

QUESTION 31

Pleasure in Itself

Next we have to consider pleasure or delight (*delectatio*) (questions 31-34) and sadness or pain (*tristitia*) (questions 35-39).

As regards pleasure, there are four things to be considered: first, pleasure itself in its own right (question 31); second, the causes of pleasure (question 32); third, the effects of pleasure (question 33); and, fourth, the goodness and badness of pleasure.

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is pleasure a passion? (2) Does pleasure exist in time? (3) Does pleasure differ from joy (*gaudium*)? (4) Does pleasure exist in the intellective appetite? (5) How do the pleasures of the higher appetite compare with the pleasures of the lower appetite? (6) How do sentient pleasures compare with one another? (7) Is any pleasure non-natural? (8) Can one pleasure be contrary to another pleasure?

Article 1

Is pleasure a passion?

It seems that pleasure (*delectatio*) is not a passion:

Objection 1: In *De Fide* 2 Damascene distinguishes an operation from a passion, saying that “an operation is a movement in accord with nature, whereas a passion is a movement contrary to nature.” But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 7 and 10, pleasure is an operation. Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 3 says, “To undergo a passion is to be moved (*pati est moveri*).” But pleasure consists not in being moved but in having been moved (*non in moveri sed in motum esse*), since pleasure is caused by a good that has already been acquired. Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

Objection 3: Pleasure consists in a certain perfection on the part of the one taking pleasure, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, pleasure “brings an operation to perfection (*perficit operationem*).” But as *Physics* 7 and *De Anima* 2 explain, to be perfected is different from undergoing a passion or being altered (*perfici non est pati vel alterari*). Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14 Augustine posits pleasure, i.e., joy (*gaudium*) or gladness (*laetitia*), among the passions of the soul.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), a movement of the sentient appetite is properly called a ‘passion’. And every affection that proceeds from sentient apprehension is a movement of the sentient appetite. But this feature must belong to pleasure. For as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Pleasure is a movement of the soul, and the soul’s establishment, all at once and sensibly, into an existent nature (*delectatio est quidam motus animae et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem*).”

To understand this claim, notice that just as it happens among natural things that some of them attain their natural perfections, so too this happens among animals. And even though their *being moved toward* their perfection does not occur all at once, their *attainment of* their natural perfection does occur all at once (*est totum simul*). However, the difference between animals and other natural things is that when other natural things are established into what is fitting for them, they do not sense this, whereas animals do sense it (*hoc non sentiunt sed animalia hoc sentiunt*). And the sensing of it is a cause of a certain movement of the soul in the sentient appetite, and it is this movement that is the pleasure.

Thus, when one says that pleasure is “a movement of the soul,” pleasure is being placed in a *genus*. And when one says that pleasure is “the soul’s establishment into an existent nature”—i.e., into that which exists in the thing’s nature—what is being posited is the *cause* of pleasure, viz., the presence of a connatural good. On the other hand, when the establishment is said to occur “all at once,” this shows that

‘establishment’ should be taken not as ‘being established’ but rather as ‘having been established’—the terminus, as it were, of a movement. For pleasure is not an instance of generation, as Plato claimed, but consists rather in something’s having been effected, as *Ethics 7* says. And when one says ‘sensibly’, this excludes the perfections of things that do not have sentience and in which there is no such thing as pleasure (*excluduntur perfectiones rerum insensibilium in quibus non est delectatio*).

So, then, it is clear that since pleasure is a movement in the animal appetite that follows upon sensory apprehension, it is a passion of the soul.

Reply to objection 1: As *De Anima 2* proves, an unimpeded connatural operation is a secondary perfection. And so when a thing is established in a proper and unimpeded connatural operation, what follows is pleasure, which, as has been explained, consists in its having been perfected. So, then, when one claims that pleasure is an operation, this predication is based on the cause [of pleasure] and not on its essence (*non est praedicatio per essentiam sed per causam*).

Reply to objection 2: In the case of an animal, there are two sorts of movement that can be considered: (a) the one has to do with the *intending* of an end, and this belongs to the appetite; (b) the other has to do with *execution*, and this pertains to the exterior operation.

