understood) provides the necessary direction for living out “the restless yearning for discovery.” For, as Augustine observes in the opening of his Confessions (I,1), our hearts are restless until they rest in God.

 

            This puts Catholics out of step with the modern academy in general. It is simply assumed by most faculty and administrators in the academy today that religion constitutes an impediment to learning. The memory and myth of Galileo is so alive in the hearts and minds of the rank and file of academia that his name need not be explicitly invoked in order to deliver the point: if you mix religion and higher education, you end up creating more martyrs for science, for enlightenment, for “the restless yearning for discovery.” We live in an era in which there has been a divorce between Christian discipleship and the practice of scholarship.

 

            Historically, this is a relatively recent development. In this country, almost every college and university was founded under Christian auspices. But over the past century, with very few exceptions, they have succeeded in detaching themselves from the tradition and authority of their founding ecclesial bodies. This has cleared the way for new traditions and authorities, and a new overarching set of institutional arrangements: the modern academy.

 

            The driving assumption behind scholarship in the modern academy has been that true, authentic scholarship can flourish only in an environment of “academic freedom,” commonly understood as freedom of intellectual inquiry from all prior assumptions about nature, the world, human society, human destiny, and especially God[1]. The paradigm of academic inquiry in the modern academy has become the natural sciences, since their declared method is to renounce all presuppositions and to attend only to empirical evidence. This empiricism has also been vigorously pursued in the social sciences, with the result that there has been a stunning proliferation of new disciplines over the past 75 years, each corresponding to newly developed, discrete models of empirical analysis.

 

            Thus the mode of inquiry which now prevails in the modern academy is shaped by the specialized needs of particular disciplines. Professors invest little if any energy toward developing a comprehensive philosophy of education. Graduate students are rarely encouraged to develop interests in other disciplines, unless they be cognate fields that will sharpen their particular expertise. The vision of learning which most faculty members and graduate students are likely to espouse is one that is committed, first and foremost, to preserving the autonomy of that most scared of unions, “the department.” The modern academy thus produces scholars who are professionally trained in discrete disciplines and are further trained in a highly specialized area within those disciplines – scholars who have relatively little to say about the activity of other disciplines and virtually nothing to offer in the way of an overarching vision of the intellectual life. Hence, the increasing irrelevance to higher education of anything associated with “religion.”

 

            And yet, there are plenty of Catholics in the modern academy, nowadays more than ever before, who fall heir to an intellectual tradition which looks upon scholarship as inquiry into the ultimate nature and purpose of God’s creation – into the good, the true, and the beautiful  and which calls for using academic skills in order to glorify God. So what is a Catholic scholar to do?

 

            One option is to keep your Catholic intellectual tradition to yourself. Self-censorship has become the personal policy of many, perhaps most, Catholic scholars, particularly the ones of the generation after Vatican II. After all, it has several advantages. You don’t have to answer to your colleagues for every utterance emanating from the Vatican; you don’t have to listen to the carping of rapidly middle-aging “ex Catholic” academics whose fifth-grade teacher, Sister Mary Aloysius Twardowskewicz, crippled them for life; you don’t have to defend the central tenets of Catholic intellectual tradition to teachers or students who aren’t interest in it anyway, except insofar as it provides more grist for the anti-Catholic mill; you don’t have to tense up in apology as you explain to doctrinaire pro-choice liberals why you think people should refrain from destroying their offspring. But it also carries with it a terrible disadvantage: it reduces Catholicism to an extracurricular activity. That is to say, it presumes that Catholicism has no real part to play when it comes to genuine, authentic, hard-core, nuts-and-bolts academic teaching and scholarship.

