QUESTION 60

An Angel's Love or Affection

We next have to consider the act of the will, which is love, i.e., affection (amor sive dilectio). For every act of an appetitive power stems from love, i.e., affection. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Do angels have natural love? (2) Do angels have elective love? (3) Is it with natural love or elective love that an angel loves himself? (4) Does an angel love another angel as himself with natural love? (5) Does an angel love God more than himself with natural love?

Article 1

Do angels have natural love or affection?

It seems that angels do not have natural love or affection:

Objection 1: As is clear from Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, natural love is contrasted with intellectual love. But an angel’s love is intellectual love. Therefore, it is not natural love.

Objection 2: Things that love with a natural love do not so much act as they are acted upon, since nothing has control over its own nature. But angels act and are not acted upon, since, as has been shown (q. 59, a. 3), they have free choice. Therefore, angels do not have natural love or affection.

Objection 3: Every affection is either upright or not upright. Now upright affection involves charity, whereas affection that is not upright involves wickedness. But neither charity nor wickedness pertains to nature; for charity is supernatural, whereas wickedness is contrary to nature. Therefore, angels do not have natural affection.

But contrary to this: Love follows upon cognition, since, as Augustine says in De Trinitate 10, nothing is loved unless it is known. But angels have natural cognition. Therefore, they also have natural love.

I respond: One must posit a natural love in the angels. To see this clearly, notice that what is prior is always preserved in what is posterior to it. But nature is prior to intellect, since the nature of each thing is its essence. Hence, that which belongs to nature has to be preserved even in entities that have an intellect.

Now it is common to every nature to have a certain inclination that constitutes its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found in diverse ways in diverse natures and in each according to its own mode. Hence, in an intellectual nature there is a natural inclination in the will, whereas in a sentient nature there is a natural inclination in the sentient appetite, and in a nature that lacks cognition there is only the nature’s being ordered toward something.

Hence, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.

Reply to objection 1: Intellectual love is distinguished from a natural love that is merely natural in the sense that merely natural love belongs to a nature that does not have, over and beyond the notion of a nature, the additional perfection of the senses or the intellect.

Reply to objection 2: All the things that exist in the whole world are acted upon by something—except the first agent, which acts in such a way that it is not in any sense acted upon by another and in which nature and will are the same. And so there is nothing inappropriate about an angel’s being acted upon, given that his natural inclination is instilled in him by the author of his nature. And yet he is not acted upon in such a way that he does not also act. For he has free will.

Reply to objection 3: Just as a natural cognition is always true, so too a natural affection is always upright. For natural love is nothing other than an inclination instilled in the nature by the author of the nature. Therefore, to say that a natural inclination is not upright is to disparage the author of the nature.
However, the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue, since the latter rectitude is perfective of the former. It is likewise in this same way that the truth of a natural cognition is different from the truth of an infused or acquired cognition.

Article 2

Do angels have elective love?

It seems that the angels do not have elective love (dilectio electiva):

Objection 1: Elective love seems to be rational love (amor rationalis), since the act of choosing (electio) follows upon deliberation, which, as Ethics 3 says, consists in inquiry. But rational love is contrasted with intellectual love, which, as De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4 says, is proper to the angels. Therefore, angels do not have elective love.

Objection 2: Over and beyond infused cognition, the angels have only natural cognition, since they do not reason from principles in order to reach conclusions. And so they are related to all the things that they can have cognition of naturally in just the way that our intellect is related to the first principles that we ourselves can have cognition of naturally. But, as has been pointed out (a. 1), love follows upon cognition. Therefore, over and beyond the love that stems from grace, angels have only natural love. Therefore, they do not have elective love.

But contrary to this: We neither gain merit nor lose merit by what is natural. But angels gain or lose merit by their love. Therefore, they have elective love.

I respond: Angels have both natural love and elective love. Their natural love is the principle of their elective love, since that which pertains to what is prior always has the nature of a principle. Hence, since the nature is what is first in each thing, what belongs to the nature must be the principle in each thing.

