After the general consideration of virtues and vices and of the other things relevant to moral matters (de aliis ad materiam moralem pertinentibus), we must next consider each of these things specifically (in speciali). For general morals (morales universales) are less useful, given that actions involve particulars.

Now there are two ways in which something concerning morals can be thought about specifically: (a) on the part of the moral matters themselves, as when one considers this particular virtue or that particular vice; and (b) as regards the specific states that belong to men (quantum ad speciales status hominum), as when one considers prelates and those subject to them, or those who are active and those who are contemplative, or any of the other different states of men. Therefore, we will first give specific consideration to what is relevant to all the states of men (questions 1-179) and, second, we will consider specifically what is relevant to determinate states (questions 180-189).

However, as regards the first topic, if we were to treat the virtues (virtutes), the gifts [of the Holy Spirit] (dona), the vices (vitia), and the commandments (praeeptae) separately, then we would have to say the same thing many times. For instance, if someone wanted to give an adequate treatment of the commandment, ‘You shall not commit adultery’, he would have to inquire into adultery, which is a certain sin, knowledge about which depends upon knowledge about the opposed virtue. Therefore, our path of inquiry will be more advantageous and expeditious if we consider a virtue, its corresponding gift, its opposite vices, and the relevant affirmative and negative commandments all together within the same treatise. Moreover, this manner of inquiry will be appropriate for the vices themselves in accord with their proper species (secundum proprium speciem). For it was shown above (ST 1-2, q. 72) that vices and sins are diversified in species by their subject matter or object (secundum materiam vel objectum) and not by the other distinctions among sins—e.g., sins of the heart, of the mouth, and of deed; or sins stemming from weakness, from ignorance, and from malice; or other distinctions of this sort. By contrast, it is the same subject matter with respect to which a virtue operates uprightly and the opposed vices recede from rectitude.

So, then, now that all moral matters have been traced back to a consideration of the virtues, all the virtues themselves are further traced back to seven virtues, three of which are the theological virtues, which we will talk about first (questions 1-46), and the other four of which are the cardinal virtues, which we will talk about after that (questions 47-179).

Now among the intellectual virtues there is, to be sure, prudence (prudentia), which is contained within the cardinal virtues and numbered among them. However, as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 57, aa. 3-4), crafts (artes), which have to do with things that can be made, are not relevant to morals, which have to do with things that can be done. And the other three intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, share their names with certain gifts of the Holy Spirit. Hence, they will be treated within the treatment of the gifts that correspond to the virtues.

Now as is clear from what was said above (ST 1-2, q. 61, a. 3), the other moral virtues are all in some way or other traced back to the cardinal virtues. Hence, in the treatment of a given cardinal virtue, all the virtues and opposed vices that are in any way relevant to it will likewise be treated. And in this way nothing belonging to morals will be left out.

**QUESTION 1**

The Object of Faith

As for the theological virtues, we must consider, first, faith (questions 1-16); second, hope (questions 17-22); and, third, charity (questions 23-46).

As regards faith, there are four things to consider: first, faith itself (questions 1-7); second, the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which correspond to faith (questions 8-9); third, the vices opposed to faith (questions 10-15); and, fourth, the commandments that belong to this virtue (question 16).
As regards faith itself, we must consider, first, the object of faith (question 1); second, the act of faith (questions 2-3); and, third, the very habit of faith (questions 4-7).

On the first topic there are ten questions:  
(1) Is the object of faith the First Truth?  
(2) Is the object of faith something complex (complexum) or something non-complex (incomplexum)—that is, is it a proposition (enuntiabile) or an entity (res)?  
(3) Can anything false fall under faith?  
(4) Can the object of faith be something that is seen?  
(5) Can the object of faith be something that is known scientifically (aliquid scitum)?  
(6) Are the things to be taken on faith (credabilia) appropriately divided into certain articles of the Faith?  
(7) Do the same articles fall under faith at all times (secundum omne tempus)?  
(8) How many articles are there?  
(9) What of the manner of handing down the articles in a creed (in symbolo)?  
(10) Whose role is it to put together a creed of the Faith (fidei symbolum constitueret)?

Article 1

Is the object of faith the First Truth?

It seems that the object of faith is not the First Truth:

**Objection 1:** It seems that the object of faith is what is proposed to us to be taken on faith (nobis proponitur ad credendum). But what is proposed to us to be taken on faith are not just those things that pertain to the divine nature, which is the First Truth, but also things that pertain (a) to Christ’s human nature (ad humanitatem Christi), (b) to the sacraments of the Church (ad Ecclesiae sacramenta), and (c) to the creation of creatures (ad creatureum conditionem). Therefore, it is not only the First Truth that is the object of faith.

**Objection 2:** Since faith and unbelief (fides et infidelitas) are opposites, they have to do with the same thing. But each thing contained in Sacred Scripture is such that unbelief can be about it, since if a man denies any one of those things, then he is counted as an unbeliever. Therefore, faith likewise has to be about all the things contained in Sacred Scripture. But Sacred Scripture contains many things that have to do with men and other created entities. Therefore, the object of faith includes not only the First Truth, but also created truth.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 62, a. 3), faith is divided off from charity on the same level (fides caritati condividitur). But by charity we love not only God, who is the highest goodness, but also our neighbor. Therefore, the object of faith is not just the First Truth.

**But contrary to this:** In De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “Faith has to do with the truth that is simple and everlasting (circa simplicem et semper existentem veritatem).” But this is the First Truth. Therefore, the object of faith is the First Truth.

**I respond:** The object of a cognitive habit has two aspects: (a) what is known materially, and this is, as it were, the material object, and (b) that through which it is known, and this is the formal character of the object (formalis ratio obiecti). For instance, in the science of geometry the conclusions are what is known materially, whereas the formal character of the knowing is the medium of demonstration through which the conclusions are known.

