

QUESTION 76

The Union of the Soul with the Body

Next we must consider the union of the soul with the body. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is the intellectual principle united to the body as a form? (2) Is the intellectual principle multiplied in accord with the multiplication of the bodies, or is there a single intellect for all men? (3) Are there any other souls in a body whose form is an intellectual principle? (4) Are there any other substantial forms in such a body? (5) What sort of body does it have to be that has an intellectual principle as its form? (6) Is the intellectual principle united to the sort of body in question by the mediation of some accident? (7) Is the intellectual principle united to the sort of body in question by the mediation of some other body? (8) Does the soul exist as a whole in each part of the body?

Article 1

Is the intellectual principle united to the body as its form?

It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form:

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the intellect is “separated” and that it is not the act or actuality of a body (*nullius corporis est actus*). Therefore, it is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 2: Every form is specified (*determinatur*) in accord with the nature of the matter whose form it is; otherwise, a proportionality between the form and the matter would not be required. Therefore, if the intellect were united to the body as its form, then since each body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature. And in that case, as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 2), the intellect would not have cognition of all things—which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore, the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 3: If a given receptive potentiality is the actuality of a body, then it receives its form materially and individually, since what is received exists in the receiver in accord with the mode of the receiver (*receptum est in recipiente secundum modum recipientis*). But the form of a thing that is understood intellectually is not received materially and individually in the intellect; instead, it is received immaterially and universally. Otherwise, the intellect would not have cognition of immaterial things and universals, but would instead have cognition only of singulars, in the way that the senses do. Therefore, the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 4: A power (*potentia*) and [corresponding] action belong to the same thing, since it is the same thing that is able to act and that acts. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 2), an intellectual action does not belong to a body. Therefore, neither is an intellectual power a power that belongs to a body. But a power or potentiality (*virtus sive potentia*) cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which that power or potentiality is derived. Therefore, the intellect’s substance is not the form of the body.

Objection 5: That which has *esse per se* is not united to a body as its form. For a form is that *by which* something exists, and so the *esse* of a form does not belong to the form itself in its own right (*secundum se*). But as was explained above (q. 75, a. 2), the intellectual principle does have *esse* in its own right and is subsistent. Therefore, it is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 6: That which exists in a thing in its own right (*secundum se*) exists in it always. But a form is such that it is united to matter in its own right. For it is through its essence, and not through any accident, that it is the actuality of the matter; otherwise, what comes to be from the matter and the form would be unified accidentally and not substantively. Therefore, a form cannot exist without its proper

matter. But as was shown above (q. 75, a. 6), since the intellectual principle is incorruptible, it persists without being united to a body, after its body has been corrupted. Therefore, the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form.

But contrary to this: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 8, the difference is taken from a thing's form. But the constitutive difference of *man* is *rational*, which is said of man because of his intellectual principle. Therefore, the intellectual principle is the form of a man.

I respond: One must claim that the intellect, which is the principle of an intellectual operation, is the form of the human body.

For that by which something operates first and foremost (*primo operatur*) is the form of that to which the operation is attributed. For instance, that by which the body is first and foremost made healthy is health, and that by which the soul first and foremost knows is knowledge (*scientia*); hence, health is a form belonging to the body, and knowledge is a form belonging to the soul. The reason for this is that nothing acts except insofar as it is actually such-and-such, and so that by which it is actually such-and-such is that by which it acts. But it is obvious that the soul is that by which the body is first and foremost alive. And since life is made manifest by different operations within the different grades of living things, the soul is that by which we perform each of these vital works. For instance, the soul is that by which we first and foremost assimilate nourishment (*nutrimur*), have sensory cognition (*sentimus*), and move from place to place (*movemur secundum locum*); and, similarly, the soul is that by which we first and foremost have intellectual understanding (*intelligimus*). Therefore, this principle by which we first and foremost have intellectual understanding—regardless of whether it is called the intellect or the intellectual soul—is the form of the body. This is Aristotle's demonstration in *De Anima* 2.

Now if someone wants to claim that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body, then he has to find a sense in which the action in question, viz., intellectual understanding, is an action that belongs to *this* man. For each of us experiences that it is he himself who understands. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 5, there are three ways in which an action is attributed to someone. For he is said to effect something, or to act, either (a) *by himself as a whole* (*secundum se totum*), as in 'The physician heals'; or (b) *by a part of himself*, as in 'The man sees with his eyes'; or (c) *incidentally* (*per accidens*), as in 'The one who is white is building', since it is incidental to a builder that he is white. Thus, when we say that Socrates (or Plato) understands, it is obvious that this is not being attributed to him incidentally, since it is attributed to him insofar as he is a man, and 'man' is predicated essentially of him. Therefore, either (a) one must claim that Socrates has intellectual understanding by himself as a whole, as Plato posited when he claimed that a man is an intellectual soul, or (b) one must claim that the intellect is a part of Socrates. However, as was shown above (q. 75, a. 4), the first answer cannot hold up. For it is the very same man who perceives that he both understands and senses, and yet sensation does not exist without the body. Hence, the body must be a part of the man. Therefore, it follows that the intellect by which Socrates has intellectual understanding is a part of Socrates in such a way that the intellect is somehow united to Socrates' body.

In *De Anima* 3 the Commentator claims that this union is effected by the intelligible species, which has two subjects, viz., (a) the potential intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) and (b) the phantasms that exist in the bodily organs. And so it is through the intelligible species that the potential intellect is connected with the body of *this* man or *that* man.

However, this sort of connection or union is not sufficient for the intellect's action to be *Socrates'* action. This is clear from a comparison with sensation, on the basis of which Aristotle proceeds to a consideration of what is involved in intellectual understanding. For as *De Anima* 3 explains, phantasms are related to the intellect as colors are related to the visual power (*ad visum*). Therefore, species of the phantasms exist in the potential intellect in the same way that species of the colors exist in the visual

power. But it is clear that the action of the visual power is not attributed to a wall in virtue of the fact that the colors whose likenesses are in the visual power exist in that wall. For we do not say that the wall *sees*; rather, we say that the wall *is seen*. Therefore, from the fact that species of the phantasms exist in the potential intellect it does not follow that *Socrates*, in whom the phantasms exist, *understands*; rather, what follows is that he or, better, his phantasms *are understood*.

Again, some have wanted to claim that an intellect is united to a body as its mover, and that a single entity is made up of an intellect and a body in such a way that the intellect's action can be attributed to the whole.

However, there are a number of things wrong (*multipliciter vanum*) with this claim:

First, an intellect moves a body only through an appetite, whose movement presupposes the intellect's operation. Therefore, it is not because Socrates is moved by an intellect that he understands; to the contrary, it is because he understands that Socrates is moved by an intellect.

