QUESTION 46

Anger in Itself

Next we have to consider anger (ira). And we will consider, first, anger in its own right (question 46); second, the causes that effect anger, along with the remedy for anger (question 47); and, third, the effects of anger (question 48).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is anger a specific passion? (2) Is the object of anger something good or something bad? (3) Does anger exist in the concupiscible part of the soul? (4) Does anger involve reason (utrum ira sit cum ratione)? (5) Is anger more natural than concupiscence? (6) Is anger more grievous than hatred? (7) Is anger directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice? (8) What are the species of anger?

Article 1

Is anger a specific passion?

It seems that anger is not a specific passion (ira non sit passio specialis):

Objection 1: The irascible power (potentia irascibilis) derives its name from anger (ira). But there are many passions that belong to this power, and not just a single passion. Therefore, anger is not a single specific passion.

Objection 2: As is clear to anyone who goes through the passions one by one, there is a contrary for each specific passion. But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 3), there is no contrary for anger. Therefore, anger is not a specific passion.

Objection 3: One specific passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in Rhetoric 2, it involves sadness and pleasure and hope (est cum tristitia et cum delectatione et cum spe). Therefore, anger is not a specific passion.

But contrary to this: Damascene posits anger as a specific passion. And so does Tully in De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 4.

I respond: There are two senses in which something is called ‘generic’ (generale):

(a) In the first sense, by predication, in the way that animal is generic with respect to all animals.

(b) In a second sense, by causality, in the way that, according to Dionysius in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, the sun is a generic or general cause (causa generalis) of all the things that are generated here below (in his inferioribus). For just as a genus, in a way similar to matter, contains many specific differences in potentiality (genus continet multas differentias potestate secundum similitudinem materiae), so an agent cause contains many effects that correspond to its active power.

(c) Now an effect can be produced by the concurrence of diverse causes, and since every cause remains in its effect in some way, one can also claim, in a third sense, that an effect produced by several causes coming together has a sort of generality in the sense that it contains several causes that are in some way actualized (quodammodo in actu).

Therefore, in the first sense, anger is not a generic passion, but, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), is instead divided off at the same level from the other passions (condivisa aliis passionibus).

Similarly, it is not a generic passion in the second sense, either. For it is not a cause of other passions. Rather, given this sense, it is love that can be called a generic passion, as is clear from Augustine in De Civitate Dei 14. For as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4), love is the primary root (prima radix) of all the passions.

However, in the third sense anger can be called a generic passion, given that it is caused by the concurrence of several passions. For the movement of anger rises up only because some sort of sadness has been inflicted and only insofar as the desire for retribution is present, along with the hope of exacting it. For as the Philosopher explains in Rhetoric 2, “Someone who is angry hopes to inflict punishment,
since he desires the retribution that is possible for him” (*appetit vindictam ut sibi possibilem*). Hence, as Avicenna points out in his *Liber de Anima*, if it is a person of very exalted status (*persona multum excellens*) who has inflicted the harm, then only sadness follows, and not anger.

**Reply to objection 1:** The irascible power derives its name from anger not because every movement of this power is an instance of anger, but rather because (a) all the movements of this power are terminated in anger, and because (b) anger is the most manifest of all the movements of this power.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since anger is caused by contrary passions, viz., by *hope*, which is directed toward something good, and by *sadness*, which is directed toward something bad, it includes contrariety within itself and so does not have a contrary outside itself—just as, within the mixed colors, one finds only the contrariety that belongs to the simple colors by which the mixed colors are caused.

**Reply to objection 3:** Anger includes several passions not in the way that a genus includes its species, but rather in the sense of containment that applies to causes and effects (*secundum continentiam causae et effectus*).

**Article 2**

*Is the object of anger something bad?*

It seems that the object of anger is something bad:

**Objection 1:** Gregory of Nyssa says that anger is “the sword-bearer of avid desire or concupiscence” (*armigera concupiscientiae*), viz., insofar as it attacks whatever impedes one’s desire. But every impediment has the character of something bad. Therefore, anger is directed toward something bad as its object.

