QUESTION 77

The Powers of the Soul in General

Next we must consider what pertains to the powers of the soul—first in general (question 77), and then specifically (questions 78-83). On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is the essence of the soul the soul’s own power? (2) Is there just a single power of the soul, or are there many powers? (3) How are the powers of the soul distinguished from one another? (4) What is the ordering of the powers with respect to one another? (5) Is the soul the subject of all the powers? (6) Do the powers flow from the essence of the soul (fluant ab essentia animae)? (7) Does one power arise from another? (8) Do all the powers of the soul remain in it after death?

Article 1

Is the very essence of the soul the soul’s power?

It seems that the very essence of the soul is the soul’s power (potentia):

Objection 1: In De Trinitate 9 Augustine says, “Mind, knowledge, and love exist in the soul substantially or, what amounts to the same thing, essentially.” And in De Trinitate 10 he says, “Memory, understanding, and will constitute one life, one mind, one essence.”

Objection 2: The soul is more noble than primary matter. But primary matter is its own power or potentiality (potentia). Therefore, a fortiori, so is the soul.

Objection 3: A substantial form is more simple than an accidental form; an indication of this is that a substantial form is not intensified or remitted, but consists in what is indivisible. But an accidental form is its own power itself (ipsa sua virtus). Therefore, a fortiori, so is the substantial form, i.e., the soul.

Objection 4: The sentient power is that by which we have sensation, and the intellective power is that by which we have intellective understanding. But according to the Philosopher in De Anima 2, it is first and foremost (primo) the soul by which we sense and understand. Therefore, the soul is its own powers.

Objection 5: Everything that does not belong to a thing’s essence is an accident. Therefore, if the soul’s power lies outside its essence, it follows that the soul’s power is an accident. But this is contrary to Augustine in De Trinitate 9, where he says that the aforementioned powers “are not in the soul as in a subject, in the way that color or shape or any other quality or quantity is in a body; for nothing like that goes beyond the subject it is in, whereas the mind is able to love and to know other things as well.”

Objection 6: “A simple form cannot be a subject.” But the soul is a simple form, since, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 5), it is not composed of form and matter. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the soul’s power is in it as in a subject.

Objection 7: An accident is not the principle of a substantival difference. But sentient and rational are substantival differences, and they are taken from sensation and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore, the soul’s powers are not accidents. And so it seems that the soul’s power is its essence.

But contrary to this: In De Caelesti Hierarchia, chap. 11, Dionysius says, “The celestial spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation.” So, a fortiori, in the case of the soul, the essence is one thing and the virtue or power (virtus sive potentia) is something else.

I respond: It is impossible to maintain that the soul’s essence is its power, even though some have made this claim. For present purposes, this will be shown in two ways:

First, since potentiality (potentia) and actuality (actus) divide being and every genus of being,
potentiality and actuality have to be referred back to the same genus. And so, if an actuality is not in the genus of substance, then the potentiality corresponding to it cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the soul’s operation is not in the genus of substance; rather, it is only in the case of God that His operation is His substance. Hence, God’s power, which is a principle of operation, is the very essence of God. But as was explained above for the case of angels (q. 54, a. 3) as well, this cannot be true either of the soul or of any other creature.

Second, this is likewise obviously impossible in the case of the soul. For in its essence the soul is an actuality. Therefore, if the soul’s essence were itself an immediate principle of operation, then whatever has a soul would always actually be engaging in [all of the] vital works, in the same way that whatever has a soul is always actually alive. For the soul, just insofar as it is a form, is not an actuality ordered toward any further actuality, but is instead the ultimate terminus of generation. Hence, the fact that the soul is in potentiality with respect to some further actuality is not something that belongs to it because of its essence, just insofar as it is a form; rather, it is something that belongs to it because of its power.