So, then, in the case of faith, if we are thinking about the formal character of the object, this is none other than the First Truth; for the sort of faith we are speaking of assents to something only because it has been revealed by God, and so it relies on divine truth as a medium.

On the other hand, if we are thinking materially about the things to which faith assents, then this is not only God Himself, but many other things as well. Still, these things fall under the assent of faith only insofar as they have a relation to God, viz., because it is through certain of God’s effects that man is assisted in tending toward the enjoyment of God. And so even on this score the object of faith is the First Truth, since nothing falls under faith except in relation to God—in the same way that the object of the medical art is health because it takes nothing into account except in relation to health.
Reply to objection 1: Things pertaining to Christ’s human nature or to the sacraments of the Church or to any creatures whatsoever fall under faith insofar as we are ordered toward God through them. And we likewise assent to them because of divine truth.

Reply to objection 2: The same thing should be said, in reply to the second objection, with respect to all the things that are handed down in Sacred Scripture.

Reply to objection 3: Charity likewise loves one’s neighbor because of God, and so, as will be explained below (q. 25, a. 1), the object of charity is, properly speaking, God Himself.

Article 2

Is the object of faith something complex in the manner of a proposition?

It seems that the object of faith is not anything complex in the manner of a proposition (non sit aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), the object of faith is the First Truth. But the First Truth is something non-complex. Therefore, the object of faith is not anything complex.

Objection 2: The exposition of the Faith is contained in the creed (expositio fidei in symbolo continetur). But it is things (res) and not propositions that are posited in the creed; for instance, the creed does not say ‘God is almighty’, but instead says ‘I believe in God the almighty’. Therefore, the object of faith is a thing and not a proposition.

Objection 3: Faith is succeeded by sight—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:12 (“We see now through a glass darkly, but then face to face”). But the vision that belongs to heaven is of something non-complex, since it is a vision of God’s essence itself. Therefore, the same likewise holds for faith in this life (ergo etiam fides viae).

But contrary to this: Faith (fides) lies between scientific knowledge (scientia) and opinion (opinio). But what lies in the middle is of the same species as the extremes. Therefore, since scientific knowledge and opinion have to do with propositions, it seems that faith likewise has to do with propositions. And so since faith has to do with propositions, the object of faith is something complex.

I respond: What is known exists in the knower in the manner of the knower. But as was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 85, a. 5), the proper mode of the human intellect is to have cognition of the truth by composing and dividing. And so it is with a certain complexity that the human intellect has cognition of things that are simple in their own right—just as, conversely, the divine intellect has cognition in a non-complex way of things that are complex in their own right.

So, then, the object of faith can be thought of in two ways: In one way, on the part of the thing itself that is taken on faith, and in this sense the object of faith is something non-complex, viz., the very thing with respect to which one has faith. In the second way, on the part of the one who has faith, and in this sense the object of faith is something complex in the manner of a proposition.

This is why both opinions were held with truth by the ancients, and why both are true in a certain respect.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through with respect to the object of faith on the part of the very thing that is taken on faith.

Reply to objection 2: As is clear from the very manner of speaking, in the creed the things with respect to which there is faith are touched upon insofar as they terminate the act of the believer. But the act of the believer is terminated in the thing and not in a proposition, since we form propositions only in order that through them we might have cognition of the things—and this holds in the case of faith, just as it holds in the case of scientific knowledge.

Reply to objection 3: The vision that belongs to heaven will be of the First Truth as it exists in
itself—this according to 1 John 3:2 (“When He appears, we shall be like Him, and we will see Him as He is”). And so that vision will exist in the manner of a simple act of understanding and not in the manner of a proposition. By contrast, we do not through faith apprehend the First Truth as He is in Himself. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Article 3

Can anything false fall under faith?

It seems that something false can fall under faith (fidei possit subesse falsum):

**Objection 1:** Faith is divided off from hope and charity on the same level (fides condividitur spei et caritati). But something false can fall under hope, since many who will not in fact have eternal life hope that they will have it. The same thing likewise holds for charity, since many are loved as good and yet are not good. Therefore, it is also the case that something false can fall under faith.

**Objection 2:** Abraham took it on faith that the Christ would be born—this according to John 7:56 (“Abraham, your father, rejoiced to see my day”). But after Abraham’s time God was able not to be incarnated, since He took on flesh by His own will alone; and in that case Abraham would have taken on faith something false about the Christ. Therefore, it is possible for what is false to fall under faith.

**Objection 3:** The faith of the ancients was that Christ would be born, and this faith endured in many right up until the preaching of the Gospel. But once Christ had already been born and before He began to preach, it was false that Christ would be born. Therefore, what is false can fall under faith.

**Objection 4:** One of the things that belongs to the Faith is that Christ would be born, and this faith endured in many right up until the preaching of the Gospel. But once Christ had already been born and before He began to preach, it was false that Christ would be born. Therefore, what is false can fall under faith.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 7, no virtue that perfects the intellect is related to what is false insofar as what is false is bad for the intellect. But as will become clear below (q. 4, aa. 2 and 5), faith is a virtue that perfects the intellect. Therefore, what is false cannot fall under it.

I respond: Nothing falls under a power or habit—or even an act—except by the mediation of the formal character of the object (nisi mediante ratione formali obiecti). For instance, color cannot be seen except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known except by means of a demonstration.

Now it has been explained (a. 1) that the formal object of faith is the First Truth. Hence, nothing can fall under faith except insofar as it stands under the First Truth (nisi inquantum stat sub veritate prima). But nothing false can stand under the First Truth—just as a non-being cannot stand under being and just as what is bad cannot stand under goodness. Hence, it follows that nothing false can stand under faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is because the true is the intellect’s good—though it is not the good of any appetitive virtue—that all the virtues which perfect the intellect totally exclude what is false. For it belongs to the nature of a virtue to be related only to the good. By contrast, the virtues which perfect the appetitive part of the soul do not totally exclude what is false; for instance, someone can act in accord with justice or temperance even while having a false opinion about that with respect to which he is acting. And so since faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and love perfect the appetitive part of the soul, the arguments are not parallel.