Thus, even though, in someone who has attained the good in which he takes pleasure, the movement of execution by which the appetitive part tends toward the end has ceased, nonetheless, what does not cease is that movement of the appetitive part by which (a) it previously desired the unpossessed good and by which (b) it afterwards takes pleasure in the possessed good. For even though pleasure is the appetite’s resting in a certain sense, given the presence of the good which gives pleasure and satisfies the appetite, nonetheless, what remains is the change effected in the appetite by the desirable good (*immutatio appetitus a appetibili*); and it is by reason of this change that pleasure is a certain movement.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1 and 4), even though the name ‘passion’ is more appropriate in the case of passions that are corruptive and tend toward what is bad—e.g., sicknesses in the body, and sadness and fear in the soul—nonetheless, there are also some passions that are ordered toward the good. And it is in this sense that pleasure is called a ‘passion’.

Article 2

Does pleasure exist in time?

It seems that pleasure exists in time:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 1*, pleasure is a certain movement. But every movement exists in time. Therefore, pleasure exists in time.

Objection 2: A thing is called ‘long-lasting’ or ‘lingering’ in relation to time (*secundum tempus*). But some pleasures are called ‘lingering’. Therefore, pleasure exists in time.

Objection 3: The passions of the soul belong to a single genus. But some passions of the soul exist in time. Therefore, so does pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics 10* the Philosopher says, “It will not take time for one to receive pleasure (*secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem*).”

I respond: There are two ways in which a thing can exist in time: (a) in its own right (*secundum se*) and (b) through another (*per aliud*) and, as it were, *per accidens*.

For since time is the numbering of successive entities, the things that are said to exist in time in their own right are those whose nature is succession or something that pertains to succession, e.g., movement, rest, speaking, and other things of this sort.

By contrast, the things that are said to exist in time because of another (*secundum aliud*) and not *per se* are those whose nature is not any sort of succession and yet which are such that they are subject to

some sort of succession. For instance, being a man does not by its nature (*de sui ratione*) involve succession, since it is not a movement but is instead the terminus of a movement or change, viz., the man's being generated; however, because human *esse* is subject to changeable causes, being a man exists in time.

Therefore, one should reply that pleasure in its own right does not exist in time, since pleasure is taken in an already acquired good which is, as it were, the terminus of a movement. However, if that acquired good is subject to change, then the pleasure will exist *per accidens* in time. On the other hand, if the good in question is altogether unchangeable, then the pleasure will not exist either *per se* or *per accidens* in time.

Reply to objection 1: As *De Anima* 3 says, 'movement' has two senses (*motus dupliciter dicitur*):

In one sense, a movement is the act of what is imperfect—more specifically, of what exists in potentiality—insofar as it is imperfect; and a movement taken in this sense is successive and exists in time.

The second sort of movement is the act of what is perfect, i.e., of what exists in actuality, e.g., understanding, sensing, willing, etc.—and, likewise, taking pleasure. And a movement in this sense is not successive and does not exist *per se* in time.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure is said to be long-lasting or lingering insofar as it exists *per accidens* in time.

Reply to objection 3: The other passions do not have as their object an already acquired good, in the way that pleasure does. Hence, they have more of the character of an imperfect movement than pleasure does. As a result, it is more fitting for pleasure not to exist in time.

Article 3

Is joy altogether the same thing as pleasure?

It seems that joy (*gaudium*) is altogether the same thing as pleasure (*delectatio*):

Objection 1: The passions of the soul differ with respect to their objects. But the object of joy is the same as the object of pleasure, viz., a good that has been acquired. Therefore, joy is altogether the same as pleasure.

Objection 2: A single movement does not terminate in two endpoints. But the movement that terminates in joy is the same as the movement that terminates in pleasure, and that movement is concupiscence. Therefore, pleasure and joy are altogether the same thing.

Objection 3: If joy differs from pleasure, then it seems that, by parity of reasoning, 'gladness' (*laetitia*), 'exultation' or 'excitement' (*exultatio*), and 'delight' or 'enjoyment' (*iucunditas*) signify something different from pleasure, and so they will all be different passions. But this seems false. Therefore, it is not the case that joy differs from pleasure.

But contrary to this: In the case of brute animals we do not use the name 'joy'. But we do in their case use the name 'pleasure'. Therefore, it is not the case that joy and pleasure are the same thing.

I respond: As Avicenna says in his *Liber de Anima*, joy is a certain species of pleasure. For notice that, as was explained above (q. 30, a. 3), some instances of concupiscence are natural, whereas some are non-natural and follow upon reason. (Or, as Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa put it, some are "corporeal" and some "belong to the soul" (*sunt animales*)—which amounts to the same thing.) For we take pleasure both (a) in those things that we naturally desire, once we acquire them, and also (b) in those things that we desire because of reason. However, the name 'joy' has a place only in the pleasure that follows upon reason. This is why we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but instead attribute to them only the name 'pleasure'.