This is obvious in man both with respect to his intellect and with respect to his will. For the intellect has cognition of the principles naturally, and this cognition is a cause of a man’s knowledge (scientia) of the conclusions, which the man does not have cognition of naturally but comes to have cognition of through discovery or teaching. Similarly, as Physics 2 points out, the end plays the same role in the case of the will that the principles play in the case of the intellect. Hence, the will naturally tends toward its own ultimate end. For every man naturally desires beatitude. And this natural act of will is a cause of all other acts of will, since a man wills whatever he wills for the sake of the end. Thus, a man’s natural love is the love of that good which he naturally wills as his end, whereas his elective love, derived from this natural love, is the love of a good that is loved for the sake of that end.

However, there is a difference here between the intellect and the will. For as was explained above (q. 59, a. 2), the intellect’s cognition occurs insofar as what the cognition is of exists in the one who has the cognition. And because of the imperfection of man’s intellectual nature, his intellect does not by nature immediately possess all of its intelligible objects, but instead has only some of them immediately and from these it moves in some way to the others. By contrast, the act of an appetitive power involves the ordering of the one who desires toward the things themselves. Certain of these things are good in themselves (secundum se) and so are desirable in themselves, whereas others have the nature of goodness because of their relation to something else and are desirable because of that something else. Hence, it is not because of any imperfection on the part of the one who desires that he should desire one thing naturally as his end and another thing by choice insofar as it is ordered toward that end. Therefore, since angels have a perfect intellectual nature, they have only natural cognition and not discursive cognition, and yet they have both natural love and elective love.
Now what has been said so far leaves out things that are supernatural to the angels, since their nature is not a sufficient principle of those things. More will be said below (q. 62) about such things.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every sort of elective love is rational love in the sense in which rational love is contrasted with intellectual love. For love is called rational when it follows upon discursive cognition and, as was explained above when we were discussing free choice (q. 59, a. 3), not every act of choosing follows upon discursive reasoning; only a man’s act of choosing does. Hence, the objection does not go through.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply to the second objection is clear from what has been said.

**Article 3**

**Does an angel love himself with both natural love and elective love?**

It seems that an angel does not love himself with both natural love and elective love:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 2), natural love is directed toward the end itself, whereas elective love is directed toward what is ordered toward the end. But the same thing cannot, in the same respect, be both the end and what is ordered toward the end. Therefore, natural love and elective love cannot be directed toward the same thing.

**Objection 2:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Love is a uniting and bonding power.” But uniting and bonding apply to diverse things that are made one. Therefore, an angel cannot love himself.

**Objection 3:** Love is a certain movement. But every movement tends toward another. Therefore, it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural love or elective love.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, “Friendship with another stems from friendship with oneself.”

**I respond:** Since, as is clear from *Ethics* 1, love is directed toward a good, and since a good is either a substantival good or an accidental good, it follows that something may be loved in one of two ways: either (a) as a subsistent good or (b) as an accidental or inhering good. What is loved as a subsistent good is loved in such a way that someone wills the good for it, whereas what is loved as an accidental or inhering good is loved in such a way that it is desired for the other, in the way that knowledge is loved not in order that it itself might be good, but rather in order that it might be possessed by someone. This second type of love is called the love of concupiscence by some, whereas the first type is called the love of friendship.

Now it is clear that each thing that lacks cognition desires naturally to attain what is good for itself; for instance, fire seeks a higher place. Hence, an angel or a man naturally desires his own good and his own perfection; and this is what it is to love oneself. Hence, an angel or a man loves himself by nature, since he desires some good for himself by a natural desire.

On the other hand, to the extent that an angel or a man desires some good for himself by choice, he loves himself with elective love.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, it is not in the same respect, but rather in diverse respects, that an angel or a man loves himself with natural love and loves himself with elective love.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as being one with something is more than simply being united with it, so there is more oneness in love directed toward oneself than there is in love directed toward other things that are united to oneself.

However, the reason why Dionysius used the names ‘uniting’ and ‘bonding’ was in order to show
that love for other things derives from love for oneself, just as being united is derived from being one.

Reply to objection 3: Just as love is an action that remains within the agent, so too it is a movement that remains within the lover. Moreover, this movement does not necessarily tend toward something else, but can instead be reflected back on the lover in order that he might love himself. In the same way, cognition is also reflected back on the one having the cognition in order that he might have cognition of himself.

Article 4

Does an angel love another angel as himself with natural love?