Still, what is false does not fall under hope, either. For one hopes that he will have eternal life not by his own power (for this would belong to presumption), but with the assistance of grace, and if he perseveres in grace, then he will attain eternal life altogether unfailingly (omnino infallibiter).
Part 2-2, Question 1

Similarly, it belongs to charity to love God in whomever He might be present (in quocumque fuerit). Hence, it does not matter to charity whether or not God is present in someone who is loved for the sake of God.

Reply to objection 2: God’s not being incarnated, considered just by itself, was possible even after the time of Abraham. However, insofar as it falls under God’s foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 14, a. 13). And this is the way in which it falls under faith. Hence, insofar as it falls under faith, it cannot be false.

Reply to objection 3: After Christ’s birth, it belongs to a believer’s faith to believe that He is born at some time. But the specification of the time about which he is deceived stems not from faith but from human conjecture. For it is possible that a faithful individual should, because of human conjecture, have a false opinion (falsum aliquid aestimare). By contrast, it is impossible for him to have a false opinion that stems from faith.

Reply to objection 4: A believer’s faith does not refer to these or those species of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ lies under those sensible species of bread when the bread is correctly consecrated. Hence, if it has not been correctly consecrated, then nothing false falls under faith because of this.

Article 4

Is the object of faith something seen?

It seems that the object of faith is something seen:

Objection 1: In John 20:29 the Lord says to Thomas, “Because you have seen me, you have believed.” Therefore, vision and faith are of the same thing.

Objection 2: In 1 Corinthians 13:12 the Apostle says, “We see now through a glass darkly.” And he is speaking here of the sort of cognition had by faith. Therefore, what is taken on faith is seen.

Objection 3: Faith is a certain spiritual light. But any sort of light is such that something is seen by it. Therefore, faith is of things that are seen.

Objection 4: As Augustine says in De Verbo Domini, “Every sensory power is called ‘sight’ (visus).” But what is taken on faith are things that are heard—this according to Romans 10:17 (“Faith comes from hearing”). Therefore, the things taken on faith are seen.

But contrary to this: In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says, “Faith is the evidence of things that are not apparent” (fides est argumentum non apparentium).

I respond: ‘Faith’ implies the intellect’s assent to what is taken on faith (creditur). But there are two ways in which the intellect assents to something:

In one way, it assents because it is moved to assent by the object itself, i.e., either (a) by the very thing that the cognition is of, as is clear in the case of first principles, with respect to which there is understanding (intellectus), or (b) by means of something else that there is a cognition of, as is clear in the case of conclusions, with respect to which there is scientific knowledge (scientia).

In the second way, the intellect assents to something not because it is sufficiently moved by its own object, but because it is moved voluntarily by an act of choosing (per quandam electionem voluntarie) that inclines it toward the one part [of a contradiction] rather than the other part. And if this occurs with hesitation and a fear of the other part, then there will be opinion (opinio), whereas if it occurs with certitude and without such a fear, then there will be faith (fides).

Now things that are said to be seen are those that by themselves move our intellect or sensory power to its cognition. Hence, it is clear that neither faith nor opinion can be of things that are seen either by the sensory power or by the intellect.
Reply to objection 1: Thomas saw one thing and took something else on faith. He saw a man and, taking Him on faith to be God, he confessed by saying, “My Lord and my God.”

Reply to objection 2: There are two possible ways to think of the things that fall under faith:
In one way they can be thought of individually (in speciali), and, as has been explained, in this sense they cannot be both seen and taken on faith at the same time.
In the second way, they can be thought of in general (in generali), viz., under the common character something to be taken on faith (sub communi ratione credibilis). And in this sense they are seen by the one who has faith, since he would not have faith in them unless he saw that they should be taken on faith, either because of the evidentness of signs or miraculous works (propter evidentiam signorum) or for some other such reason.

Reply to objection 3: The light of faith makes one see which things are taken on faith. For just as through other virtuous habits a man sees what is appropriate for him in accord with that habit, so, too, through the habit of faith a man’s mind is inclined toward assenting to those things that are appropriate for a correct faith and not to other things.

Reply to objection 4: What is heard are words that signify what belongs to the Faith, but not the very things that are taken on faith. And so it is not necessary for these latter things to be seen.

Article 5

Can what belongs to the Faith be known scientifically?

It seems that what belongs to the Faith can be known scientifically (ea quae sunt fidei possint esse scita):

Objection 1: What is not known scientifically seems to be such that one is ignorant of it (quae non sciuntur videntur ignorata), since ignorance is opposed to scientific knowledge (ignorantia scientiae opponitur). But what belongs to the Faith is not such that one is ignorant of it, since ignorance pertains to unbelief ( ignorantia ad infidelitatem pertinet)—this according to 1 Timothy 1:13 (“I did it while ignorant, in my unbelief” (in incredulitate mea)). Therefore, what belongs to the Faith can be known scientifically.

Objection 2: Scientific knowledge is acquired through arguments. But arguments are adduced by the sacred writers for what belongs to the Faith. Therefore, what belongs to the Faith can be known scientifically.

Objection 3: What is proved demonstratively is known scientifically, since a demonstration is a syllogism that produces scientific knowledge. But certain things that are contained in the Faith have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, e.g., that God exists, that there is one God, and other things of this sort. Therefore, what belongs to the Faith can be known scientifically.

Objection 4: Opinion is more distant from scientific knowledge than faith is, since faith is said to be in the middle between opinion and scientific knowledge. But as Posterior Analytics 1 says, there is a sense in which there can be opinion and scientific knowledge about the same thing. Therefore, this holds for faith and scientific knowledge as well.

But contrary to this: Gregory says, “What is evident is subject to intellectual perception and not to faith” (apparentia non habent fidem sed agnitionem). Therefore, what is held on faith is not subject to intellectual perception. But what is known scientifically (scita) is subject to intellectual perception. Therefore, there cannot be faith with respect to what is known scientifically.