 

            When people refer to “spiritual life on campus,” they are all too often speaking of activities which are, quite literally, extracurricular, which occur outside the sphere of academic teaching and scholarship: Mass and other liturgies, informal prayer groups and Bible studies, programs concerning drug and alcohol abuse or sexual activity on campus, volunteer social service projects, and any number of other activities commonly associated with campus ministry offices and Newman Centers. While such activities can be crucial to campus life, they become peripheral when pursued in isolation from the central mission of colleges and universities, which is to promote intellectual inquiry. Thus, attempts to develop a “spirituality of academic life” that focus on these kinds of activities tend to underwrite the assumption that these terms refer to two separate realms of human activity: a sphere for “academic life,” which pertains to the hustle-bustle of the academy, and sphere for “spirituality,” which pertains to some other place – and as we see it, to make this assumption is already to distort the true nature of both “spirituality” and “academic life.” Accordingly, in the following reflections we do not intend to lay out a “spirituality” of academic life. Rather, we intend to show that one must get beyond the notion that there exist two distinct domains, “spirituality” and “academic life,” if one is even to arrive at an understanding of religio and eruditio that regards religio as more than a quaint term that has no place in the academy other than its appearance on archaic university mottos.

 

II.

 

            When Teresa of Avila wasn’t busy reforming her network of Carmelite communities throughout sixteenth-century Europe or tending to her troubled relationship with God (she says she went seventeen years without a religious experience), she studied, taught, and wrote books whose publishing life continues to this day. When Thomas Aquinas wasn’t eating, sleeping, or praying the liturgy with his Dominican brothers, he studied, taught, and wrote scores of commentaries on Aristotle and Scripture, plus of course the Summa Theologiae. When Augustine wasn’t managing the administrative affairs of the diocese, ruling on legal disputes that came up through the region surrounding Hippo (which many days took from sunup to sundown), or keeping the Manicheans, Donatists, and Pelagians at bay, he studied, taught, and wrote books, so many books in fact that Isidore of Seville once remarked that anyone who claims to have read all the works of Augustine is a liar.[2]

 

            These people hold several things in common. For one thing, they all were (and are) saints. For another, they all were members of religious communities of one sort or another. Moreover, their lives as scholars and teachers were understood as a crucial part of their overall service to the Church. And finally, religion for them was in no way an impediment to learning, but was, on the contrary, the only true means by which they could ultimately fulfill their restless yearning to know. And the same could be said of Anselm of Canterbury, Hildegard of Bingen, Bonaventure, Catherine of Siena, Julian of Norwich, Thomas More, Robert Bellarmine, as well as many devoted Christians scholars who were not saints. Certainly these figures put forth different visions of the relationship between Christian revelation and other areas of inquiry (sometimes profoundly different, as in the case, say, of Augustine and Thomas More), but all of them saw religio as the central ingredient of eruditio.

 

            A glimpse of this vision of the relationship between religio and eruditio is vividly portrayed by the late Dom Jean Leclerq, O.S.B., in The Love of Learning and the Desire for God. The title alone suggests a profoundly different world of scholarship than that which most of us currently inhabit. Leclerq shows that after Saint Benedict established the tiny lay community at Monte Cassino in the sixth century, Christian scholarship was embedded within a Christian culture, that is, within a complex web of practices and beliefs encompassing every aspect of the life of the Christian monastic community.  One’s “spiritual life” was simply one’s life in all its myriad activities. Within this monastic culture, every activity was shaped by what at that time was considered to be the only pursuit worth devoting one’s life to – the pursuit of the good, otherwise known as God. Praying throughout the hours of the day, working in the cellar or in the fields, eating at common table, welcoming visitors into the community, every activity was oriented to the praise and service of God. So too with intellectual activity.

 

            The intellectual activity of the monastery came in two basic forms. First, there was the intellectual activity in which most every monk participated. Praying the liturgy, for example, was a time for memorizing and ruminating over the Scriptures. Working was a time for meditating on the presence of God, and it was routinely punctuated by short prayers in order to enhance this practice. Eating was a time for continued reflection on whatever book was being read aloud at meals. In other words, this form of intellectual activity was distributed throughout the various aspects of monastic form of life.