It seems that an angel does not love another angel as himself with natural love:

Objection 1: Love follows upon cognition. But one angel does not have cognition of another angel as of himself, since, as was explained above, (q. 56, aa. 1 and 2), he has cognition of himself through his own essence, whereas he has cognition of another angel through a likeness of that angel. Therefore, it seems that one angel does not love another angel as himself.

Objection 2: A cause is more powerful than what it causes, and a principle is more powerful than what is derived from that principle. But as the Philosopher says in Ethics 9, a love that is directed toward another is derived from the love that is directed toward oneself. Therefore, an angel does not love another angel as himself; instead, he loves himself more.

Objection 3: Natural love is directed toward something as an end, and it cannot be removed. But it is not the case that one angel is the end of another angel; in addition, the love of one angel for another can be removed, as is clear in the case of the demons, who do not love the good angels. Therefore, one angel does not love another angel as himself with natural love.

But contrary to this: What is found in all things, even in things that lack reason, seems to be natural. But Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, “Every beast loves its like.” Therefore, one angel naturally loves another angel as himself.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), an angel or a man naturally loves himself. Now what is one with a thing is that very thing itself, and so each thing loves that which is one with it. If that thing is one with it through a natural union, then it loves it with natural love, whereas if it is one with it through a non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. For instance, a man loves his fellow citizen with the love that is a political virtue, whereas he loves his blood relative with natural love, since he is one with his blood relative in the principle of natural generation.

Now it is clear that what is one with something in species or genus is one with him in nature. And so each thing loves with natural love that which is one with him in species, since it loves its own species. This is obvious even in the case of things that lack cognition; for instance, a fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another—which communication is its good—in just the same way that it has a natural inclination to seek its own good, viz., being high up.

So, then, one should claim that one angel loves another angel with natural love insofar as he shares a nature with him. However, it is not the case that he loves another angel with natural love insofar as he shares other things with him or, again, insofar as he differs from him in other things.

Reply to objection 1: In one sense, the phrase “as himself” can modify the cognition (or the love) with respect to the thing that the cognition is of (or that is loved). And in this sense an angel knows another as himself because he knows that the other exists, just as he knows that he himself exists.

In a second sense, the phrase “as himself” modifies the cognition (or love) with respect to the one
who has the cognition (or who is loving). And in this sense it is not the case that one angel knows another angel as himself, since he knows himself through his own essence, whereas he does not know the other through the other’s own essence. Similarly, he does not love the other as himself, since he loves himself through his own will, whereas he does not love the other through the other’s own will.

**Reply to objection 2:** The particle ‘as’ implies similarity and not equality. For since natural love is based upon natural oneness, that which is one with him to a lesser degree is such that he naturally loves it less. Hence, he naturally loves that which is numerically one with him to a greater degree than he loves what is one with him only in species or in genus. On the other hand, it is natural that he should have a love for the other that is similar to his love for himself in the sense that just as he loves himself insofar as he wills the good for himself, so he loves the other insofar as he wills the other’s good.

**Reply to objection 3:** Natural love is said to be directed toward the end itself not in the sense that one wills the good for the end, but in the sense that he wills the end as a good for himself and, consequently, as a good for another insofar as that other is one with him.

Moreover, this natural love cannot be removed even from the bad angels in the sense that it would not be the case that they have a natural love for other angels insofar as they share their nature with them. However, they do hate the good angels insofar as they differ from them with respect to uprightness (*iustitia*) and wickedness (*iniustitia*).

**Article 5**

**Does an angel love God more than himself with natural love?**

It seems that an angel does not love God more than himself with natural love:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 4), natural love is based on natural union. But God’s nature is maximally distant from an angel’s nature. Therefore, an angel loves God less than himself with natural love—and even less than he loves another angel.

**Objection 2:** That for the sake of which each thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such. But it is for his own sake that each one loves another with natural love, since everything is such that it loves a thing insofar as that thing is good for it. Therefore, an angel does not love God more than himself with natural love.

**Objection 3:** Nature reflects back on itself; for we see that every agent acts naturally to conserve itself. But nature would not reflect back on itself if it tended toward another more than it tends toward itself. Therefore, an angel does not love God more than himself with natural love.

**Objection 4:** It seems proper to charity that someone should love God more than himself. But the love of charity is not natural in angels; instead, as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 12, the love of charity is “poured into their hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to them.” Therefore, angels do not love God more than themselves with natural love.