I respond: All scientific knowledge is had through principles that are known per se and are, as a consequence, seen. And so anything that is known scientifically has to be seen in some way. But as was explained above (a. 4), it is impossible for the same thing to be both seen and taken on faith by the same
individual. Therefore, it is impossible for the same thing to be both known scientifically and taken on faith by the same individual.

However, it is possible for something that is seen or known scientifically by one individual to be taken on faith by another individual. For instance, we hope to see what we take on faith about the Trinity—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:12 ("We see now through a glass darkly, but then face to face"). This vision is already seen by the angels, and so they see what we take on faith. Similarly, even in the state of the present life it is possible for something that is seen or known scientifically by one man to be taken on faith by another man, who does not know it demonstratively.

However, what is proposed generally to all men to be taken on faith is in all cases not known scientifically (communiter non scitum). And so these are the things that fall under faith absolutely speaking. And this is why faith and scientific knowledge are not about the same thing.

**Reply to objection 1:** Those who do not believe what belongs to the Faith are in a state of ignorance (ignorantia habent), since they do not see these things or know them scientifically, and they do not realize that these things are to be taken on faith. Now it is in this last way that the faithful have knowledge of them (habent eorum notitiam)—not demonstratively, but rather, as has been explained, to the extent that they are seen by the light of faith to be things that should be taken on faith (inquantum per lumen fidei videntur esse credenda).

**Reply to objection 2:** The arguments adduced by the saints to prove what belongs to the Faith are not demonstrative arguments, but are instead certain persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed in the Faith is not impossible.

Or else, as Dionysius explains in De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 2, they are arguments that proceed from the principles of the Faith. Now something is proved from these principles in the eyes of the faithful (apud fideles) in the same way that something is proved in everyone’s eyes from naturally known principles. Hence, as was explained at the beginning of this work (ST 1, q. 1, a. 2), theology is likewise a science.

**Reply to objection 3:** Things that can be proved demonstratively are numbered among the things to be taken on faith not because faith is directed toward them absolutely speaking in the case of everyone, but because they are prerequisites for the things that do belong to the Faith, and they must at least be presupposed for faith by those who do not have demonstrations of them.

**Reply to objection 4:** As the Philosopher says in the same place, “Scientific knowledge and opinion can be had by different men about exactly the same thing,” in the same way that was just explained for the case of scientific knowledge and faith.

However, faith and scientific knowledge about the same thing can, in fact, be had by one and the same individual in a certain sense—viz., they can be had about the same subject matter but not in the same respect. For with respect to one and the same entity, it is possible for someone to know one thing and to have opinion about some other thing; and, similarly, with respect to God, it is possible for someone to know demonstratively that He is one and to take it on faith that He is triune.

Still, in one and the same man scientific knowledge cannot exist along with either opinion or faith about the same thing in the same respect—but for different reasons in the two cases:

For it is impossible, absolutely speaking, for scientific knowledge to exist along with opinion about the same thing, since it is of the nature of scientific knowledge that what is known scientifically is thought of as not being possibly otherwise, whereas it is of the nature of opinion that what one is thinking about is such that he thinks it possible that it should be otherwise.

By contrast, what is taken on faith is, because of the certitude of faith, likewise thought of as not being possibly otherwise. Instead, the reason why the same thing cannot, in the same respect, be both known scientifically and taken on faith, is that, as has been explained (a. 4), what is known scientifically is seen and what is taken on faith is not seen.
Article 6

Should what is taken on faith be divided into a set number of articles?

It seems that what is taken on faith should not be divided into a set number of articles (credibilia non sint per certos articulos distinguenda):

**Objection 1:** Faith is to be had with respect to all the things that are contained in Sacred Scripture. But because of their multiplicity these things cannot be reduced to any set number. Therefore, it is useless to divide the articles of the Faith.

**Objection 2:** Since material distinctions can go on to infinity, they have to be set aside by the arts and crafts (est ab arte praetermittenda). But, as was explained above (a. 1), the formal character of the object of faith is singular and indivisible, viz., the First Truth, and so the things taken on faith cannot be distinguished by appeal to their formal character. Therefore, one should set aside the material division into articles of what is taken on faith.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained by certain writers, an article is “an indivisible truth about God that constrains us to have faith (arctans nos ad credendum).” But having faith is voluntary, since, as Augustine explains, “No one has faith unless he wills to.” Therefore, it seems inappropriate for what is taken on faith to be divided into articles.

But contrary to this: Isidore says, “An article is a perception of God’s truth and tends toward it.” But a perception of God’s truth belongs to us in accord with a certain division, since what is one in God is multiplied in our intellect. Therefore, what is taken on faith should be divided into articles.

**I respond:** The name ‘article’ seems to be derived from the Greek. For ‘arthon’ in Greek, which is translated by the Latin ‘articulus’, signifies a sort of joining together of distinct parts (significat quandam coaptationem aliquarum partium distinctarum). This is why the smaller parts of the body which fit together with one another are called ‘articulations’ of the limbs (articuli membrorum). And, similarly, in Greek grammar the ‘articles’ are certain parts of speech that fit together with other words to express their genus, number, or case. Again, in rhetoric what are called ‘articulations’ (articuli) are certain collections of parts; for instance, in Rhetorica 4 Tully explains that there is an articulation when individual words are distinguished by breaks in speech, in this way: “By your acrimony, by your voice, and by your look, you have struck terror into your adversaries.”

