QUESTION 93

The End or Terminus of the Production of Man

The next thing we have to consider is the end or terminus of the production of man, insofar as man is said to be made to the image and likeness of God (ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei) (Genesis 1:26).

On this topic there are nine questions:  (1) Does the image of God exist in man?  (2) Does the image of God exist in non-rational creatures?  (3) Does the image of God exist more in an angel than in a man?  (4) Does the image of God exist in every man?  (5) Is the image of God in man related to [God’s] essence, or to all the divine persons, or to just one of the divine persons?  (6) Is the image of God found in man only with respect to man’s mind?  (7) Does the image of God exist in man because of man’s powers, or because of his habits, or because of his acts?  (8) Does the image of God exist in man in relation to all objects?  (9) What is the difference between an image and a likeness?

Article 1

Does the image of God exist in man?

It seems that the image of God does not exist in man:

Objection 1: Isaiah 40:18 says, “To whom have you likened God? Or what image will you make for Him?”

Objection 2: Being an image of God is proper to the Firstborn, of whom the Apostle says in Colossians 1:15, “He is the Image of the invisible God, the Firstborn of every creature.” Therefore, the image of God is not found in man.

Objection 3: In De Synodis Hilary says, “An image is not different in species (species indifferens) from the thing it is an image of.” And, again, he says, “An image is an undivided and unified likeness of a thing, meant to equate that thing with another thing.” But God and man do not share the same species (non est species indifferens Dei et hominis); nor can man have equality with God. Therefore, the image of God cannot exist in man.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:26 says, “Let us make man to our image and likeness.”

I respond: In 83 Quaestiones Augustine says, “Where there is an image (imago), there is always a likeness (similitudo), but where there is a likeness, there is not always an image.” From this it is clear that likeness is part of the concept image, and that image adds something beyond the concept likeness, viz., that an image is modeled after something else (sit ex alio expressum). For the word ‘image’ (imago) is derived from something’s being done in imitation of another (agitur ad imitationem alterius). Hence, even if one egg is similar to and equal to a second egg, nonetheless, it is not called an image of that other egg, because it is not modeled after it.

Moreover, equality is not part of the concept image. For as Augustine says in the same place, “It does not follow that where there is an image, there is equality.” This is clear in the case of the image of someone in a mirror (in speculo relucente). Still, equality is part of the concept perfect image, since a perfect image lacks nothing that exists in the thing after which it is modeled (in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imaginii quod insit illi de quo expressa est).

Now it is clear that in man there is some sort of likeness to God that is derived from God as its exemplar (sicut ab exemplari); however, it is not a likeness of equality, since in this case the exemplar infinitely exceeds that which it is the exemplar of. And so the image of God is said to exist in man not as a perfect image, but as an imperfect image. Scripture signifies this when it says that man was made “to the image of God (ad imaginem Dei).” For the preposition ‘to’ (ad) signifies the approach of something that is far off in the distance (accessum quendam qui competit rei distantii).
Reply to objection 1: The prophet is talking about corporeal images fabricated by man, and this is why he expressly says, “What image will you make for Him?” But it is God Himself who has placed a spiritual image of Himself in man.

Reply to objection 2: The “Firstborn of every creature” is the perfect Image of God, perfectly matching (perfecte implens) that of which He is the Image (cf. q. 35). This is why He is said to be “the Image” and never “to the image” (dicitur imago et numquam ad imagem).

By contrast, man is called an image because of a likeness, and he is said to be made “to the image” because of the imperfection of the likeness. And since a perfect likeness of God cannot exist except by an identity of nature, the Image of God exists in His Firstborn Son in the way that the image of a king exists in his connatural son, whereas in man the image of God exists in a different nature, in the way that the king’s image exists on a silver coin. This is clear from Augustine in De Decem Chordis.

Reply to objection 3: Since one is [the same as] undivided being, a species is called ‘non-different’ (indifferens) in the same way that it is called ‘one’. But a thing is said to be one not only in number or in species or in genus, but also in accord with a certain analogy or proportion (secundum analogical vel proportionem quandam); and this is the sort of oneness or agreement that a creature has with respect to God.

On the other hand, what [Hilary] says about equating the one thing with the other has to do with the concept perfect image.

Article 2

Is the image of God found in non-rational creatures?

It seems that the image of God is found in non-rational creatures (in irrationalibus creaturis):

Objection 1: In De Divinis Nominibus Dionysius says, “Things that have causes bear contingent images of their causes.” But God is a cause not only of rational creatures, but also of non-rational creatures. Therefore, the image of God is found in non-rational creatures.

Objection 2: The more explicit (expressior) a likeness is in a thing, the closer it approaches the nature of an image. But in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, Dionysius says that a solar ray has a maximal likeness to God’s goodness. Therefore, it is made to the image of God.

Objection 3: The more perfect a thing is in goodness, the more like God it is. But the universe as a whole is more perfect in goodness than man is, since even if each particular thing is good, all of them together are called “very good” in Genesis 1:31. Therefore, the whole universe—and not just man—is made to the image of God.

