QUESTION 28

The Effects of Love

Next we have to consider the effects of love. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is union (unio) an effect of love? (2) Is mutual indwelling (mutua inhaesio) an effect of love? (3) Is ecstasy (extasis) an effect of love? (4) Is jealousy (zelus) an effect of love? (5) Is love a passion that is hurtful (passio lasesiva) to the lover? (6) Is love a cause of everything that a lover does?

Article 1

Is union an effect of love?

It seems that union (unio) is not an effect of love:

Objection 1: Absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for in Galatians 4:18 the Apostle says, “Always emulate the good in one who is good” (speaking of himself, as a Gloss says), “and not only when I am present among you.” Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

Objection 2: Union exists either (a) through the essence, in the way that form is united with matter, and an accident with its subject, and a part either with its whole or with another part to constitute a whole, or (b) through a likeness of either genus or species or accident. But love does not cause a union of essence; otherwise, love would never be had with respect to things that are divided by their essence. And love does not cause the sort of union that exists through likeness; instead, it itself is caused by such a union, as has been explained (q. 27, a. 3). Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: The sensory power in acting (in actu) becomes in actuality (in actu) the thing sensed, and the intellect in acting becomes in actuality the thing understood. But the one who is exercising an act of love (amans in actu) does not become in actuality the thing loved. Therefore, union is more an effect of cognition than it is of love.

But contrary to this: In De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, Dionysius says that every instance of love is “a unitive power.”

I respond: A lover has two sorts of union with what is loved:

(a) The one is a real union (secundum rem), viz., when the thing loved is now present to the lover.
(b) The other is an affective union (secundum affectum), and this union has to be thought of as proceeding from a previous apprehension, since an appetitive movement follows upon an apprehension.

Now since there are two types of love, viz., love of concupiscence and love of friendship, both proceed from an apprehension of the unity of the thing loved with the lover. For when someone loves something in the sense of desiring it (quasi concupiscens illud), he apprehends it as relevant to his own well-being (quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse). Similarly, when he loves someone with a love of friendship, he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself; hence, he apprehends him as another self (apprehendit eum ut alterum se) insofar as he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself. Thus it is that a friend is said to be another self (amicus dicitur esse alter ipse), and in Confessiones 4 Augustine says, “Someone fittingly called his friend half of his soul.”

Therefore, love brings about the first type of union as an efficient cause (effective), since it effects a movement toward desiring and seeking the presence of the thing that is loved as something that is fitting for and relevant to oneself. However, it brings about the second type as a formal cause (formaliter), since love itself is just this sort of union or connection. Hence, in De Trinitate 8 Augustine says that love is like “a life that connects, or seeks to connect, two things, viz., the lover and what is loved.” When he says ‘connects’, this refers to the affective union (refertur ad unionem affectus), without which there is no love, whereas when he says ‘seeks to connect’, this has to do with the real union.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for the case of a real union. Pleasure requires real union as its cause, whereas desire exists in the real absence of what is loved, and love exists both in
the absence of what is loved and in its presence.

Reply to objection 2: There are three ways in which an instance of union may be related to love:

(a) An instance of union may be a cause of love. This is a substantial union in the case of the love by which someone loves himself, while, as has been explained (q. 27, a. 3), it is a union of likeness in the case of the love by which someone loves other things.

(b) An instance of union may be essentially the love itself, and this is union by a bond of affection (secundum adaptationem affectus). This sort of union is assimilated to a substantial union in a case in which the lover is related to what is loved either in a love of friendship with respect to himself or in a love of concupiscence with respect to something of his own.

(c) An instance of union may be an effect of love. This is a real union that the lover seeks after with respect to what is loved. And this sort of union is appropriate for love (est secundum convenientiam amoris). For as the Philosopher reports in Politics 2, “Aristophanes claimed that lovers would desire to be united by the two becoming one,” but since “this would result in one or both of them being destroyed,” they seek a union that is appropriate and fitting, viz., to live together and converse together and to be joined in other such ways.

Reply to objection 3: Cognition is perfected by the fact that the thing known is united to the knower by a likeness. By contrast, as has been explained, love brings it about that the very thing that is loved is united in some way to the lover. This is why love is more unitive than cognition is.

Article 2

Is love a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa?

It seems that love is not a cause of mutual indwelling (mutua inhaesio) in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved, and vice versa:

Objection 1: What exists in another is contained in that other. But the same thing cannot be both the container and the contained. Therefore, love cannot be a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

Objection 2: Nothing can penetrate into the interior of any whole except through some sort of division. But to divide what is joined in reality pertains to reason and not to the appetite, in which love exists. Therefore, mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: If through love the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa, then it will follow that what is loved is united to the lover in the same way that the lover is united to what is loved. But as has been explained (a. 1), the union itself is the love. Therefore, it follows that the lover is always loved by what is loved, which is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that mutual indwelling is an effect of love.