Hence, the things to be held by the Christian faith are said to be divided into articles insofar as they are divided into parts that fit together in some way with one another. Now as has been explained (a. 4), the object of faith is something regarding God that is not seen. And so when there is something that is not seen for a specific reason, there is a special article, whereas when many things are hidden (incognita) for the same reason, then they should not be divided into articles. For instance, there is one sort of difficulty associated with seeing that God suffers, and another sort of difficulty in seeing that someone dead rises again. And so the article about the resurrection is divided of from the article about the passion. On the other hand, the fact that He suffered, died, and was buried presents one and the same difficulty, in the sense that once one of them is accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others; and for this reason all of them belong to a single article.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some of the things to be held by faith are such that there is faith with respect to them in their own right (secundum se), while some of the things to be held by faith are such that there is faith with respect to them not in their own right, but only in relation to other things—just as, in the other sciences as well, some things are proposed as intended in their own right (ut per se intenta), and some are proposed in order to make other things clear (ad manifestationem aliorum).

For faith has to do principally with what we hope to see in heaven—this according to Hebrews 11:1 (“Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for” (fides est substantia sperandarum rerum)). So what pertains in its own right to faith are those things that directly order us toward eternal life, e.g., that there
are three persons [in God], God’s omnipotence, the mystery of Christ’s incarnation, and other things of this sort. And it is with respect to these items that the articles of the faith are distinguished.

By contrast, some things are proposed in Sacred Scripture to be taken on faith not in the sense that they are principally intended, but rather for the manifestation of the things noted above, e.g., that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man was resuscitated by being made to touch of the bones of Elisha, and other things of this sort which are narrated in Sacred Scripture in order to manifest God’s majesty or Christ’s incarnation. And it is unnecessary to distinguish articles with respect to such things.

Reply to objection 2: There are two possible ways to understand the formal object of faith:

In one way, on the part of the very thing that is taken on faith. And in this sense there is one formal object for everything taken on faith, viz., the First Truth. And on this score there is no division into articles.

In the second way, the formal object of the things taken on faith can be understood on our part. And in this sense the formal object of what is taken on faith is that it is not seen. And, as has been seen, it is on this score that the articles of the Faith are distinguished.

Reply to objection 3: This definition of an article is more in keeping with an etymology of the name as deriving from the Latin than in keeping with its true signification as derived from the Greek. Hence, the definition that is given has no great weight.

Still, one could reply that even though, since faith is voluntary, no one is constrained to have faith by a necessity of coercion (necessitate coactionis), one is nonetheless constrained by a necessity of the end (arctatur tamen necessitate finis), since for one who approaches God it is necessary to have faith and, as the Apostle puts it in Hebrews 11:6, “Without faith it is impossible to please God.”

Article 7

Have the articles of the Faith increased with the passage of time?

It seems that the articles of the Faith have not increased with the passage of time (non creverint secundum temporum successionem):

Objection 1: As the Apostle says in Hebrews 11:1, “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” But the same things are to be hoped for at every time. Therefore, the same things are to be taken on faith at every time.

Objection 2: As is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, in the humanly ordered sciences there has been an increase with the passage of time because of a lack of cognition in the first people who invented the sciences. By contrast, the doctrine of the Faith was handed down by God and not humanly invented. For as Ephesians 2:8 says, “It is a gift of God.” Therefore, since there is no defect of knowledge in God, it seems that the cognition of what is to be taken on faith was perfect from the beginning and that it did not grow with the passage of time.

Objection 3: The operation of grace proceeds in no less orderly a way than does the operation of nature. But as Boethius says in De Consolatione Philosophiae, nature always takes its beginning from what is perfect (a perfectis). Therefore, it seems that the operation of grace has likewise taken its beginning from what is perfect, so that those who first handed down the Faith had the most perfect cognition of it (perfectissime eam cognoverunt).

Objection 4: Just as faith in Christ has come to us through the apostles, so, too, in the Old Testament the cognition of the Faith came to later fathers through earlier fathers—this according to Deuteronomy 32:7 (“Ask your father and he will proclaim it to you”). But the apostles were most fully instructed concerning the mysteries, since, as a Gloss on Romans 8:23 (“We ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit”) says, “Just as they received them prior in time, so, too, they received them more
abundantly than the others.” Therefore, it seems that the cognition of what is to be taken on faith did not grow with the passage of time.

But contrary to this: Gregory says, “The knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on ... and the closer they were to our Savior’s coming, the more fully they perceived the mysteries of salvation.”

I respond: The articles of the Faith play a role within the doctrine of the Faith like the role that principles that are known per se play within doctrine that is had through natural reason. A certain ordering is found among these principles in the sense that some are contained implicitly in others—in the way that, as the Philosopher makes clear in Metaphysics 4, all the principles are traced back to the following as a first principle: It is impossible to affirm and deny at the same time. Similarly, all the articles are implicitly contained in certain first things to be taken on faith (in aliquibus primis credibilibus), viz., that it is taken on faith that God exists and exercises providence over the salvation of men—this according to Hebrews 11:6 (“One who approaches God must believe that He exists and that He rewards those who seek after Him”). For God’s existence includes all the things which we take on faith to exist in God eternally and in which our beatitude exists, whereas faith in providence includes all the things which have been dispensed by God in time for human salvation and which constitute the way to beatitude. And this is likewise the way in which some subsequent articles are contained in others; for instance, faith in human redemption implicitly contains Christ’s incarnation and his passion and other things of this sort.

So, then, one should reply that as far as the substance of the articles of the faith is concerned, they have not increased with the passage of time, since whatever later fathers have taken on faith was contained in the faith of the earlier fathers, at least implicitly. But with respect to their unfolding (quantum ad explicationem), the number of articles has grown, since those who came later had an explicit cognition of things that those who came earlier did not have an explicit cognition of. Hence, in Exodus 6:2-3 the Lord says to Moses, “I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, and my name, Adonai, I did not show them.” And David says, “I have understood beyond the ancients” (Psalm 108:100). And in Ephesians 3:5 the Apostle says, “To other generations the mystery of the Christ was not known in the way that it has now been revealed to His holy apostles and prophets.”