 

            Second, there was the pursuit of knowledge that we would associate with scholarship or higher learning. The Rule of St. Benedict states that the monastery is to be “a school in God’s service,”[3] and over the centuries this service came to be seen as including scholarship, which at length was fully integrated into the overall mission of the monastery. This meant that no specialized knowledge, no skill, was seen as an end in itself; its end was always the service of God. Accordingly, a scholar might attain a certain technical competence in a narrowly circumscribed area, such as the curative powers of herbs, the classifications of animals, or the intricacies of translating Greek or Arabic manuscripts into Latin, but a full and true understanding of any single field of knowledge fell within a comprehensive theological context. Everything relating to scholarship was envisioned in a Christological light; as Leclerq puts it, “to understand things is to realize the relationship they have to Christ.”[4] Properly understood, every creature was seen as a sign of its Creator. Of course, as Leclerq himself points out, deep tensions were encompassed within a vision of the universe which made for a profoundly optimistic attitude toward learning. Anything in the world that reflected the true, the good, or the beautiful, drawn from whatever source – oriental scientists or Greek pagan literature – was welcomed as part of the handiwork of God (the intellectual equivalent of the Benedictine charism of hospitality.  It was no coincidence that the monks preserved the philosophies and literature of antiquity.

           

            During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there was a shift in the locus of higher learning form the monasteries to the large universities of medieval Europe. This represented a departure from the more tightly knit monastic vision of education, but it was not a decisive departure. The infusion of Islamic and Jewish thought, including the reintroduction of the texts of Aristotle, gave rise to intense disputes as to their intellectual status.[5]  Some medieval scholars exhibited virtually no hesitation in welcoming the new modes of knowledge; others displayed a deep suspicion of knowledge that threatened to disrupt their moral and intellectual vision (not unlike the instinctive aversion scholars today display to patriarchal literature or to evidence that contradicts evolutionary theory).  But in either case, as with the monasteries, the commonly understood theological task was to incorporate new modes of knowledge in the arts and science into a comprehensive, overarching theological narrative.[6] Exactly how this should be done was not decided once and for all, thus producing different and oftentimes competing accounts of the place of secular knowledge in university curricula; one account, for example, calling for direct regulation of the disciplines in the arts by theology (Bonaventure) over against a competing account which gave these disciplines a limited but definite measure of autonomy (Aquinas). But these disputes were adjudicated on the basis of shared assumptions about Christian tradition and were contained within a broad theological narrative of exitus and reditus, in which all creatures processed forth from God and are now in the process of returning to God.

 

            In monasteries and medieval universities, then, there persisted a vision of intellectual inquiry in which there was no division between “spirituality” and “academic life.” This vision saw the life of the mind as the single, yet multifaceted endeavor of serving God through intellectual inquiry, an endeavor that was intrinsically “spiritual” because it was carried out in the context of a vast, complete web of Christian belief and practice, and because, when properly carried out, it would prepare one for beatitude, the gift of beholding the mysteries of God.

 

III.

 

            So, how did this separation between “spirituality” and “academic life” emerge? It was, in a word, constructed. The separation began to emerge in the late Middle Ages, when the standard thirteenth-century distinction between nature and supernature widened into an unbridgeable chasm, so much so that by the fourteenth century thinkers such as William of Ockham posited a fundamental separation between knowledge gained on the basis of reason and knowledge gained on the basis of faith. In this theoretical scheme, it is possible to grasp the operations and purpose of nature through the exercise of the intellect without reference to supernatural realities. Conversely, it is possible to give assent to doctrines such as the Trinity or transubstantiation solely through “faith,” an ungrounded movement of the will that need not refer to reason and experience and sometimes contradicts it.[7] Herein lay the first flowering of the division between faith and reason that would eventually become the hallmark of the modern secular academy.

 

            With “faith” severed from “reason,” theology’s interaction with philosophy and the arts diminished. By the sixteenth century, this estrangement was institutionalized in the curricula of the major European universities. The most influential of these was the Ratio Studiorum, a voluminous set of pedagogical and curricular guidelines developed by Jesuit teachers and administrators that in 1599 became the standard curriculum for all Jesuit universities.[8] Designed to convey both Ignatian spirituality and the humanistic learning of the Renaissance, the Ratio (as it is called) was structured along three general tiers: the first tier consisted of studies in the arts (grammar, the humanities, and rhetoric) and was geared for the youngest students, many of whom went no further; the second tier consisted of the study of philosophy, under which were subsumed all branches of science, a comprehensive treatment of the liberal arts, plus philosophy and morals, and was designed for more advanced students; and the third tier consisted of a broad instruction in theology, which was normally pursued by religious or diocesan seminarians preparing for the priesthood. This kind of segregated educational scheme in effect produced two separate spheres of knowledge, one sphere associated with “academic life,” and the other associated with “spirituality.”

