QUESTION 23

The Differences among the Passions

Next we have to consider the differences the passions have from one another. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Are the passions that exist in the concupiscible power diverse from the ones that exist in the irascible power? (2) Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based on the contrariety between the good and the bad? (3) Is there any passion that does not have a contrary? (4) Are there any passions within the same power that differ in species and are not contrary to one another?

Article 1

Do the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers?

It seems that the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers:

Objection 1: In Ethics 2 the Philosopher says that the passions of the soul are “the ones that joy (gaudium) and sadness (tristitia) follow upon.” But joy and sadness exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, all the passions exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, the passions that exist in the irascible power are not different from the ones that exist in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: Jerome’s Gloss on Matthew 13:33 (“The kingdom of heaven is like leaven ....”) says, “In the power of reason we have prudence, in the irascible power we have hatred for the vices, and in the concupiscible power we have desire for the virtues.” But as Topics 2 says, hatred (odium) exists in the concupiscible power, as does love (amor), which it is its contrary. Therefore, the same passions exist in the concupiscible and irascible powers.

Objection 3: Passions, as well as actions, differ in species from one another according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the irascible power are the same as the objects of the passions of the concupiscible power. Therefore, the same passions belong to the irascible and concupiscible powers.

But contrary to this: The acts of diverse powers, e.g., seeing and hearing, are diverse in species. But as was established in the First Part (ST 1, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers that divide the sentient appetite. Therefore, since, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), the passions are movements of the sentient appetite, it follows that the passions that exist in the irascible power differ in species from the passions that exist in the concupiscible power.

I respond: The passions that exist in the irascible power and the passions that exist in the concupiscible power differ from one another in species. For since, as was explained in the First Part (q. 77, a. 3), diverse powers have diverse objects, it is necessary for the passions of diverse powers to be directed toward diverse objects. Hence, a fortiori, the passions of the diverse powers differ in species, since a greater difference in the objects is required for a diversity of species among powers than for a diversity of species among the passions or actions of those powers. For just as, among natural things, a diversity of genus follows upon a diversity in the potentiality of the matter, whereas a diversity of species follows upon a diversity of form in the same matter, so too, among the acts of the soul, acts belonging to diverse powers are diverse not only in species but also in genus, whereas the acts or passions that are directed toward diverse specific objects that fall under the common object of a single power differ as species of the same genus.

Therefore, in order to discern which passions exist in the irascible power and which exist in the concupiscible power, one must take the object of each of these powers. Now in the First Part (ST 1, q. 81, a. 2) it was explained that the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad taken absolutely (bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum), i.e., the pleasurable (delectabile) or the painful (dolorosum). However, because it is necessary for the soul to suffer sometimes from
difficulties and opposition in attaining a good of this sort or in avoiding something bad, and to the extent that attaining the good or avoiding the bad is in some sense elevated beyond the animal’s easily exercised power (quodammodo elevatum supra facilem potestatem animalis), it follows that the object of the irascible power is the good or the bad insofar as it has the character of being arduous or difficult (secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis).

Therefore, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad absolutely speaking—e.g., joy (gaudium), sadness (tristitia), love (amor), hatred (odium)—then it belongs to the concupiscible power. By contrast, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad under the notion arduous, i.e., insofar as it is attainable or avoidable with some difficulty—e.g., daring (audacia), fear (timor), hope (spes), etc.—then it belongs to the irascible power.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible power was given to animals in order that the obstacles might be removed by which the concupiscible power is prevented from tending toward its object—either because of the difficulty involved in attaining a good or because of the difficulty involved in overcoming an evil. And this is why the irascible passions are all terminated in the concupiscible passions. Accordingly, joy and sadness, which exist in the concupiscible power, follow upon even those passions that exist in the irascible power.

Reply to objection 2: Jerome attributes the hatred of the vices to the irascible power not because of the character of hatred, which properly belongs to the concupiscible power, but rather because of the pugnacity (propter impugnationem) that belongs to the irascible power.

Reply to objection 3: It is the good insofar as it is pleasurable (bonum inquantum est delectabile) that moves the concupiscible power. But if a good is such that there is a difficulty involved in attaining it, then by that very fact the good in question has something that is contrary to the concupiscible power. And so it was necessary for there to be another power that would tend toward that good; and the same line of reasoning applies to bad things. The power in question is the irascible power. Hence, it is because of this that the passions of the concupiscible power differ in species from the passions of the irascible power.

Article 2

Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad?

It seems that the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power (contrarietas passionum irascibilis) is based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), the passions of the irascible power are ordered toward the passions of the concupiscible power. But the passions of the concupiscible power are not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad, in the way that love is contrary to hatred and joy to sadness. Therefore, the passions of the irascible appetite are likewise not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad.

