QUESTION 57

The Distinctions Among the Intellectual Virtues

Next we have to consider the distinctions among the virtues: first, as regards the intellectual virtues (question 56); second, as regards the moral virtues (questions 58-61); and, third, as regards the theological virtues (question 62).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Are the speculative intellectual habits virtues? (2) Are there three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding (sapientia, scientia et intellectus)? (3) Is an intellectual habit that is an art or craft (ars) a virtue? (4) Is prudence (prudentia) a virtue distinct from an art? (5) Is prudence a virtue that is necessary for a man? (6) Are good deliberation (eubulia) and two sorts of good judgment (synesis et gnome) virtues that are joined to prudence?

Article 1

Are the speculative intellectual habits virtues?

It seems that the speculative intellectual habits are not virtues:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), a virtue is a habit ordered toward an operation (est habitus operativus). But speculative habits are not ordered toward an operation (non sunt operativi), since the speculative is distinguished from the practical, i.e., from what is ordered toward an operation. Therefore, the speculative intellectual habits are not virtues.

Objection 2: Virtue is among the things by which a man is made happy or blessed, because, as Ethics 2 says, “Happiness (felicitas) is the reward of virtue.” But intellectual habits do not pay attention to human acts or the other human goods through which a man attains beatitude; instead, they pay attention to natural and divine entities. Therefore, habits of this sort cannot be called virtues.

Objection 3: Scientific knowledge (scientia) is a speculative habit. But as is clear from the Philosopher in Topics 4, scientific knowledge and virtue are posited as diverse and non-subalternate genera. Therefore, speculative habits are not virtues.

But contrary to this: Only speculative habits pay attention to necessary things that cannot be otherwise. But in Ethics 6 the Philosopher posits certain “intellectual virtues” in the part of the soul that considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise. Therefore, the speculative intellectual habits are virtues.

I respond: Since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), every virtue involves an ordering toward the good, it follows, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), that there are two ways in which a given habit is called a virtue: (a) in one way, because it effects a facility for acting well, and (b) in a second way, because, along with the facility, it also effects the good use of the facility. And this latter condition, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), applies only to those habits that have to do with the appetitive part of the soul, because it is the soul’s appetitive power that effects the use of all the powers and habits (quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus).

Therefore, since the speculative intellectual habits do not perfect the appetitive part of the soul, and since they have to do only with the intellective part and in no way with the appetitive part, it follows that while they can, to be sure, be called virtues insofar as they effect a facility for a good operation, viz., considering what is true (for this is the intellect’s good work), they are nonetheless not called virtues in the second way, i.e., in the sense that they bring it about that one uses the power or habit well. For one is not inclined to use a habit of speculative scientific knowledge by the fact that he has the habit; rather, his making use of the scientific knowledge that he has stems from the will’s moving him (sed quod utatur scientia habita hoc est movente voluntate).

And so a virtue that perfects the will, e.g., charity or justice, also makes it use speculative habits of
this sort well. Accordingly, there can likewise be merit in the acts of these speculative habits if they are
done out of charity—just as Gregory says in Moralia 6: “The contemplative life is of greater merit than
the active.”

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two sorts of works, exterior and interior. Thus, the practical or
operative, which is divided off from the speculative, is taken from the exterior work, toward which a
speculative habit has no ordering. Nevertheless, it does have an ordering toward the intellect’s interior
work, which is to theorize about what is true (*speculari verum*). And in this sense it is a habit ordered
toward an operation (*habitus operativus*).

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which a virtue ‘has to do with something’ (*virtus est
aliquorum dupliciter*):

In one way, a virtue has to do with its objects (*sicut obiectorum*). And in this sense the speculative
virtues do not have to do with the things through which a man is made blessed—except, perhaps, insofar
as the preposition ‘through’ expresses the efficient cause or the object of complete beatitude, viz., God,
who is the highest object of speculative knowledge (*quod est summum speculabile*).

In a second way, a virtue is said to have to do with its acts (*sicut actuum*). And in this sense the
intellectual virtues have to do with those things through which a man is made blessed—both because (a)
the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as has been explained, and also because (b) they constitute a
certain beginning of perfect beatitude, which, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 7), consists in the
contemplation of what is true.

**Reply to objection 3:** Scientific knowledge is divided off from virtue taken in the second sense
explained above, which belongs to the appetitive power.

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**Article 2**

Is it appropriate to distinguish three speculative intellectual virtues, viz.,
wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding?