Objection 4: In De Consolatione Philosophiae Boethius says of God, “... holding the world in His mind and forming it in a like image.” Therefore the whole world—and not just the rational creature—is made to the image of God.

But contrary to this: In Super Genesim ad Litteram 6 Augustine says, “This reaches its peak in man, since God made man to His own image by giving him an intellectual mind by which he stands out from the beasts.” Therefore, things that do not have an intellect are not made to the image of God.

I respond: Not just any likeness, even if it is modeled after another, is enough for the concept image. For if the likeness corresponds only to a genus or to some common accident, the thing in question will not thereby be said to be made “to the image” of the other. For instance, one could not say that a worm which comes out of a man is an image of the man because of the likeness in genus. Nor, again, can one say that if something becomes white and so like another thing, it is thereby made to that thing’s
image; for whiteness is an accident common to many species.

What is required for the concept image is that the likeness be either (a) with respect to the species, in the way that the image of a king exists in his son, or (b) at least with respect to some accident that is proper to the species—especially its shape—in the way that an image of a man is said to exist in copper. This is why Hilary explicitly says, “An image is not different in species.” And it is clear that a likeness in species has to do with the last difference [contained in the definition].

Now first, and most generally, some things are like God insofar as they exist. Second, some are like Him insofar as they are alive. Third, some are like Him insofar as they have knowledge or intellective understanding (sapiunt vel intelligunt). These last ones are, as Augustine puts it in "Quaestiones," “so close to God in likeness that nothing among creatures is closer.”

So, then, it is clear that, properly speaking, only intellectual beings are made to the image of God.

Reply to objection 1: Everything imperfect is a sort of participation (quaedam participatio) in what is perfect. And so even those things that fall short of the concept image still participate to some extent in the nature of an image insofar as they have some sort of likeness to God. This is why Dionysius says that things that have causes bear “contingent images” of their causes; that is, they bear the images not absolutely speaking, but to the extent that this is possible for them.

Reply to objection 2: Dionysius compares a solar ray to God’s goodness with regard to its causality, but not with respect to the dignity of its nature—which is what is required for the concept image.

Reply to objection 3: In the extensive and diffusive sense (extensive et diffusive), the universe is more perfect in goodness than an intellectual creature is. However, in the intensive and concentrated sense (intensive et collective), the likeness of the divine perfection is found to a greater degree in an intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good (capax summi boni).

An alternative reply is that a part is contrasted not with the whole, but with other parts. Hence, when one claims that intellectual natures alone are made to the image of God, this rules out other parts of the universe from being made to God’s image, but it does not rule out the universe’s being made to the image of God in some of its parts.

Reply to objection 4: Boethius is taking ‘image’ here as a kind of likeness by which an artifact imitates the pattern (species) of art that exists in the craftsman’s mind; and in this sense every creature is an ‘image’ of the exemplary conception that it has in God’s mind.

However, this is not the sense of ‘image’ that we are talking about in the present context. Instead, we are talking now about images that have a likeness in their nature. More specifically, all things are like the First Being insofar as they are beings, and some are like the First Life insofar as they are alive, and some are like the Highest Wisdom insofar as they have intellective understanding.

Article 3

Is an angel made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is?

It seems that an angel is not made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is:

Objection 1: In his sermon De Imagine Augustine says that God did not grant to any creature other than man that it should be made to His image. Therefore, it is not true that an angel is made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is.

Objection 2: According to Augustine in "Quaestiones," “Man is made to the image of God in such a way that he is formed by God without any other creature intervening. And so nothing is more
closely conjoined to God than he is.” But a creature is called an image of God to the extent that it is conjoined to God. Therefore, an angel is not made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is.

**Objection 3:** A creature is made to the image of God insofar as it has an intellectual nature. But there is no such thing as more of an intellectual nature or less of an intellectual nature (*intellectualis natura non intenditur nec remittitur*), since intellectual nature is in the genus *substance* and does not belong to the genus *accident*. Therefore, an angel is not made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is.

**But contrary to this:** In one of his homilies Gregory says, “An angel is called ‘a seal of likeness’, because in him the likeness of the divine image is imprinted more explicitly.”

**I respond:** There are two ways of talking about the image of God:

First, with respect to what the notion of an image is primarily thought of as existing in, viz., an intellectual nature. And in this sense the image of God exists to a greater degree in angels than in men, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 3), a more perfect intellectual nature exists in angels.

Second, the image of God in a man can be thought of with respect to what the image is secondarily thought of as existing in. More specifically, a certain imitation of God can be found in a man (a) insofar as man is from man in the way that God is from God, and (b) insofar as a man’s soul is a whole in his whole body and also a whole in each part of the body, in the same way that God is related to the world. As far as these and other such likenesses are concerned, the image of God is found to a greater degree in a man than in an angel. However, the nature of God’s image in man is associated with these likenesses *per se* only insofar as they presuppose the first sort of imitation, which has to do with the intellectual nature. Otherwise, brute animals would likewise be made to God’s image.