**Objection 2:** Anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each has the effect of inflicting harm on another. But as was explained above (q. 29, a. 1), hatred is directed toward something bad as its object. Therefore, so is anger.

**Objection 3:** Anger is caused by sadness; hence, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, “Anger acts with sadness.” But the object of sadness is something bad. Therefore, so is the object of anger.

**But contrary to this:**

1. In *Confessiones 2* Augustine says, “Anger desires retribution.” But a desire for retribution is a desire for something good, since retribution is a part of justice. Therefore, the object of anger is something good.

2. Anger always involves hope, and so, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, anger is a cause of pleasure. But the object of hope and pleasure is something good. Therefore, so is the object of anger.

**I respond:** The movement of an appetitive power follows upon an act of an apprehensive power. But there are two ways in which an apprehensive power apprehends something: (a) in the manner of something *simple* (*per modum incomplexi*), as when we understand what a *man* is; and (b) in the manner of something *complex* (*per modum complexi*), as when we understand *whiteness* to exist in a *man*. Hence, it is in both of these ways that an appetitive power can tend toward something good or toward something bad:

(a) *in the manner of something simple and incomplex*, as when the appetite simply pursues or adheres to something good or withdraws from something bad. Movements of this sort are *desire* and *hope, pleasure* and *sadness*, and others of this type.

(b) *in the manner of something complex*, as when the appetite is directed toward a good thing (or a bad thing) which exists in another or which is being done to another, either by tending toward this [object] or by withdrawing from it. This is manifestly obvious in the case of love and hatred. For instance, we love someone insofar as we want something good to exist in him, whereas we hate him...
insofar as we want something bad to exist in him. And the same thing holds for anger. For whoever gets angry seeks to exact retribution from someone (*quaerit vindicari de aliquo*). And so the movement of anger tends toward two things, viz., (a) toward the *retribution* itself, which it desires and hopes for as something good, and hence takes pleasure in, and also (b) toward the *one against whom it seeks retribution* as against someone who is opposed to him and harmful, and this involves the character of something bad.

However, there are two noteworthy differences between anger, on the one hand, and hatred and love. The first is that anger is always directed toward two objects, whereas love and hatred are sometimes directed toward just one object, as when someone is said to love or to hate wine or something of this sort. The second is that each of the objects that love is directed toward is something good, since the lover wills something good for someone, insofar as that individual is agreeable to him (*vult amans bonum alicui tanquam sibi convenienti*). On the other hand, each of the objects that hatred is directed toward has the character of something bad, since one who hates wills something bad for someone, insofar as that individual is disagreeable to him. By contrast, anger has one object with the character of something good, viz., the retribution that it desires, and another object with the character of something bad, viz., the noxious man whom it wants to exact retribution from. And so anger is a passion that is in some sense composed of contrary passions.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections.

---

**Article 3**

**Does anger exist in the concupiscible part of the soul?**

It seems that anger exists in the concupiscible part of the soul (*ira sit in concupiscibili*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Tusculanis Quaestiones* 4 Tully says that anger is a sort of desire (*libido quaedam*). But desire exists in the concupiscible part. Therefore, so does anger.

**Objection 2:** In *Regula* Augustine says, “Anger grows into hatred.” And in *De Tusculanis Quaestiones* 4 Tully says, “Hatred is inveterate anger.” But like love, hatred exists in the concupiscible part. Therefore, anger exists in the concupiscible part.

**Objection 3:** Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa claim that anger is composed of sadness and desire. But both of these exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, anger exists in the concupiscible part.

**But contrary to this:** The concupiscible power is distinct from the irascible power. Therefore, if anger existed in the concupiscible power, then the irascible power would not derive its name from it.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible part in that the objects of the passions of the concupiscible part are something good or something bad simply speaking (*bonum et malum absolute*), whereas the objects of the passions of the irascible part are something good or something bad along with a certain loftiness or arduousness (*bonum et malum cum quadam elevatione vel arduitate*).