It seems that it is inappropriate to distinguish three speculative intellectual virtues, viz.,
wisdom (*sapientia*), scientific knowledge (*scientia*), and understanding (*intellectus*):

**Objection 1:** A species should not be divided off at the same level as its genus (*species non debet
condividi generi*). But as *Ethics* 6 says, wisdom is a certain sort of scientific knowledge. Therefore, in
the enumeration of the intellectual virtues, wisdom should not be divided off at the same level as
scientific knowledge.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 54, a. 2 and *ST* 1, q. 77, a. 3), in the case of
the distinction among powers, habits, and acts, which corresponds to their objects, one pays attention
mainly to the distinction that corresponds to the formal conception of their objects (*quae est secundum
rationem formalem obiectorum*). Therefore, diverse habits should be distinguished by the formal
character of their objects and not by their material objects. Now a principle of demonstration is the
formal characteristic by which one knows conclusions scientifically (*principium demonstrationis est
ratio sciendi conclusiones*). Therefore, the understanding of the principles (*intellectus principiorum*)
should not be posited as a habit or virtue distinct from the scientific knowledge of the conclusions.

**Objection 3:** An intellectual virtue is one that by its essence exists in the rational power itself. But
just as reason, including speculative reason, reasons discursively by forming demonstrative syllogisms
(*rationcinatur syllogizando demonstrative*), so too it reasons discursively by forming dialectical
syllogisms (*syllogizando dialectice*). Therefore, just as having scientific knowledge (*scientia*), which is
caused by a demonstrative syllogism, is posited as a speculative intellectual virtue, so, too, holding an
opinion (*opinio*) is likewise a speculative intellectual virtue.
But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher posits just three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), a speculative intellectual virtue is a virtue by which the speculative intellect is perfected in its consideration of what is true; for this is what its good work is.

Now what is true can be considered in two ways: (a) insofar as it is known in its own right (*per se notum*), and (b) insofar as it is known through something else (*per aliud notum*).

Now what is *known in its own right* has the status of a starting point or principle (*se habet ut principium*), and it is perceived immediately by the intellect. And so the habit that perfects the intellect with respect to the consideration of this sort of truth is called understanding (*intellectus*), which is a habit with respect to principles.

On the other hand, a truth that is *known through something else* is not perceived immediately (*non statim percipitur*) by the intellect, but is instead perceived through reason’s inquiry, and so it has the status of an endpoint or terminus (*se habet in ratione termini*). Now there are two ways in which it can be a terminus: (a) insofar as it is *ultimate in some particular genus*, or (b) insofar as it is *ultimate with respect to the whole of human cognition*.

And since, as *Physics* 1 says, “Those things that are known later to us are prior and more known by their nature (*secundum naturam*), it follows that what is ultimate with respect to the whole of human cognition is what is first and maximally knowable by its nature (*secundum naturam*). And this is what wisdom (*sapientia*) is about, since, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, it is wisdom that considers the highest causes. Hence, it is appropriate for wisdom to pass judgment on and order all things, since perfect and universal judgment can be had only by tracing things back to their first causes (*non nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas*).

By contrast, it is scientific knowledge (*scientia*) that perfects the intellect with respect to what is ultimate in this or that genus of knowable things (*in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium*). And so there are diverse habits of scientific knowledge corresponding to the diverse genera of knowable things (*secundum diversa genera scibilium*), whereas wisdom is only unitary (*non sit nisi una*).

Reply to objection 1: Wisdom is a certain sort of scientific knowledge (*sapientia est quaedam scientia*), since it has what is common to all types of scientific knowledge, viz., that it demonstrates conclusions from principles. But because it has something proper over and beyond all the other types of scientific knowledge, viz., that it passes judgment on all of them—not only with respect to their conclusions but even with respect to their first principles—it follows that it has the character of a virtue that is more perfect than scientific knowledge.

Reply to objection 2: When the formal conception of an object (*ratio obiecti*) is referred to a power or habit under a single act, then in such a case the habits or powers are not distinguished into a formal conception of the object and a material object. For instance, it belongs to one and the same power of sight both to see a color and to see the light-source (*lumen*), where the light-source (*lumen*) is the formal reason for seeing the color (*ratio videndi colorem*) and is seen along with the color.

By contrast, the principles of a demonstration can be considered separately without considering the conclusions. They can, in addition, be considered along with the conclusions insofar as the principles lead to the conclusions (*prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur*). Thus, to consider the principles in this second way belongs to scientific knowledge, whereas to consider the principles in their own right (*secundum seipsa*) belongs to understanding.

