

QUESTION 25

The Ordering of the Passions with respect to One Another

Next we have to consider the ordering of the passions with respect to one another. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) How are the passions of the irascible power ordered with respect to the passions of the concupiscible power? (2) How are the passions of the concupiscible power ordered with respect to one another? (3) How are the passions of the irascible power ordered with respect to one another? (4) What are the four principal passions?

Article 1

Are the passions of the irascible power prior to the passions of the concupiscible power?

It seems that the passions of the irascible power are prior to the passions of the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: The order of the passions follows the order of their objects. But the object of the irascible power is the arduous good, which seems to be higher than all the other goods (*supremum inter alia bona*). Therefore, the passions of the irascible power seem to be prior to (*praeesse*) the passions of the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: What effects movement is prior to what is moved. But the irascible power is related to the concupiscible power in the way that what effects movement is related to what is moved; for as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the irascible power is given to animals in order to remove obstacles by which the concupiscible power is prevented from enjoying its object, and, as *Physics* 8 says, “that which removes an obstacle has the character of something that effects movement.” Therefore, the passions of the irascible power are prior to the passions of the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: Joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*) are passions of the concupiscible power. But joy and sadness follow upon the passions of the irascible power; for in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, “Punishing someone (*punitio*) puts to rest the force of anger, producing pleasure (*delectatio*) in the place of sadness.” Therefore, the passions of the concupiscible power are posterior to the passions of the irascible power.

But contrary to this: The passions of the concupiscible power are directed toward the good in an unrestricted sense (*respiciunt bonum absolutum*), whereas the passions of the irascible power are directed toward the good in a restricted sense (*respiciunt bonum contractum*), viz., the arduous good. Therefore, since the good in an unrestricted sense is prior to the good in a restricted sense, it seems that the passions of the concupiscible power are prior to the passions of the irascible power.

I respond: The passions of the concupiscible power are related to more things than are the passions of the irascible power. For among the passions of the concupiscible power there is (a) something, viz., desire, that has to do with movement and (b) something, viz., joy and sadness, that has to do with rest. But among the passions of the irascible power there is only something that has to do with movement and nothing that has to do with rest. The reason for this is that a good in which something is at rest no longer has the character of being difficult or arduous—which is the object of the irascible power.

Now since being at rest is the end of a movement (*quies est finis motus*), it is prior in intention and posterior in execution. Therefore, if the passions of the irascible power are compared to those passions of the concupiscible power that signify *resting in the good*, then the passions of the irascible power are clearly prior in the order of execution to passions of this sort that belong to the concupiscible power, in the way that hope (*spes*) is prior to joy (*gaudium*) and is thus a cause of joy—this according to the Apostle in Romans 12:12 (“Rejoicing in hope” (*spe gaudentes*)). On the other hand, a passion of the concupiscible power that signifies *resting in the bad*, e.g., sadness (*tristitia*), stands midway between two

passions of the irascible power. For sadness follows upon fear (*timor*), since it is caused when the evil that was feared has occurred; and it precedes the movement of anger, since when someone is aroused to retribution by a preceding sadness (*ex tristitia praecedente aliquis insurgit in vindictam*), this pertains to the movement of anger. And because paying back evils is apprehended as a good, an angry individual rejoices when he has accomplished this. And so it is clear that every passion of the irascible power is terminated in a passion of the concupiscible power that pertains to rest, viz., either joy or sadness.

However, if the passions of the irascible power are compared to the passions of the concupiscible power that imply movement, then the passions of the concupiscible part are clearly prior, because the passions of the irascible power add something to the passions of the concupiscible power, in the same way that the object of the irascible power adds arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible power. For instance, hope (*spes*) adds to desire (*desiderium*) a certain effort and elevation of the mind in order to attain an arduous good. Similarly, fear (*timor*) adds to withdrawal (*fuga*) or aversion (*abominatio*) a certain sinking of the mind because of the difficulty involved in the relevant evil (*addat quandam depressionem animi propter difficultatem mali*).