And so insofar as the soul itself is the subject of its own power, it is called a first actuality that is ordered toward a second actuality. But a thing that has a soul is not always in actuality with respect to [all the] vital works (non semper esse in actu operum vitae). Hence, in the definition of the soul one likewise says that the soul is “the actuality of a body having life in potentiality,” where this potentiality “does not exclude the soul.” Therefore, it follows that the soul’s essence is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality with respect to an actuality insofar as it itself is an actuality.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about the mind insofar as it knows itself and loves itself. So, then, insofar as the knowledge and love are referred back to the mind itself as what is known and loved, they are substantially or essentially in the soul, since it is the soul’s very substance or essence that is being known and loved. And this is likewise the way to understand what he says in the other place, viz., “[Memory, understanding, and will constitute] one life, one mind, one essence.”

An alternative reply is that, as some claim, this last passage is rendered true by the way in which a whole of power (totum potestativum) is predicated of its parts, where this sort of whole lies between a universal whole (totum universale) and an integral whole (totum integrale). For a universal whole is present to each part with its whole essence and power, in the way that animal is predicated of man and horse, and in this sense is properly predicated of each part. By contrast, an integral whole is not in each part either with its whole essence or with its whole power; and so it is not in any way predicated of each part—though in a certain way, albeit improperly, it is predicated of all the parts taken together, as when we say that the walls, the roof, and the foundation are a house. Lastly, a whole of power (totum potentiale) is present to each part with its whole essence but not with its whole power; and there is a sense in which it can be predicated of each part, but not as properly as a universal whole is. And it is in this sense that Augustine is claiming that memory, understanding, and will are a single essence of the soul.

Reply to objection 2: The actuality with respect to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. And this is why the power or potentiality (potentia) of the matter is not distinct from its essence (non est aliquid quam eius essentia).

Reply to objection 3: Acting belongs to the composite, in the same way that the esse belongs to the composite; for acting belongs to that which exists. But the composite has esse substantively through its substantial form, whereas it acts through a power that follows upon its substantial form. Hence, a power of the soul is related to the soul in the way that an active accidental form is related to the agent’s substantial form, e.g., in the way that heat is related to the form of fire.

Reply to objection 4: The very fact that an accidental form is a principle of action is something it derives from the substantial form. And so the substantial form is the first principle of action, but not the
proximate principle of action. This is the sense in which the Philosopher is claiming that “the soul is that by which we understand and sense.”

Reply to objection 5: If accident is taken in the sense in which it is divided off against substance, then there cannot be anything between a substance and an accident, since they are divided off as an affirmation and a negation, viz., existing in a subject and not existing in a subject. And in this sense, since the soul’s power is not its essence, it must be an accident contained within the second species of quality.

On the other hand, if accident is taken in the sense in which it is posited as one of the five universals, then there is something between a substance and an accident. For whatever is essential to a thing pertains to substance, but not everything that lies outside of the essence can be called an accident; rather, an accident is only that which is not caused by the essential principles of the species. For a property (proprium) does not belong to the thing’s essence, but is caused by the essential principles of the thing, and so it lies between an essence and an accident taken in the present sense. In this way, the powers of the soul can be said to lie between a substance and an accident in the sense that they are natural properties of the soul.

As for Augustine’s claim that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents are in a subject, this is to be understood in the way explained above; that is, knowledge and love are being related to the soul insofar as the soul is that which is being loved and known—and not insofar as the soul is that which is knowing and loving. In this way his argument goes through. For if the love were in the-soul-as-loved as in a subject, then it would follow that an accident transcends its own subject, since there are also other things loved through the soul.

Reply to objection 6: Even though the soul is not composed of matter and form, it nonetheless has potentiality mixed in with it, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 5). And so it can be the subject of an accident.

The cited proposition, [viz., “A simple form cannot be a subject,”] has a place in the case of God, who is Pure Actuality, and it is in the material on God that Boethius introduces this proposition.

Reply to objection 7: Insofar as rational and sentient are differences, they are taken not from the powers of sentience and reason, but from the sentient and rational soul itself. Yet because substantial forms, which are unknown to us in their own right, are known through their accidents, nothing prevents accidents from sometimes being used [in definitions] in place of substantival differences.