But contrary to this: 1 John 4:16 says, “He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.” But charity (caritas) is the love of God (amor Dei). Therefore, for the same reason, every instance of love brings it about that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

I respond: This effect of mutual indwelling can be thought of both (a) with respect to the apprehensive power and (b) with respect to the appetitive power:

As regards the apprehensive power, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as what is loved lingers in the lover’s apprehension—this according to Philippians 1:7 (“..... because I have you in my heart”). On the other hand, the lover is said to exist by apprehension in what is loved insofar as the lover is not content with a superficial apprehension of what is loved, but instead tries to discover everything that belongs intrinsically to what is loved and so to enter into its depths (ad interiora eius ingeditur)—just as 1 Corinthians 2:10 says of the Holy Spirit, who is the Love of God, that He “searches
all things, even the deep things of God.”

As regards the appetitive power, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as it exists in his affections through his being pleased, so that either (a) he takes pleasure in it or in its good aspects when it is present or (b) in its absence he tends toward (i) what is loved itself through a love of concupiscence or (ii) toward the goods that he wills through a love of friendship for the one who is loved—not because of any extrinsic cause, as when someone desires something for the sake of something else or when someone wills a good for another for the sake of something else, but because he is pleased with the one he loves in a way that is interiorly rooted. This is why love is called ‘intimate’ and why one uses the expression ‘the bowels of charity’. Conversely, the lover exists in what is loved in one way through the love of concupiscence and in a different way through the love of friendship. For the love of concupiscence does not come to rest in any extrinsic or superficial attainment of or enjoyment of what is loved, but instead seeks to possess it perfectly—reaching its insides, as it were (quasi ad intima illius perveniens). By contrast, in the love of friendship the lover exists in what is loved in the sense of treating his friend’s goods or evils as his own, and his friend’s will as his own, so that he himself seems to undergo the good and the bad in his friend, as it were, and to be affected by them. Because of this, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 9 and Rhetoric 2, it is proper for friends “to will the same things and to sorrow over and rejoice in the same things.” And so to the extent that he thinks of what belongs to his friend as his own, the lover seems to exist in the one who is loved and becomes, as it were, the same as the one who is loved. Conversely, to the extent that he wills and acts for the sake of his friend as for his own sake, thinking of his friend as if he were identical with himself, the one who is loved exists within the lover.

There is also a third way in which mutual indwelling can be thought of in the love of friendship, by way of reciprocation, insofar as the friends mutually love one another and will and do good things for one another.

Reply to objection 1: What is loved is contained in the lover in the sense that it is impressed in his affections through his being pleased. Conversely, the lover is contained in what is loved in the sense that the lover pursues in some way that which is innermost (intima) in what is loved. For nothing prohibits a thing’s being both container and contained in different senses, just as a genus is contained within its species and vice versa.

Reply to objection 2: Reason’s apprehension precedes love’s affection. And so, as is clear from what has been said, as reason investigates what is loved, love’s affection enters into it.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for the third mode of indwelling, which is not found in every instance of love.

Article 3

Is ecstasy an effect of love?

It seems that ecstasy is not an effect of love:

Objection 1: Ecstasy seems to imply a sort of loss of self (extasis quandam alienationem importare videtur). But love does not always bring about loss of self, since lovers sometimes have self-mastery (amantes interdum sui compotes). Therefore, love does not bring about ecstasy.

Objection 2: A lover desires to be united to what is loved. Therefore, he draws the lover toward himself instead of entering into what is loved by going outside of himself (quam etiam pergam in amatum extra se extens).

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), love unites the lover to what is loved. Therefore, if the lover moves outside of himself in order to enter into what is loved, it follows that a lover always loves what is loved more than he loves himself. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that
ecstasy is an effect of love.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “God’s love brings about ecstasy, and God Himself undergoes ecstasy because of love.” Therefore, since, as is explained in the same place, every instance of love is a sort of participated likeness in God’s love, it seems that every instance of love is a cause of ecstasy.

I respond: Someone is said to undergo ecstasy when he is put outside himself. This happens both (a) with respect to the apprehensive power and (b) with respect to the appetitive power.

As regards the apprehensive power, someone is said to be put outside himself when he is put outside of the sort of cognition that is proper to him, either because (a) he is elevated to a higher sort of cognition—as a man, when he is elevated to comprehend things that lie beyond the senses and beyond reason, is said to undergo ecstasy in the sense of being put outside of the apprehension connatural to reason and the sensory power—or because (b) he sinks down to a lower level, as someone is said to undergo ecstasy when he falls into furiousness or mindlessness (*cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit*).

On the other hand, as regards the appetitive part of the soul, someone is said to undergo ecstasy when his desire for something carries him into the other and he in some sense goes outside himself.