Second, Socrates is an individual in a nature whose essence is unified (*una*) and composed of matter and form. If an intellect were not his form, it would follow that it lies outside his essence, and in that case an intellect would be related to the whole Socrates as a mover is related to the thing moved. But intellectual understanding is an action that comes to rest within the agent and that, unlike the action of heating, does not pass into another. Therefore, it cannot be the case that understanding is attributed to Socrates by virtue of his being moved by an intellect.

Third, a mover's action is never attributed to the thing moved except as an instrument, in the way that the carpenter's action is attributed to the saw. Therefore, if it is because of his mover's action that understanding is attributed to Socrates, then it follows that understanding is attributed to him as an instrument. But this contradicts the Philosopher, who claims that intellectual understanding does not occur by means of a corporeal instrument.

Fourth, even though the action of a part may be attributed to the whole—in the way that the eye's action is attributed to the man—still, the action of one part is never attributed to another part, except perhaps incidentally. For we do not say that the hand sees in virtue of the fact that the eye sees. Therefore, if Socrates and his intellect are made one in the way in question, then the intellect's action cannot be attributed to Socrates.

On the other hand, if (a) Socrates is a whole composed by the union of the intellect to the other things belonging to Socrates and if (b) the intellect is nonetheless united to the other things belonging to Socrates only as a mover, then it follows that Socrates is not a single thing absolutely speaking (*non sit unum simpliciter*) and hence is not an entity absolutely speaking. For an entity is a being in the same sense in which it has oneness (*sic enim aliquid est ens quomodo et unum*).

Therefore, the only way left is the one proposed by Aristotle, viz., that *this* man understands because an intellectual principle is his form. Thus, it is clear from the intellect's very operation that an intellectual principle is united to the body as its form.

The same point can also be made clear from the nature of the human species, since the nature of an entity is shown by its operation. But the proper operation of a man *qua* man is to have intellectual understanding, since it is through this operation that he transcends all the animals. Hence, in the *Ethics* Aristotle locates ultimate happiness in this operation, as in something proper to man. Therefore, a man must be assigned his species in accord with the principle of this operation, since each thing is assigned a species by reference to its proper form. Therefore, it follows that an intellectual principle is the proper form of a man.

But note that the more noble a form is, the more it dominates corporeal matter, and the less immersed it is in it, and the more it exceeds it in its operation or power. Hence, we see that the form of a mixed body has certain operations that are not caused by the qualities of the elements. And the further one proceeds in nobility among forms, the more the power of the form exceeds elemental matter; for

instance, the vegetative soul exceeds it more than does the form of a metal, and the sentient soul exceeds it more than does the vegetative soul. But the human soul ranks first in nobility among forms. Hence, by its power it exceeds corporeal matter to such a degree that it has a certain operation and power that corporeal matter does not share in at all. And this power is called the intellect.

Now notice that if someone were to claim that the soul is composed of matter and form, he could in no way agree that the soul is the form of the body. For given that form is actuality, whereas matter is being only in potentiality, there is no way in which what is composed of matter and form can in its own right as a whole be the form of something else. Still, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 5), if some part of it is a form, then we will call that which is form ‘the soul’ and that whose form it is ‘the first animated thing’.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2, the highest (*ultima*) among natural forms, and the one that completes the natural philosopher’s investigation, viz., the human soul, is (a) separated, to be sure, and yet (b) in matter. The latter he proves from the fact that “man, along with the sun, generates a man out of matter.” On the other hand, it is separated with respect to its intellectual power, since the intellectual power is not a power that belongs to any corporeal organ in the way that the visual power is an act that belongs to the eye. For intellectual understanding is an act that cannot be exercised by means of a corporeal organ, in the way that the act of seeing is exercised. Still, the soul exists in matter to the extent that the soul itself, to which the power of understanding belongs, is the form of the body and the terminus of human generation.

So, then, the reason why the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3 that the intellect is “separated” is that it is not a power that belongs to any corporeal organ.

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the second and third objections. For the fact that the intellectual power is not an act belonging to the body is sufficient both (a) for a man’s being able to understand all things through his intellect and (b) for the intellect’s understanding immaterial things and universals.

Reply to objection 4: Because of its perfection, the human soul is not a form that is immersed in corporeal matter or entirely encompassed (*totaliter comprehensa*) by it. And so nothing prevents it from being the case that a certain power of the soul is not an act belonging to the body, even though the soul is by its essence the form of the body.

Reply to objection 5: The soul communicates the *esse* in which it itself subsists to the corporeal matter that, along with the intellectual soul, makes up a single entity, with the result that the *esse* that belongs to the whole composite is also the *esse* of the soul itself. This is not the case with other forms that are not subsistent. And it is for this reason that the human soul, but not other forms, remains in its own *esse* after its body has been destroyed.

Reply to objection 6: It is fitting for the soul in its own right to be united to the body, in the same way that it is fitting for a lightweight body to be high up. And just as a lightweight body remains lightweight when separated from its proper place and retains its aptitude for, and inclination toward, its proper place, so too the human soul remains in its *esse* when it has been separated from its body—even while retaining its natural aptitude for, and inclination toward, union with the body.

Article 2

Is the intellectual principle multiplied as the bodies are multiplied?

It seems that the intellectual principle is not multiplied as the bodies are multiplied, but that instead

there is just a single intellect for all men (*sit unus intellectus in omnibus hominibus*):

Objection 1: No immaterial substance is numerically multiplied within a single species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; for as was shown above (q. 75, a. 5), it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, it is not the case that there are many human souls belonging to a single species. But all men belong to a single species. Therefore, there is a single intellect for all men (*unus intellectus omnium hominum*).

Objection 2: When a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied as the bodies are multiplied, it would seem to follow that when the bodies are removed, what remains is not a multitude of souls, but just a single one of all the souls. But this is heretical, since the difference between rewards and punishments would disappear.

Objection 3: If my intellect is distinct from your intellect, then my intellect is a certain individual, and likewise your intellect; for they are particulars that differ numerically and agree in a single species. But whatever is received in a thing exists in that thing according to the mode of the receiver. Therefore, the species of things are received individually in my intellect and in your intellect. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect, because the intellect has cognition of universals.

Objection 4: What is understood (*intellectum*) exists in an intellect when that intellect has an act of understanding (*in intellectu intelligente*). Therefore, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, then what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you (*aliud sit intellectum a me et aliud intellectum a te*). And so what is understood will be counted as an individual (*individualiter numeratum*), and it is only in potentiality that it will be understood intellectually; and so it will be necessary to abstract a common intention from the two things understood, since from any two different things it is possible to abstract a common intelligible thing. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect, since if it were so, then the intellect would not seem to be distinct from the power of imagining (*a virtute imaginativa*). Therefore, it seems to follow that there is a single intellect for all men.

Objection 5: When a student receives knowledge from a teacher, one cannot say that the teacher's knowledge generates knowledge in the student, since otherwise knowledge would be an active form in the way that heat is—which is clearly false. Therefore, it seems that numerically the same knowledge that is in the teacher is communicated to the student. But this is impossible unless there is a single intellect for the two of them. Therefore, it seems that there is a single intellect for the student and the teacher—and, consequently, for all men.