Article 2

Does the soul have more than one power?

It seems that the soul does not have more than one power (non sint plures potentiae animae):

Objection 1: The intellective soul comes closest to a likeness of God. But in God there is a single and simple power. Therefore, the same holds for the intellective soul.

Objection 2: The higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellective soul exceeds all other forms in its power. Therefore, it is especially the case that it ought to have a single power or potentiality (unam virtutem seu potentiam).

Objection 3: Operating belongs to that which exists in actuality. But as was established above (q. 76, a. 3-4), it is through one and the same essence of the soul that a man has esse with respect to the diverse grades of perfection. Therefore, it is through one and the same power of the soul that he carries out the diverse operations of those diverse grades.
But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher posits a multiplicity of powers of the soul.  

I respond: One must claim that the soul has a multiplicity of powers (*plures potentias*). To see this clearly, note that, as the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 2, the lowest things cannot attain perfect goodness, but they do attain a certain imperfect goodness by means of a few movements; and things higher than these acquire perfect goodness by means of many movements; and still higher things acquire perfect goodness by means of a few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things that possess perfect goodness without any movements at all—in the same way that someone who is least disposed toward health cannot attain perfect health, but does attain some measure of health by means of a few medicines; and someone who is better disposed toward health can attain perfect health, but by means of many medicines; and someone who is still better disposed can attain perfect health by means of a few medicines; and someone who is the best disposed toward health has perfect health without any medicines at all.

Therefore, one should reply that the things below man attain certain particular goods and so have a few limited operations and powers, whereas man can attain universal and perfect goodness, since he is able to possess beatitude. However, he is, according to nature, in the lowest order of beings to whom beatitude belongs, and so the human soul needs many and diverse operations and powers. By contrast, the angels have a lesser diversity of powers, whereas in God there is no power or action at all beyond His essence.

There is also another reason why the human soul abounds in a diversity of powers, viz., that it is at the boundary between spiritual and corporeal creatures (*est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum*), and so the powers of both sorts of creatures come together in it.

Reply to objection 1: The intellective soul comes closer to a likeness of God than do lower creatures in the very fact that it is able to attain perfect goodness—even if through many diverse operations, a point on which it falls short of higher beings.

Reply to objection 2: A unified power is higher as long as it extends to just as many effects. But a multiplicity of powers is higher if more effects are subject to it.

Reply to objection 3: There is a single substantival *esse* for a single entity, but it is possible for there to be many operations. And so there is a single essence of the soul, but many powers.

Article 3

Are the powers distinguished from one another by their acts and objects?

It seems that the powers are not distinguished from one another by their acts and objects:

Objection 1: Nothing is contracted to a species by anything posterior to it or extrinsic to it. But the act is posterior to the corresponding power, whereas the object is extrinsic to the power. Therefore, it is not through their acts or objects that the powers are distinguished from one another in species.

Objection 2: Contraries differ from one another to the maximal degree. Therefore, if powers were distinguished from one another by their objects, it would follow that there is no one power with respect to contraries. But this is obviously false in almost all the relevant cases; for instance, the same visual power has black and white [as objects], and the same sense of taste has the sweet and the bitter [as objects].

Objection 3: When a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if the differences among the powers stemmed from differences among their objects, the same object would not belong to diverse powers. But this is obviously false; for instance, the same thing is such that the cognitive power has
cognition of it and the appetitive power desires it.

**Objection 4:** That which is a *per se* cause of something is a cause of that thing in all cases. But certain diverse objects belonging to diverse powers also belong to some one power. For instance, color and sound belong to the sense of sight and the sense of hearing, which are diverse powers; and yet they also belong to the unified common sensory power (*ad unam potentiam sensus communis*). Therefore, powers are not distinguished from one another by differences in their objects.