As has been explained (a. 1), love effects the first type of ecstasy as a disposing cause (*dispositive*), viz., by bringing it about that one thinks about what is loved, where such intense thinking about this one thing draws his thoughts away from other things.

On the other hand, love effects the second type of ecstasy directly (*directe*). The love of friendship effects it absolutely speaking, whereas the love of concupiscence effects it in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking. For in the case of the love of concupiscence, the lover is carried outside of himself in the sense that, not content to rejoice over the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside of himself. But because he seeks to have that extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out of himself absolutely speaking; rather, this sort of affection ends up within himself after all. By contrast, in the case of the love of friendship, one’s affection goes outside himself absolutely speaking, since he wills the good for his friend and, for the sake of the friend himself, exercises care for him and provides for him (*operatur quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius propter ipsum amicum*).

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the first type of ecstasy.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for the case of the love of concupiscence, which, as has been explained, does not bring about ecstasy absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 3: To the extent that a lover goes outside of himself, he wills and does good things for his friend. However, he does not will his friend’s good more than his own. Hence, it does not follow that he loves another more than he loves himself.

Article 4

Is jealousy an effect of love?

It seems that jealousy or zeal (*zelus*) is not an effect of love:

Objection 1: Jealousy is principle of contention; hence, 1 Corinthians 3:3 says, “There is among you jealousy and contention ….” But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

Objection 2: The object of love is the good, which communicates itself. But jealousy is incompatible with such communication, since it seems to be part of jealousy that an individual does not tolerate sharing what is loved (*non patiatur consortium in amato*). For instance, husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, because they do not want them to have familiarity with others (*quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris*). Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Jealousy does not exist without hatred, just as it does not exist without love; for Psalm 72:3 says, “I was jealous of the wicked (zelavi super inquos).” Therefore, jealousy should not be called an effect of love more than an effect of hatred.

But contrary to this: In De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “God is called a jealous lover (zelotes) because of the great love He has for the things that exist.”

I respond: Jealousy (zelus), however it is understood, proceeds from love’s intensity. For it is clear that the more intensely a power tends toward something, the more forcefully it repels anything that is contrary or counteractive. Therefore, since, as Augustine says in 83 Quaestiones, “Love is a certain movement toward what is loved,” an intense love seeks to exclude everything that counteracts it.

Now this occurs in one way in the case of the love of concupiscence and in a different way in the case of the love of friendship.

For in the case of a love of concupiscence that intensely desires something, one moves against anything that counteracts the attainment or restful enjoyment of what is loved (illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni quietae eius quod amatur). And it is in this sense that husbands are jealous of their wives, lest the exclusiveness (singularitas) that they seek in a wife should be impeded by her familiarity with others. Similarly, someone who seeks excellence is moved against those who seem to excel, as if they were impeding his own excellence. This is the jealousy of envy (zelus invidiae) that is spoken of in Psalm 36:1 (“Do not emulate evildoers or be jealous of those who work iniquity”).

By contrast, the love of friendship seeks the friend’s good, and so when it is intense, it makes a man move against everything that counteracts his friend’s good. Accordingly, someone is said to be jealous or zealous on his friend’s behalf (aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico) when he is eager to repel anything said or done against his friend’s good. And, in the same way, someone is likewise said to be jealous or zealous on God’s behalf (zelare pro Deo) when he tries to repel, as much as he can, what is contrary to God’s honor or will—this according to 3 Kings 19:14 (“With zeal I have been jealous on behalf of the Lord of hosts”). And a Gloss on John 2:17 (“Zeal for your house consumes me”) says, “He is consumed with a good jealousy who seeks to remedy whatever evil he sees; but if he is unable to remedy it, then he bears it and laments it.”

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is here talking about the zeal of envy, which is a cause of contending not against what is loved, but on behalf of what is loved and against obstacles to it.

Reply to objection 2: A good is loved to the extent that it is communicable to the lover. Hence, everything that impedes the perfection of this communicability becomes odious. And this is the way in which jealousy is caused by loving the good.

Now because of a shortage of goodness (ex defectu bonitatis) it happens that certain scarce goods (quaedam parva bona) cannot be fully possessed by many at the same time. And the jealousy of envy is caused by loving goods of this sort. By contrast, the jealousy of envy is not, properly speaking, caused by loving goods that can be fully possessed by many. For instance, no one envies another’s cognition of a truth that can be fully possessed by many, though he may perhaps envy another’s excellence with respect to the cognition of this truth.

Reply to objection 3: The very fact that someone hates the things that counteract what is loved stems from love. Hence, jealousy is properly posited as an effect of love rather than of hatred.

Article 5

Is love a harmful passion?