Now it has been explained (a. 2) that anger is directed toward two objects, viz., (a) the retribution that it desires and (b) the individual against whom it seeks retribution. And anger requires a certain arduousness in both, since the movement of anger arises only if there is a certain degree of magnitude in both objects (*non insurget motus irae nisi aliqua magnitude circa utrum existente*). For as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “We judge to be of little worth anything that amounts to nothing or almost nothing.” Hence, it is clear that anger exists in the irascible part and not in the concupiscible part.

**Reply to objection 1:** Tully is using the name ‘desire’ (*libido*) to designate an appetite (*appetitus*)
for any sort of future good, with no distinction between arduous goods and non-arduous goods. Accordingly, he places anger under desire insofar as anger is a desire for retribution. But ‘desire’ (libido) in this sense is common to both the irascible part and the concupiscible part.

Reply to objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred not because numerically the same passion that was at first anger becomes hatred later on through a sort of aging process (per quinadam inveterationem), but because of a certain sort of causality. For when anger lasts for a long time, it causes hatred.

Reply to objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sadness and desire, not in the sense of being composed of parts, but in the sense of being composed of causes. Now it has already been explained above (q. 25, a. 2) that the passions of the concupiscible part are causes of the passions of the irascible part.

Article 4

Does anger involve an act of reason?

It seems that anger does not involve an act of reason (ira non sit cum ratione):

Objection 1: Since anger is a passion, it exists in the sentient appetite. But the sentient appetite follows the apprehension of the sentient part of the soul and not of reason. Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

Objection 2: Brute animals lack reason. And yet anger is found in them. Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

Objection 3: Inebriation constricts reason (inebrietas ligat rationem). But it is conducive to anger (adiuvat ad iram). Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

But contrary to this: In Ethics 7 the Philosopher says, “In some sense anger follows upon an act of reason.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), anger is a desire for retribution (appetitus vindictae). But this implies an act of collating the punishment to be inflicted with the harm that has been done to one (collationem poenae infligendae ad nocumentum sibi illatum); hence, in Ethics 7 the Philosopher says, “Inferring (syllogizans) that it is necessary to fight back against such an individual, he immediately gets angry.” But collating and inferring are acts of reason (conferre et syllogizare est rationis). And so anger in some sense involves an act of reason.

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which an appetitive power can involve an act of reason (potest esse cum ratione):

In one way, when reason gives a command (cum ratione praecipiente), and it is in this way that an act of willing involves an act of reason (sic voluntas est cum ratione); this is why the will is called a ‘rational appetite’.

In the second way, when reason makes something known (cum ratione denunciante), and it is in this way that anger involves an act of reason. Hence, in De Problematis the Philosopher says, “Anger involves an act of reason not in the sense that reason commands the anger, but in the sense that it makes manifest an injury.” For the sentient appetite obeys reason by the mediation of the will and not directly.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 40, a. 3), brute animals have a natural instinct which is instilled in them by God’s reason and through which they have interior and exterior movements similar to the movements of reason.

Reply to objection 3: As Ethics 7 says, “Anger listens to reason in a certain sense,” viz., insofar as reason makes it known (nuntiat) that one has been injured, “but it does not listen perfectly,” since it does not observe the rule of reason in measuring out the retribution (in rependendo vindictam). Therefore,
anger requires an act of reason and adds an impediment to reason. Hence, in De Problematibus the Philosopher says that (a) those who are greatly inebriated, in the sense that they have nothing of reason’s judgment, do not get angry, but that (b) when they are just a little inebriated, in the sense of having reason’s judgment, though an impaired judgment, they do get angry (irascatur tamquam habentes iudicium rationis sed impeditum).

Article 5

Is anger more natural than concupiscence?