**But contrary to this:** Things that are posterior are distinguished by appeal to what is prior. But in *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says that “acts and operations are conceptually prior to the corresponding powers and prior still to them are their opposites,” i.e., their objects. Therefore, powers are distinguished from one another by their acts and objects.

**I respond:** A power, insofar as it is a power, is ordered toward an act. Hence, the nature of the power (*ratio potentiae*) has to be taken from the act toward which it is ordered and, as a result, the nature of the power must vary as the nature of the act varies. But the nature of the acts varies with the diverse nature of the objects.

Now every action belongs to either an *active power* or a *passive power*. The object is related to the act of a *passive* power as its source (*principium*) and moving cause; for instance, color is a source of the act of seeing (*principium visionis*) insofar as it moves the visual power (*inquantum movet visum*). On the other hand, the object is related to the act of an *active* power as its terminus and end; for instance, the object of the power to grow is a full size (*quantum perfectum*), which is the end of growth. Now an action receives its species from these two things, viz., either from its source or from its end, i.e., its terminus; for instance, heating differs from cooling insofar as the former proceeds from what is hot, viz., the active principle, to the hot, whereas the latter proceeds from what is cold to the cold. Hence, it must be the case that powers vary according to their acts and objects.

Note, however, that what is incidental (*per accidens*) does not make for a diversity of species. For instance, since being of a certain color is incidental to an animal, the species that belong to *animal* do not vary according to differences in color; instead, they vary according to the difference in what accrues *per se* to an animal, viz., differences belonging to the sentient soul, which is sometimes found accompanied by reason and sometimes found without reason. Hence, *rational* and *non-rational* are differences that divide *animal* and constitute its diverse species.

So, then, not just any variation in the objects makes for a variation in the powers of the soul; rather, what makes for a variation is a difference in something that the power is related to *per se*. For instance, the sensory power is related *per se* to sensible quality (*passibilem qualitatem*), which is divided *per se* into *color*, *sound*, etc.; and so the sentient power that has to do with color (the sense of sight) is distinct from the sentient power that has to do with sound (the sense of hearing). But it is incidental to sensible qualities such as color whether a thing is a musician or a grammarian, large or small, a man or a rock. And so it is not by differences of this latter sort that the powers of the soul are distinguished.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the act is posterior to the power in *esse*, it is nonetheless prior in intention and conceptually, in the way that the end is prior to the agent. And even though the object is extrinsic, it is nonetheless a principle and end of the action; and those things that are intrinsic to the thing are proportioned to the principle and to the end.

**Reply to objection 2:** If a power is related *per se* to one of two contraries as its object, then the other contrary must be related to some other power. However, a power of the soul relates *per se* not to the proper natures of the contraries, but rather to a nature that is common to both of the contraries; for instance, the sense of sight is related *per se* not to the nature *white*, but to the nature *color*. And the reason for this is that the one contrary is in some sense the nature of the other, since they are related as the perfect and the imperfect.
Reply to objection 3: Nothing prevents what is the same in subject from being conceptually diverse. And in this sense it can be related to diverse powers of the soul.

Reply to objection 4: A higher power is related per se to a more universal conception of its object (respicit universalorem rationem objecti) than a lower power is. For the higher a power is, the more things it extends to. And so more things agree in the single conception of the object that the higher power is related to per se, and yet those things differ from one another in the conceptions that the lower powers are related to per se. And this is how diverse objects belong to diverse lower powers, even though they fall under a single higher power.

Article 4

Is there any ordering among the powers of the soul?

It seems that there is no ordering among the powers of the soul (in potentiis animae non sit ordo):

Objection 1: There is no ‘before’ (prius) or ‘after’ (posterius) among things that fall under the same division; rather, they are naturally ‘simultaneous’ (naturaliter simul). But the powers of the soul are divided off against one another. Therefore, there is no ordering among them.