So, then, the passions of the irascible part stand between those passions of the concupiscible power that signify a movement with respect to the good or the bad (*important motum in bonum vel in motum*) and those passions of the concupiscible power that signify resting in the good or the bad. And in this way it is clear that the passions of the irascible power both (a) take their beginning from the passions of the concupiscible power and (b) are terminated in the passions of the concupiscible power.

Reply to objection 1: This argument would go through if something opposed to arduousness were part of the object of the concupiscible power in the way that being arduous belongs to the nature of the object of the irascible power. But since the object of the concupiscible power is the good absolutely speaking, it is naturally prior to the object of the irascible power in the way that what is general is prior to what is more specific (*sicut commune proprio*).

Reply to objection 2: Something that removes an obstacle is a mover *per accidens* and not *per se*. But here we are talking about the *per se* ordering of the passions.

Moreover, the irascible power removes what prevents the concupiscible power from resting in its own object. Hence, from this all that follows is that the passions of the irascible power precede those passions of the concupiscible power that have to do with rest.

Reply to objection 3: The third objection has to do with these same passions of the concupiscible power.

Article 2

Is love the first among the passions of the concupiscible power?

It seems that love (*amor*) is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: The concupiscible power is named from sentient desire (*concupiscentia*), which is the same passion as desire (*desiderium*). But as *De Anima 2* says, a thing is named from what is most important. Therefore, sentient desire is more important than love.

Objection 2: Love implies a certain union, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, it is “a unitive and consolidating force” (*vis unitiva et concretiva*). But sentient desire or desire (*concupiscentia vel desiderium*) is a movement toward union with a thing that is longed for or desired (*ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae*). Therefore, sentient desire is prior to love.

Objection 3: A cause is prior to its effect. But pleasure (*delectatio*) is sometimes a cause of love; for as *Ethics 8* says, some individuals love for the sake of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is prior to love. Therefore, love is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that all the passions are caused by love, since “love (*amor*) that longs to have what is loved is avid desire (*cupiditas*), and love that has what is loved and enjoys it is unrestrained delight (*laetitia*).” Therefore, love is the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

I respond: The objects of the concupiscible power are the good and the bad. But the good is prior to the bad, since the bad is a privation of the good. Hence, all the passions whose object is the good are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad. More specifically, each such passion is prior to its opposite; for the reason why the opposed evil is being rejected is that the good is being sought.

Now the good has the character of an end, which is prior in *its being intended* but posterior in *its being attained* (*est prior in intentione sed est posterior in consecutione*). Therefore, the ordering of the passions of the concupiscible power can be thought of either (a) in accord with good’s being intended or (b) in accord with the good’s being attained.

As regards its being attained, what is prior is what first comes to exist in that which tends toward the end. But it is clear that everything that tends toward an end has, first of all, a readiness for or proportion to the end (*primo habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem*); for nothing tends toward an end that is disproportionate to it. Second, it is moved toward the end. Third, it comes to rest in the end after the end has been attained.

Now the appetite’s very readiness for or proportion to the good is *love (amor)*, which is nothing other than being pleased with the good (*quid nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni*). On the other hand, the movement toward the good is *desire* or *sentient desire (desiderium vel concupiscentia)*, whereas rest in the good is *joy* or *pleasure (gaudium vel delectatio)*. And so in accord with this ordering, love precedes desire and desire precedes pleasure.

By contrast, in the order of the good’s being intended, the reverse holds. For intended pleasure causes desire and love, since pleasure is the enjoyment of the good (*fruitio boni*), and, as was explained above (q. 11, a. 3), it is in some sense the end, just as the good itself is.

Reply to objection 1: A thing is named in accord with what is known to us, since, according to the Philosopher, spoken words are signs of acts of understanding (*voces sunt signa intellectuum*). And in most cases we know a cause through its effect. Now when a thing that is loved is itself possessed, the effect of love is pleasure, whereas when it is not possessed, the effect of love is desire or sentient desire. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, “Love is felt more strongly when a lack [of the good] produces it.” Hence, among all the passions of the concupiscible power, the one that is most felt is sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And it because of this that the concupiscible power (*concupiscibilis*) is named from it.