Objection 2: The passions differ from one another according to their objects in the same way that movements differ from one another according to their termini. But as is clear from Physics 5, there is no contrariety among movements other than that based on the contrariety among their termini. But the object of an appetite is either the good or the bad. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions in any appetitive power except one based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

Objection 3: As Avicenna says in De Naturalibus 6, “Every passion of the soul involves approach and withdrawal (omnis passio animae attenditur secundum accessum et recessum).” But approach is caused by the character of the good, whereas withdrawal is caused by the character of the bad, since just
as the good “is what all things desire,” as Ethics 1 puts it, so too the bad is what all things seek to avoid. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions of the soul that is not based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

But contrary to this: As is clear from Ethics 3, fear and daring are contrary to one another. But fear and daring do not differ with respect to the good and the bad, since both of them are directed at things that are bad. Therefore, not every contrariety among the passions of the irascible power is based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

I respond: As Physics 3 says, a passion is a certain sort of movement. Hence, one has to interpret the contrariety among the passions in accord with the contrariety among movements or changes.

Now as Physics 5 says, there are two sorts of contrariety among changes or movements:
(a) The first has to do with approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus (secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino). This sort of contrariety belongs properly to changes (mutationes), i.e., to (a) generation, which is a change toward esse, and (b) corruption, which is a change away from esse.
(b) The second has to do with a contrariety among the termini. This sort of contrariety properly belongs to movements (motus)—in the way that whitewashing (dealbatio), which is a movement from blackness to whiteness, is contrary to blackening (denigratio), which is a movement from whiteness to blackness.

So, then, two sorts of contrariety are found among the passions of the soul—(a) one involving a contrariety among their objects, viz., the good and the bad, and (b) the other involving approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus.

Now among the passions of the concupiscible power one finds only the first sort of contrariety, viz., contrariety among the objects, whereas among the passions of the irascible power one finds both sorts of contrariety. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad absolutely speaking. Now the good as good cannot be a terminus from which (terminus ut a quo), but can only be a terminus toward which (solum ut ad quem), since nothing withdraws from the good insofar as it is good, but instead all things desire it. Similarly, nothing desires the bad insofar as it is bad, but instead all things withdraw from it; because of this, the bad has only the character of a terminus from which and not the character of a terminus toward which.

So, then, every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the good—viz., love (amor), desire (desiderium), and joy (gaudium)—tends toward the good itself, whereas every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the bad—viz., hatred (odium), withdrawal (fuga), and sadness (tristitia)—tends away from the bad itself. Hence, among the passions of the concupiscible power there cannot be any contrariety based on approach toward and withdrawal from the same object.

By contrast, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the irascible power is not the sensible good or bad absolutely speaking, but rather the sensible good or bad as characterized by difficulty or arduousness (sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatidis). Now the arduous or difficult good has (a) the character of being tended toward insofar as it is good, and this pertains to the passion of hope (spes), and (b) the character of being withdrawn from insofar as it is arduous or difficult, and this pertains to the passion of despair (desperatio). Similarly, the arduous bad has (a) the character of being avoided insofar as it is bad, and this pertains to the passion of fear (timor), and it also has (b) the character of being tended toward as something arduous in order thereby to escape from being subjected to the bad, and it is daring (audacia) that tends toward it in this way. Thus, among the passions of the irascible power one finds (a) a contrariety according to the good and the bad, as in the case of the contrariety between hope and fear, and again (b) a contrariety according to approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus, as in the case of the contrariety between daring and fear.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.
Article 3

Does every passion of the soul have a contrary?

It seems that every passion of the soul has a contrary (*habeat aliqua contrarium*):

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 1), every passion of the soul exists either in the irascible power or in the concupiscible power. But both sorts of passions have contrariety in their own way. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

**Objection 2:** Every passion of the soul has either the good or the bad as its object, and these are in general the objects of the appetitive part of the soul. But a passion whose object is the bad is contrary to a passion whose object is the good. Therefore, every passion has a contrary.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 2), every passion of the soul involves either approach or withdrawal. But for every approach there is a contrary withdrawal (*cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus*), and vice versa. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

**But contrary to this:** Anger is a passion of the soul. But as is clear from *Ethics* 4, no passion is posited as the contrary of anger. Therefore, not every passion of the soul has a contrary.

I respond: It is peculiar to the passion of anger that it cannot have a contrary based either on approach and withdrawal or on the good and the bad.

For anger is caused by a difficult evil that is already occurring and in the presence of which the appetite must either (a) succumb, in which case it does not go beyond the limits of sadness, which is a concupiscible passion, or else (b) experience a movement toward attacking the hurtful evil, and this pertains to anger. However, the appetite cannot experience a movement toward withdrawal, since the evil is already assumed to be present or past. And so there is no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between approach and withdrawal.