Objection 6: In his book *De Quantitate Animae* Augustine says, "If I were to claim that there are as many human souls as that, I would laugh at myself." But it is especially with respect to the intellect that the soul seems to be one. Therefore, there is a single intellect for all men.

But contrary to this: In *Physics 2* the Philosopher says that particular causes are related to particulars in the same way that universal causes are related to universals. But it is impossible for a soul that is one in species to belong to animals that are diverse in species. Therefore, it is impossible for an intellectual soul that is one in number to belong to things that are numerically diverse.

I respond: It is altogether impossible for there to be a single intellect for all men.

This is utterly obvious if, in keeping with Plato's opinion, a man is the intellect itself. For it would follow that if there is just one intellect for Socrates and Plato, then Socrates and Plato are a single man and are distinct from one another only in what lies outside the essence of both. And in that case the distinction between Socrates and Plato will be no different from the distinction between a man wearing a tunic and the same man wearing a cape (*distinctio non alia quam hominis tunicati et cappati*)—which is completely absurd.

It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, in keeping with Aristotle's opinion, the intellect is thought of as a part, i.e., a power, of that soul which serves as the form of a man. For it is impossible that

many numerically diverse things should have a single form, just as it is impossible that numerically diverse things should have a single *esse*. For the form is the source of *esse* (*principium essendi*).

Similarly, it is clear that the claim in question is impossible regardless of how one thinks of the intellect's union with *this* man and *that* man:

(a) For instance, it is obvious that if they are a single principal agent and two instruments, then one can say that there is a single agent absolutely speaking but more than one action—just as, if a single man touches different things with his two hands, there will be one toucher and two touches.

(b) Conversely, if they are a single instrument and two different principal agents, then there would be more than one agent but a single action—in the same way that if many men are dragging a boat with a single rope, there will be many draggers but only a single dragging.

(c) On the other hand, if they are a single principal agent and a single instrument, then there will be one agent and one action—just as, when a blacksmith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one striking.

But it is clear that however the intellect might be united to or connected with *this* man or *that* man, the intellect has preeminence over the other things that belong to a man. For instance, the sentient powers obey the intellect and serve it. Therefore, if one supposed that two men had more than one intellect but a single sensory power—for instance, if the two men had a single eye—then there would be more than one man seeing but just a single act of seeing (*visio*). But if there is a single intellect, then no matter how different the other powers used by the intellect as instruments are, Socrates and Plato could not in any way be called anything but a single knower (*intelligens*). And if we add that the very act of intellectual understanding (*ipsum intelligere*), which is the intellect's action, is not effected by any organ other than the intellect itself, it will follow further that there is both a single agent and a single action; that is, it will follow that all men are a single knower and that there is a single act of understanding (I mean with respect to the same intelligible object).

To be sure, my intellectual action and yours could be diversified by a diversity of phantasms—that is, by the fact that the phantasm of a rock in me is different from the one in you—if the phantasm itself, differing in the two of us, were the form of the potential intellect. For a single agent produces different actions corresponding to different forms; for instance, there are different acts of seeing (*visiones*) corresponding to the different forms of things in the same eye.

However, the phantasm is not itself the form of the potential intellect; rather, the form of the potential intellect is the intelligible species that is abstracted from the phantasms. But in a single intellect there is just one intelligible species that is abstracted from different phantasms of the same species. For instance, it is clear that in one man there can be different phantasms of a rock, and yet what is abstracted from all of them is a single intelligible species of a rock, through which that one man's intellect understands the nature *rock* by means of a single operation, despite the diversity of the phantasms. Therefore, if there were a single intellect for all men, then the diversity of the phantasms existing in *this* man and *that* man could not, as the Commentator imagines in *De Anima* 3, cause a diversity of intellectual operations in *this* man and *that* man.

Therefore, what follows is that it is altogether impossible and absurd to posit a single intellect for all men.

Reply to objection 1: Even though the intellectual soul, just like an angel, has no matter *out of which* it is made (*non habeat materiam ex qua sit*), it is nonetheless the form of a certain matter—something that is not true of an angel. And so corresponding to the division of matter (*secundum divisionem materiae*) there are many souls of a single species, whereas it is altogether impossible for there to be many angels of a single species.

Reply to objection 2: Each thing has oneness in the same way that it has *esse* and, as a result, the same judgment should be made about the multiplication of a thing as about its *esse*. But it is obvious that

by its own *esse* an intellectual soul is united to a body as its form and, yet, when the body is destroyed, the intellectual soul remains with its *esse*. For the same reason, a multitude of souls corresponds to the multitude of bodies, and, yet, when the bodies are destroyed, the souls remain multiplied in their *esse*.

Reply to objection 3: The *individuality* (*individuatio*) of that which has intellective understanding, or of the species through which it understands, does not rule out its understanding universals; otherwise, given that intellects are certain subsistent substances and thus particulars, they would not be able to understand universals. Rather, it is the *materiality* of a cognitive [power] and of the species through which it has cognition that impedes the cognition of a universal. For just as every action follows the mode of the form by which its agent acts—in the way that the action of giving warmth follows the mode of heat—so too a cognition follows the mode of the species by which the knower has the cognition. But it is obvious that a common nature is made distinct and is multiplied in accord with the individuating principles, which come from the side of the matter. Therefore, if the form by which a cognition comes to be is a material form that is not abstracted from the conditions of matter, then it will be a likeness of the nature of a species or genus insofar as that nature is made distinct and multiplied by individuating principles, and so the nature will not be able to be known in its commonality. By contrast, if the species is abstracted from the conditions of the material individual, then it will be a likeness of the nature in the absence of the principles that divide and multiply it; and it is in this way that there is cognition of a universal.

Also, as far as this present point is concerned, it makes no difference whether there is a single intellect or more than one. For even if there were just one intellect, it would have to be a certain individual (*aliquem quendam*), and the species through which it has intellective understanding would have to be a certain individual (*aliquam quendam*).

Reply to objection 4: What is understood intellectually is a single thing, regardless of whether there is a single intellect or many. For what is understood exists in the intellect not in its own right (*non secundum se*) but as a likeness. For as *De Anima* 3 says, “It is not the rock, but a likeness of the rock, that exists in the soul.” And yet, except when the intellect is reflecting upon itself, what is understood is the rock, and not a likeness of a rock; otherwise, scientific knowledge would be about intelligible species and not about the things.

Now it is possible for diverse things to be assimilated to one and the same thing by means of diverse forms. And since cognition comes to be by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known (*secundum assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam*), it follows that it is possible for the same thing to be known by different knowers. This is clear in the case of the senses; for many knowers see the same color by means of different likenesses. Similarly, many intellects have intellective understanding of a single thing that is understood (*plures intellectus intelligunt unam rem intellectam*).