 

            The sphere of “academic life” was actually an outgrowth of theology’s diminished interaction with philosophy and the liberal arts. Implicit in the structure of the Ratio was the assumption that classical humanities and philosophy could be taught and understood without integral reference to theological categories. By reserving theological studies for the final and most advanced phase of learning, an unprecedented measure of autonomy was given to the humanities and especially to philosophy. At length, it came to be understood that philosophy, not theology, supplied the unifying intellectual vision and overarching context of all knowledge. And with philosophy, rather than theology, providing the integrating vision of all higher learning, the arts and sciences became the domain of secular modes of inquiry and discourse. Thus, an intellectual enterprise emerged that was largely uninformed by Christology, pneumatology, eschatology, or any other theological categories.

 

            The sphere of “spirituality” was likewise created by the severance of theology from the other disciplines, an estrangement that was institutionalized with the rise of the seminary system after the Council of Trent. Once confined to the seminary setting, theology became the special interest and domain of the clergy, and as is often the case when professional training becomes the overriding purpose of education, the emphasis was placed on providing expertise in specialized areas at the expense of comprehensive intellectual inquiry. The overarching theological vision of the thirteenth-century theology thus disintegrated into several discrete specialties, such as doctrine, sacraments, canon law, apologetics, scriptural commentary, and what would now be called “spirituality,” which became a discipline unto itself.

 

            The specialized study of “spirituality” drew heavily from the devotia moderna, a movement of the late Middle Ages which understood prayer as a purely affective activity that could be enhanced through techniques of introspection.[9] The best example of the devotio moderna is probably Thomas a Kempis’s Imitation of Christ, but this was just one of a series of quasi-scientific manuals that focused on the how-to aspects of prayer while paying scant attention to the life of the intellect. The eventual result was the construction of an autonomous sub-discipline of “mystical” or “ascetical” theology, later to be known as “spiritual theology.” Thus by the eighteenth century we have, on the one hand, scholarship in philosophy and liberal arts abandoning theology, so as to be shaped by the rationalistic standards of academia, and on the other hand, a spirituality which increasingly divorces itself from theology so as to become an entirely different mode of competence pertaining to human affectivity. This structure remained remarkably intact for the next several centuries, leaving theology to degenerate into a dry scholasticism that was both intellectually and spiritually moribund. [10]            

 

            Leo XIII’s call for a revival of Thomism in the encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879) sparked a major effort to reintegrate the different segments of knowledge into a comprehensive whole, but the unifying framework was still to be provided by philosophy, not theology. Catholic scholars saw philosophy as providing the principles upon which all other forms of intellectual inquiry were grounded, a comprehensive vision of how each discipline bears upon the others. Thus, in this country in the 1920s and for several decades thereafter, the study of Thomist philosophy comprised the centerpiece of the typical curriculum in a Catholic college or university. The standard philosophy course was designed to integrate the entire breadth of learning under a single, unifying worldview, to supply the ligaments which made scholarship intelligible as a whole. This so-called “Thomistic synthesis” left a profound mark upon intellectuals who were trained and formed at Catholic schools in the United States. It was the intellectual basis for what was then called “integral Catholicism.”[11]

           

            However, by the late fifties, secular standards of scholarship demanded increased specialization, particularly in the natural and social sciences, and disciplines and departments sprouted up accordingly. This left philosophy with the burdensome chore of providing theoretical unity to expanding and increasingly disparate modes of knowledge. The entire framework broke down in the sixties, leaving Catholic institutions of higher learning without an overarching perspective that could guide and harness the vibrant intellectual activity they had come to sponsor. At the same time, many Catholic scholars began doing their graduate work at the country’s best secular universities, where a Catholic intellectual vision, to put it mildly, enjoyed little currency. By the seventies, Catholics had begun to heed John Tracy Ellis’s famous challenge to Catholic intellectuals to move out of their intellectually cloistered status and into the academic mainstream of the United States.[12]

 

            The problem has been that in the process of moving into the mainstream, Catholic intellectual life has lost its identity and purpose. On the personal level, Catholic scholars, whether at Catholic or non-Catholic schools, are becoming incognizant of the fact that their scholarship can be seen as a devoted pursuit of learning in the presence of God. And institutionally, Catholic colleges and universities have become indistinguishable from their secular counterparts, vocational centers for training in democratic ideology and capitalist theory and practice: hence, the nervous search for identity in Catholic higher education. Catholic scholarship – the very idea sounds quaint these days – has come to mirror the disarray of the contemporary academy, a chaotic marketplace of clashing values.