Reply to objection 1: The same things were always to be hoped for by everyone. However, since men arrived at hoping for these things only through Christ, the more remote in time they were from Christ, the further off they were from acquiring the things hoped for. Hence, in Hebrews 11:13 the Apostle says, “All of them died in accord with the Faith, when the things promised had not been received, beholding them from afar.” But the farther the distance from which something is seen, the less distinctly it is seen. And so those who were close to Christ’s coming had a more distinct cognition of the things to be hoped for.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which progress in cognition (profectus cognitionis) can occur:

In one way, on the part of the teacher, whether one or many, who progresses in cognition with the passage of time. And this is the explanation of increase in the sciences which have been invented by human reason.

In the second way, on the part of the learner, in the sense that a teacher who knows the entire art does not hand down the entire art to his student from the beginning, since the student would be unable to grasp it; instead, he passes it on little by little, reaching down to the student’s level (condescendens eius capacitati). And this is the way in which men progress in their cognition of the Faith with the passage of time. Hence, in Galatians 3:24 the Apostle compares the status of the Old Testament to childhood.

Reply to objection 3: Two sorts of causes are required for natural generation, viz., agent causes and material causes.

Thus, as regards the ordering of agent causes, it is the naturally prior cause that is the more perfect
cause, and this is the sense in which nature takes its beginning from what is perfect. For imperfect things are led to perfection only through preexistent perfect things.

By contrast, as regards the ordering of material causes, it is the naturally prior cause that is more imperfect, and on this score nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.

Now in the manifestation of the Faith God is like an agent who has perfect knowledge from eternity, whereas man is like the matter that receives the influence of God the agent. And so it was necessary that the cognition of the Faith in men should proceed from the imperfect to the perfect. And even though, among men, some behaved in the manner of an agent cause, given that they were teachers (doctores) of the Faith, still, as 1 Corinthians 12:7 says, the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good (ad utilitatem communem). And so cognition of the Faith was given to the fathers who were instructors in the Faith to the extent that it was necessary at that time for the Faith to be handed down to the people, either plainly or in figures (vel nude vel in figura).

Reply to objection 4: The final consummation of grace was accomplished by Christ, and this is why, in accord with Galatians 4:4, His time is called the time of fullness (tempus plenitudinis). And so those who were closer to Christ—either before Him, like John the Baptist, or after Him, like the apostles—had a fuller cognition of the mysteries of the Faith. For we likewise see, as regards the state of a man, that perfection occurs in young adulthood (in iuventute), and that a man has a more perfect state, either beforehand or afterwards, the closer he is to young adulthood.

Article 8

Are the articles of the Faith appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the articles of the Faith are not appropriately enumerated:

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 5), what can be known scientifically by demonstrative reasoning does not belong to the Faith in the sense of being something that is taken on faith by everyone. But it can be known scientifically through demonstration that there is one God; hence, the Philosopher proves this in Metaphysics 12, and many other philosophers as well have adduced demonstrations for this. Therefore, that there is one God should not be posited as an article of the Faith.

Objection 2: Just as it is by a necessity of faith that we take it on faith that God is omnipotent (omnipotens), so, too, it is likewise by a necessity of faith that we take it on faith that He knows all things and that He has providence over all things. But with respect to each of these latter two points some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of the Faith mention should have been made of God’s wisdom and providence as well as of His omnipotence.

Objection 3: Knowledge of the Father is the same as knowledge of the Son—this according to John 14:9 (“He who sees me also sees the Father”). Therefore, there should be just one article of the Faith concerning the Father and the Son—and, for the same reason, concerning the Holy Spirit.

Objection 4: The person of the Father is not less than the person of the Son or the person of the Holy Spirit. But several articles are posited about the person of the Holy Spirit and, likewise, about the person of the Son. Therefore, more articles should be posited about the person of the Father.

Objection 5: Just as something is appropriated to the person of the Father and to the person of the Holy Spirit, so, too, something is likewise appropriated to the person of the Son with respect to His divine nature (secundum divinitatem) (cf. ST 1, q. 39, aa. 7-8). But in the articles a certain work, viz., the work of creation, is appropriated to the Father and, similarly, a certain work, viz., that He has spoken through the prophets, is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, among the articles of the Faith some work should be appropriated to the Son with respect to His divine nature.

Objection 6: The sacrament of the Eucharist poses a special difficulty over and beyond many of
the articles. Therefore, a special article should have been posited concerning it. Therefore, it does not seem that enough articles are enumerated (non articuli sufficienter enumerentur).

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Church, which enumerates the articles in the way they are enumerated.

I respond: As has been explained (aa. 4 and 6), what belongs to the Faith *per se* are those things (a) the vision of which we will enjoy in eternal life and (b) through which we will be led to life everlasting.

Now there are two things proposed to us to be seen in eternal life, viz., the secret of the divine nature (*occultum divinitatis*), the vision of which beatifies us (*cuius visio nos beatos facit*), and the mystery of Christ’s human nature, through which, as Romans 5:2 says, “we have access to the glory” of the sons of God. Hence, John 17:13 says, “This is eternal life, to know you, the true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent.”

And so the first distinction among the things to be taken on faith is that some of them pertain to God’s majesty, whereas others of them pertain to the mystery of Christ’s human nature, which, as 1 Timothy 3:16 puts it, is “the mystery of godliness” (*sacramentum pietatis*).

As regards the majesty of God’s nature, three things are proposed to us to be taken on faith:

The first is the **oneness of God’s nature**, and the first article has to do with this.

The second is the **Trinity of persons**, and concerning this there are three articles corresponding to the three persons.

Third, the **works proper to the divine nature** are proposed to us. The first of these has to do with the existence of *nature*, and so an article about creation is proposed to us. The second has to do with the existence of *grace*, and there are proposed to us, under one article, all the things pertaining to human sanctification. The third has to do with the existence of *glory*, and another article is posited about the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting.

And so there are seven articles having to do with the divine nature.

Similarly, seven articles are likewise posited concerning Christ’s human nature.