It seems that anger is not more natural than concupiscence or avid desire (ira non sit naturalior quam concupiscientia):

Objection 1: It is proper to man to be an animal that is gentle by nature. But as the Philosopher says in Rhetoric 2, “Gentleness is opposed to anger.” Therefore, anger is not more natural than concupiscence, but seems to be altogether contrary to a man’s nature.

Objection 2: Reason is divided off against nature. For we do not say that things that act in accord with reason act ‘in accord with nature’. But as Ethics 7 says, “Anger involves an act of reason, but concupiscence does not involve an act of reason.” Therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger.

Objection 3: Anger is a desire for retribution, whereas concupiscence is, more than anything, a desire for things that are pleasurable to the sense of touch, viz., food and sex. But these pleasures are more natural to a man than retribution is. Therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger.

But contrary to this: In Ethics 7 the Philosopher says, “Anger is more natural than concupiscence.”

I respond: As is clear from Physics 2, the ‘natural’ is what is caused by nature. Hence, whether a passion is more or less natural can be perceived only on the basis of its cause. Now as was explained above (q. 36, a. 2), the cause of a passion can be thought of in two ways: (a) on the part of the object, and (b) on the part of the subject.

Thus, if the causes of anger and concupiscence are considered on the part of the object, then in this sense concupiscence—and especially concupiscence with regard to food and sex—is more natural than anger, since food and sex are more natural than retribution is.

On the other hand, if the cause of anger is considered on the part of the subject, then there is one sense in which anger is more natural and another sense in which concupiscence is more natural.

For a man’s nature can be thought of either (a) in relation to the nature of the genus or (b) in relation to the nature of the species or (c) in relation to the temperament peculiar to an individual (secundum complexionem propriam individui).

Thus, if one thinks of the nature of the genus, i.e., the nature of this man insofar as he is an animal, then concupiscence is more natural than anger, since it is from the common nature itself that a man has a certain inclination toward desiring those things that conserve life either in the species or in the individual.

On the other hand, if we think of a man’s nature on the part of the species, viz., insofar as the man is rational, then anger is more natural to a man than concupiscence is, since anger involves reason more than concupiscence does. Hence, in Ethics 4 the Philosopher says, “It is more human to punish,” which pertains to anger, “than to be gentle.” For each thing naturally rises up against what is contrary to it and harmful.

Again, if one considers the nature of this individual in accord with his peculiar temperament, then anger is more natural than concupiscence, since anger follows upon the natural disposition to get angry, which is part of one’s temperament, more readily than concupiscence or any other passion follows upon
its corresponding natural disposition. For a man is disposed toward getting angry insofar as he has a choleric temperament, where, among the humors, yellow bile (cholera) is the one that moves most quickly, since it is similar to fire. And so someone who is disposed by his natural temperament toward anger gets angry more readily (magis in promptu) than someone who is disposed toward concupiscence experiences a desire (quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum quod concupiscat). This is why, in Ethics 7 the Philosopher says that anger is more easily handed down from parents to children than is concupiscence.

Reply to objection 1: In the case of a man, one can consider both the body’s natural condition, which is temperate, and reason itself.

On the part of the natural condition, a man does not by his species naturally have an excess of anger or of any other passion because of the temperament that belongs to his condition. By contrast, the other animals, insofar as they fall short of this sort of condition in the direction of a disposition to some extreme condition, are thereby naturally disposed toward the excess of some passion, in the way that a lion is disposed toward daring, a dog toward anger, a rabbit toward fear, etc.

On the part of reason, it is natural to a man both to get angry and to be gentle. For (a) reason in some sense causes anger, insofar as it makes known (nuntiat) the cause of anger, and (b) reason in some sense sedates anger, insofar as someone who is angry “does not pay complete attention to reason’s command.” This was explained above (a. 4).

Reply to objection 2: Reason itself is part of human nature. Hence, from the very fact that anger involves an act of reason it follows that it is in some sense natural to a man.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to anger and concupiscence on the part of the object.