Objection 2: The powers of the soul are related to their objects and to the soul itself. But from the side of the soul, there is no ordering among the powers, since the soul is one. Likewise, from the side of the objects, there is no ordering among the powers, since the objects are diverse and wholly disparate, as is clear in the case of color and sound. Therefore, there is no ordering among the powers of the soul.

Objection 3: In powers that are ordered with respect to one another one finds that the operation of the one depends upon the operation of the other. But it is not the case that the act of one power of the soul depends on the act of another; for instance, the sense of sight can act without the sense of hearing, and vice versa. Therefore, it is not the case that there is an ordering among the powers of the soul.

But contrary to this: In De Anima 2 the Philosopher compares the parts or powers of the soul to shapes. But shapes have an ordering with respect to one another. Therefore, so do the powers of the soul.

I respond: Since the soul is one, whereas the powers are many, and since a multitude proceeds from one thing in a certain order, there must be an ordering among the powers of the soul.

In fact, three types of ordering are found among them. Two of these types have to do with the dependence of one power on another, while the third is taken from an ordering among their objects.

Now there are two ways to think of the dependence of one power on another: the first concerns an ordering of nature, insofar as what is perfect is naturally prior to what is imperfect; and the second concerns an ordering of time and generation, insofar as the perfect arises from the imperfect.

According to the first type of ordering among the powers, the intellective powers are prior to the sentient powers, and so they direct them and command them. Similarly, the sentient powers are prior in this type of ordering to the powers of the nutritive soul.

According the second type of ordering, the converse holds. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior, in the line of generation, to the powers of the sentient soul and so prepare the body for the actions of the sentient powers. And the same holds for the powers of the sentient soul with respect to the powers of the intellective soul.

On the other hand, according to the third type of ordering, certain of the sentient powers (vires sensitivae) have an ordering with respect to one another, viz., the sense of sight, the sense of hearing, and the sense of smell. For the visible is naturally prior to the other [objects], since it is common to both
higher and lower bodies. And the audible sound exists in the air, which is naturally prior to the mixing of the elements that the odoriferous follows upon.

**Reply to objection 1:** The species of certain genera are related as ‘before’ and ‘after’, e.g., the genera *number* and *shape*, as far as their *esse* is concerned—even though the species in question are said to be ‘simultaneous’ insofar as they bear the predication of a common genus.

**Reply to objection 2:** The relevant ordering of the powers of the soul is (a) on the part of the soul, which has an aptitude for diverse acts in a certain order, even though it is one in essence, and (b) on the part of the objects, and also (c) on the part of the acts, as has been explained.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through in the case of those powers among which there is an ordering only of the third type. By contrast, those powers that are ordered according to the other two modes are related in such a way that the act of the one is dependent on the act of the other.

**Article 5**

**Are all the soul’s powers in the soul as in a subject?**

It seems that all the soul’s powers are in the soul as in a subject:

**Objection 1:** The powers of the soul are related to the soul in the same way that the powers of the body are related to the body. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore, the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul.

**Objection 2:** The operations of the soul’s powers are attributed to the body because of the soul; for, as is explained in *De Anima* 2, “the soul is first and foremost (primum) that by which we have sensation and intellective understanding.” But the powers are the proper principles of the operations of the soul. Therefore, the powers are first and foremost (per prius) in the soul.

**Objection 3:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says that the soul senses (sentit) certain things but not through the body—indeed, without the body—e.g., fear and things of that sort. But if the sentient power were not in the soul alone as in a subject, it would not be able to sense anything without a body. Therefore, the soul is the subject of the sentient power and, by parity of reasoning, of all the other powers as well.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Somno et Vigilia* the Philosopher says, “Sensing is proper neither to the soul nor the body, but to the conjoined being.” Therefore, the sentient power is in the conjoined being as in a subject. Therefore, it is not the case that the soul is by itself (sola) the subject of all its own powers.

**I respond:** The subject of an operative power is that which is able to operate, since every accident denominates its proper subject. But the thing that is able to operate is the same as the thing that does operate. Hence, “what has the power” as a subject “is that to which the operation belongs,” as the Philosopher likewise says at the beginning of *De Somno et Vigilia*.