Reply to objection 2: There are two types of union between the lover and the loved.

One type is a *real union*, viz., the conjoining of the lover to the thing itself. And this type of union involves joy or pleasure, which follows upon desire.

The second is an *affective union*, which has to do with the readiness or proportion—namely, in the sense that something already participates in some way in another by the fact that it has a readiness for and inclination toward that other. And it is in this sense that love implies a union. And this is the union that precedes the movement of desire.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure is a cause of love in the sense that it is prior to love in intention.

Article 3

Is hope the first among the passions of the irascible power?

It seems that hope (*spes*) is not the first among the passions of the irascible power.:

Objection 1: The irascible power (*irascibilis*) is named from anger (*ira*). Therefore, since a thing

is named from what is most important, it seems that anger is more important than and prior to hope.

Objection 2: The object of the irascible power is what is arduous. But it seems to be more arduous for someone to try to overcome a contrary evil that either (a) threatens him as something future, and this pertains to daring (*audacia*), or that (b) is already upon him as something present, and this pertains to anger (*ira*), than to try to simply acquire some good. Similarly, it seems to be more arduous for someone to try to conquer a present evil than a future evil. Therefore, anger seems to be a more important passion than daring, and daring seems to be a more important passion than hope. And so hope does not seem to be prior.

Objection 3: In a movement toward an end, withdrawing from a terminus is prior to approaching a terminus. But fear (*timor*) and despair (*desperatio*) imply a withdrawal from something, whereas daring (*audacia*) and hope (*spes*) imply an approach toward something. Therefore, fear and despair precede hope and daring.

But contrary to this: Something is prior to the extent that it is closer to what is first. But hope is closer to love, which is the first among the passions. Therefore, hope is first among all the passions of the irascible appetite.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), all the passions of the irascible power imply a movement with respect to something. Now there are two ways in which a movement with respect to something in the irascible power can be caused:

(a) solely by the readiness for or proportion to the end, and this pertains to either love or hatred;
 (b) by the presence of the good or the bad itself, and this pertains to either sadness or joy. To be sure, as has been explained (q. 23, a. 4), no passion in the irascible power is caused by the presence of the good, but the passion of anger is caused by the presence of the bad.

Therefore, since, along the path of generation or attainment (*in via generationis seu consecutionis*), the proportion to or readiness for the end precedes the attainment of the end, it follows that among all the passions of the irascible power *anger (ira)* is the last in the order of generation. Among the other passions of the irascible power that imply a movement that follows upon love or hatred for the good or the bad, the passions whose object is the good, viz., *hope (spes)* and *despair (desperatio)*, are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad, viz., *daring (audacia)* and *fear (timor)*. However, this is so in such a way that *hope* is prior to *despair*, since hope is a movement toward the good as a good that is attractive by its nature, and so hope is a *per se* movement toward the good, whereas despair is a withdrawal from the good—a withdrawal that (a) belongs to the good not insofar as it is good, but insofar as it is something else, and hence a withdrawal that (b) is, as it were, *per accidens*. And by the same line of reasoning, since fear is a withdrawal from evil, it is prior to daring.

Now the claim that hope and despair are naturally prior to fear and daring is clear from the fact that just as a desire for the good (*appetitus boni*) is the reason why the bad is avoided, so too hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring. For daring follows upon the hope for victory and fear follows upon despairing of victory. On the other hand, anger follows upon daring, since, according to what Avicenna says in *De Naturalibus* 6, no one who desires vindication becomes angry unless he dares to vindicate himself.

So, then, it is clear that hope is the first among all the passions of the irascible power. And if we want to know the ordering of all the passions along the way of generation, the first to occur are *love* and *hatred*; second, *desire* and *withdrawal*; third, *hope* and *despair*; fourth, *fear* and *daring*; fifth, *anger*; and sixth, and last, *joy* and *sadness*, which, as *Ethics* 2 says, follow upon all the passions. Yet, as can be inferred from what has been said, this is so in such a way that love is prior to hatred, desire is prior to withdrawal, hope is prior to despair, fear is prior to daring, and joy is prior to sadness.