According to Aristotle’s position, the only difference between the senses and the intellect is that a thing is sensed in accord with the disposition it has outside the soul, in its particularity, whereas the nature of a thing, which is what there is intellective understanding of, exists, to be sure, outside the soul, but outside the soul it does not have the very mode of existence according to which it is understood. For a common nature is understood intellectually with its individuating principles set aside, but it does not have this mode of existing outside the soul. However, according to Plato’s position, the thing that is understood intellectually exists outside the soul in the same mode as that in which it is understood; for he claimed that the natures of things are separated from matter.

Reply to objection 5: The student’s knowledge is different from the teacher’s. In what follows (q. 117, a. 1) we will show how it is caused.

Reply to objection 6: Augustine’s meaning is that there are not so many souls that they cannot be united in a single concept of the species.

Article 3

Are there, in addition to the intellective soul, other souls in a man that differ from it in their essence, viz., a sentient soul and a nutritive soul?

It seems that there are, in addition to the intellective soul, other souls in a man that differ from it in their essence, viz., a sentient soul and a nutritive soul:

Objection 1: The corruptible and the incorruptible cannot belong to the same substance. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 6), the intellective soul is incorruptible, whereas the other souls, viz., the sentient soul and the nutritive soul, are corruptible. Therefore, it cannot be the case that in a man the intellective soul, the sentient soul, and the nutritive soul have a single essence.

Objection 2: If someone replies that in a man the sentient soul is incorruptible, then against this:

As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “The corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus.” But the sentient soul is corruptible in a horse and in a lion and in other brute animals. Therefore, if the sentient soul were incorruptible in a man, it would not be of the same genus in a man and in a brute animal. But something is called ‘an animal’ from the fact that it has a sentient soul. Therefore, *animal* will not be a single genus common to both man and the other animals—which is absurd.

Objection 3: In *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher claims that the embryo is an animal before being a man. But this cannot be the case if the same essence belongs to both the sentient soul and the intellective soul, since something is an animal through the sentient soul and a man through the intellective soul. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the sentient and intellective souls have a single essence.

Objection 4: In *Metaphysics* 8 the Philosopher says that the genus is taken from the matter and the difference from the form. But *rational*, which is the constitutive difference of man, is taken from the intellective soul, whereas something is called an *animal* because it has a body animated by a sentient soul. Therefore, the intellective soul is related to a body animated by a sentient soul as form to matter. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the intellective soul is the same in essence as the sentient soul. Rather, the intellective soul presupposes the sentient soul as a material suppositum.

But contrary to this: *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “Unlike Jacob and the other Syrians, we do not say that there are two souls in a man—the one an animal soul, by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and the other a spiritual soul, which gives rise to reason. To the contrary, we say that in a man there is one and same soul which both vivifies the body by its association with it and conducts itself by its reason.”

I respond: Plato held that there are diverse souls in the one body and even, corresponding to the organs, distinct souls to which he attributed the various vital operations—claiming that the nutritive power resides in the liver, the concupiscible power in the heart, and the cognitive power in the brain.

In *De Anima* Aristotle argues against this opinion as regards the parts of the soul that use corporeal organs in their operations; he does so by appealing to the fact that in animals that live after having been divided, the different operations of the soul, such as sensation and appetition, are found in each part. But this would not be so if different principles of the soul’s operations—i.e., souls diverse in their essence—were distributed among the different parts of the body. However, as regards the intellective soul, he seems to leave it in question whether it is separate from the other parts of the soul “only conceptually or also spatially” (*solum ratione, an etiam loco*).

Now Plato’s position could be sustained if one claimed that the soul is united to the body not as a form but as a mover, as Plato did in fact claim. For nothing absurd follows if the same moveable thing is moved by different movers, especially with respect to different parts.

However, if we claim that the soul is united to the body as a form, it seems altogether impossible for many souls, differing in their essence, to exist in a single body. This can be made clear in three ways:

First, an animal would not have oneness absolutely speaking (*non esset simpliciter unum*) if it had more than one soul. For nothing has oneness absolutely speaking except because of a single form through which the thing has *esse*, since the fact that an entity is a being and the fact that it is unified derive from the same source. And so things that are denominated from different forms, e.g., *white man*, do not have oneness absolutely speaking. Therefore, if the fact that a man is living were derived from one form, viz., the vegetative soul, and the fact that he is an animal were derived from a second form, viz., the sentient soul, and the fact that he is a man were derived from a third form, viz., the rational soul, then it would follow that a man does not have oneness absolutely speaking—in just the way Aristotle argued against Plato in *Metaphysics* 8 that if the idea *animal* were different from the idea *bipedal*, then a bipedal animal would not have oneness absolutely speaking. It is for this reason that in *De Anima* 1 he asks, in opposition to those who posit diverse souls in the body, what it is that contains those souls, i.e., what it is that is constituted as one thing from them. One cannot reply that they are made one by the body's oneness, since it is the soul that contains the body and makes it to have oneness, rather than vice versa.

Second, the position in question is seen to be impossible by appeal to the modes of predication. For things derived from different forms are such that either (a) they are predicated of one another *per accidens*, if the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white is sweet, or (b), if the forms are ordered to one another, then there will be *per se* predication in the second mode of *per se* predication, since the subject occurs in the definition of the predicate. For instance, a surface is a prerequisite for color, and so if we say that a body with a surface is colored, this will be the second mode of *per se* predication. Therefore, if the form from which something is called 'an animal' were different from the form from which it is called 'a man', then either (a) one of them would be able to be predicated of the other only *per accidens*, if they have no ordering with respect to one another, or (b) there would be a predication in the second mode of *per se* predication, if one of the souls were a prerequisite for the other. But both of these alternatives are manifestly false. For *animal* is predicated *per se* of *man* and not *per accidens*; nor does *man* occur in the definition of *animal*—just the opposite. Therefore, the form through which something is an animal must be the same form through which something is a man; otherwise, a man would not truly be something that is an animal, so that *animal* might be predicated *per se* of *man*.

Third, the position in question is seen to be impossible from the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense, it impedes the other operations. But this would not be possible if the principle of the actions were not one in essence.

Therefore, one should claim that in a man the sentient, intellectual, and nutritive souls are numerically the same (*eadem numero*).

Now just how this is possible can easily be seen if one attends to the differences among species and forms. For the species and forms of things are found to differ with respect to the more perfect and the less perfect. For instance, within the order of things, the living are more perfect than the non-living, and animals are more perfect than plants, and men are more perfect than brute animals; and within each of these genera there are diverse levels. This is why in *Metaphysics* 8 Aristotle compares the species of things to numbers, which themselves differ in species insofar as the number *one* (*unitas*) is added or subtracted. And in *De Anima* 2 he compares the different types of soul to shapes that are such that one of them contains the other, in the way that a pentagon contains a tetragon and goes beyond it. So, then, the intellectual soul has within its power whatever the sentient soul of brutes animals has and whatever the nutritive soul of plants has. Therefore, just as a surface with a pentagonal shape is not tetragonal through one shape and pentagonal through another shape—since the tetragonal shape would be superfluous, given

that it is contained within the pentagon—so neither is Socrates a man through one soul and an animal through another soul; instead, it is through one and the same soul that he is a man and an animal.