Now it is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 2-3 and q. 76, a. 1) that certain operations that are exercised without a corporeal organ, e.g., intellective understanding and willing, belong to the soul. Hence, the powers that are the principles of these operations are in the soul as in a subject.

However, there are certain operations of the soul that are exercised through corporeal organs, e.g., the act of seeing with the eyes and the act of hearing with the ears. And the same holds for all the other operations of the nutritive and sentient parts of the soul. And so the powers that are the principles of such operations are in the conjoined being as in a subject, and not in the soul alone.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the powers are said to belong to the soul not as a *subject* but as a
principle, since it is through the soul that the conjoined being is able to carry out such operations.

**Reply to objection 2:** All the powers in question are in the soul prior to being in the conjoined being, but as in a principle and not as in a subject.

**Reply to objection 3:** Plato’s opinion was that sensing is an operation proper to the soul, just as intellective understanding is, and in many matters related to philosophy Augustine makes use of Plato’s opinions by reciting them without asserting them.

Now as far as the matter at hand is concerned, there are two possible ways to understand the claim that the soul senses some things with the body and some without the body:

In the first way, the phrases ‘with the body’ (cum corpore) and ‘without the body’ (sine corpore) modify the act of sensing insofar as it proceeds from the one who is sensing. And given that the phrases are taken in this way, nothing has sensation without a body, since the action of sensing cannot proceed from the soul except through a corporeal organ.

In the second way, the phrases modify the act of sensing on the part of the object that is sensed. And given that the phrases are taken in this way, the soul senses some things ‘with the body’, i.e., as existing in the body, as when it senses a wound or something of that sort, whereas it senses other things ‘without the body’, i.e., as existing not in the body but only in the soul’s apprehension, as when it senses that it is sad or joyful about something that has been heard.

**Article 6**

**Do the powers of the soul flow from its essence?**

It seems that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence (non fluant ab eius essentia):

**Objection 1:** Diverse things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Therefore, since the powers of the soul are many and diverse, they cannot proceed from the soul’s essence.

**Objection 2:** That from which something else proceeds is a cause of that thing. But the soul’s essence cannot be called a cause of the powers, as is clear to one who runs through each of the genera of causes. Therefore, the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.

**Objection 3:** ‘Emanation’ names a certain movement. But as Physics 7 proves, nothing is moved by itself—except perhaps by reason of a part, as when an animal is said to be moved by itself because one part of it is the mover and another part the thing moved. Again, as De Anima 1 proves, the soul is not moved. Therefore, it is not the case that the soul in itself is a cause of its own powers.

**But contrary to this:** The powers of the soul are certain properties that are natural to it. But a subject is a cause of its proper accidents and thus, as is clear from Metaphysics 7, is mentioned in the definition of its accident. Therefore, the powers of the soul proceed from the soul’s essence as from a cause.

**I respond:** A substantial form and an accidental form agree in some things and differ in others. They agree in that both are actualities and each is such that because of it something in some way exists in actuality. However, there are two ways in which they differ:

First, a substantial form makes something to exist absolutely speaking, and its subject is a being only in potentiality. By contrast, an accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely speaking, but makes it to be such-and-such qualitatively (esse tale), or to be such-and-such a size (esse tantum), or to be related in some way (esse aliquo modo se habens); for its subject is a being in actuality. Hence, it is clear that actuality is found in a substantial form prior to being found in its subject; and because the
first thing in any genus is the cause, the substantial form causes esse in actuality in its subject. By contrast, actuality is found in the subject of an accidental form prior to being found in the accidental form, and so the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. Hence, insofar as the subject exists in potentiality, it is receptive of the accidental form, whereas insofar as it exists in actuality, it is productive of the accidental form. (I am making this claim about a proper and per se accident, since with respect to extraneous accidents the subject is receptive only, while an extrinsic agent produces such an accident.)