Hence, if one thinks correctly about the three virtues in question, they are not distinguished from one another in exactly the same way (*ex aequo*); rather, they are distinguished by a certain ordering, as happens in the case of potential wholes, one part of which is more perfect than another—in the way that the rational soul is more perfect than the sentient soul and the sentient soul is more perfect than the vegetative soul. For in this way scientific knowledge depends on understanding as on what is more
important (sicut a principaliori). And both of them depend on wisdom as on that which is most important (sicut a principalissimo) and which contains under itself both understanding and scientific knowledge, insofar as it passes judgment both on the conclusions of the types of scientific knowledge and on the principles of those same types of scientific knowledge.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 55, aa. 3 and 4), the habit of a virtue is related in a determinate way to what is good, but is not in any way related to what is bad. Now the intellect’s good is what is true, whereas what is bad for it is what is false. Hence, the only intellectual habits that are called virtues are those that always express what is true and never what is false.

By contrast, holding an opinion (opinio) and having a suspicion (suspicio) can be true or false. And so, as Ethics 6 says, they are not intellectual virtues.

**Article 3**

**Is an art or craft an intellectual virtue?**

It seems that an art or craft (ars) is not an intellectual virtue:

**Objection 1:** In De Libero Arbitrio Augustine says, “No one uses a virtue badly.” But some craftsmen use their art badly, since a craftsman is able to act badly in accord with the knowledge of his art. Therefore, an art is not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** There is no virtue that belongs to a virtue. But as Ethics 6 says, “Some virtue belongs to an art.” Therefore, an art is not a virtue.

**Objection 3:** The liberal arts (artes liberales) are more excellent than the mechanical arts (artes mechanicae). But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if an art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be numbered among the speculative virtues.

**But contrary to this:** In Ethics 6 the Philosopher claims that an art is a virtue, and yet he does not number art among the speculative virtues, whose subject he claims to be the scientific part of the soul.

I respond: An art or craft (ars) is nothing other than right reason concerning certain works to be made (ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum). Yet the good of those works consists not in the human appetite’s being disposed in a certain way, but rather in the work that is made being itself good in its own right. For what is relevant to a craftsman’s praiseworthiness insofar as he is a craftsman is not the sort of act of willing by which he makes his work (non qua voluntate opus faciat), but the quality of the work which he makes (quale sit opus quod facit).

So, then, an art is, properly speaking, a habit directed toward a work (habitus operativus); and yet an art shares something in common with the speculative habits, since it is likewise relevant to the speculative habits themselves how it stands with the things which they are considering and not how the human appetite is disposed toward those things. For when a geometer is demonstrating a truth, it does not matter what the condition of the appetitive part of his soul is (non refert qualiter se habeat secundum appetitivam partem), e.g., whether he is cheerful or angry—in the same way that, as has been explained, this does not matter in the case of the craftsman.

And so an art has the character of a virtue in the same way that a speculative habit does. More specifically, an art or a speculative habit makes a work good only as regards the facility for acting well and not as regards use, which is what is proper to a virtue that perfects the appetite.

**Reply to objection 1:** When someone who has an art makes a bad artifact, this is not a work of the art or craft—indeed, it is contrary to the art. Likewise, when someone who has scientific knowledge of the truth engages in deception instead, what he says is contrary to his scientific knowledge and not in accord with his scientific knowledge. Hence, as has been explained, an art is always related to the good in the same way that scientific knowledge is, and this is why it is called a virtue.
Still, it falls short of the complete concept of a virtue because it does not bring about good use itself; for this, something else is required, even though the good use could not exist in the absence of the art.

**Reply to objection 2:** In order that a man might make good use of an art that he possesses, what is required is a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; this is why the Philosopher claims that virtue belongs to an art, viz., moral virtue, insofar as some moral virtue is required for the good use of the art. For it is clear that it is through justice, which makes the will upright, that a craftsman is inclined to do his work reliably.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even in the case of the objects of the speculative intellect themselves (*etiam in ipsis speculabilibus*) there is something in the manner of a work, e.g., the construction of a syllogism or of an appropriate expression, or a work of enumerating or measuring. And so any speculative habits that are ordered toward those sorts of works of reason are called ‘arts’ because of a certain similarity—though they are called ‘liberal arts’ (*artes liberales*) in order to differentiate them from those arts which are ordered toward works exercised through the body and which are in some sense ‘servile’ arts, insofar as the body is subject as a servant to the soul, and insofar as a man is free (*liber*) because of the soul. By contrast, those types of scientific knowledge that are not ordered toward any work of this sort are called scientific knowledge absolutely speaking and not arts (*scientiae simpliciter, non autem artes*).