Article 6

Is anger more grave than hatred?

It seems that anger is more grave than hatred (ira sit gravior quam odium):

Objection 1: Proverbs 27:4 says, “Anger has no mercy; nor does fury (furor) when it erupts.” But hatred is sometimes accompanied by mercy. Therefore, anger is more grave than hatred.

Objection 2: Suffering an evil and grieving over the evil (de malo dolere) is something more than simply suffering an evil. But for someone who hates another it is enough that the one whom he hates should suffer evil, whereas for someone who is angry this is not sufficient; rather, as the Philosopher points out in Rhetoric 2, he wants the other to recognize the evil and to grieve over it. Therefore, anger is more grave than hatred.

Objection 3: The greater the number of things that come together in order to constitute something, the more stable that thing seems to be; for instance, a habit that is caused by many acts is more permanent. But as was explained above (a. 1), anger, but not hatred, is caused by the concurrence of several passions. Therefore, anger is more stable and more grave than hatred.

But contrary to this: In Regula Augustine says that hatred is like “a beam,” whereas anger is like “a mote” (cf. Matthew 7:3).

I respond: The species of a passion, along with its concept (species passionis et ratio ipsius), is taken from its object.

Now the object of anger is the same in subject (idem subiecto) as the object of hatred; for just as the one who hates desires something bad for the one whom he hates, so someone who is angry desires something bad for the one whom he is angry with.

However, these objects are not the same conceptually. Instead, the one who hates desires what is
bad for his enemy insofar as it is something bad, whereas the one who is angry desires what is bad for the
one he is angry with, not insofar as it is something bad, but insofar as it has the character of something
good; for he thinks of it as something that is just, insofar as it effects retribution.

Hence, it was likewise explained above (a. 2) that hatred has to do with the application of what is bad
to what is bad, whereas anger has to do with the application of what is good to what is bad.

Now it is clear that to desire something bad under the concept just has less of the character of
badness than simply to will something bad for someone. For to will something bad for someone under
the concept just can even be in accord with the virtue of justice if it is tempered by a precept of reason,
whereas the only way that anger falls short is in not obeying the precept of reason when it exacts
retribution.

Hence, it is clear that hatred is much worse and much more grave than anger.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible things to consider in the case of anger and hatred,
viz., what is desired and the intensity of the desire.

As regards what is desired, anger has more mercy than hatred does. For since hatred desires what is
bad in its own right (malum secundum se) for another, there is no measure of badness that satisfies it. For
as the Philosopher points out in Politics 1, things that are desired in their own right are desired
without measure, in the way that an avaricious man desires wealth. Thus, Ecclesiasticus 12:16 says, “If
an enemy finds the opportunity, he will not be satisfied with blood.” By contrast, anger desires
something bad only under the concept just retribution. Thus, when the bad thing that has been inflicted
exceeds the measure of justice in the judgment of the one who is angry, at that point he has mercy.
Hence, in Rhetoric 2 the Philosopher says, “Someone who is angry will have mercy if many bad things
happen, whereas someone who hates will not have mercy on any account.”

As regards the intensity of the desire, anger tends to exclude mercy more than hatred does, since the
movement of anger is more impetuous because of the inflammation of the yellow bile. Hence, Proverbs
adds right afterwards, “Who can bear the force of a spirit roused to violence?”

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, one who is angry desires what is bad for someone
insofar as it has the character of just retribution. Now retribution is effected by inflicting a punishment.
But it is part of the nature of punishment that it is contrary to the will of the one being punished, that it is
painful, and that it is inflicted because of some fault. And so one who is angry desires that the individual
on whom he inflicts this harm should perceive it, grieve over it, and recognize that it comes to him
because of a harm inflicted on the one who is angry. By contrast, someone who hates another cares
nothing about this, since he desires what is bad for the other insofar as it is bad.