Now everything that we desire according to nature we can also desire with the pleasure of reason, but not vice versa. Hence, all the things with respect to which there is pleasure are such that there can also be joy with respect to them in individuals who have reason. However, there is not always joy with respect to all of them. For sometimes one feels some bodily pleasure (*aliquis sentit aliquam delectationem secundum corpus*) and yet does not rejoice in this according to reason. Because of this, it is clear that ‘pleasure’ applies to more things than (*est in plus quam*) ‘joy’ does.

Reply to objection 1: Since the object of an animal appetite is an apprehended good, the diversity of apprehensions is in some way relevant to a diversity of objects. And so pleasures belonging to the soul that are also joys are distinguished from corporeal pleasures, which are only called ‘pleasures’, in a way that corresponds to what was said above (q. 30, a. 3) about the kinds of concupiscence.

Reply to objection 2: A similar difference is likewise found in the case of concupiscence, so that ‘pleasure’ corresponds to ‘sentient desire’ or ‘concupiscence’ (*concupiscentia*) and ‘joy’ corresponds to ‘desire’ (*desiderium*), which seems to pertain to the ‘soul’s concupiscence’ (*ad concupiscentiam animalem*). And corresponding to the difference in the types of movement there is also a difference in types of rest.

Reply to objection 3: The other names relevant to pleasure are imposed because of pleasure’s effect. For instance, *laetitia* (‘gladness’) is imposed because of the widening (*dilatatio*) of the heart, as if one were saying *latitia* (‘width’). *Exultatio* (‘exultation’ or ‘excitement’) is imposed because of those exterior signs of interior pleasure that become apparent externally to the extent that the interior joy breaks out into the open. *Iucunditas* (‘delight’ or ‘enjoyment’) is imposed because of the special signs of, or effects of, gladness. And yet all these names seem to pertain to joy; for we use them only in the case of rational natures.

Article 4

Does pleasure exist in the intellectual appetite?

It seems that pleasure does not exist in the intellectual appetite:

Objection 1: In *Rhetoric* 1 Aristotle says, “Pleasure is a felt movement (*motus quidam sensibilis*).” But there is no felt movement in the intellectual part of the soul. Therefore, pleasure does not exist in the intellectual part.

Objection 2: Pleasure is a passion. But every passion exists in the sentient appetite. Therefore, pleasure exists only in the sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Pleasure is common to us and brute animals. Therefore, it exists only in that part of the soul that is common to us and brute animals.

But contrary to this: Psalm 36:4 says, “Take pleasure in the Lord (*delectare in domino*).” But only the intellectual appetite, and not the sentient appetite, can reach out to God. Therefore, pleasure can exist in the intellectual appetite.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), some instances of pleasure follow upon reason’s apprehension. However, it is not only the sentient appetite but also the intellectual appetite, called the ‘will’, that is moved at reason’s apprehension by means of an application to something particular. Accordingly, in the intellectual appetite, or will, there is pleasure that is called ‘joy’, though not corporeal pleasure.

Now the relation between the types of pleasure in the two appetites is that the sentient appetite’s pleasure is accompanied by some corporeal change, whereas the intellectual appetite’s pleasure is nothing other than a simple movement of the will. And this is why, in *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine says, “Avid desire (*cupiditas*) and gladness (*laetitia*) are nothing other than an act of will in agreement

with what we wish for (*voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus*.)”

Reply to objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher’s, ‘felt’ is being used generally for any sort of apprehension. For in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “There is pleasure with respect to every sensory power, and, similarly, with respect to the intellect and speculative inquiry.”

A possible alternative reply is that the Philosopher is here defining pleasure for the case of the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure has the character of a passion, properly speaking, insofar as it occurs with some corporeal change. And it does not exist in this way in the intellective appetite. Rather, in the intellective appetite it exists as a simple movement; for this is also the way it exists in God and in the angels. Hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “God rejoices by a single simple operation.” And at the end of *De Caelesti Hierarchia* Dionysius says, “The angels are not susceptible to our passive pleasure, but instead they rejoice along with God with a gladness of incorruption.”

Reply to objection 3: In us there is not only the sort of pleasure that we share with brute animals, but also the sort of pleasure that we share with the angels. Hence, in the same place Dionysius says, “Holy men often participate in the pleasures of the angels.” And so in us pleasure exists not only in the sentient appetite, which we share with brute animals, but also in the intellective appetite, which we share with the angels.

Article 5

Are corporeal and sensible pleasures greater than intelligible spiritual pleasures?