And it is not necessary that if the liberal arts are more noble, the concept *art* should apply to them to a higher degree.

**Article 4**

**Is prudence a virtue distinct from an art?**

It seems that prudence is not a virtue distinct from an art:

**Objection 1:** An art is right reason with respect to certain works. But diverse genera of works do not make anything lose the character of an art, since there are diverse arts with respect to very diverse works. Therefore, since prudence likewise is a type of right reason with respect to works, it seems that it should likewise be called an art.

**Objection 2:** Prudence shares more in common with an art than do the speculative habits, since, as *Ethics* 6 says, both prudence and art “have to do with what can be otherwise.” But certain speculative habits are called arts. Therefore, *a fortiori*, prudence should be called an art.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 6 says, “It belongs to prudence to deliberate well.” But as *Ethics* 3 points out, in the case of some arts it is likewise possible to deliberate, e.g., in the case of military art, and the art of governing, and the art of medicine. Therefore, prudence is not distinct from an art.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art.

**I respond:** Where one finds diverse conceptions of virtue, it is necessary to distinguish the virtues. Now it was explained above (a. 1 and q. 56, a. 3) that some habits have the character of a virtue solely from the fact that they confer a *facility* for a good work, whereas other habits have the character of a virtue from the fact that they confer not only a facility for a good work, but also the *use* [of that facility].

Now an art confers only a facility for a good work, since it does not involve the appetite (*non respicit appetitum*). By contrast, prudence effects not only a facility for a good work, but also use, since it does involve the appetite insofar as it presupposes uprightness of appetite. The reason for the difference is that art is right reason with respect to what can be *made* (*recta ratio factibilium*), whereas prudence is right reason with respect to what can be *done* (*recta ratio agibilium*). Now making (*facere*) and doing (*agere*) differ from one another in the sense that, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, making (*factio*) is a transient act on an exterior matter, e.g., building, cutting, etc., whereas doing (*agere*) is an act that
remains within the agent himself, e.g., seeing, willing, etc. So, then, prudence is related to human acts of this latter sort, which are the use of powers and habits, in the same way that art is related to exterior makings, since both are reason perfected with respect to the things to which they are related.

Now in speculative matters reason’s perfection and rectitude depend on the principles from which reason constructs syllogisms—just as it has been explained (a. 2) that scientific knowledge (scientia) depends upon understanding (intellectus), which is a habit with respect to the principles, and presupposes understanding. And, as Ethics 7 claims, in the case of human acts the ends are like the principles in speculative matters. And so what is required for prudence, which is right reason with respect to what can be done, is that the man be well-disposed with respect to the ends, and this is effected by an upright appetite.

Now the good of artifacts is the good of the things that are made themselves (bonum ipsorum operum artificialium) and not the good of the human appetite, and so an art does not presuppose an upright appetite. This is why a craftsman who makes a mistake on purpose (volens peccat) is praised more than a craftsman who makes a mistake unwittingly (nolens peccat). By contrast, it is more contrary to prudence for someone to sin wittingly rather than unwittingly (magis contra prudentiam quod aliquis peccat volens quam nolens). For uprightness of will is part of the nature of prudence, but not part of the nature of an art (est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de ratione artis).

So, then, it is clear that prudence is a virtue distinct from an art.

Reply to objection 1: The diverse genera of things made by art (diversa genera artificialium) all exist outside of a man, and so the character of a virtue is not diversified by them. But prudence is right reason with respect to human acts themselves, and, as has been explained, this is the way in which the character of virtue is diversified from art.

Reply to objection 2: Prudence shares more in common with an art than the speculative habits do as regards their subject and matter. For both prudence and art exist in the part of the soul that deals with opinions (utrumque est in opinativa parte animae), and both of them have to do with what can be otherwise.

On the other hand, as has been explained (above and a. 3), art shares more in common with the speculative habits than with reason as far as the nature of a virtue is concerned.

Reply to objection 3: Prudence effects good deliberation about what pertains to a man’s whole life and to the ultimate end of human life. But in some of the arts there is deliberation with respect to what pertains to the proper ends of those arts. Hence, insofar as certain individuals deliberate well about matters of war or about nautical matters, they are called prudent leaders or prudent ship-captains—but not prudent absolutely speaking. Rather, only those who deliberate well about what makes up a whole life are called prudent absolutely speaking.