Moreover, it is not true that what someone grieves over is worse; for as the Philosopher says in
Rhetoric 2, “Even though injustice and imprudence are bad,”—still, because they are voluntary—“they
do not grieve those in whom they exist.”

Reply to objection 3: What is caused by a number of causes is more stable when the causes are of
the same type (quando causae accipiuntur unius rationis); however, it is possible for a single cause to
dominate over many others.

Now hatred stems from a more permanent cause than does anger. For anger has its source in a sort
of mental commotion (ex aliqua commotione animi) due to an inflicted injury, whereas hatred proceeds
from a disposition on a man’s part to think of what he hates as something opposed to and harmful to
himself. And so just as a passion passes away more quickly than a disposition or habit does, so anger
passes away more quickly than hatred does. (Even though hatred is likewise a passion, it proceeds from
this sort of disposition.) This is why in Rhetoric 2 the Philosopher says, “Hatred is more incurable than
anger is.”
Article 7

Is anger directed only toward individuals with respect to whom there is justice?

It seems that anger is not directed only toward individuals with respect to whom there is justice (\textit{solum sit ad illos ad quos est iustitia)}:

\textbf{Objection 1}: There is no human justice with respect to non-rational things. Yet sometimes a man is angry with non-rational things—as, e.g., when, out of anger, a writer throws his pen or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore, anger is not directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice.

\textbf{Objection 2}: As \textit{Ethics} 5 says, “There is no such thing as justice with respect to oneself or with respect to what belongs to oneself.” But sometimes a man gets angry with himself, in the way that a penitent gets angry with himself because of his sin; hence, Psalm 4:5 says, “Be angry, and do not sin.” Therefore, anger is not directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice.

\textbf{Objection 3}: There can be justice and injustice with respect to a whole genus or with respect to a whole community—as, for instance, when a city does harm to someone (\textit{cum civitas aliquem laesit}). But as the Philosopher points out in \textit{Rhetoric} 2, anger is directed only toward singular individuals and not toward any genus. Therefore, anger is not, properly speaking, directed toward those with respect to whom there is justice and injustice.

\textbf{But contrary to this} is what the Philosopher says in \textit{Rhetoric} 2.

\textbf{I respond}: As was explained above (a. 6), anger desires something bad insofar as it has the character of just retribution. And so anger is directed at those with respect to whom there is justice and injustice. For to exact retribution is something that pertains to justice, whereas to inflict harm is something that pertains to injustice. Hence, both on the part of its cause, which is an injury inflicted by another, and on the part of the retribution that is desired by the one who is angry, it is clear that anger pertains to the very same individuals with respect to whom there is justice and injustice (\textit{ad eosdem pertinet ira ad quos iustitia et iniiustitia}).

\textbf{Reply to objection 1}: As was explained above (a. 4), even though anger involves an act of reason, it can nonetheless exist in brute animals, which lack reason, to the extent that, by natural instinct, they are moved through their imagination toward something similar to the works of reason.

So, then, since in a man there is both reason and imagination, there are two ways in which the movement of anger can arise in a man:

(a) In one way, with the imagination alone making the injury known (\textit{ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem}). And in such a case a movement of anger arises even with respect to non-rational and non-living things—similar to the movement that exists in animals with respect to any sort of harm whatsoever.

(b) In the second way, with reason making the injury known. And in such a case, as the Philosopher puts it in \textit{Rhetoric} 2, “there cannot in any way be anger with respect to non-sentient things or with respect to the dead.” This is both because (a) they do not experience pain (\textit{non dolent}), which is especially what those who are angry want for those with whom they are angry, and also because (b) there is no such thing as retribution with respect to them, since they are not the sort of things that inflict injury (\textit{cum eorum non sit inuriam facere}).