Reply to objection 1: The sentient soul does not have incorruptibility by virtue of its being sentient; rather, incorruptibility is owed to it by virtue of its being intellective. Therefore, when a soul is merely sentient, it is corruptible, whereas when it is intellective in addition to being sentient, then it is incorruptible. For even though sentience does not bestow incorruptibility (*incorruptio*), it nonetheless cannot rob what is intellective of its incorruptibility.

Reply to objection 2: It is the composites, and not the forms, that are collected together into a genus or species. Now man is corruptible, just as the other animals are. Hence, the difference with respect to corruptibility and incorruptibility, which has to do with the forms, does not make man differ in genus from the other animals.

Reply to objection 3: The embryo first has a soul that is merely sentient, but when this is cast off, there comes a more perfect soul that is both sentient and intellective (*qua abiecta advenit perfectior anima quae est simul sensitiva et intellectiva*). This will be shown in more detail below (q. 118, a. 2).

Reply to objection 4: It is not necessary for there to be among natural things a diversity that corresponds to the diverse concepts (*rationes*) or logical intentions (*intentiones logicae*) that follow upon our mode of understanding. For reason can apprehend one and the same entity in diverse ways. Therefore, since, as has been explained, the intellective soul contains within its power what the sentient soul has and more besides, reason is able to consider what pertains to the power of the sentient soul separately as something imperfect and material (*quasi imperfectum et materiale*), so to speak. And since it finds this to be common to men and other animals, it forms the concept of the genus from it. On the other hand, it takes that in which the intellective soul exceeds the sentient soul as formal and perfective (*quasi formale et completivum*), and from this it formulates the specific difference of man.

Article 4

Is there in man any other form besides the intellective soul?

It seems that there is in man some other form besides the intellective soul:

Objection 1: In *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says, “The soul is the actuality of a physical body that has life in potentiality.” Therefore, the soul is related to the body as form to matter. But a body has a substantial form through which it is a body. Therefore, in the body there is a substantial form prior to the soul.

Objection 2: Man, along with every animal, is a self-mover. But as *Physics 8* shows, everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which effects the movement and the other of which is moved. Now the part that effects the movement is the soul. Therefore, the other part must be such that it is capable of being moved. But as *Physics 5* says, primary matter cannot be moved, since it is an entity only in potentiality, whereas everything that is moved is a body. Therefore, in man—and in every animal—there must be a second substantial form through which the body is constituted.

Objection 3: There is an ordering among forms according to their relation to primary matter, since ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ are predicated relative to some principle. Therefore, if in man there were no substantial form besides the rational soul, and if instead the rational soul directly inhered in primary matter, then it would follow that the rational soul belongs to the order of the most imperfect forms, viz., those that directly inhere in matter.

Objection 4: The human body is a mixed body. But a mixture cannot be made just of matter (*non*

fit secundum materiam tantum), since in that case it would be a mere corruption. Therefore, the forms of the elements, which are substantial forms, must remain in a mixed body. Therefore, in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectualive soul.

But contrary to this: A single entity has just a single substantial *esse*. But it is the substantial form that gives substantial *esse*. Therefore, a single entity has just one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be in a man any substantial form other than the intellectualive soul.

I respond: If one claimed, as did the Platonists, that the intellectualive soul is united to the body only as its mover and not as its form, then he would have to assert that in a man there is another substantial form through which the body moved by the soul is constituted in its own *esse*. However, if, as we have already claimed above (a. 1), the intellectualive soul is united to the body as its substantial form, then it is impossible for any other substantial form besides it to be found in a man.

To see this clearly, note that a substantial form differs from an accidental form in that an accidental form gives such-*esse* (*esse tale*) and not *esse* absolutely speaking (*esse simpliciter*); for instance, heat makes its subject *to be hot* and not *to be* absolutely speaking. And so when an accidental form appears, one does not say that a thing is made or generated absolutely speaking (*fieri vel generari simpliciter*); rather, one says that the thing comes to be such-and-such (*fieri tale*) or that it comes to be disposed in a certain way (*fieri aliquo modo habens se*). Similarly, when an accidental form disappears, one does not say that something is corrupted absolutely speaking (*corrumpi simpliciter*); rather, one says that it is corrupted in a certain respect (*corrumpi secundum quid*). By contrast, a substantial form gives *esse* absolutely speaking, and so at its appearance something is said to be generated absolutely speaking, and at its disappearance something is said to be corrupted absolutely speaking. This is why the ancient natural philosophers, who thought that primary matter is some actual being (e.g., fire or air or something of this sort), claimed that nothing is either generated or corrupted absolutely speaking; instead, as *Physics* 1 reports, they maintained that every instance of coming-to-be is an instance of being-altered. Therefore, if it were true that besides the intellectualive soul there are other preexistent substantial forms in the matter through which the soul's subject is an actual being, then it would follow that the soul does not give *esse* absolutely speaking, and that consequently it is not a substantial form, and that at the soul's appearance there is no generation absolutely speaking, and that at its disappearance there is no corruption absolutely speaking; instead, there would be generation or corruption only in a certain respect. But all of these claims are manifestly false.

Hence, one should reply that (a) there is no substantial form in a man other than the intellectualive soul alone, and that (b) just as the intellectualive soul virtually contains the sentient soul and the nutritive soul, so too it virtually contains all the lower forms, and that (c) it brings about by itself alone whatever the more imperfect forms bring about in other things. And the same should be said of the sentient soul in brute animals and of the nutritive soul in plants and, in general, of all more perfect forms in relation to less perfect forms.

Reply to objection 1: Aristotle did not say merely that the soul is “the actuality of a body.” Rather, he said that the soul is “the actuality of an organic physical body that has life in potentiality,” and that this potentiality “does not exclude the soul.” Hence, the soul is also clearly included in what the soul is called the actuality of, in the same manner of speaking in which one says that heat is the actuality of what is hot, and that light is the actuality of what is bright—not that it is bright taken separately without the light, but that it is bright because of the light. Likewise, the soul is said to be the actuality of a body, etc., because it is through the soul that it is a body, and that it is organic, and that it “has life in potentiality.” And first actuality is said to be in potentiality with respect to second actuality, i.e., operation; for this potentiality does not rule out, i.e., exclude, the soul.

Reply to objection 2: It is not through its own *esse*, or insofar as it is united to the body as its

form, that the soul moves the body; instead, it moves the body through its moving power, the actualization of which presupposes that the body has already been brought into actuality through the soul. So through its moving power the soul is the part that effects movement, and the animated body is the part that is moved.