Article 5

Is prudence a virtue that is necessary for living well?

It seems that prudence is not a virtue that is necessary for living well:

Objection 1: Prudence is related to what can be done, in accord with which a man’s whole life is taken into account, in the same way that an art is related to what can be made; for art is right reason with respect to the latter and, as Ethics 6 says, prudence is right reason with respect to what can be done. But an art is necessary in the case of what can be made only in order for the things to come into existence, and not after they have been made. Therefore, prudence is not necessary for a man to live well after he has become virtuous; rather, it is perhaps necessary only with respect to his becoming virtuous.

Objection 2: As Ethics 6 says, “It is prudence by which we deliberate well.” But a man can act
not only on his own good counsel but also on someone else’s good counsel. Therefore, for living well it is not necessary that a man himself have prudence; instead, it is sufficient that he follow the counsel of prudent individuals.

**Objection 3:** An intellectual virtue is a virtue by which it is possible always to say what is true and never what is false. But this does not seem to be possible in the case of prudence; for it is not human never to make a mistake in deliberating about what to do, since human actions are such that they could be otherwise. Hence, Wisdom 9:14 says, “The thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.” Therefore, it seems that prudence should not be posited as an intellectual virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In Wisdom 8:7 prudence is enumerated with the other virtues necessary for human life when it says of divine wisdom: “She teaches temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such that men can have nothing more useful in life.”

**I respond:** Prudence is a virtue that is necessary to the highest degree for human life. For to live well consists in acting well (in bene operari). But in order for someone to act well, what is important is not only what he does but also how he does it, viz., that he act in accord with a correct choice (secundum electionem rectam) and not just out of impulse or passion.

Now since the act of choosing (electio) has to do with the means to an end, two things are required for a correct choice, viz., (a) a fitting end and (b) what is appropriately ordered toward the fitting end. Now a man is appropriately disposed toward a fitting end by the sort of virtue which perfects the appetitive part of the soul, the object of which is the good and the end. On the other hand, a man has to be directly disposed by a habit of reason toward what is appropriately ordered toward a fitting end, since deliberating and choosing, which have to do with the means to an end, are acts of reason.

And so it is necessary for there to exist in reason some intellectual virtue by which reason is perfected with respect to being appropriately related to the means to an end. And this virtue is prudence. Hence, prudence is a virtue necessary for living well.

**Reply to objection 1:** The good of an art is thought of as existing not in the craftsman himself, but rather in the artifact itself, since an art is right reason with respect to what can be made. For the making, which passes into an exterior matter, is a perfection not of the one who makes the artifact but of the artifact that is made, in the way that a movement is the actuality of a thing that can be moved—though art has to do with what can be made.

By contrast, the good of prudence exists in the very agent whose perfection is the acting itself, for as has been explained (a. 4), prudence is right reason with respect to things that can done. And so what is required for an art is not that the craftsman should act well, but that he should make a good work. Indeed, if it were proper to the artifacts to act rather than to be acted upon (for they do not have dominion over their acts), it would rather be required that the artifact itself should act well, e.g., that the knife should carve well or that the saw should cut well.

This is why a craftsman’s art or craft is not necessary in order for him to live well himself; rather, it is necessary only in order for him to make good artifacts and to conserve them. By contrast, prudence is necessary in order for a man to live well and not only for him to become good.

**Reply to objection 2:** When a man acts well not in accord with his own reason but insofar as he is moved by someone else’s counsel, his action is not yet altogether perfect as regards his reason directing him and his appetite moving him. Hence, if he does something good, he is not acting well, i.e., living well, absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Ethics 6 says, ‘the truth of practical reason’ (verum intellectus practici) is understood in a way different from ‘the truth of speculative reason’. For ‘the truth of speculative reason’ is understood through a conformity of the intellect to the thing. And since the intellect can be infallibly conformed to the things only in necessary matters and not in contingent matters, it follows that only a speculative habit with respect to necessary matters—and no speculative habit with respect to contingent matters—is an intellectual virtue.
By contrast, ‘the truth of the practical intellect’ is understood through a conformity to an upright appetite. This sort of conformity has no place in the case of necessary matters, which are not effected by the human will; instead, it has a place only in the case of contingent matters that we are able to effect, whether they be interior actions or exterior things that can be made. And so virtues of the practical intellect are posited only with respect to contingent things, viz., art with respect to what can be made and prudence with respect to what can be done.