\textbf{Reply to objection 2}: As the Philosopher says in \textit{Ethics} 5, “There is a sort of metaphorical justice and injustice that a man has with respect to himself,” viz., insofar as reason governs the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. Accordingly, a man can likewise be said to exact retribution from himself and, as a result, to be angry with himself. However, no one can be angry with himself properly speaking and \textit{per se}.

\textbf{Reply to objection 3}: In \textit{Rhetoric} 2 the Philosopher assigns as a difference between hatred and anger that hatred can be directed toward a genus, in the way that we hate the whole genus of thieves,
whereas anger is directed only toward something singular. The reason for this is that hatred is caused by judging a quality of a given thing to be disagreeable to our disposition, and this can be either in general or in particular. By contrast, anger is caused by someone’s injuring us through his act.

Now all acts are singulars, and so anger always has to do with something singular. And when a city as a whole wrongs us (cum tota civitas nos laeserit), then the whole city is being counted as a singular thing.

Article 8

Does Damascene correctly enumerate the species of anger?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly enumerates the three species of anger as wrath (fel), bitterness or rancor (mania), and fury or rage (furor):

Objection 1: The species of a genus are not differentiated by any accidents. But the three things in question are differentiated by accidents. For the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath (fel), whereas persistent anger (ira permanens) is called bitterness or rancor (mania), and fury or rage (furor) is anger waiting for the time of retribution. Therefore, these are not three different species of anger.

Objection 2: In De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 4 Tully says, “Nascent anger (excandescentia) is called ‘thumosis’ in Greek, and is the kind of anger that now flares up and now subsides.” But according to Damascene, thumosis is the same as fury (furor). Therefore, fury subsides with time and does not seek an opportunity for retribution.

Objection 3: In Moralia 21 Gregory posits three levels of anger, viz., “silent anger, anger with an utterance, and anger with an expressed phrase” (iram sine voce et iram cum voce et iram cum verbo expresso)—in accord with these three sayings of our Lord at Matthew 5:22: “Whoever is angry with his brother.....,” where He touches on silent anger; and afterwards He adds, “Whoever says to his brother, ‘Raca’.....,” where He touches on anger with an utterance, but not yet formulated with a full phrase; and afterwards He says, “Whoever says to his brother, ‘You fool’.....,” where the utterance is expressed with a complete phrase. Therefore, since Damascene does not say anything about utterance, his division of anger is inadequate.

But contrary to this is the authority of Damascene and of Gregory of Nyssa.

I respond: The three species of anger posited by Damascene, and also by Gregory of Nyssa, are taken from things that augment anger in some way. This happens in three ways:

(a) because of the ease of the movement itself, and he calls this sort of anger wrath (fel), because it erupts quickly;

(b) because of a sadness that causes the anger and remains for a long time in the memory, and this feature belongs to bitterness or rancor (mania), which is called mania because it remains (a manendo);

(c) because of what the one who is angry desires, viz., retribution, and this has to do with fury or rage (furor), which does not die down until it metes out the punishment.

Hence, in Ethics 4 the Philosopher calls some angry individuals ‘sharp-tempered’ (acuti) because they are quick to anger; others ‘bitter’ (amari) because they retain their anger for a long time; and others ‘obstinate’ (difficiles) because they never rest until they mete out punishment.

Reply to objection 1: Not all the features through which anger is in some way brought to completion are related to anger entirely per accidens. And so nothing prevents the species of anger from being assigned on the basis of such things.

Reply to objection 2: Nascent anger (excandescentia), which Tully posits, seems to be more relevant to the first species of anger, which is constituted (perficitur) by the quickness of the anger, than
it is to fury. But there is nothing to prevent the Greek ‘\textit{thumosis}', which corresponds to the Latin ‘\textit{furor}', from implying both things, viz., being quick to anger and being firm in the intention to punish.

\textbf{Reply to objection 3:} The grades of anger referred to here are distinct from one another as effects of anger, but they are not diverse ways of augmenting the movement of anger itself (\textit{non autem secundum diversam perfectionem ipsius motus irae}).