Reply to objection 3: In matter there are different grades of perfection, e.g., *to exist (esse)*, *to live (vivere)*, *to sense (sentire)*, and *to understand intellectually (intelligere)*. Now the next in line (*secundum*), which supervenes on what is prior to it (*superveniens priori*), is always more perfect than what is prior to it. Therefore, a form that gives only the first grade of perfection to matter is the least perfect, while a form that gives the first and second and third grades, and so on, is the most perfect, even though it inheres directly in the matter (*tamen materiae immediata*).

Reply to objection 4: Avicenna claimed that (a) the substantial forms of the elements maintain their integrity in a mixed thing, but that (b) a mixture comes into existence insofar as the contrary qualities of the elements are moderated to a mean (*reducuntur ad medium*).

But this is impossible. For the diverse forms of the elements can exist only in diverse parts of matter, and the diversity of those parts must presuppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. But matter subject to dimensions is found only in bodies, and diverse bodies cannot exist in the same place. Hence, it follows that the elements in a mixed thing are distinct from one another in place. Hence, there will not be a *genuine mixture (vera mixtio)*, i.e., a mixture with respect to the whole, but instead there will be a *mixture with respect to the senses (mixtio ad sensum)*, which consists of very small entities positioned close to one another.

Averroes, on the other hand, claimed in *De Caelo* 3 that, because of their imperfection, the forms of the elements lie midway between accidental forms and substantial forms, and so they admit of more and less. And so in a mixture they are remitted and moderated to a mean, and a single form is fused together from them.

But this is even more impossible. For the substantial *esse* of any given thing consists in something indivisible, and, as *Metaphysics* 7 puts it, every addition or subtraction changes the species, just as with numbers. Hence, it is impossible that any substantial form should admit of more and less. Nor is it any less impossible for something to lie midway between a substance and an accident.

And so, in keeping with what the Philosopher says in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1, one should reply that the forms of the elements remain in a mixed thing *virtually* but *not in actuality*. For what remains are the qualities which, though less intense (*remissae*), are proper to the elements, and it is in these qualities that the power of the elemental forms resides. And the quality of this sort of mixture is a proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body, e.g., the form of a rock or of any type of soul.

Article 5

Is it fitting for an intellectual soul to be united to the sort of body in question?

It seems that it is not fitting for an intellectual soul to be united to the sort of body in question:

Objection 1: The matter has to be proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is an incorruptible form. Therefore, it is not fitting for it to be united to a corruptible body.

Objection 2: The intellectual soul is a maximally immaterial form; an indication of this is that it has an operation in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more subtle a body is, the less it has of matter. Therefore, the soul should have been united to the most subtle sort of body, viz., fire, and not to a body that is mixed and rather earthy (*non corpori mixto et terrestri magis*).

Objection 3: Since the form is the principle of the species, it is not the case that diverse species spring from a single form. But the intellectual soul is a single form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body that is composed of parts of dissimilar species.

Objection 4: There ought to be a more perfect subject (*perfectius susceptibile*) for a more perfect form. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect of forms. Therefore, since the bodies of the other animals are naturally provided with covering, e.g., fur instead of clothes and hooves instead of shoes, and since they are also naturally endowed with weapons such as claws, teeth, and horns, it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to an imperfect body, i.e., one deprived of these sorts of assistance.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says that the soul is “the actuality of an organic physical body that has life potentially.”

I respond: Since the form does not exist for the sake of the matter, but instead the matter exists for the sake of the form, the reason why the matter is the way that it is has to be taken from the form (*ex forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia sit talis*), and not vice versa.

Now as was established above (q. 55, a. 2), within the order of nature the intellectual soul occupies the lowest grade among intellectual substances. For unlike the angels, the intellectual soul is not endowed by nature with knowledge of the truth, but instead, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, it must gather its knowledge from divisible things by way of the senses.

Now nature is not lacking in necessities, and so the intellectual soul had to possess not only the power of intellectual understanding, but also the power of sensing. But the action of the senses does not exist in the absence of a corporeal instrument. Therefore, the intellectual soul had to be united to a body of a sort that could serve as an appropriate instrument of the sensory power (*conveniens organum sensus*). But all the other senses are grounded in the sense of touch, and the organ of touch must be a medium between those contraries that the sense of touch apprehends, viz., hot and cold, moist and dry, etc. And in this way it is in potentiality with respect to the contraries and able to sense them. Hence, the more the organ of touch is drawn toward a balanced composition (*reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis*), the more sensitive the sense of touch will be. But the intellectual soul has the sentient power most fully, because, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, what belongs to the lower exists more perfectly in the higher. Hence, the body to which the intellectual soul is united had to be a mixed body that, among all others, was more drawn toward a balanced composition. And because of this, among all the animals man has the best sense of touch. And among men themselves, those who have a better sense of touch have better intellectual understanding. An indication of this is that as, *De Anima 2* points out, “We see that those who are refined in body are very capable mentally.”

Reply to objection 1: Someone might want to evade this objection by claiming that man’s body was incorruptible before sin.

But this reply does not seem adequate. For prior to sin, man’s body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of God’s grace. Otherwise, his immortality would not have been taken away because of sin, just as a demon’s immortality was not taken away because of sin.

And so one must reply in an alternative way, viz., that there are two conditions in which matter is found: (a) one is chosen in order that it might be appropriate for the form, and (b) the other follows from a necessity of a prior disposition. For instance, a craftsman chooses iron as the matter for the form of a saw because of iron’s aptness for cutting through hard material, whereas the fact that the teeth of the saw can become blunt and rusted follows from a necessity of the matter. So, then, the intellectual soul needs a body that has a balanced composition, but it thereby follows, from a necessity of the matter, that the body is corruptible.

Now if someone objects that God could have circumvented this necessity, the appropriate reply

is that, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, when it comes to the constitution of natural things, one takes into account not what God can do, but instead what is fitting for the nature of things. Still, God provided in this case by applying the remedy against death through the gift of grace.

Reply to objection 2: It is not because of the intellectual operation itself, taken in its own right, that the intellective soul needs the body; rather, it needs the body because of the sentient power, which requires an instrument with balanced composition (*organum aequaliter complexionatum*). And this is the reason why the intellective soul had to be united to this sort of body and not to a simple element or to a mixed body in which fire dominated quantitatively. For because of fire's excessively active power, such a body could not have had a balanced composition. On the other hand, this body, with its balanced composition, has a certain dignity because of its remoteness from the contraries, and in this feature it is in some sense similar to a celestial body.

Reply to objection 3: It is not the parts of an animal, such as the eye, the hand, the flesh and bone, etc., that belong to a species, but rather the whole animal. And so it cannot be said, properly speaking, that these parts are diverse in *species*; rather, they are diverse in *disposition*. And this fact is traced to the intellective soul, which, even though it is one in essence, is nonetheless, because of its perfection, complex in its power (*multiplex in virtute*). And so for the diverse operations it needs diverse dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. Because of this, we see that there is more diversity in the parts of perfect animals than in the parts of imperfect animals, and more diversity in animals than in plants.