And so since as far as the intellectual nature itself is concerned, an angel is made to God’s image to a greater degree than a man is, one should grant that (a) absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) an angel is made to God’s image to a greater degree than a man is, but that (b) in a certain respect (*secundum quid*) a man is made to God’s image to a greater degree than an angel is.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is here excluding from God’s image other lower creatures that lack intellective understanding. He is not, however, excluding the angels.

**Reply to objection 2:** The claim that nothing is more closely conjoined to God than the human mind is asserted with respect to the genus *intellectual nature*, in the same way that fire is, as a species, the most subtle of bodies, even though one instance of fire is more subtle than another. For as Augustine had said earlier, “Those who have knowledge bear such a close likeness to Him that there is nothing closer among creatures.” Hence, this does not rule out the claim that an angel is made to God’s image to a greater degree.

**Reply to objection 3:** The assertion, “A substance does not admit of more and less,” does not imply that one species of substance is not more perfect than another. Instead, it implies that (a) one and the same individual does not participate more in its own species at some times and less at other times, and also that (b) different individuals [of the same species] do not participate to greater and lesser degrees in that species of substance.

**Article 4**

**Is the image of God found in every man?**

It seems that the image of God is not found in every man (*in quolibet homine*):
Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 11:7 the Apostle says, “The man (vir) is the image of God, while the woman (mulier) is the image of the man.” Therefore, since the woman is an individual of the human species, not every individual is an image of God.

Objection 2: In Romans 8:29 the Apostle says, “Those whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son.” But not all men have been predestined. Therefore, not all men are conformed to the image.

Objection 3: As was explained above (a. 1), likeness (similitudo) is part of the concept image (imago). But through sin a man becomes unlike God (Deo dissimilis). Therefore, he loses the image of God.

But contrary to this: Psalm 38:7 says, “Surely man passes as an image.”

I respond: Since it is because of his intellectual nature that man is said to be made to the image of God, it follows that he is made to God’s image to the highest degree to the extent that his intellectual nature is able to imitate God to the highest degree. But it is with respect to God’s knowing and loving Himself that an intellectual nature especially imitates God. Hence, there are three possible ways to think of the image of God in man:

In the first way, a man has a natural capacity to understand and to love God, and this capacity resides in the very nature of the mind (consistit in ipsa natura mentis), which is common to all men.

In the second way, a man actually or habitually understands and loves God, but still imperfectly; and this is the image associated with the conformity of grace (imago per conformitatem gratiae).

In the third way, a man has actual and perfect understanding of and love for God, and the image so taken is associated with the likeness of glory (imago secundum similitudinem gloriae).

This is why a Gloss on Psalm 4:7 (“The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”) distinguishes three images: (a) the image of creation, (b) the image of re-creation, and (c) the image of likeness. The first image is found in all men, the second image is found only in the justified (tantum in iustis), and the third image is found only in the blessed in heaven (solum in beatis).

Reply to objection 1: The image of God is found in both the man and the woman with respect to what the character of an image primarily consists in, viz., an intellectual nature. Hence, after Genesis 1:27 had said, “He created him”— viz., man (homo)—“to the image of God,” it adds, “... male and female He created them.” And as Augustine explains, it says “them” in the plural, lest it be thought that both sexes had been joined in one individual.

On the other hand, there is a certain secondary sense in which the image of God is found in the man and not in the woman. For the man is the source and the end of the woman in the way that God is the source and the end of the whole creation. Hence, after the Apostle had said, “The man is the image and glory of God, while the woman is the glory of the man,” he explained why he had said this by adding, “For the man is not from the woman, but the woman is from the man; and the man is not created for the sake of the woman, but the woman is created for the sake of the man.”

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: These arguments proceed from the type of image that has to do with the conformity of grace and glory.

Article 5

Does the image of God in man bear upon the Trinity of divine persons?

It seems that the image of God in man does not bear upon the Trinity of divine persons (non sit quantum ad Trinitatem divinarum personarum):
Objection 1: In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, “There is a unified divine essence of the Holy Trinity, and there is a unified image to which man was made.” And in *De Trinitate* 5 Hilary says, “Man is made to the common image of the Trinity.” Therefore, the image of God in man bears upon the divine essence and not upon the Trinity of persons.

Objection 2: *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says that the image of God in man bears upon [God’s] eternity. Also, Damascene says, “Man’s being made to the image of God signifies *per se* the intellect, the free will, and the power.” Again, Gregory of Nyssa says that when Scripture said that man was made to God’s image, “this amounts to saying that human nature was made a participant in every good; for the divine nature (*divinitas*) is the plenitude of goodness.” But all of this pertains to the oneness of the essence and not to the distinction among the persons. Therefore, in man the image of God bears upon the oneness of the essence and not upon the Trinity of persons.