It seems that love is a harmful passion (passio laesiva):

Objection 1: ‘Languor’ signifies a sort of harm on the part of the one who is languishing (languor significat laesionem quandam languentis). But love causes languor; for Song of Songs 2:5 says, “Sustain
me with flowers, surround me with apples, because I am languishing with love.” Therefore, love is a harmful passion.

**Objection 2:** Melting is a sort of dissolution (*liquefactio est quaedam resolutio*). But love causes melting; for Song of Songs 5:6 says, “My soul melted as my beloved spoke.” Therefore, love causes dissolution. Therefore, it is corruptive and harmful.

**Objection 3:** ‘Fervor’ (*fervor*) signifies a certain excess of heat, and this excess is corruptive. But fervor is caused by love; for in De Caelestis Hierarchibus, chap. 7, Dionysius lists “hot,” “sharp,” and “highly fervent” among the properties that belong to the Seraphim’s love. And Song of Songs 8:6 says of love that “its splendors are the splendors of fire and flames.” Therefore, love is a harmful and corruptive passion.

**But contrary to this:** In De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Each thing loves itself in a way that holds it together,” i.e., in a way that conserves it (*singula se ipsa amant contentive, idest conservative*). Therefore, love is not a harmful passion, but is instead a passion that conserves and perfects.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 26, aa. 1-2 and q. 27, a. 1), ‘love’ signifies a certain bond (*coaptatio*) between the appetitive power and some good. But nothing is bonded with anything fitting for it by the fact that it is harmed; rather, if it is possible, the thing is advantageous to it and makes it better. By contrast, it is harmed and made worse by the very fact that it is united to something that is not fitting for it. Therefore, love for a fitting good perfects the lover and makes him better (*est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis*), whereas love for a good that is not fitting for the lover is harmful to the lover and makes him worse (*est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis*). Hence, a man is perfected and made better especially by love for God, whereas he is harmed and made worse by a love for sin—this according to Hosea 9:10 (“They became abominable, just like the things they loved”).

To be sure, what has just been said about love applies to what is *formal* in it, i.e., what belongs to the appetite. By contrast, with respect to what is *material* in the passion of love, viz., the corporeal change, it happens that love might be harmful because of the excessiveness of the change—in the same way that this happens in the case of a sensory power and in the case of every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through a change in a corporeal organ.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** To the objections one should reply that four proximate effects can be attributed to love, viz., melting (*liquefactio*), enjoyment (*fruitio*), languor (*languor*), and fervor (*fervor*).

Among these the first is *melting*, which is opposed to freezing (*congelatio*). For things that are frozen are compressed within themselves, so that they cannot easily allow themselves to be entered into by another (*ut not possint de facili subintrationem alterius pati*). But it is part of love that the appetite is adapted to the reception of the good that is loved insofar as what is loved exists in the lover—in the way that has already been explained above (a. 2). Hence, the freezing or hardening of the heart (*congelatio vel duritia cordis*) is a disposition incompatible with love. By contrast, ‘melting’ implies a certain softening of the heart by which the heart shows itself ready to be entered into by what is loved.

Therefore, if what is loved is present and possessed, then what is effected is *pleasure* or *enjoyment*. On the other hand, if what is loved is absent, then two passions result, viz., (a) *sadness* over the absence, and this is signified by ‘*languor*’ (this is why, in De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 3, Tully mainly uses the word ‘*sickness*’ for this sadness), and (b) *intense desire* to attain what is loved, and this is signified by ‘*fervor*’.

These are, to be sure, the effects of love understood formally, i.e., in accord with the relation of the appetitive power to its object. However, in the case of the passion of love there are some effects, proportionate to these, that result from changes in the organ.
Article 6

Does a lover do everything out of love?

It seems that a lover does not do everything out of love:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 26, a. 2), love is a passion. But a man does not do everything he does out of passion; rather, as Ethics 6 explains, certain things he does by choice and others he does out of ignorance. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does everything he does out of love.

Objection 2: As is clear from De Anima 3, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals. Therefore, if someone does everything he does out of love, then the other passions of the appetitive part of the soul will be superfluous.

Objection 3: Nothing is caused simultaneously by contrary causes. But some things are done out of hatred. Therefore, not all things are done out of love.

But contrary to this: In De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “It is because of the love of the good that each agent does everything.”

I respond: As has been explained (q. 1, a. 2), every agent acts for the sake of some end. But the end is the good that each thing desires and loves. Hence, it is clear that every agent, whatever it might be, does every action out of some sort of love.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for the case of the love that is a passion in the sentient appetite. But we are now talking about love taken in general, insofar as it includes under itself intellective love, rational love, animal love, and natural love. For this is how Dionysius is talking about love in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4.

Reply to objection 2: As has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4), desire, sadness, and pleasure are all caused by love, and as a result all the other passions are caused by love as well. Hence, every action that proceeds from any passion whatsoever also proceeds from love as a first cause. Hence, the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 29, a. 2), hatred is also caused by love.