Reply to objection 4: Since the intellective soul comprehends universals, it has power with respect to infinitely many things. And so it was impossible for nature to have given it determinate natural judgments (*determinatae existimationes naturales*) or even determinate aids or defenses or coverings like those of the other animals, whose souls have apprehension and power with respect to a limited range of particulars (*ad aliqua particularia determinata*). In place of all of these, man by nature has reason and hands, which are "the instruments of instruments" (*organa organum*), since by use of them man is able to make instruments of infinitely many kinds and for the sake of infinitely many effects.

Article 6

Is the intellective soul united to the body through the mediation of certain accidental dispositions?

It seems that the intellective soul is united to the body through the mediation of certain accidental dispositions:

Objection 1: Every form is in a matter that is proper to it and disposed for it. But the dispositions for a form are certain accidents. Therefore, certain accidents must be presupposed in the matter prior to the substantial form—and so prior to the soul, since the soul is a substantial form.

Objection 2: Diverse forms of a single species require diverse parts of matter. But diverse parts of matter can be thought of only as corresponding to the division of dimensional quantities. Therefore, dimensions have to be presupposed in the matter prior to those substantial forms that are multiplied within a single species.

Objection 3: The spiritual is applied to the corporeal through a virtual contact. But the soul's virtue (*virtus*) is its power (*potentia*). Therefore, it seems that the soul is united to the body by the mediation of power, which is a certain accident.

But contrary to this: As *Metaphysics 7* says, an accident is posterior to its substance “both temporally and conceptually.” Therefore, no accidental form can be thought of as existing in the matter prior to the soul, which is the substantial form.

I respond: If the soul were united to the body as its mover, then nothing would prevent its being the case—indeed, it would have to be the case—that certain dispositions mediate between the soul and the body, viz., (a) on the part of the soul, a power by which it moves the body, and (b) on the part of the body, a certain aptitude by which the body is able to be moved by the soul.

However, if, as has already been explained (a. 1), the intellective soul is united to the body as its substantial form, then it is impossible for any accidental disposition to mediate (*cadat media*) between the body and the soul—or, for that matter, between *any* substantial form and its matter. The reason is that there is a certain order in which the matter is in potentiality to all its corresponding actualities, and so the actuality that is the first of all the actualities, absolutely speaking, must be thought of as the first one that is in the matter. But the first among all the actualities is *esse*. Therefore, it is impossible to think of the matter as being hot or quantified before thinking of it as existing in actuality. But *esse* in actuality is had through the substantial form, which makes a thing to exist absolutely speaking, as has already been explained (a. 4). Hence, it is impossible that any accidental disposition should exist in the matter prior to the substantial form or, consequently, prior to the soul.

Reply to objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (a. 4), a more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the lower forms. And so one and the same existent form perfects the matter with respect to diverse grades of perfection. For it is one and the same form in essence through which a man is (a) a being in actuality, (b) a body, (c) a living being, (d) an animal, and (e) a man. But it is clear that every genus is such that its proper accidents follow from it. Therefore, just as the matter is thought of as being complete in its *esse* (*perfecta secundum esse*) prior to its being thought of as a body (*ante intellectum corporeitatis*), and so on, so too the accidents that are proper to it as a being are thought of as preceding its being a body (*ante corporeitatem*). And so dispositions are thought of as being present in the matter prior to the form with respect to the form’s later effects, but not with respect to all its effects.

Reply to objection 2: Quantitative dimensions are accidents that follow upon the thing’s being a body, which belongs to the matter as a whole (*accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit*). Hence, once the matter is thought of as existing under the corporeity and dimensions, it can then be thought of as being divided into distinct parts, so that it might receive diverse forms corresponding to further grades of perfection. For even though, as has been explained (a. 4), it is in essence the same form that gives the diverse grades of perfection to the matter, there are nonetheless differences according to reason’s consideration of it.

Reply to objection 3: A spiritual substance that is united to a body only as its mover is united to it through its power, i.e., virtually (*per potentiam vel virtutem*). But the intellective soul is united to the body as a form through its own *esse*.

Still, it is through the soul’s power or virtue that it oversees (*administrat*) the body and moves it.

Article 7

Is the soul united to the animal body by the mediation of some other body?

It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by the mediation of some other body:

Objection 1: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram 7* Augustine says, “The soul oversees (*administrat*) the body through light, i.e., fire, and air, which are more similar to a spirit.” But fire and air are bodies.

Therefore, the soul is united to the human body by the mediation of a body.

Objection 2: If something is such that when it is taken away, the union of things that had been united is dissolved, then it seems to be a mediator between those things. But when breathing (*spiritus*) ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore, breath, which is a subtle body, is a mediator in the union of the body and the soul.

Objection 3: Things that are distant from one another are united only through a medium. But the intellective soul is distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal and because it is incorruptible. Therefore, it seems that it is united to the body by the mediation of something that is an incorruptible body. And this seems to be some sort of celestial light, which harmonizes the elements and makes them one.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says, “one need not ask if the soul and body are one, just as one need not ask whether the wax and the shape are one.” But the shape is united to the wax without the mediation of any other body. Therefore, the soul is likewise united to the body without the mediation of a body.

I respond: If, as the Platonists hold, the soul were united to the body only as a mover, then it would be appropriate to claim that certain other bodies intervene between man’s soul—or that of any animal—and his body. For it is appropriate that a mover should effect movement in a distant thing through the mediation of things that are closer.

However, if, as has already been explained (a. 1), the soul is united to the body as its form, then it is impossible that it should be united to it by the mediation of a body. The reason for this is that a thing is called *one* in the same way that it is called *a being*. But it is the form that through itself makes a thing to exist in actuality, since it is an actuality through its own essence and so does not give *esse* through any mediator. Hence, the oneness of an entity composed of matter and form is due to the form itself, which is united to the matter in its own right as the actuality of the matter. Nor, with the exception of the agent, is there anything else that makes the matter to exist in actuality—as *Metaphysics* 8 explains.

Hence, the views of those who claimed that certain bodies mediate between man’s soul and body are clearly false. Certain Platonists among them asserted that (a) the intellective soul has an incorruptible body that is naturally united to it and from which it is never separated, and that (b) it is by the mediation of this body that the intellective soul is united to a corruptible human body.

Others claimed that it is united to the body by the mediation of a corporeal spirit.

Still others said that it is united to the body by the mediation of light, which they claimed to be a body and a fifth essence by nature, so that (a) the vegetative soul is united to the body by the mediation of the light of the starry heaven, (b) the sentient soul is united by the mediation of the light of the crystalline heaven, and (c) the intellectual soul is united by the mediation of the light of the empyrean heaven. All of this is clearly fictitious and ridiculous, since (a) light is not a body, (b) the fifth essence enters only virtually and not materially into the composition of mixed bodies, given that it is not subject to alteration (*inalterabilis*), and (c) the soul is directly united to the body as the form of its matter.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about the soul insofar as it moves the body; this is why he uses the word ‘oversight’ (*administratio*). And it is true that the grosser parts of the body are moved by the more subtle ones. As the Philosopher puts it in *De Causa Motus Animalium*, the first instrument of the moving power is a spirit.