Reply to objection 1: Since anger is caused by other passions in the way that an effect is caused by causes that precede it, it follows that the irascible power is named from anger as something more manifest.

Reply to objection 2: It is not the arduousness that is a reason for approaching or desiring something, but rather its goodness. And so hope, which is aimed more directly at the good, is prior, even though daring, or even anger, is sometimes directed at something that is more arduous.

Reply to objection 3: The appetite is moved *per se* and primarily toward the good as its proper object, and its withdrawing from the bad is caused by this. For a movement of the appetitive part of the soul is likened not to a natural movement but to the tendency of a nature (*proportionatur non motui naturali sed intentioni naturae*), which tends toward the end prior to tending toward the removal of a contrary, something that is sought after only for the sake of attaining the end.

Article 4

Are the four principal passions joy and sadness, hope and fear?

It seems not to be the case that the four principal passions are joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*), hope (*spes*) and fear (*timor*):

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine does not mention hope, but puts avid desire (*cupiditas*) in its place.

Objection 2: There are two orderings among the passions of the soul, viz., the order of intention and the order of attainment or generation. Therefore, either (a) the principal passions are taken from the order of intention, in which case only *joy* and *sadness*, which are ending passions (*passiones finales*) will be principal passions, or (b) the principal passions are taken from the order of attainment or generation, in which case *love* will be the principal passion. Therefore, there is no way in which one should claim that the four principal passions are these four: joy and sadness, hope and fear.

Objection 3: Just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Therefore, either (a) hope and despair should be posited as the principal passions in the sense of being causes, or (b) hope and daring should be posited as the principal passions in the sense of being close to one another.

But contrary to this: In *De Consolatione* Boethius, in enumerating the four principal passions, says, “Banish joys, banish fear. Away with hope, let pain (*dolor*) be not near.”

I respond: The four passions in question are commonly said to be the principal passions.

Two of them, viz., *joy* and *sadness*, are called principal passions because they are, absolutely speaking, culminating and final (*completivae et finales*) with respect to all the passions and so, as *Ethics 2* says, they follow upon all the passions.

On the other hand, *fear* and *hope* are principal passions not in the sense that they are culminating absolutely speaking, but rather in the sense that they are culminating in the genus *appetitive movement toward something*. For with respect to the good, the movement begins in *love (amor)*, continues in *desire (desiderium)*, and terminates in *hope (spes)*, whereas with respect to the bad, the movement begins in *hatred (odium)*, continues in *withdrawal (fuga)*, and terminates in *fear (timor)*.

And so the enumeration of these four passions is usually taken in accord with the differences *present* and *future*. For a movement has to do with the future, whereas rest is in something present. Therefore, (a) with respect to a present good there is *joy*; (b) with respect to a present evil there is *sadness*; (c) with respect to a future good there is *hope*; and (d) with respect to a future evil there is *fear*.

Now all the other passions that have to do with a good or an evil that is present or future are traced back to these four as their culmination. Hence, some writers call the four passions in question ‘principal passions’ because they are general. And, to be sure, this is true as long as ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ designate any appetitive movement that tends in general toward something that is to be desired or avoided.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine posits desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*) in the place of hope because they seem to pertain to the same thing, viz., a future good.

Reply to objection 2: The passions in question are called the principal passions in accord with the order of intention and completion. And even though fear and hope are not the last passions absolutely speaking, they are nonetheless last in the genus *passions tending toward another as something future*.

The only possible counterexample is anger (*ira*). But anger cannot be posited as a principal passion, since it is a certain effect of daring, which, as will be explained in a moment, cannot be a principal passion.

Reply to objection 3: Despair implies a withdrawal from the good that is, as it were, *per accidens*, and daring implies an approach toward the bad that is likewise *per accidens*. And so these passions cannot be principal passions, since what is *per accidens* cannot be called 'principal'. And this is why anger, which follows upon daring, cannot be called a principal passion, either.