 

            Here we have all the ingredients of a collective spiritual and vocational crisis for Catholic scholars. Today, Catholic scholars stand to spend their lives reading, writing, teaching, publishing, sitting on committees, and so on, without a clear sense of the end to which all this intellectual activity is directed.  In the midst of the disarray of the modern academy, they may well become scholars without a telos.

           

IV.

 

            There has been an attempt in the twentieth century to restore a broad, overarching theological framework within which intellectual inquiry could proceed. Catholic thinkers such as Maurice Blondel, Henri de Lubac, Karl Rahner, and Hans Urs von Balthasar have sought to overcome the neo-scholastic legacy of theology severed from philosophy and the other disciplines through a renewed understanding of the capacities of human beings as dynamically oriented toward supernatural life with God. The task of reintegrating intellectual inquiry within a broad theological vision has proved difficult because the divisions of secular academic inquiry, theology, and spirituality have been written into the very curricula of Catholic institutions of higher education. Moreover, in secular institutions theology and spiritually are altogether absent from the curricula. Nevertheless, as we see it, the antidote to the aimlessness and disintegration of modern academia is for Catholic scholars to recover a sense of their intellectual endeavors as dynamically ordered toward their end in God. Catholic scholars, in other words, need to recover a vision of what St. Bonaventure called “the journey of the mind of God.”

 

            Though it might seem strange or, worse yet, quaint to invoke a thirteenth-century scholastic theologian as a model for contemporary Catholic academics, it is crucial to remember that Bonaventure lived in an era not unlike our own, with many scholars bent on divorcing faith from scholarship. This is why he so persistently criticized intellectuals who, in his words, “think that mere reading will suffice without fervor, speculation without devotion, investigation without admiration, observation without exultation, industry without piety, knowledge without love, understanding without humility, study without grace, the mirror without divinely inspired wisdom”[13] – or, in other words, those who sought eruditio without religio. Similarly, Bonaventure warned his colleagues at the University of Paris not to indulge in idle speculation, because the world about which they speculated was in fact a mirror (speculum) in which the God who created it could be seen. All reality, for Bonaventure, and therefore all intellectual inquiry, is imbued with the presence of God.

 

            Perhaps because of his Franciscanism, Bonaventure possessed a keen sense of the grace-sodden character of the material world. The natural world, for Bonaventure, is marked by the footprints (vestigia) of its Maker and, as such, serves a ladder ascending to God.[14] The reason we tend not to see the material world this way is that sin has blinded us, turned us in upon ourselves, and obscured our understanding of it in reference to the God who is its origin, exemplar and end. Thus for Bonaventure, our human capacities, including our intellects, have been deformed, and must therefore be reformed by Christ. Then we will be able once more to mount the ladder of nature and ascend to God.

 

            The wisdom of Bonaventure’s vision for those involved in the natural sciences is unmistakable: we must relearn the proper use of the natural world, not as something to be exploited for human gratification, nor even to be investigated only for its own beauty and wonder, but ultimately as assign of God’s glory. Moreover, questions of how we are to use our knowledge of the material world, e.g., nuclear fission or the replication of DNA, are not to be deferred until after that knowledge is obtained; rather, the proper use of the material world is intrinsic to our knowledge of it. Bonaventure’s vision thus challenges the currently accepted distinction between “theoretical” or “pure” science and “applied” science. If we do not understand the proper use of our world, then we do not really understand it all.