Reply to objection 2: The reason why the union of the soul with the body ceases when breath ceases is not that breath is a mediator, but that the disposition by which the body is disposed toward such a union is destroyed. Still, breath is a mediator in effecting movement as the first instrument of movement.

Reply to objection 3: If the conditions of the body and the soul are thought of separately, then

there are several senses in which the soul is distant from the body. Hence, if the two of them had *esse* separately from one another, then many mediators would have to intervene. But since the soul is the form of the body, it does not have *esse* separately from the body's *esse*; instead, it is united to the body directly through its own *esse*. In the same way, if any form at all is thought of as an actuality, it has a great distance from matter, which is a being only in potentiality.

Article 8

Does the soul exist as a whole in each part of the body?

It seems that the soul does not exist as a whole in each part of the body:

Objection 1: In *De Causa Motus Animalium* the Philosopher says, "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; rather, if it is in some principle of the body, then it will vivify the other parts, since all of them are apt by nature to effect their proper movement."

Objection 2: The soul is in the body whose actuality it is. But it is the actuality of an organic body. Therefore, it exists only in an organic body. But not every part of the human body is an organic body. Therefore, the soul does not exist as a whole in each part of the body.

Objection 3: *De Anima 2* says that the soul as a whole is related to the whole body of the animal in the same way that a part of the soul is related to a part of the body, e.g., the power of vision to the pupil. Therefore, if the whole soul exists in each part of the body, then it will follow that each part of the body is an animal.

Objection 4: Every power of the soul is grounded in the very essence of the soul. Therefore, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, then it will follow that every power of the soul exists in every part of the body—and so vision will exist in the ear and hearing in the eye. But this is absurd.

Objection 5: If each part of the body were such that the soul as a whole exists in it, then each part of the body would be directly dependent on the soul. Therefore, it would not be the case that one part of the body depends upon another, or that one part is more important than another—which is manifestly false. Therefore, the soul does not exist as a whole in each part of the body.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate 6* Augustine says, "In each body the soul exists as a whole in the whole and as a whole in each part of it."

I respond: As we have already explained in the other articles, if the soul were united to the body only as a mover, then one could claim that it is not in every part of the body, but is just in the one part of the body by which it moves the other parts.

However, since the soul is in fact united to the body as its form, it must exist in the whole body and in each part of the body. For it is a substantial form and not an accidental form. But a substantial form is the perfection not only of the whole, but of each part. For since a whole consists of its parts, a form of a whole that does not give *esse* to each part of a body is a form which is, like the form of a house, itself a composition and an ordering [of parts]; and a form of this sort is an accidental form. The soul, by contrast, is a substantial form, and so it has to be the form and actuality not only of the whole but also of each part. And so just as, when the soul departs, [the body] is only equivocally called an animal and a man, like an animal in a picture or one made out of stone, so it is with the hands and eyes, or bones and flesh—as the Philosopher explains. An indication of this is that when the soul departs, no part of the body retains its proper function (*proprium opus*), whereas anything that retains its species retains the operation of that species. Now an actuality exists in that of which it is the actuality. Hence, the soul has to be in the whole body and in each part of the body.

From here we can consider the claim that the soul exists *as a whole* in each part of the body. For there are three kinds of wholes, corresponding to the three types of division in which a whole is divided into parts. One type is a whole divided into *quantitative parts*, e.g., a whole line or a whole body. Next, there is the type of whole divided into *rational or essential parts* (*partes rationis et essentiae*), as when what is defined is divided into the parts of the definition, or when what is composed is resolved into its matter and form. The third type is a whole power (*totum potentiale*), which is divided into *virtual parts* (*partes virtutis*).

Now the first type of wholeness belongs to forms only *per accidens* and then only to those forms that have a uniform relation (*habent indifferentem habitudinem*) to a quantitative whole and to its parts. For instance, as far as its own nature is concerned, a whiteness (*albedo*) is equally in a whole surface and in each part of the surface, and so the whiteness is incidentally (*per accidens*) divided when the surface is divided. By contrast, a form that requires diversity in the parts—such as a soul, and especially the soul of a perfect animal—is not related in the same way to the whole and to the parts, and so it is not divided *per accidens* when the quantity is divided. So, then, quantitative wholeness cannot be attributed to the soul either *per se* or *per accidens*.

On the other hand, the second kind of wholeness, which involves a completeness of concept or of essence, belongs to forms properly and *per se*. And the same holds for a wholeness of power (*totalitas virtutis*), since a form is a principle of operation.

Therefore, if one were asking whether or not whiteness exists as a whole in the whole surface and in each of the parts, it would be necessary to draw a distinction. For if the question were about a quantitative whole that has whiteness *per accidens*, then the whiteness would not exist as a whole in each of the parts. And the same would have to be said of a complete power, since the whiteness that exists in the whole surface is able to affect vision more than is the whiteness that exists in some small part (*particula*) of the surface. On the other hand, if the question were about the specific and essential whole (*de totalitate speciei et essentiae*), then whiteness as a whole is in each part of the surface.

However, since, as has been explained, the soul does not have a quantitative wholeness either *per se* or *per accidens*, it is enough to say that the soul exists as a whole in each part of the body with respect to a wholeness of perfection and essence, but not with respect to a completeness of power. For it is not the case that the soul is in each part of the body with respect to each of its powers; rather, it is in the eye with respect to the power of seeing (*secundum visum*) and in the ear with respect to the power of hearing (*secundum auditum*), and so on for the others.

Note, however, that since the soul requires diversity in the parts, it is not related in the same way to the whole and to the parts. Rather, it is related to the whole in the first place and *per se* (*primo et per se*), since the whole is what it properly and proportionately perfects; by contrast, it is related to the parts secondarily (*per posterius*), insofar as they are ordered toward the whole.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is talking about the soul's moving power.

Reply to objection 2: The soul is the actuality of an organic body in the sense that the organic body is what it perfects in the first place and proportionately.

Reply to objection 3: An animal is composed of the soul and the whole body, which the soul perfects in the first place and proportionately. But the soul is not in a part in this same way. Hence, it is not necessary for a part of an animal to be an animal.

Reply to objection 4: Some powers of the soul, viz., the intellect and will, are in it insofar as it exceeds the whole capacity of the body, and powers of this sort are not said to be in any part of the body. However, other powers are common to the soul and the body, and so it is not necessary for each of these powers to be in whatever part the soul is; instead, a power is just in that part of the body that is proportionate to its operation.

Reply to objection 5: One part of the body is said to be more important (*principalior*) than another because of the diverse powers whose organs are parts of the body. A more important part of the body is one that is an organ of a more important power or one that serves that power in a more important way.