**Article 6**

Are good deliberation (**eubulia**), and two sorts of good judgment (**synesis** and **gnome**) appropriately joined to prudence?

It seems that good deliberation (**eubulia**) and two sorts of good judgment (**synesis** and **gnome**) are not appropriately joined to prudence:

**Objection 1:** As Ethics 6 says, **eubulia** is a habit by which we deliberate well. But as it says in the same book, it belongs to prudence to deliberate well. Therefore, **eubulia** is not a virtue joined to prudence, but is instead prudence itself.

**Objection 2:** It belongs to what is higher to pass judgment on what is lower. Therefore, the virtue whose act is judgment seems to be the highest. But **synesis** is what judges well. Therefore, good judgment is not a virtue joined to prudence but is rather itself the main virtue.

**Objection 3:** Just as there are diverse matters that have to be judged, so, too, there are diverse matters that have to be deliberated about. But a single virtue, viz., **eubulia**, is posited with respect to all matters that can be deliberated about. Therefore, in order to judge well about things to be done, it is unnecessary to posit, besides **synesis**, another virtue, viz. **gnome**.

**Objection 4:** In Rhetorica Tully posits three parts of prudence, viz., “memory of things past (**memoria praeteritorum**), understanding of things present (**intelligentia praesentium**), and foresight with respect to things future (**providentia futurorum**).” In Super Somnium Scipionis Macrobius posits, in addition, certain other parts of prudence, viz., “caution (**cautio**), docility (**docilitas**),” and others of this sort. Therefore, the virtues under discussion do not seem to be the only virtues joined to prudence.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethics 6, where he claims that the three virtues under discussion are joined to prudence.

**I respond:** Among all ordered powers, the power that is more principal is the one that is ordered toward the act that is more principal.

Now there are three acts of reason with respect to actions: first, to deliberate (**consiliari**); second, to judge (**iudicare**); and third, to command (**praecipere**). The first two correspond to two acts of the speculative intellect, viz., to inquire (**inquirere**) and to pass judgment (**iudicare**); for deliberation is a certain sort of inquiry. But the third act is proper to the practical intellect, insofar as it is ordered toward action (**est operativus**), since reason does not have to command what cannot be done by a man.

Now it is clear that in the case of those things that are done by a man, the main act is to command, and the others are ordered toward it. And so to the virtue, viz., prudence, that involves commanding well as its main act, one adds **eubulia**, which is good deliberating, and **synesis** and **gnome**, which are the parts having to with judging, as secondary virtues. (The distinction between **synesis** and **gnome** will be explained in a moment.)

**Reply to objection 1:** Prudence involves deliberating well (**est bene consiliativa**) not in the sense that its act is directly to deliberate well, but in the sense that it perfects the act of deliberating by the mediation of a virtue that is subject to it, viz., good deliberating (**eubulia**).

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of things to be done, judgment is ordered toward something
further. For it is possible to make a good judgment about what is to be done and yet not to execute that judgment correctly. Rather, the ultimate fulfillment is reached when reason has commanded well with respect to what is to be done.

Reply to objection 3: A judgment regarding a given thing is made through its proper principles. But an inquiry is not made through the thing’s proper principles, since once those principles are had, then there is no need for inquiry, but the matter has already been figured out (iam res esset inventa). And so just one virtue is ordered toward deliberating well, whereas two virtues are ordered toward judging well, since the distinction between the latter lies not in the common principles, but instead within the proper principles. Likewise, in speculative matters there is a single sort of dialectical inquiry about all things, whereas the demonstrative sciences, which pass judgment, are diverse with respect to diverse things.

Now synesis and gnome are distinguished from one another by the diverse rules by which they judge. For synesis passes judgment about what has to be done in accord with ordinary law (secundum communem legem), whereas gnome passes judgment in accord with natural reason itself in cases in which ordinary law falls short. This will be explained more fully below (ST 2-2, q. 51, a. 4).

Reply to objection 4: Memory, understanding, and foresight—and, likewise, caution, docility and other things of this sort—are not virtues distinct from prudence, but are in some sense related to prudence as integral parts, insofar as they are all required for the perfection of prudence. There are also certain subjective parts, or species, of prudence, e.g., economic prudence, kingly prudence, etc. But the three virtues under discussion here are, as it were, potential parts of prudence, since they are ordered toward prudence in the way that what is secondary is related to what is principal. More will be said about this below (ST 2-2, qq. 48ff.).