

QUESTION 80

The Appetitive Powers in General

Next we have to consider the appetitive powers. And on this topic there are four things to be considered: first, the appetitive powers in general (question 80); second, the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*) (question 81); third, the will (question 82); and, fourth, free choice (question 83).

On the first topic there are two questions: (1) Should appetite be posited as a special power of the soul? (2) Is the division of appetite into the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite a division into diverse powers?

Article 1

Is appetite a special power of the soul?

It seems that appetite (*appetitus*) is not a special power of the soul:

Objection 1: No power should be assigned to the soul with respect to what is common to living and non-living things. But to desire (*appetere*) is common to living and non-living things, since, as *Ethics* 1 says, the good is “what all things desire.” Therefore, appetite is not a special power of the soul.

Objection 2: Powers are distinguished by their objects. But it is the very same thing that we have cognition of and that we desire. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be a distinct appetitive power in addition to the apprehensive power.

Objection 3: What is common is not divided off from what is proper. But every power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing, viz., the object that is fitting for it. Therefore, there is no need to countenance a power which is distinct from the others and which is called the appetitive power with respect to the object *desirable in general* (*appetibile in communi*).

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher distinguishes the appetitive from the other powers. Likewise, in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene distinguishes the appetitive powers from the cognitive powers.

I respond: It is necessary to posit an appetitive power in the soul. To see this clearly, note that every form has some inclination following upon it, in the way that fire is by its form inclined toward the highest place and toward generating what is similar to itself.

However, in those things that participate in cognition the form exists in a higher mode than in things that lack cognition.

For among those things that lack cognition, the form determines each thing only to its own singular *esse*, which is likewise its *natural esse*. Therefore, a natural inclination, which is called *natural appetite*, follows upon this sort of natural form.

By contrast, among things that have cognition, each is determined to its own proper natural *esse* through a natural form, yet in such a way that it is receptive to the species of other things, in the way that the sensory power receives the species of all sensible things and the intellect receives the species of all intelligible things. The result is that man’s soul is in a certain sense all things through its sensory power and intellect, and in this respect things that have cognition come close in a certain sense to a likeness of God, “in whom all things preexist,” as Dionysius says. Therefore, just as forms exist in a higher mode in things that have cognition, beyond the mode of natural forms, so there must exist in them an inclination beyond the natural inclination called ‘natural appetite’. And this higher inclination involves the appetitive power of the soul, through which an animal is able to desire what it apprehends and not merely to desire what it is inclined toward by its natural form.

So, then, it is necessary to posit an appetitive power of the soul.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, in things that have cognition, desire (*appetere*) is found in a mode higher than the common mode in which it is found in all things in general. And so there must be a power of the soul that is prescribed for this (*oportet ad hoc determinari aliquam potentiam animae*).

Reply to objection 2: What is apprehended and desired is the same in subject but conceptually diverse. For a thing is apprehended as a sensible or intelligible being, but it is desired as something fitting or good. Now what is required for a diversification of powers is a *conceptual* diversity in the objects of those powers, and not a *material* diversity.

Reply to objection 3: Each power of the soul is a sort of form or nature, and it has a natural inclination toward something. Hence, it is by a *natural appetite* that each power of the soul desires an object fitting for itself. Beyond this, there is *animal appetite*, which follows upon apprehension and by which something is desired not because it is fitting for the act of this or that power, in the way that the visual power (*visio*) is for seeing and the power of hearing (*auditio*) is for hearing, but because it is fitting for the animal absolutely speaking.

Article 2

Are the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite diverse powers?

It seems that the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite are not diverse powers:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), powers are not diversified by incidental differences. But the difference between being apprehended by the sensory power and being apprehended by the intellect is incidental to a desirable object. Therefore, the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite are not diverse powers.

Objection 2: Intellective cognition is of universals, and this is what distinguishes it from sentient cognition, which is of singulars. But there is no room for this distinction in the case of appetite; for since appetite is a movement from the soul toward the things—i.e., toward singulars—every desire seems to be a desire for a singular thing. Therefore, it is not the case that the intellective appetite should be distinguished from sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Just as the appetitive power falls as a lower power under the apprehensive power, so it is with the power to effect movement. But the power to effect movement that follows upon man's intellective understanding is not distinct from the power to effect movement that follows upon sensory cognition in the other animals. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither is the appetitive power in man distinct from the appetitive power in the other animals.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher distinguishes two appetites, and he says that the higher appetite moves the lower appetite.

I respond: It is necessary to claim that the intellective appetite is a power distinct from the sentient appetite. For an appetitive power is a passive power that is naturally moved by what is apprehended; hence, as is explained in *De Anima* 3 and *Metaphysics* 12, the desirable apprehended thing is an unmoved mover, whereas the appetite is a moved mover. But things that are passive and movable are distinguished in a way that corresponds to the distinction among active movers, since what effects movement must be proportioned to what is moved, and what is active must be proportioned to what is passive. And the passive power itself has its proper nature from being ordered toward its active counterpart (*ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum*). Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect is different in genus from what is apprehended by the sensory power, it follows that the

intellective appetite is a power distinct from the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 1: The difference between being apprehended by the sensory power and apprehended by the intellect is not incidental to what is desirable. Rather, this feature belongs to it *per se*, since what is desirable moves the appetite only insofar as it is apprehended. Hence, differences in what is apprehended are *per se* differences in what is desired. And so the appetitive powers are distinguished by the differences in the apprehended things as by their proper objects.

Reply to objection 2: Even if the intellective appetite is led toward things which are singulars outside the soul, it is nonetheless led toward them under some universal notion (*secundum aliquam rationem universalem*)—as when it desires something because it is good. Hence, in the *Rhetoric* the Philosopher says that there can be hatred with respect to a universal, as when “we hate every type of thief.” Similarly, through the intellective appetite we can desire non-material goods that the sensory power does not apprehend—e.g., knowledge, virtue, and other things of this sort.

Reply to objection 3: As is explained in *De Anima* 3, a general opinion (*opinio universalis*) does not effect movement except by the mediation of a particular case (*mediante particulari*). Similarly, a higher appetite effects movement by the mediation of a lower appetite. This is why the power to effect movement that follows upon the intellect is not distinct from the power to effect movement that follows upon the sensory power.