It seems that corporeal and sensible pleasures are greater than intelligible spiritual pleasures:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, everyone pursues certain pleasures. But more people pursue sensible pleasures than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore, corporeal pleasures are greater.

Objection 2: The magnitude of a cause is known by its effect. But corporeal pleasures have more powerful effects, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, “They alter bodies and in some they cause insanity.” Therefore, corporeal pleasures are more powerful.

Objection 3: It is necessary to temper and curb corporeal pleasures because of their strength. But it is unnecessary to curb spiritual pleasures. Therefore, corporeal pleasures are greater.

But contrary to this: Psalm 118:103 says, “How sweet are Your words to my palate, more than honey to my mouth.” And in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “The greatest pleasure is that which stems from the operation of wisdom.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), pleasure stems from one’s being joined to something fitting that is sensed or known. Now in the works of the soul, principally the sentient and intellective works, one has to take into account that since they do not pass into an exterior matter, they are acts or perfections of the one who is operating, viz., by understanding, by sensing, by willing, etc. For the actions that pass into exterior matter are instead the actions and the perfections of the matter that is changed, since a movement is an act of the thing moved that comes from the thing that effects the movement (*motus est actus mobilis a movente*). So, then, the aforementioned actions of the sentient and intellective soul are themselves a certain good belonging to the one who operates, and they are also known through the sensory power or the intellect. Hence, pleasure arises from the actions themselves and not just from their objects.

Therefore, if intelligible pleasures are compared to sensible pleasures insofar as we take pleasure *in the actions themselves*, viz., in the sensory power’s cognition and in the intellect’s cognition, then there is no doubt that intelligible pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For a man takes much more

pleasure in knowing something by having an intellectual understanding of it than he does in knowing something by sensing it. For intellectual cognition is more perfect and even better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than the sensory power does. Intellectual cognition is also loved to a greater degree, since, just as Augustine claims in *De Civitate Dei*, there is no one who would not wish to be without corporeal vision rather than to be without intellectual vision, in the way in which beasts and simpletons are without intellectual vision.

On the other hand, if intelligible spiritual pleasures are compared to sensible corporeal pleasures *in their own right and simply speaking*, then the spiritual pleasures are greater. This is clear from the three things that are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the good that is conjoined, (b) that to which it is conjoined, and (c) the conjoining itself:

(a) For a spiritual good is itself greater than a corporeal good, and it is loved to a greater degree. An indication of this is that men abstain from even the greatest corporeal pleasures (*etiam a maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent*) in order not to lose honor, which is an intelligible good.

(b) Similarly, the intellectual part of the soul is itself much more noble and more capable of cognition (*magis cognoscitiva*) than the sentient part.

(c) Again, the conjoining of the two is more intimate, more perfect, and more stable (*firma*). It is more intimate because the sensory power stops at a thing's exterior accidents, whereas the intellect penetrates through to a thing's essence; for the intellect's object is what a thing is (*quod quid est*). It is more perfect because a movement, which is an imperfect act, accompanies the conjoining of the sensory power to what is sensed, and for this reason sensible pleasures do not occur all at once, but instead something passes away in them while something else waits to be consummated, as is obvious in the case of the pleasures of food and sex. By contrast, intelligible things exist without movement, and for this reason pleasures of this sort occur all at once. Again, the conjoining is more firm because corporeal pleasures are corruptible and quickly pass away, whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.

However, *as things appear to us (quoad nos)*, corporeal pleasures are stronger (*magis vehementes*), and this for three reasons. First, sensible things are more known to us than intelligible things are. Second, since sensible pleasures are passions belonging to the sentient appetite, they are accompanied by some corporeal change; this does not happen in the case of spiritual pleasures, except in virtue of a sort of overflow from the higher appetite into the lower appetite. Third, corporeal pleasures are desired as a sort of remedy (*ut medicinae quaedam*) for corporeal defects or problems that result in sadness; hence, when corporeal pleasures supersede such sadness, they are felt more keenly and, as a result, they are welcomed to a greater degree than are spiritual pleasures. For, as will be explained below (q. 35, a. 5), spiritual pleasures do not have any contrary forms of sadness.

Reply to objection 1: The reasons why the majority pursues corporeal pleasures are that (a) sensible things are known to a greater degree and to a greater number of people, and also that (b) men need these pleasures as remedies for many pains and sorrows, and that (c) since the majority of men cannot attain to spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, they consequently fall back into corporeal pleasures (*declinent ad corporales*).