 

            What about the human person? For Bonaventure, the human person’s apprehension of nature as a mirror of its Maker leads to a further apprehension: the human mind (mens) as a trinity of memory, intellect, and will which bears the image of the triune God. [15]  But, as with our apprehension of nature, sin has so deformed our faculties that they must be reformed in order for the image of God to be restored, a reformation that is achieved by the virtues of faith, hope, and love. Of these, it is above all love, love of God and love of neighbor, which reforms the soul according to the image of Christ, who is at once, Bonaventure writes, “our Make and Re-maker (reformator).”[16]

 

            Think of what Bonaventure’s vision has to say to Catholic scholars in the humanities and social sciences. We must, he says, recover a sense of the human person as an image of God, and more specifically, we must recover a sense of human possibility redefined in terms of our new creation in Jesus Christ. This means that, for Catholics, all accounts of “human nature” which lock humanity into a cycle of violence, greed, and lust for domination must be rejected in the belief that now it is Christ who defines the concrete possibilities of human nature.[17] The implication is clear: Catholics must reject the cheap, ironic cynicism and phony sophistication that so often pass for “realism” in the modern academy. Instead, they must learn to see Christ in all people. As Gerard Manley Hopkins put it:

 

                        To the Father through the features of men’s faces.

For Christ plays in ten thousand places

Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his

To the Father through the features of men’s faces.[18]

 

            Bonaventure stresses that in its journey, the mind will never be content in contemplating itself. Rather, it ceaselessly yearns for contemplation of its ultimate other: the self-diffusive goodness of the life of the Trinity. Only in this contemplation of the self-diffusive, self-transcending goodness and love of the Trinity can God be truly known; and only here is the human intellect truly and finally humbled. It is at this point, before the consuming fire of the living God, that we “die and enter into this darkness,” and “with Christ crucified…pass out of this world to the Father.”[19] Thus for Bonaventure, we must know things not only by virtue of their “mere existence,” but also by virtue of their goodness in creation and their destiny. And this goodness and destiny can finally be known only through the self-diffusive love of God as displayed in the story of Israel, Jesus, and the saints.[20]

 

            Bonaventure’s intellectual vision is of crucial importance to Catholic scholarship today, for it calls for the development (or re-development) of Catholic institutions of higher learning in which specific philosophical and theological convictions permeate and transform the curricula, departmental structures, faculty membership, and even the specific content of a core of courses. It calls for Catholics in secular institutions to break their silence and abandon their false humility, to draw on the riches of Catholic tradition in order to offer their students and colleagues an alternative to the reigning ideologies of secular liberalism or nihilism. In short, Bonaventure’s vision invites Catholics in the academy to allow their convictions about God, the Church, and the moral and intellectual life to inform their own scholarly work.

 

            On a formal level, it will involve coming to see how, when understood within a broad vision of the Christian life, the meticulous attention demanded by good scholarship can hone our attentiveness to God, so that scholarly endeavor can become a form of prayer of the Church.[21] On a material level, it might mean that it would be incumbent upon Catholic scholars to bring their beliefs about God and God’s creation more directly into their intellectual inquiry. For example, in light of the tradition of Catholic reflection on wealth and poverty, it might mean curbing the advancement of neo-capitalist economic theories that currently predominate in the economics departments of Catholic schools in favor of cultivating approaches to economics which are grounded more deeply in what Christian faith says about the supernatural end of the human person. On this score, Virgil Michel’s contention that economics should be understood in terms of the Mystical Body of Christ is important because it places questions about the distribution of goods in an economy within the context of the distribution of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist.[22]  In this way Michel’s work represents an instinct within Catholicism against confining theology to a separate sphere, called “the supernatural,” and then divorcing it from economics which is confined to the sphere of the “the natural.” Of course, Michel’s “Eucharistic economics” runs counter to the kind of Christian capitalist economics that has been espoused in recent years by Michael Novak.[23] Now it is our contention that the disagreement between the two must be understood as a theological dispute over ultimate ends, and not simply a question of neutral descriptions of market forces. The issues involved here are many and complex, and we do not propose to go into them in detail. But we do want to suggest that, while accuracy of description is crucial for economic analysis, it is equally important to locate those descriptions within a broader theological vision of the final destiny of producers and consumers. Thus the relationship between the natural and the supernatural is of central importance to Catholic economic theory, and it should be brought to bear in the debates now occurring among Catholic economists over whether capitalism, socialism, or some form of mixed economy is more just. This, we submit, is the sort of concrete discussion that is now needed in the economics departments of Catholic colleges and universities.