The first of these has to do with Christ’s incarnation or conception. The second has to do with Christ’s being born of a virgin. The third has to do with His passion, death, and burial. The fourth has to do with His descent into hell (*descensus ad inferos*). The fifth has to do with His resurrection. The sixth has to do with His ascension. The seventh has to do with His coming for judgment.

And so there are fourteen articles in all.

However, there are some who distinguish twelve articles of the Faith, six having to do with the divine nature and six having to do with the human nature. For they condense the three articles about the three persons into one, since the cognition of the three persons is the same, whereas they divide the work of glorification into two, viz., the resurrection of the flesh and the glory of the soul. Similarly, they merge the articles about the conception and the birth into one.

**Reply to objection 1:** We take many things on faith about God that the philosophers have been unable to investigate by natural reason, viz., concerning His providence and omnipotence, along with the fact that He alone is to be worshiped. All of these are contained in the article concerning the oneness of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 13, a. 8), the very name ‘divinity’ (*nomen divinitatis*) implies a sort of foresight. On the other hand, in the case of beings that have an intellect, power does not operate except through will and cognition. And so God’s omnipotence in some sense includes knowledge of and providence over all things. For it would not be possible for Him to will to act among lower things unless He had cognition of them and had providence over them.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is just a single cognition of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with respect to the oneness of their essence, which pertains to the first article.

Now with respect to the distinction among the persons, which stems from the relations of origin,
the cognition of the Son is in some sense included in the cognition of the Father, since the Father would not be the Father if He did not have a Son, and the nexus between them is the Holy Spirit. And on this score, those who posited a single article concerning the three persons were well motivated.

However, since, with respect to each single person, we need to attend to certain things concerning which error is possible, three articles can be posited about the three persons to take care of this (quantum ad hoc). For instance, Arians believed that the Father is almighty and eternal, but he did not believe that the Son is coequal to and consubstantial with the Father, and so it was necessary to posit an article about the Son in order to fix this point conclusively (ad hoc determinandum). For the same reason, it was necessary to posit, against Macedonius, a third article concerning the person of the Holy Spirit.

Similarly, it is likewise the case that, according to one line of argument, Christ’s conception and birth, along with His resurrection and life everlasting can all be included in a single article, and yet according to another line of argument, they can be distinguished insofar as, taken separately, each poses special difficulties.

Reply to objection 4: It belongs to the Son and the Holy Spirit to be sent on mission in order to sanctify creatures, and concerning this there are several things to be taken on faith. And so more articles are enumerated about the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Spirit than about the person of the Father, who, as was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 43, a. 4), is never sent on mission.

Reply to objection 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace and the consummation of this sanctification by glory are accomplished (a) by the gift of charity, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and (b) by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son. And so both of these works belong through appropriation to both the Son and the Holy Spirit, but in diverse ways.

Reply to objection 6: There are two things that can be thought about in the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is that it is a sacrament, and this point has the same explanation as the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is that Christ’s body is miraculously contained there, and this is included under omnipotence in the same way as all the other miracles that are attributed to God’s omnipotence.

Article 9

Is it appropriate for the articles to be placed in a creed?

It seems that it is inappropriate for the articles to be placed in a symbol or creed (inconvenienter symbolo ponantur):

Objection 1: Sacred Scripture is the rule of faith and nothing is allowed to be added to it or subtracted from it; for Deuteronomy 4:2 says, “You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it.” Therefore, it was illicit to set up a creed as a rule of faith after the promulgation of Sacred Scripture (post sacram Scripturam editam).

Objection 2: As the Apostle says in Ephesians 4:5, there is “one faith.” But a creed is a profession of faith. Therefore, it is inappropriate that several creeds should be handed down.

Objection 3: The profession of faith that is contained in the creed pertains to all the faithful. But it is not appropriate for all the faithful to have faith in God; rather, this belongs only to those who have faith informed [by charity]. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the creed of the Faith to be handed down in the form of the words, “I believe in one God” (credo in unum Deum).

Objection 4: As was noted above (a. 8), the descent into hell is one of the articles. But in the Nicene Creed (symbolum patrum) no mention is made of the descent into hell. Therefore, that creed seems inadequately put together.

Objection 5: As Augustine says in his exposition of John 14:1 (“You believe in God; believe also in me”), “We believe Peter or Paul, but we are not said to believe in anyone but God (non dicimus
credere nisi in Deum). Therefore, since the Catholic Church is a purely created thing, it seems inappropriate to say, “I believe in one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church.”

**Objection 6:** The creed is handed down in order to be a rule of faith. But a rule of faith ought to be proposed publicly and to everyone. Therefore, every creed ought to be sung at Mass, in the way that the Nicene Creed (*symbolum patrum*) is. Therefore, the promulgation of the articles of the Faith in the creed does not seem to be adequate.

**But contrary to this:** The universal Church cannot err, since it is governed by the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of truth. For our Lord promised this to His disciples in John 16:13 when He said, “When the Spirit of truth comes, He will teach you all truth.” But the creed is promulgated by the authority of the universal Church. Therefore, nothing inappropriate is contained in it.

**I respond:** As the Apostle says in Hebrews 11:6, “One who approaches God must believe that He exists.” But no one can have faith with respect to anything unless the truth that he has faith with respect to is proposed to him. Therefore, it was necessary for the truth of the Faith to be collected together so that it might more easily be proposed to everyone, and so that no one would fall short of the truth of the Faith because of ignorance. And the name ‘symbol’ (*nomen symboli*) is derived from this sort of collection of the determinations of the Faith (*ab huiusque collectione sententiarum fidei*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The truth of the Faith is contained in Sacred Scripture in a diffuse manner and in various modes, and in some cases obscurely, with the result that in order to extract the truth of the Faith from Sacred Scripture long study and practice are required. Not everyone who has to have cognition of the truth of the Faith is able to accomplish this; most of them, occupied with other affairs, are unable to free up time for study. And so it was necessary for something clear, in the form of a summary, to be collected together from the passages of Sacred Scripture which might be proposed to everyone for belief. This is not, to be sure, something added to Sacred Scripture, but instead something taken from Sacred Scripture.