Reply to objection 2: Corporeal change is caused more by corporeal pleasures because they are passions of the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal pleasures accord with the sentient part of the soul, which is regulated by reason, and this is why they need to be tempered and curbed by reason. By contrast, spiritual pleasures accord with the mind, which is itself the rule, and so they are sober and moderate in their own right.

Article 6

Are the pleasures associated with touch greater than the pleasures associated with the other senses?

It seems that the pleasures associated with touch (*delectationes secundum tactum*) are not greater than the pleasures associated with the other senses (*delectationes secundum alios sensus*):

Objection 1: The greatest pleasure seems to be a pleasure which is such that if it is excluded, all joy ceases. But such is the pleasure associated with sight; for Tobit 5:12 says, “What sort of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness and see not the light of heaven?” Therefore, the pleasure that stems from sight is the greatest among sensible pleasures.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Each thing is such that what is pleasurable to it is what it loves.” But among all the senses, sight is loved the most. Therefore, the pleasure associated with sight is the greatest.

Objection 3: Sight is especially the beginning of the friendship of pleasure. But pleasure is the cause of such friendship. Therefore, pleasure seems to be especially associated with sight.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that the greatest pleasures are associated with touch.

I respond: As has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4), each thing, insofar as it is loved, becomes pleasurable. Now as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* points out, the sensory powers are loved for two reasons, viz., for the sake of *cognition* and because of their *usefulness*. Hence, it is in both these ways that there can be pleasure associated with the sensory power.

However, since it is proper to man to apprehend cognition itself as a certain good, it follows that the first pleasures of the senses, viz., those associated with cognition, are proper to men, whereas to the extent that the pleasures of the senses are loved for their usefulness, they are common to all animals. Therefore, if we are speaking of the sensory pleasure that exists by reason of *cognition*, then it is clear that there is greater pleasure associated with *sight* than with any other sense.

However, if we are speaking of the sensory pleasure that exists by reason of *usefulness*, then the greatest pleasure is associated with *touch*. For the usefulness of sensible things has to do with their being ordered toward the conservation of animal nature. But it is the sensible objects of touch that are related more closely to this sort of usefulness, since touch has cognition of the things that an animal consists of, viz., hot and cold and other things of this sort. Accordingly, the pleasures associated with touch are greater in the sense of being more proximate to the end. Moreover, because of this, the other animals, which do not have sensible pleasure except by reason of its usefulness, do not take pleasure in the other senses except in relation to the sensible objects of touch. For as *Ethics* 3 puts it, “Dogs take pleasure not in smelling hares, but in eating them; and the lion takes pleasure not in the sound made by an ox, but in devouring the ox.”

Therefore, given that the pleasure of touch is the greatest in relation to usefulness and that the pleasure of sight is the greatest in relation to cognition, if someone wants to compare the two of them, he will find that to the extent that he remains within the confines of sensible pleasure, the pleasure of touch is greater, absolutely speaking, than the pleasure of sight. For, clearly, it is what is natural in any given thing that is the most powerful, and the pleasures of touch are the ones toward which natural concupiscence—e.g., the desire for food, sexual desire, etc.—is ordered. On the other hand, if we consider the pleasures of sight insofar as sight serves the intellect, then in this sense the pleasures of sight will be more powerful, for the same reason that intelligible pleasures are more powerful than sensible pleasures.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 3), ‘joy’ signifies pleasure that *belongs to the soul* (*animalem delectationem*) and this pertains especially to sight. But *natural* pleasure pertains

especially to touch.

Reply to objection 2: As is shown in the same place, sight is especially loved for the sake of cognition, since it shows us many of the differences among things.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure is a cause of carnal love in one way, and sight is a cause of it in another way. For pleasure—and especially the pleasure associated with touch—is a cause of the friendship of pleasure in the manner of an end, whereas sight is a cause in the sense of being the beginning of movement, insofar as it is through seeing what is lovable that one receives an impression of the likeness of the thing, and this entices one to love it and desire its pleasure.

Article 7

Are any pleasures non-natural?

It seems that no pleasure is non-natural (*innaturalis*):

Objection 1: Pleasure in the affections of the soul is like rest in the case of bodies. But a body's natural appetite comes to rest only in its natural place. Therefore, an animal appetite's rest, i.e., pleasure, can exist only in something natural. Therefore, no pleasure is non-natural.

Objection 2: What is contrary to nature is violent. But as *Metaphysics 5* says, everything violent produces sadness. Therefore, nothing that is contrary to nature can be pleasurable.