The second difference between a substantial form and an accidental form is that because what is less important (minus principale) exists for the sake of what is more important (principalius), the matter exists for the sake of the substantial form, whereas, conversely, the accidental form exists for the sake of the completion of its subject.

Now it is clear from what has been said (a. 5) that the subject of the soul’s powers is either (a) just the soul itself, which, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 3), can, insofar as it has some sort of potentiality (secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis), be the subject of an accident, or (b) the composite. But the composite exists in actuality because of the soul. Hence, it is clear that all the soul’s powers—whether their subject is the soul by itself or the composite—flow from the soul’s essence as their principle. For it has already been explained that an accident (a) is caused by its subject insofar as its subject exists in actuality and (b) is received in its subject insofar as its subject is in potentiality.

Reply to objection 1: Many things can naturally proceed from a single simple thing according to a certain order, and this, once again, because of the diversity of the things receiving them. So, then, from a single essence of the soul there proceed many and diverse powers, both because of the ordering among the powers, and also because of the diversity of the corporeal organs.

Reply to objection 2: The subject is a final cause and, in some sense, an acting cause of its proper accidents—and also a material cause, insofar as it receives the accidents. And from this one can infer that the soul’s essence is a cause of all the soul’s powers as an end and an active principle, whereas it is a cause of some of its powers as their subject.

Reply to objection 3: The emanation of the proper accidents from a subject is not through any sort of transmutation but through a sort of natural resultancy (per aliquam naturalem resulationem), in the manner in which one thing naturally results from another, e.g., color from light.

Article 7

Does one power arise from another?

It seems that it is not the case that one power arises from another:

Objection 1: Things that begin to exist at the same time are such that the one does not arise from the other. But all the powers of the soul are co-created together with the soul. Therefore, it is not the case that one of those powers arises from another.

Objection 2: A power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident arises from its subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another, since an accident does not have accidents. Therefore, it is not the case that one power arises from another.

Objection 3: An opposite does not arise from its opposite, but instead each of them arises from something similar to it in species. But the powers of the soul are divided off from one another as opposites, in the way that diverse species are divided off from one another as opposites. Therefore, it is not the case that one of them arises from another.
But contrary to this: Powers are known through their acts. But the act of one power is caused by another power; for instance, an act of imagining (actus phantasiae) is caused by an act of sensing. Therefore, one power of the soul is caused by another.

I respond: Among things that proceed in a certain natural ordering from one first thing, just as the first thing is a cause of all of them, so what is closer to the first thing is in some sense a cause of what is more remote from the first thing. But it was shown above (a. 4) that there is a multiple ordering among the powers of the soul. And so one power of the soul proceeds from the soul’s essence by the mediation of another power. But since (a) the soul’s essence is related to the powers both as an active and final principle and also as a receptive principle (either separately by itself or together with the body), and since (b) that which is an agent and an end is more perfect, whereas that which is a receptive principle is as such less perfect, it follows that those powers of the soul which are prior in the order of perfection and nature are principles of the other powers in the manner of an end and an active principle. For we see that the sensory power exists for the sake of the intellect, and not vice versa. Again, the sensory power is a certain deficient participation in the intellect, and so according to its natural origin it in some sense arises from the intellect in the way that what is imperfect arises from what is perfect.

Conversely, along the path of receptive principles, the more imperfect powers are principles with respect to the others, in the same way that the soul, insofar as it has the sentient power, is thought of as a subject and as a sort of material [cause] with respect to the intellect. And because of this, the less perfect powers are prior on the path of generation, since the animal is generated before the man.

Reply to objection 1: Just as a power of the soul flows from the soul’s essence—not through a transmutation but through a sort of natural resultancy—and yet is simultaneous with it, so the same holds for one power with respect to another.

Reply to objection 2: An accident cannot per se be the subject of an accident, but one accident is received in the substance prior to another, in the way that quantity is received before quality. And in this sense the one accident is said to be the subject of the other—in the way that a surface is said to be the subject of a color—because it is by the mediation of the one accident that the substance receives the other accident. And something similar can be said about the powers of the soul.