Objection 3: An image leads to the cognition of the one whose image it is. Therefore, if the image of God in man bore upon the Trinity of persons, then since man is able to know himself through his natural reason, it would follow that man could know the Trinity of divine persons through his natural reason. But as was shown above (q. 32, a. 1), this is false.

Objection 4: The name ‘image’ belongs only to the Son and not to each of the three Persons; for in *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “The Son alone is the Image of the Father.” Therefore, if the image of God in man were associated with a [divine] person, there would be just an image of the Son in man and not an image of the whole Trinity.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “Man’s being made to the image of God shows the plurality of the divine persons.”

I respond: As was established above (q. 40, a. 2), the distinctions among the divine persons stem only from origins or, better, from the relations of origin. But the mode of origin is not the same in all things; instead, each thing’s mode of origin is appropriate to its nature. For instance, living things are produced in one way and non-living things in another way; animals are produced in one way and plants in another way.

Hence, it is clear that the distinction among the divine persons is appropriate to the divine nature. Thus, being made to the image of God in imitation of the divine nature does not rule out being made to the image of God in a sense that represents the three persons. Instead, the one follows upon the other.

So, then, one should reply that the image of God exists in man in a way that bears upon both the divine nature and the Trinity of persons. For in God Himself the one nature exists in three persons (*in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura*).

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The reply to the first two objections is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument would go through if the image of God in man represented God perfectly. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, there is a huge difference (*maxima est differentia*) between the trinity that exists in us and the divine Trinity. And so, as he says in the same place, “We see, rather than believe, the trinity that is in us, whereas we believe, rather than see, that God is a Trinity.”

**Reply to objection 4:** Some have claimed that only the image of the Son exists in man. But Augustine disproves this claim in *De Trinitate* 12.

First, since the Son is similar to the Father by an equality of essence, it is necessary that if man is made to the likeness of the Son, then he is made to the likeness of the Father.

Second, if man had been made only to the image of the Son, then the Father would have said, “Let us make man to *your* image and likeness,” and not “to our image and likeness.”

Therefore, when it says, “He made him to the image of God,” one should not, as some have,
interpret this to mean that the Father made man only to the image of the Son, who is God. Instead, it should be interpreted to mean that the Triune God (Deus Trinitas) made man to His own image, i.e., to the image of the whole Trinity.

Now there are two readings of the sentence, ‘God made man to His image (Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam)’.

On the first reading, the preposition ‘to’ (ad) designates the terminus of the act of making, so that the sentence has this meaning: ‘Let us make man in such a way that the image exists in him.’

On the second reading, the preposition ‘to’ can designate the exemplary cause, as when one says, “This book is made to [conform to] that book.” On this reading the image of God is the divine essence itself—improperly (abusive) called an ‘image’—insofar as ‘image’ is being used for ‘exemplar’. Alternatively, in keeping with what some have claimed, the divine essence is being called an ‘image’ because one [divine] person is like the other with respect to the divine essence.

Article 6

Does the image of God exist in man only because of his mind?

It seems not to be the case that the image of God exists in man only because of his mind (non solum secundum mentem):

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 11:7 the Apostle says, “The man (vir) is the image of God.” But the man is not only the mind. Therefore, the image of God is not associated only with the mind.

**Objection 2:** Genesis 1:27 says, “God created man to His own image. To the image of God He created him. Male and female He created them.” But the distinction of male from female has to do with the body. Therefore, the image of God in man is associated with the body and not just with the mind.

**Objection 3:** An image seems mainly to have to do with shape. But shape pertains to bodies. Therefore, the image of God in man is associated with the body, too, and not just with the mind.

**Objection 4:** According to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, we have three types of vision, viz., (a) corporeal, (b) spiritual or imaginative, and (c) intellectual. Therefore, if, because of our intellectual vision, which pertains to the mind, there is a ‘trinity’ (alia trinitas) in us by virtue of which we are made to the image of God, then by parity of reasoning the same should hold for the other types of vision as well.

But contrary to this: In Ephesians 4:23-24 the Apostle says, “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind and put on the new man.” From this we are given to understand that our renewal, which is effected by our putting on the new man, pertains to the mind. But Colossians 3:10 says, “... putting on the new man, who is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of Him who created him .... ,” where he attributes the renewal which is effected by putting on the new man to the image of God. Therefore, being an image of God involves just the mind.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), even though there is some sort of likeness to God in all creatures, it is only in the rational creature that one finds a likeness to God in the manner of an image, whereas in other creatures there is a likeness in the manner of a trace (vestigium). But it is his intellect or mind (intellectus sive mens) in which the rational creature exceeds other creatures. Hence, it follows that the image of God is found in the rational creature himself only because of his mind (non nisi secundum mentem).