**Objection 5:** Natural love always remains as long as the nature remains. But to love God more than oneself does not remain in an angel or a man who sins. For as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, “The two loves created two cities. Specifically, the love of oneself even to the point of contempt for God created the earthly city, whereas the love of God even to the point of contempt for oneself created the heavenly city.” Therefore, it is not natural to love God above oneself (*supra seipsum*).

**But contrary to this:** All the moral precepts of the Law belong to the natural law. But the precept to love God above oneself is a moral precept of the Law. Therefore, it belongs to the natural law. Therefore, an angel loves God above himself with natural love.
I respond: Some have claimed that (a) by natural love an angel loves God more than himself both with a love of concupiscence, since he desires the divine good for himself more than his own good, and in some sense with a love of friendship, insofar as an angel naturally wills for God a greater good than he wills for himself, since he naturally wills that God should be God and that he himself should have his own proper nature, but that (b), absolutely speaking, by natural love an angel loves himself more than God in the sense that he loves himself more intensely and more principally than he loves God.

However, the falsity of this opinion is obvious if one considers, in the case of natural things, what such things are naturally moved toward. For the natural inclination of the things that lack reason is an indication of the natural inclination of an intellectual nature’s will. Now among natural things, each thing that by its very nature belongs to another is such that it is inclined more principally and more intensely toward that to which it belongs than toward itself. This natural inclination is clear from things that are naturally acted upon. For as Physics 2 says, each thing is acted upon in just the way that it is naturally apt to be acted upon. For instance, we see that a part naturally exposes itself for the sake of conserving the whole, in the way that a hand is exposed to a blow without deliberation for the sake of conserving the whole body. And since reason imitates nature, we also find an inclination of this sort among the political virtues. For a virtuous citizen exposes himself to the danger of death for the sake of conserving the whole polity; and if a man were a natural part of this [earthly] city, then this inclination would be natural to him.

Therefore, since God Himself is the universal good, and since this good contains within itself angels and men and all creatures (for every creature is naturally such that, given what it is, it belongs to God), it follows that even by natural love an angel or man loves God to a greater degree and more principally than himself. Otherwise, if he naturally loved himself more than God, it would follow that his natural love is perverted and that it would be destroyed, rather than perfected, by charity.

Reply to objection 1: This argument is talking about those things which are divided from one another as equals and which are not such that one of them is the reason for the existence and goodness of the other. For among such things, each one loves itself by nature more than the other, since it is more one with itself than with the other.

By contrast, if the one has the other as the whole reason for its existence and goodness, then by nature it loves this sort of other more than itself—in the way that, as was explained above, a part naturally loves the whole more than itself, and in the way that each particular thing naturally loves the good of its species more than its own particular good. But God is not only the good of each species but also the universal good itself, absolutely speaking. Hence, each thing in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.

Reply to objection 2: When one says that God is loved by an angel insofar as He is good for that angel, if the expression ‘insofar as’ expresses the end [of the love], then the claim is false. For an angel naturally loves God not for the sake of his own good, but for the sake of God Himself.

On the other hand, if ‘insofar as’ expresses the explanation for the love (amoris ratio) on the part of the lover, then the claim is true. For it would not be natural to anything that it should love God, if it were not the case that each thing depends on the good which is God.

Reply to objection 3: Nature is reflected back on itself not only with respect to what is particular in it, but even more with respect to what is common. For each thing is inclined to conserve not only itself as an individual, but also its own species. And, a fortiori, each thing has a natural inclination toward that which is the universal good, absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 4: It is insofar as God is the universal good on which every natural good depends that He is loved by each thing with a natural love. However, it is insofar as He is the good who naturally beatifies everyone with a supernatural beatitude that He is loved with the love of charity.
Reply to objection 5: Since God’s substance and the common good are one and the same, everyone who sees God’s very essence is moved with the very same movement of love toward God’s essence itself both (a) insofar as it is distinct from other things and also (b) insofar as it is the common good. And since a good is naturally loved by all things insofar as it is common, everyone who sees God through His essence is such that he cannot but love Him.

However, those who do not see His essence have cognition of Him through His particular effects, which are sometimes contrary to their will. And so it is in this sense that they are said to hold God in contempt. And yet, insofar as God is the common good of all things, everything still loves God naturally more than itself.