 

            But what troubles us is that Catholic scholars are too often not engaged by such issues. They have achieved a remarkable level of professional competence in a relatively short time, but in the process they have also taken on as their own the modern academy’s specialized, departmentalized vision of knowledge. The institutions in which we have been trained and in which we perform our scholarly work are organized in such a way that there exists a wall of separation between academic life and spirituality, intellect and affectivity, knowledge and love. Academic performance has become a matter of rational calculation or, particularly in the humanities, virtuoso interpretive practice – tasks which in either case are essentially unrelated to one’s passions. And spirituality has become a matter of mastering our interior lives, a hobby to be indulged in after hours, when we turn off our minds. Hence, we have grown accustomed to university scientists designing bigger and better nuclear warheads during the day while learning the art of centering prayer in the evenings, or to professors in public policy churning out utilitarian cost-benefit analyses for health-care providers during the week and retreating to Trappist monasteries on the weekends.

 

            We think that many Catholic scholars experience this loss of purpose. They experience it personally and profoundly in their struggles to find a “spirituality” of the “academic life.” They experience it communally and ecclesially in their bewildered search for Catholic institutional identity. What we are losing, and are therefore called to recover, is an understanding of our vocations as scholars dedicated to glorifying God. As Catholics   and perhaps this is unique to Catholics – we have the resources needed to recover this kind of tradition in scholarship. It will entail exploring seriously how our beliefs can shape the way we write history, analyze date in economics, debate with cynical Nietzscheans in philosophy, or contend with the latest fad of critical theory sweeping through English departments.

 

V.

 

            What we envision as central to a “spirituality” for Catholic scholars is an extended conversation with scores of interlocutors: Augustine, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Pseudo-Dionysius, Teresa of Avila, Thomas More, Hildegard of Bingen, Julian of Norwich, Roger Bacon, Nicholas of Cusa, Alphonsus Liguori, Joseph Pieper, Edith Stein, Karl Rahner, Dorothy Day; a conversation which includes all Catholic scholars from all branches of inquiry, the humanities, the human sciences, and the natural sciences.

 

            We are aware that some people will find our perspective narrow, reminiscent of the Catholic intellectual ghetto of decades past. The objection will be that we have depicted a role for Catholic scholars and Catholic institutions of learning that neglects the importance of taking up the challenges confronting modern society and helping to find solutions to them. We have, in other (all too familiar) words, presented a so-called “sectarian” role for our institutions that takes up a narrowly conceived religious task at the expense of developing a foundation upon which a common ground can be built so that we can address the larger pluralistic society in “public” terms which can be understood by everyone, regardless of religious belief.

 

            To which we respond: meeting modern society on its own terms was the self-appointed agenda of the mainline liberal Protestant schools in the later decades of the last century and the results have been disastrous. These schools are barely recognizable as having been founded by Christian denominations.[24]  In recent decades, Christian belief and practice has had virtually no impact on curricular development, faculty hiring, and daily administration. Actual religious practices and traditions are reserved to Sunday mornings, if at all. The main chapels serve as little more than museums that arouse sentimental recollections of a religious past in the hearts of incoming students or significant donors.

 

            Catholic higher education is headed in the same directions.[25] And Catholics will repeat the blunders of liberal Protestant scholars if they persist in some generic intellectual vision, garnished around the edges with vague talk about how well they promote volunteer service programs and other religiously inspired “values.” We think that following the kind of vision we have sketched out is and will be difficult. Developing  a strong, vibrant Catholic intellectual vision and then institutionalizing it in our colleges and universities will distance Catholics from the central forums of the political and cultural, not to mention academic, mainstream in the United States. But this may well bring into greater relief the meaning of the baptismal vows for Catholic scholars: not the pursuit of some general, culturally-determined excellence, but the pursuit of the excellence of Christian moral and intellectual virtue.

 

            If it is difficult to envision how our religious convictions can transform scholarship in the arts and in the natural and social sciences, if what we have suggested seems like a wistful vision of an irretrievable past – when Christian faith permeated the humanities and when the leading scientists were Franciscans, Dominicans, and other committed Christians – then we would like to suggest that this may be a sign not of the impractical or utopian nature of our proposal, but of how far we have strayed form our true vocation, and of how much works needs to be done in retrieving the unity between scholarship and discipleship, between eruditio and religio.