Moreover, if the rational creature in question has any other parts, then the likeness of a trace is found in those parts, just as it is in the other creatures that this rational creature is similar to in virtue of
those parts. The reason for this can be seen clearly if one looks carefully at the way in which a trace represents and the way in which an image represents. For as has been explained (a. 2), an image’s representation involves a likeness of species. By contrast, a trace represents in the manner of an effect that represents its cause in such a way that it does not attain to a likeness of species; for instance, the footprints left behind by the movement of animals are called traces, and ash is likewise called the trace of a fire, and the desolation of the land is called the trace of a hostile army.

One can see a difference of this sort between rational creatures and other creatures—both with respect to how a likeness to the divine nature is represented in the creatures and also with respect to how a likeness of the uncreated Trinity is represented in creatures. For as far as the likeness to the divine nature is concerned, rational creatures seem in some sense to attain a representation of the species insofar as they imitate God not only in existing and in living but also in having intellection understanding—as was explained above (a. 2). By contrast, the other creatures do not have intellection understanding; instead, what appears in them is a certain trace of a productive intellect (vestigium intellectus producentis), if the way they are arranged is taken into account (si earum dispositio consideretur).

Similarly, since, as was established above (q. 28, a. 3), the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word (Verbum) from the Speaker (Dicens) and by the procession of the Love (Amor) from the two of them, in the rational creature, in which there is a procession of a word stemming from (secundum) the intellect and a procession of love stemming from the will, one can say that there is an image of the uncreated Trinity through a certain representation of the species. By contrast, in the other creatures one does not find either a source of a word, or a word, or love; rather, what one finds is a certain trace, because the cause that produces these other creatures has within itself a Source of the Word, and the Word, and the Love. For the very fact that a creature has a limited and finite substance (substantiam modificatam et finitam) demonstrates that it comes from some Source, whereas a creature’s species points to its Maker’s Word in the same way that the form of a house points to the craftsman’s conception; and the creature’s being ordered points to its Maker’s Love, by which the effect is ordered toward the good, in the same way that the use of a building points to the craftsman’s will.

So, then, in man the likeness of God is found in the manner of an image because of his mind, whereas in his other parts the likeness of God is found in the manner of a trace.

Reply to objection 1: Man is called an image of God not because he is an image in his essence, but because the image of God is imprinted on him in virtue of his mind—in the way that a denarius is called an image of Caesar in virtue of bearing Caesar’s image. Hence, it is not necessary that the image of God be received with respect to every part of a man.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine reports in De Trinitate 12, some have claimed that the image of the Trinity in man is borne not by one individual man, but by several individuals together (secundum plura). They say that “a man (vir) intimates the person of the Father, whereas the person of the Son is intimated by one who proceeds from the man in such a way as to be generated from him (de illo nascetur); and they claim that the third person, corresponding to the Holy Spirit, is the woman, who proceeds from the man in such a way that she is neither his son nor his daughter.”

On the surface, this seems absurd. First, it would follow that the Holy Spirit is a source of the Son in the way that the woman is a source of the child who is generated from the man. Second, a man (homo) would be the image of just one person. Third, on this view Scripture ought not to have mentioned the image of God in man until after offspring had been produced.

And so one should reply that after Scripture had said “He created him to the image of God,” it added “male and female He created them” not in order to associate the image of God with the distinction between the sexes, but because the image of God is common to both sexes, since it stems from the mind, in which there is no distinction between sexes. Hence, in Colossians 3:10, after the Apostle had said, “... according to the image of Him who created him,” he adds, “where there is neither male nor female.”
**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the image of God in man does not involve the shape of the body, still, as Augustine says in 83 *Quaestiones*, “since man’s body, alone among the bodies of the land animals, does not lie face downward (*non prostratum est*), with its belly close to the ground, but is instead such that it is more suitable for contemplating the heavens, it can rightly seem to be made to the image and likeness of God to a greater degree than the other animal bodies.” However, this should be understood to mean not that there is an image of God in man’s body, but that the very shape of the human body represents, in the manner of a trace, the image of God in the soul.

**Reply to objection 4:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, in both corporeal vision and imaginative vision there is a certain trinity.

For in corporeal vision there is first the *species* of the exterior body; second, the *act of seeing* itself, which is effected by the impression of a likeness of the species in question on the faculty of sight; and, third, the *will’s intention* in applying the faculty of sight to the act of seeing and keeping the act of seeing fixed on the thing seen.

Similarly, in the case of imaginative vision, one finds, first, a *species* reserved in memory; second, the *very act of imaginative seeing*, which stems from the fact that the soul’s glance, i.e., the very power of imagining, is informed by the species in question; and, third, there is the *will’s intention*, which joins the two.

However, both of these trinities fall short of the concept *image of God*.

For the species itself of the exterior body lies outside the nature of the soul, whereas even if the species that exists in memory does not exist outside the soul, it is nonetheless incidental to the soul. And so in both these cases the representation of the connaturality and coeternity of the divine persons is lacking.

Again, corporeal vision proceeds not only from the species of the exterior body but, along with this, from the sensory power of the one who sees; and, similarly, imaginative vision proceeds not only from the species that is conserved in the memory, but also from the power of imagining. And this does not appropriately represent the procession of the Son from the Father alone.