Reply to objection 3: The powers of the soul are opposed to one another by an opposition of what is perfect to what is imperfect, in the way that the species of number and shape are opposed to one another. However, this sort of opposition does not prevent one power from arising from another, since what is imperfect naturally proceeds from what is perfect.

Article 8

Do all the powers of the soul remain in a soul that is separated from its body?

It seems that all the powers of the soul remain in a soul that is separated from its body:

Objection 1: In De Spiritu et Anima it says, “The soul recedes from the body, taking the sensory power and power of imagination with it, along with reason, and intellect, and understanding, and concupiscibility, and irascibility.”

Objection 2: The powers of the soul are the soul’s natural properties. But a property always exists in, and is never separated from, that of which it is a property. Therefore, the powers of the soul remain in it even after death.

Objection 3: The soul’s powers, even its sentient powers, are not weakened when the body is weakened, since, as De Anima 1 says, “If an old man received the eyes of a young man, he would see in
the same way that a young man does.” But weakening is a path to corruption. Therefore, the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted; instead, they remain in the separated soul.

**Objection 4:** As the Philosopher shows, memory is a power of the sentient soul. But memory remains in a separated soul; for in Luke 16:25 the rich glutton, whose soul is in hell, is told, “Remember that you received good things in your life.” Therefore, memory remains in a separated soul and, consequently, so do the other powers of the sentient part of the soul.

**Objection 5:** Joy and sadness exist in the concupiscible power, which is a power of the sentient part of the soul. But it is obvious that separated souls are sad or joyful about the rewards or punishments they have. Therefore, the concupiscible power remains in a separated soul.

**Objection 6:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says that just as when the body lies senseless though not yet wholly dead, the soul sees certain things by means of an imaginative vision, so the same holds when the soul is completely separated from its body through death. But the imagination is a power of the sentient part of the soul. Therefore, the power of the sentient part remains in a separated soul and, consequently, so do all the other powers.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* it says, “A man is composed of just two substances, the soul with its reason and the flesh with its senses.” Therefore, when the flesh is dead, the sentient powers do not remain.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 5-7), all the powers of the soul have the soul alone as their *principle*.

However, certain of the powers, viz., the intellect and the will, have the *soul alone* as their subject, and powers of this sort must remain in the soul after its body has been destroyed.

By contrast, certain of the powers, viz., all the powers of the sentient and nutritive parts of the soul, have the *conjoined being* as their subject. Now when a subject is destroyed, its accidents cannot remain. Hence, when the conjoined being is corrupted, powers of the sort in question do not remain in actuality but remain only *virtually* in the soul as in their principle or root. And so the claim made by some, viz., that powers of this sort remain in the soul even after the body is corrupted, is false. And the further claim that the acts of these powers remain in a separated soul is all the more false, since no action belongs to these powers except through a corporeal organ.

**Reply to objection 1:** The book in question has no authority. Hence, what is written in it is rejected just as easily as it is asserted.

Still, one can reply that the soul takes powers of the sort in question along with it virtually and not actually.

**Reply to objection 2:** The powers which we claim do not remain actual in the separated soul are properties not of the soul alone, but of the conjoined being.

**Reply to objection 3:** Powers of the sort in question are said not to be weakened when the body is weakened because the soul, which is a virtual principle of these powers, remains immutable.

**Reply to objection 4:** Memory as referred to here (*illa recordatio*) is taken in the sense in which Augustine posits memory in the mind, and not in the sense in which it is posited as a part in the sentient soul.

**Reply to objection 5:** Sadness and joy are in the separated soul not with respect to the sentient appetite, but with respect to the intellective appetite—as is also the case with the angels.

**Reply to objection 6:** Augustine is speaking here by way of inquiry and not by way of assertion. That is why he retracts some of the things that were said in this place.