Again, there is likewise no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between the good and the bad. For what is contrary to an already occurring evil is an already acquired good, which no longer has the character of an arduous or difficult good. Nor does any other movement remain after the good is acquired—except for the appetite’s resting in the acquired good, and this pertains to joy, which is a concupiscible passion.

Hence, the movement of anger cannot have any contrary movement of the soul. Rather, the only thing contrary to it is a cessation of movement. As the Philosopher says in the *Rhetoric*, “Calming down is opposed to getting angry, but it is opposed to it not as its contrary, but instead as its negation or privation.”

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Is it possible for passions that differ in species and are not contrary to one another to exist in the same power?

It seems that it is impossible for passions that differ in species and are not opposed to one another to exist in the same power:

**Objection 1:** The passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the soul are the good and the bad, and it is according to the difference between them that the passions have contrariety. Therefore, no passions that belong to the same power and are not contrary to
one another differ from one another in species.

**Objection 2:** A difference in species is a difference in form. But as *Metaphysics* 10 says, “Every difference in form is a difference in accord with some sort of contrariety.” Therefore, passions that belong to the same power and are not contraries do not differ in species.

**Objection 3:** Since every passion of the soul involves approach toward or withdrawal from the good or the bad, it seems necessary for every difference among the passions of the soul to be based either (a) on the difference between the good and the bad or (b) on the difference between approach and withdrawal or (c) on a greater or lesser approach or withdrawal. But as has been explained (a. 2), the first two sorts of differences make for a contrariety among the passions of the soul. On the other hand, the third sort of difference does not make for diverse species, since if it did, then there would be infinitely many species of passions of the soul. Therefore, it is impossible for passions belonging to the same power of the soul to differ in species and yet not be contraries.

**But contrary to this:** Love and joy differ in species and exist in the concupiscible power. And yet they are not contrary to one another in a way that prevents the one from being a cause of the other. Therefore, there are passions of the soul belonging to the same power that differ in species and yet are not contraries.

**I respond:** The passions differ in accord with the agents (*activa*) that are the objects of the passions of the soul. And there are two possible ways to think of the differences among the agents: (a) with respect to the species or natures of the agents themselves, and (b) with respect to their diverse active powers.

The diversity of agents or movers with respect to the power of effecting movement can be applied to the passions in accord with a likeness to natural agents. For everything that effects movement either draws the patient toward itself in some way or repels it away from itself. When it draws it toward itself, it effects three things in it. First, the agent gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend toward it, as when a lightweight body located in a high place (*quod est sursum*) gives to a generated body a lightweightness through which it has an inclination toward or aptitude for being in a high place. Second, if the generated body is located outside its proper place, the agent gives it movement toward that place (*dat ei moveri ad locum*). Third, the agent gives it rest when it arrives at that place, since something comes to rest in a place in virtue of the same cause by which it is moved to that place. And one should think along similar lines of a repelling cause (*de causa repulsionis*).

Now in the movements of the appetitive part of the soul, the good has, as it were, the power to attract, whereas the bad has the power to repel.

Thus, first of all, the good causes in the appetitive power a certain inclination toward, or aptitude for, or connaturality with the good (*causat quandam inclinationem seu aptitudinem seu connaturalitatem ad bonum*). This pertains to the passion of love (*amor*); and corresponding to it, as its contrary on the side of the bad, is hatred (*odium*).

Second, if the good has not yet been attained, it gives the appetitive power a movement toward acquiring the good that is loved, and this pertains to the passion of desire (*desiderium*) or sentient desire (*concupiscencia*). And contrary to this, on the part of the bad, is withdrawal (*fuga*) or aversion (*abominatio*).

Third, when the good has been attained, it gives the appetite a certain sort of rest (*quaedam quietatio*) in the good that has been attained, and this pertains to pleasure (*delectatio*) or joy (*gaudium*). And the opposite of this on the part of the bad is pain (*dolor*) or sadness (*tristitia*).

Now in the case of the passions of the irascible power, what is presupposed is an aptitude for or inclination toward pursuing the good and withdrawing from the bad on the part of the concupiscible power, which has to do with the good and the bad absolutely speaking.

With respect to a good that has not yet been attained, there is hope (*spes*) and despair (*desperatio*). With respect to something bad that has not yet occurred, there is fear (*timor*) and daring (*audacia*). With
respect to a good that has already been attained, there is no passion in the irascible power, since, as was explained above (a. 3), such a good no longer has the character of something arduous. However, the passion of anger (ira) follows upon something bad that has already occurred.

So, then, it is clear that in the concupiscible power there are three groups of passions, viz., (a) love and hatred, (b) desire and withdrawal, and (c) joy and sadness. Similarly, in the irascible power there are three groups, viz., (a) hope and despair, (b) fear and daring, and (c) anger, which has no passion opposed to it. Therefore, the passions that differ in species number eleven in all—six in the concupiscible power and five in the irascible power. All the passions of the soul are contained under these.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the responses to the objections.