Again, the will’s intention, which connects the species and the power, does not proceed from them in the case of either corporeal vision or spiritual vision, and so it does not appropriately represent the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son.

**Article 7**

**Is the image of God found in the soul’s acts?**

It seems that the image of God is not found in the soul’s acts (*non inveniatur in anima secundum actus*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 11 Augustine says that man was made to the image of God “insofar as we exist, and know that we exist, and love our existence (*esse*) and our knowing (*nosse*).” But ‘existence’ (*esse*) does not signify an act. Therefore, the image of God in the soul is not associated with the soul’s acts.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine assigns the image of God in the soul to three things, viz., mind (*mens*), knowledge (*notitia*), and love (*amor*). But ‘mind’ signifies not an act, but rather a power of—or even the essence of—the intellective soul. Therefore, the image of God is not associated with acts.

**Objection 3:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to memory
(memoria), intellective understanding (intelligentia), and will (voluntas). But as the Master says in Sentences 1, dist. 3, these are “natural powers of the soul.” Therefore, the image is associated with powers and not with acts.

**Objection 4:** The image of the Trinity remains in the soul continuously (semper manet). But the acts do not remain continuously. Therefore, the image of God in the soul is not associated with the acts.

**But contrary to this:** In De Trinitate 11 Augustine associates the trinity in the lower parts of the soul with the sentient act of seeing and the imaginative act of seeing (secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et imaginariam). Therefore, the trinity that exists in the mind, in accord with which man is made to the image of God, should likewise be associated with the act of seeing (debet attendi secundum actualem visionem).

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), some type of representation of the species is part of the concept image. Therefore, if the image of the divine Trinity is going to be received in the soul, then it must be associated principally with what comes as close as possible to representing the species of the divine persons.

Now the divine persons are distinguished from one another by the procession of the Word from the Speaker and the procession of the Love that joins the two of them (secundum processio Verbi a Dicente et Amoris connectentis utrumque). But as Augustine says in De Trinitate 14, the word in our soul cannot exist in the absence of actual thinking. Therefore, the image of the Trinity in our mind is primarily and principally associated with the act. More specifically, on the basis of the knowledge (notitia) we have, we form an interior word by thinking (cogitando interius verbum formamus) and from this we break out into love (in amorem prorumpimus).

However, since habits and powers are the principles of acts and since each thing exists virtually in its principles, there can be in the soul a secondary and, as it were, implied (ex consequenti) image of the Trinity that is associated with the soul’s powers and mainly with its habits, insofar as the acts exist virtually in the habits.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our existence (esse) pertains to the image of God because it is proper to us above and beyond the other animals; for esse belongs to us insofar as we have a mind. And so the trinity mentioned here is the same one that Augustine posits in De Trinitate 9, consisting of mind, knowledge, and love.

**Reply to objection 2:** Augustine at first finds in the mind the trinity mentioned in the objection. However, the mind is such that even if it in some sense knows itself as a whole, it is also in some sense ignorant of itself, viz., insofar as it is distinct from other things; and so it also seeks itself, as Augustine later shows in De Trinitate 10. Hence, given that knowledge (notitia) is not entirely the same as mind (mens), he takes three things in the soul—viz., memory (memoria), intellective understanding (intelligentia), and will (voluntas)—which are proper to the mind and which no one is ignorant of having. And it is to these three things that he then ascribes the image of the Trinity, given that his first ascription was in some sense deficient.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine shows in De Trinitate 14, we are said to understand and to will (or love) certain things both when we are actually thinking of them and when we are not actually thinking of them. But when they exist in the absence of thought, they belong only to the memory, which in itself is nothing other than the habitual retention of knowledge and love. “But since,” as he himself puts it, “the word cannot exist there in the absence of thought (for we think everything that we say, at least by means of that interior word which does not belong to the language of any nation), the image in question is known instead in these three things, viz., memory, memory, intellective understanding, and will. I mean the intellective understanding by which we understand when we are thinking; and I mean the will (or love (amor) or higher affection (dilectio)) which joins that parent and that offspring.” From this it is
clear that he locates the image of the Trinity in actual understanding and actual willing rather than in their habitual retention in memory—even though in habitual retention there is also a certain image of the Trinity in the soul, as he says in the same place. And so it is clear that ‘memory’, ‘intellective understanding’, and ‘will’ are not being used here for three powers, as they are in the Sentences.

Reply to objection 4: Someone could reply by citing the fact that in De Trinitate 14 Augustine says, “The mind always remembers itself, always understands itself, and always loves itself.” Some take this to mean that actual intellective understanding of itself and actual love for itself are [always] present in the soul.

However, Augustine undermines this interpretation when he adds, “[The mind] is not always thinking of itself as discrete from those things that are not what it itself is.” From this it is clear that the soul is always understanding and loving itself habitually and not actually—though one can also say that because it perceives its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything at all.