**Reply to objection 2:** The same truth of the Faith is taught in all the creeds. But where errors rise up, the people have to be instructed more diligently in the truth of the Faith, lest the faith of simple people be corrupted by heretics. And this was the reason why it was necessary to issue more creeds. These creeds differ from one another only in that one explicates more fully what is implicitly contained in another, to the extent that this was required by the obstinance of the heretics.

**Reply to objection 3:** The profession of the Faith is handed down in the creed by, as it were, the person of the whole Church, which is united through the Faith. Now the faith of the Church is faith informed [by charity], since such faith is found in all those who belong to the Church both in number and in merit. And so the profession of the Faith is handed down in the creed insofar as it is appropriate for informed faith, but also so that if any of the faithful do not have informed faith, they might strive to attain this form.

**Reply to objection 4:** No error arose from heretics concerning the descent into hell, and so it was unnecessary for an explication to be made with respect to it. And for this reason it was not reiterated in the Nicene Creed (*in symbolo patrum*); instead, it was presupposed as already having been fixed in the Apostles’ Creed (*in symbolo apostolorum*). For as has been explained, a later creed does not abolish an earlier creed, but instead elaborates on it.

**Reply to objection 5:** If one says “in the holy Catholic Church,” this should be taken to mean that our Faith is traced back to the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies the Church—so that the sense is, “I believe in the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies the Church.”

However, it is better, and in accord with common usage, not to say “in” here, but just to say, “I believe the holy Catholic Church,” as Pope Leo likewise asserts.

**Reply to objection 6:** It is because the Nicene Creed (*symbolum patrum*) clarifies the Apostles’ Creed (*symbolum apostolorum*) and because it was established when the Faith was already well-known and the Church was at peace that it is publicly sung at Mass.
By contrast, the Apostles’ Creed, which was promulgated during a time of persecution and when the Faith was not yet widely known, is said silently at Prime and Compline—directed, as it were, against the darkness of past and future errors.

Article 10

**Does it belong to the Supreme Pontiff to put together a creed of the Faith?**

It seems that it does not belong to the Supreme Pontiff to put together a creed of the Faith (*fidei symbolum ordinare*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 9), the new promulgation of a creed is necessary in order to explicate the articles of the Faith. But as has been explained (a. 7), in the Old Testament the articles of the Faith were explicated more and more with the passage of time in order to make the truth of the Faith more manifest as the time of Christ came closer. Therefore, given the absence of this sort of cause in the New Law, there should not have to be more and more explication of the articles of the Faith. Therefore, the new promulgation of a creed does not seem to belong to the Supreme Pontiff’s authority.

**Objection 2:** What has been condemned under pain of anathema (*sub anathemate interdictum*) by the universal Church does not fall within the power of any man. But the new promulgation of a creed has been forbidden by the authority of the universal Church. For in the Acts of the First Council of Ephesus it says, “After the symbol of the Nicene council had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter, write, or draw up any other creed beyond that which was defined by the Fathers assembled together with the Holy Spirit at Nicea.” And the same thing is reiterated in the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon. Therefore, it seems that the new promulgation of a creed does not belong to the Supreme Pontiff’s authority.

**Objection 3:** Athanasius was the Patriarch of Alexandria and not the Supreme Pontiff. And yet he put together a creed that is sung in the Church. Therefore, the promulgation of a creed does not belong to the Supreme Pontiff more than to others.

**But contrary to this:** The promulgation of a creed is done in a general council (*in synodo generali*). But as *Decretals*, dist. 17 has it, a council of this sort can be convened by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff alone. Therefore, the promulgation of a creed belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 9), the new promulgation of a creed is necessary to avoid errors that arise. Therefore, the promulgation of a creed belongs to the authority of the one who has the authority to fix, in the form of sentences, the things that belong to the Faith (*ea quae sunt fidei*), so that they might be held by everyone with an unshakable faith.

Now this belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, “to whom,” as *Decretals*, dist. 17 says, “the greater and more difficult questions in the Church are referred.” Hence, in Luke 22:32 our Lord said to Peter, whom He set up as Supreme Pontiff, “I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith might not fail; and when you have been converted, strengthen your brothers.”

And the reason for this is that the Faith ought to be one for the whole Church—this according to 1 Corinthians 1:10 (“... that you should all profess the same thing, and that there not be schisms among you”). But this condition could not be preserved unless a question about the Faith that arises from the Faith were determined by someone who presides over the whole Church in such a way that his decision (*sententia*) is held firmly by the whole Church.

And so the new promulgation of a creed belongs solely to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, just like all the other things that pertain to the Church as a whole, such as convening a general council and other things of this sort.
Reply to objection 1: The truth of the Faith is sufficiently explained in the teaching of Christ and of the apostles. But because, as 2 Peter 3:16 says, bad men corrupt the apostolic teaching and the rest of the Scriptures “to their own destruction,” the explication of the Faith becomes necessary against the errors that arise as time goes on.

Reply to objection 2: The council’s prohibition and decision extends to private persons, who do not have the role of making determinations about the Faith. Nor does this sort of decision by a general council undermine the power of a subsequent council to make a new edition of the creed—not, to be sure, a creed that contains a different Faith, but the same creed explicated more fully. For each council has taken into account that a later council will explicate something beyond the point that a preceding council had explicated it, and this because of the necessity imposed by some heresy that has arisen. Hence, the power to promulgate a creed belongs to the Supreme Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convened and its decisions are confirmed.

Reply to objection 3: As is apparent from his very way of speaking, Athanasius composed an exposition of the Faith not in the manner of a creed, but more in the manner of teaching. But since his teaching contained the whole truth of the Faith in summary form (*breviter continebat*), it was accepted by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff in order that it might be held as a sort of rule of Faith.