 

 

Communio 22 (Summer, 1995)

Copyright by Communio International Catholic Review.

Posted here with permission.

 



[1] Such a view has been ridiculed by Bernard Lonergan as “the principle of the empty head.” See his Method in Theology (New York: herder and Herder, Inc., 1979; repr., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 156.

[2] These lines are placed above the cupboard containing the works of Augustine in the library of Seville: Migne, Patrologia Latina, 83, col. 1109; cf. Possidius, Vita Augustina, xviii, 9, quoted in Peter Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1972), 25.

[3] The Rule of Saint Benedict, ed. Timothy Fry, O.S.B. (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1981), 165 (Prologue, n. 45).

[4] Jean Leclerq, O.S.B., The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture, trans. Catherine Misrahi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 39.

[5] For an account of these various disputes, see Fernand Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteen Century (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1955).

[6] Not all parties, of course, joined in this theological task. For example, certain members of the Arts faculty at the University of Paris, the so-called “Latin-Averroists,” resisted precisely the location of Aristotelian wisdom within a Christian framework. See Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement, 20-51.

[7] As Marilyn McCord Adams puts it, “Ockham’s method is thus to subordinate reason and experience to Church authority, while keeping violations of reason and experience to a minimum” (William Ockham [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987], 1009).

[8] The following description of the Ratio Studiorum is based on John W. Donahue, S.J., Jesuit Education: An Essay on the Foundation of Its Idea (New York: Fordham University Press, 1963), 32-62.

[9] For an account of this development of “spirituality,” see Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality and History: Question s of Interpretation and Method (New York: Crossroads, 1992), 40-47.

[10] This shift in academic understandings of “intellectual life” and “spiritual life” is imbedded in larger cultural shifts which are sketched by Michel de Certeau in The Mystic Fable, vol. I, The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, trans. Michael B. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. 79-112, 241-70.

[11] For a wonderful description of the worldview that was forged in this intellectual setting, se Philip Gleason, Keeping the Faith: American Catholicism Past and Present (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), ch.7, “The Search for Unity and Its Sequel,” 136-51.

[12] John Tracy Ellis, American Catholics and the Intellectual Life (Chicago: The Heritage Foundation, Inc.,1956)

[13] Saint Bonaventure, The Journey of the Mind to God, trans. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., intro. And notes by Stephen F. Brown (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 1993), 2 (Prologue, n.4).

[14] Ibid., 5(I,2).

[15] Ibid.,21-22 (III,5).

[16] Ibid.,25(IV,5).

[17] John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (n.103): “Only in the mystery of Christ’s redemption do we discover the ‘concrete’ possibilities of man.”

[18] Gerard Manley Hopkins, “As Kingfishers Catch Fire, Dragonflies Draw Flame,” in The Poems of Gerard Manly Hopkins, ed. W.H. Gardner and N.H. MacKenzie (London: Oxford University Press, 1972),90.

[19] Bonaventure, Journey of the Mind to God, 39 (VII,6).

[20] For a recent example of a similar argument, this time in a “postmodern” mode, see Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte, trans. Thomas A Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[21] For an understanding of the theological importance of “attention,” see Simone Weil, “Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of God,” in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas (Mt. Kisco, NY: Moyer Bell Ltd., 1977), 49-50.

[22] For a brief but vivid account of the interconnection between the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ and economics, see Virgil Michel, “The Mystical Body and Economic Justice,” in The Social Question: Essays on Capitalism and Christianity, ed. Robert L. Spaeth, intro. R. William Franklin (Collegeville, MN: St. John’s University Pres, 1987), 55-63. For a fuller account of Michel’s social theory, see Christian Social Reconstruction (New York: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1937). For a summary of Michel’s economic theory, see John J. Mitchell, Critical Voices in American Catholic Economic Thought (New York: Paulist Press, 1989),77-105.

[23] See for example, Michael Novak, The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: the Free Press, 1993). The phrase “eucharistic economics” is taken from Mitchell, Critical Voices.

[24] Geroge Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[25] James T. Burtchaell, C.S.C., “The Alienation of Christian Higher Education: Diagnosis and Prognosis,” in Schooling Christians: “Holy experiments” in American Education, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and John H. Westerhoff (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,1992),129-183.