However, since the soul is not always actually engaged in intellective understanding, as is clear in the case of someone who is sleeping, one must say that even if its acts do not in themselves remain continuously, they nonetheless do always remain in their principles, viz., the powers and habits. Hence, in De Trinitate 14 Augustine says, “If the rational soul is made to the image of God because it is able to use reason and intellect to understand and contemplate God, then from the very beginning of its existence the image of God existed within it.”

Article 8

Does the image of the divine Trinity exist in the soul only in relation to the object which is God?

It seems that it is not the case that the image of the divine Trinity exists in the soul only in relation to the object which is God (non solum per comparationem ad obiectum quod est Deus):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 6-7), the image of the divine Trinity is found in the soul because the word in us proceeds from the speaker and the love in us proceeds from both the speaker and the word. But [these processions] are found in us with respect to every object whatsoever. Therefore, the image of the divine Trinity is found in our mind with respect to every object whatsoever.

Objection 2: In De Trinitate 12 Augustine says, “When we are looking for the Trinity in the soul, we look in the whole soul, not separating rational action in the realm of temporal things from the contemplation of eternal things.” Therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul even with respect to temporal objects.

Objection 3: The fact that we understand and love God belongs to us by a gift of grace. Therefore, if the image of the Trinity in the soul is associated [only] with the memory of God, the understanding of God, and the willing (or loving) of God, then the image of God will exist in man only by grace and not by nature. Therefore, it will not be something common to all men.

Objection 4: The saints who dwell in heaven are maximally conformed to the image of God by the vision of glory (secundum gloriae visionem); this is why 2 Corinthians 3:18 says, “We are being transformed into the same image from glory to glory (a claritate in claritatem).” But temporal things are known through the vision of glory. Therefore, it is also in relation to temporal objects that the image of God exists in us.

But contrary to this: In De Trinitate 14 Augustine says, “It is not because the mind remembers itself and understands itself and loves itself that the image of God exists in it; rather, it is because the
mind is able to remember, understand, and love the God by whom it was made.” Therefore, even less is it the case that the image of God in the mind is associated with objects other [than God or the mind itself].

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), image implies a likeness that somehow involves a representation of the species. Hence, the image of the divine Trinity in the soul must be associated with something that represents the divine persons by a representation of their species, insofar as this is possible for a creature. Now as has been said (a. 6-7), the divine persons are distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker and the procession of the Love from the two of them. And the Word of God is begotten of God insofar as He knows Himself (secundum notitiam sui ipsius), and the Love proceeds from God insofar as He loves Himself. Now it is clear that it is the diversity of the objects that differentiates the species of words and the species of love. For instance, the word rock conceived in the human heart is not the same in species as the word horse; nor is the love of a rock the same in species as the love of a horse. Therefore, the divine image in man is associated with (a) the word that is conceived from knowledge about God and (b) the love that is derived from that word. And so the image of God is present in the soul insofar as the soul is drawn—or is capable of being drawn—toward God.

Now there are two ways in which the mind is drawn toward something: (a) directly and immediately, and (b) indirectly and mediately, as when someone looking at a man’s image in a mirror is said to be drawn toward the man himself. This is why, in De Trinitate 14 Augustine says, “The mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we discern this, we discern the Trinity—not yet God Himself, but even now an image of God.” This is not because the mind is drawn toward itself, absolutely speaking, but rather because by being drawn toward itself, it can be drawn further toward God. This is clear from the passage just quoted.

Reply to objection 1: As far as the concept image is concerned, one must attend not only to the fact that something proceeds from something, but also to what exactly proceeds from what, viz., that the word God proceeds from knowledge about God.

Reply to objection 2: There is a sort of trinity in the whole soul—not, to be sure, such that, in addition to action regarding temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, “there is some third thing to look for by which the trinity is completed,” as Augustine adds in the same place. Instead, as he explains later, “Even if a trinity could be found in the part of reason that is derived from the side of temporal things, the image of God would still not be found there,” because this sort of knowledge of temporal things is incidental to the soul.

Moreover, the habits by which temporal things are known are not themselves always present in the soul; instead, they are sometimes there in the present and sometimes there only in memory, even after they have begun to be present. This is clear, for instance, in the case of faith, which comes to us temporally in the present life but which in the state of future beatitude will no longer be faith, but a memory of faith.

Reply to objection 3: The meritorious cognition and love of God occur only through grace. However, as was established above (q. 12, a. 12), there is such a thing as a natural cognition and love of God.

And it is likewise natural for the mind to be able to use reason to understand God, and because of this we have claimed that the image of God remains continuously (permanere semper) in the mind, regardless of whether (a) “this image of God is so thinned out”—clouded over, as it were—“as to amount to almost nothing,” as in those who do not have the use of reason, or whether (b) “it is darkened or deformed,” as in sinners, or whether (c) “it is bright and beautiful,” as in the justified—as Augustine says in De Trinitate 14.
Reply to objection 4: Through the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself, and so this sort of vision of temporal things will be relevant to the image of God. This is what Augustine is talking about in De Trinitate 14: “In the nature to which the mind will happily adhere, the mind will see as immutable everything that that nature sees. For the conceptions of all creatures exist in the uncreated Word Himself.”