Objection 3: As is clear from the Philosopher's definition cited above (a. 1), establishment into one's proper nature is, when it is sensed, a cause of pleasure. But establishment into its proper nature is natural to each thing, since a natural movement is a movement toward a natural terminus. Therefore, every pleasure is natural.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says that some pleasures “are sicknesses and contrary to nature.”

I respond: As *Physics 2* says, ‘natural’ means what is in accord with nature. Now in the case of a man, ‘natural’ can be taken in two senses:

(a) In one sense, insofar as the intellect and reason are most principally man's nature, since it is by reason that man is constituted in his species. And in this sense, what can be called man's ‘natural’ pleasures are those that lie in what is fitting for a man with respect to reason, in the way in which it is natural to a man to take pleasure in the contemplation of truth and in acts of virtue.

(b), ‘Nature’ can be taken in a second sense in the case of a man insofar as it is divided off from ‘reason’, so that what is natural is that which is common to men and other things and, especially, that which is not obedient to reason. Accordingly, things that pertain to the conservation of the body, either (a) in the individual, such as food, drink, sleep, etc., or (b) in the species, such as sexual intercourse, are said to be naturally pleasurable to a man.

Now with respect to both sorts of pleasures, it happens that some are non-natural absolutely speaking but natural in a certain respect. For it is possible for some principles that are natural to the species to be corrupted in a given individual, and in such a case what is contrary to the nature of the species becomes natural *per accidens* to *this* individual, in the way that it is natural to *this* heated water that it give warmth. So, then, it is possible for what is contrary to man's nature—either with respect to reason or what respect to the conservation of the body—to become connatural to *this* man because of some corruption of nature that exists in him. This corruption can be either (a) on the part of the body, due either (i) to sickness, as when bitter things seem sweet, and vice versa, to those who are feverish, or (ii) to some bad persistent condition (*propter malam complexionem*), as when someone takes pleasure in eating dirt or coal, etc., or even (b) on the part of the soul, as when out of custom some men take pleasure in eating men, or in having sex with beasts or with males, or other practices of this sort that are not in

accord with human nature.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 8

Is one pleasure contrary to another?

It seems that it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another:

Objection 1: The passions of the soul receive their species and their oppositions from their objects. But the object of pleasure is the good. Therefore, since it is not the case that one good is contrary to another, but instead, as the *Categories* says, “the good is contrary to the bad, and the bad to the bad,” it seems that it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another.

Objection 2: As *Metaphysics* 10 proves, it is a single thing that is contrary to a single thing. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore, it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another.

Objection 3: If one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only because of an opposition among the things in which one takes pleasure. But this difference is a material difference, whereas, according to *Metaphysics* 10, contrariety is a difference in form. Therefore, there is no contrariety between one pleasure and another.

But contrary to this: According to the Philosopher, contraries are things that impede one another and exist in the same genus. But as *Ethics* 10 says, there are pleasures that impede one another. Therefore, some pleasures are contrary to one another.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), pleasure in the affections of the soul is like rest in the case of bodies. Now two instances of rest are called ‘contrary’ when they exist in contrary termini, in the way that “a rest that exists above is contrary to a rest that exists below,” as *Physics* 5 puts it. Hence, in the case of the affections of the soul, it is possible for two pleasures to be contrary to one another.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage from the Philosopher ‘good’ and ‘bad’ should be interpreted as ‘virtues’ and ‘vices’. For two vices may be contrary to one another, whereas it is not the case that one virtue is contrary to another.

Now in other cases, there is nothing to prevent two goods from being contrary to one another, in the way that hot and cold, one of which is good for fire and the other of which is good for water, are opposed to one another. And it is in this way that one pleasure can be contrary to another. But this cannot happen in the case of the good of virtue, since the good of virtue exists only because of agreement with some single thing, viz., reason.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure is related to the affections of the soul in the way that natural rest is related to bodies, since it exists in something fitting and, as it were, natural. By contrast, sadness is like a violent rest, since what is painful is repugnant to the animal appetite in the way that a place of violent rest is repugnant to a natural appetite. But as *Physics* 5 explains, the natural rest of a body is opposed both by the violent rest of the same body and by the natural rest of another body. Hence, a pleasure is opposed both by a pleasure and by sadness.

Reply to objection 3: Since the things in which we take pleasure are the objects of pleasure, they make for not only a material difference but also a formal difference, as long as there are diverse types of pleasurable. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 23, a. 1 and 4, and q. 30, a. 2), the diverse characters of the objects make for diverse species of acts or of passions.