Article 9

Is it appropriate to distinguish the likeness [of God] from the image [of God]?

It seems that it is not appropriate to distinguish the likeness [of God] from the image [of God] (similitudo ab imagine non convenienter distinguatur):

Objection 1: It is not appropriate to distinguish a genus from its species. But likeness is related to image in the way that a genus is related to its species, since “where there is an image, there is always a likeness, but not vice versa,” as 83 Quaestiones puts it. Therefore, it is inappropriate to distinguish the likeness from the image.

Objection 2: The concept image involves not only a representation of the divine persons, but also a representation of the divine essence, where immortality and indivisibility are relevant to the latter. Therefore, it is not appropriate to claim that “the likeness exists in the essence [of the soul], since it is immortal and indivisible, whereas the image exists in other things” [Sentences 2, dist. 16].

Objection 3: As was established above (a. 4), there are three images of God in man, viz., the image of nature, the image of grace, and the image of glory. But innocence and justification pertain to grace. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that “the image is associated with memory, intellective understanding, and will, whereas the likeness is associated with innocence and justification” [Sentences 2, dist. 16].

Objection 4: The cognition of truth belongs to intellective understanding, whereas the love of virtue belongs to the will—and these are two parts of the image. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that “the image exists in the cognition of truth, whereas the likeness exists in the love of virtue” [Sentences 2, dist. 16].

But contrary to this: In 83 Quaestiones Augustine says, “It is not in vain that some understand that two things are being spoken of in the phrase ‘to [our] image and likeness’ (Genesis 1:26); for if there were just one thing, then a single name could have sufficed.”

I respond: A likeness is a certain sort of oneness (quaedam unitas); for as Metaphysics 5 says, “Oneness (unum) is a cause of likeness in quality.” Now since one is a transcendent and common to all things, it can be adapted to each individual (ad singula potest aptari) in the same way that good and true can be.

Hence, just as good can be applied to a particular thing both (a) as preliminary to it (ut praeambulum ad ipsam) and also (b) as subsequent to it (ut subsequens), viz., insofar as good designates some perfection it has, so it is with the relation of likeness to image. For instance, good is preliminary to man insofar as a man is a certain particular good and, again, good is subsequent to man insofar as we say that some individual man is good within his species (bonum specialiter) because of the perfection of his virtue. Similarly, likeness is thought of as preliminary to image insofar as likeness is more general than image, as was explained above (a. 1); and likeness is thought of as subsequent to image insofar as likeness signifies a certain perfection in an image, in the sense in which we say that an image of someone is like or unlike the one whose image it is, depending on whether the image represents him more
perfectly or less perfectly.

So, then, there are two possible ways to distinguish likeness from image. In the first way, likeness is preliminary to image and exists in more things. And in this sense, the likeness [of God] involves those things that are more general than the properties of the intellectual nature that image is properly associated with. Accordingly, 83 Quaestiones says, “No one doubts that spirit”—i.e., mind—“is made to the image of God, whereas, according to what some want to say, the rest of a man”—viz., those things that belong to the lower parts of the soul or even to the body itself—“are made to the likeness [of God].” It is also in keeping with this reading that De Quantitate Animae says that the likeness of God in the soul is associated with the soul’s being incorruptible, since corruptible and incorruptible are differences of being-in-general.

In the second way in which it can be thought of, likeness signifies the vividness (expressio) and perfection of an image. It is in accord with this reading that Damascene says, “What is relevant to the image signifies an intellectual power and a power that is per se free because of choice, whereas what is relevant to the likeness is a likeness of virtue, to the extent that it is possible for virtue to exist in a man.” And this is equivalent to saying that the likeness pertains to the love of virtue; for there is no virtue without a love of virtue.

Replay to objection 1: A likeness is distinguished from an image not with respect to the general concept likeness (for this concept is included within the concept image itself), but rather insofar as a given likeness either (a) falls short of the concept image or (b) is perfective of an image.

Replay to objection 2: The soul’s essence is relevant to the image to the extent that the image represents the divine essence in what is proper to an intellectual nature, e.g., being simple and being indissoluble—though not in the conditions that follow upon being in general (conditiones consequentes ens in communi).

Replay to objection 3: Certain virtues exist in the soul naturally, at least as far as their seeds are concerned, and a natural likeness could be associated with these virtues. However, it is not inappropriate for something that is called an image by one criterion (secundum assignationem unam) to be called a likeness by some other criterion.

Replay to objection 4: Love for the Word (dilectio verbi), i.e., knowledge that is loved (amata notitia), pertains to the concept image, but the love of virtue pertains to the concept likeness, as does virtue as well.