QUESTION 123

Fortitude

Next, after justice, we have to consider fortitude: first, the virtue itself of fortitude (questions 123-127); second, the parts of fortitude (questions 128-138); third, the gift [of the Holy Spirit] corresponding to fortitude (question 139); and, fourth, the precepts pertaining to fortitude (question 140).

Now concerning [the virtue of fortitude] there are three things that have to be considered: first, fortitude itself (question 123); second, the principal act of fortitude, viz., martyrdom (question 124); and, third, the opposed vices (questions 125-127).

On the first topic there are twelve questions: (1) Is fortitude a virtue? (2) Is fortitude a specific virtue? (3) Does fortitude have to do with instances of *fear* and *daring*? (4) Does fortitude have to do just with the fear of death? (5) Does fortitude exist just in matters of battle? (6) Is the act of enduring the principal act of fortitude? (7) Does fortitude operate for the sake of its own good? (8) Does fortitude find pleasure in its own act? (9) Does fortitude arise especially in the case of sudden occurrences? (10) Does fortitude make use of anger in its operation? (11) Is fortitude a cardinal virtue? (12) How does fortitude compare with the other cardinal virtues?

Article 1

Is fortitude a virtue?

It seems that fortitude is not a virtue:

Objection 1: In 2 Corinthians 12:9 the Apostle says, "Virtue is perfected in weakness." But fortitude is opposed to weakness. Therefore, fortitude is not a virtue.

Objection 2: If fortitude is a virtue, then it is either a theological virtue, an intellectual virtue, or a moral virtue. But as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 57, a. 2 and q. 62, a. 3), fortitude is not included either among the theological virtues or among the intellectual virtues. Neither does it seem to be a moral virtue. For as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 3, some individuals seem to be courageous out of ignorance—or, again, because of their experience, as in the case of soldiers, and this pertains to an art or skill rather than to a moral virtue (*quae magis pertinent ad artem quam ad virtutem moralem*). Again, some individuals are said to be courageous because of certain passions, e.g., because of their *fear* of being threatened or dishonored, or because of *sorrow*, or because of *anger* or *hope*; but as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 59, a. 1), a moral virtue acts by choice and not out of passion. Therefore, fortitude is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Human virtue resides especially in the soul, since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 55, a. 4), a virtue is "a good quality of the mind." But fortitude seems to reside in the body or at least to follow upon one's bodily constitution. Therefore, it seems that fortitude is not a virtue.

But contrary to this: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine numbers fortitude among the virtues.

I respond: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, "Virtue (*virtus*) is that which makes what has it good and renders its work good." Hence, "a virtue belonging to a man"—which is the sort of virtue [or power] we are now talking about—"is what makes the man good and renders his work good." But according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a man's good is to live in accord with reason (*secundum rationem esse*). And so it pertains to human virtue to make a man and his work exist in accord with reason.

This occurs in three ways:

First, insofar as *reason itself is rectified*, and this is accomplished by the *intellectual* virtues.

Second, insofar as this rectitude of reason *is established within human affairs*, and this pertains to *justice*.

Third, through *the removal of impediments* to the rectitude that should be present in human affairs.

Now there are two ways in which the human will is impeded from following the rectitude of reason:

First, by the will's being *attracted*, by what is pleasurable, toward something other than what the rectitude of reason requires; and it is the virtue of *temperance* that removes this sort of impediment.

Second, by the will's being *driven away* from what accords with reason, because of something difficult that presses against it, and for this sort of impediment to be removed what is required is the mind's *fortitude,* by which the will resists such difficulties, in the way that a man overcomes and repels a corporeal obstacle through his bodily strength.

Hence, it is manifest that fortitude is a virtue insofar as it contributes to a man's living in accord with reason (*inquantum facit hominem secundum rationem esse*).

Reply to objection 1: The soul's virtue is perfected not in the weakness of the *soul*, but in the weakness of the *flesh*—which is what the Apostle is talking about.

Now fortitude or strength of mind involves (*ad fortitudinem mentis pertinet*) bearing courageously the weakness of the flesh, and this pertains to the virtue of *patience* or the virtue of *fortitude*. Moreover, a man's recognizing his own weakness pertains to the perfection that is called *humility*.

Reply to objection 2: Sometimes individuals effect the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and they do this because of some other cause and not because of the virtue. That is why in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher posits five modes that belong to those are called courageous by a sort of similitude, in the sense that they exercise an act of fortitude outside of the virtue. This happens in three ways:

First, because *they approach what is difficult as if it were not difficult*, and this is divided into three modes. For sometimes this happens out of *ignorance*, because the man does not perceive the magnitude of the danger. Again, sometimes it happens because the man has a *sound hope of overcoming the dangers*, e.g., when he has many times experienced himself evading the dangers. Again, sometimes it happens because of a certain *knowledge and skill*, e.g., in the case of soldiers who, because of their familiarity with arms and their training, do not regard the dangers of war as serious, calculating that they can defend themselves against those dangers because of their skill; as Vegetius puts it in *De Re Militari*, "No man fears to do what he is confident he has learned to do well."

Second, an individual performs an act of fortitude without the virtue *because of an impulse of passion*—either of sorrow that he wants to repel or, again, of anger.

Third, *because of an act of choosing*—not, to be sure, an act of choosing to acquire a fitting end, but either an act of choosing to acquire an advantageous temporal end, e.g., honor, pleasure, or monetary gain, or an act of choosing to avoid something disadvantageous, e.g., blame, affliction, or monetary loss.

Reply to objection 3: As has been said, strength or fortitude in the soul is so-called by way of a similarity with bodily strength or fortitude.

Still, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 63, a. 1), it is not contrary to the nature of virtue that an individual should, because of his natural constitution, have a natural inclination toward a virtue.

Article 2

Is fortitude a specific virtue?

It seems that fortitude is not a specific virtue (*fortitudo non sit specialis virtus*):

Objection 1: Wisdom 8:7 says, "Wisdom teaches temperance (*sobrietas*) and prudence (*prudentia*), justice (*iustitia*) and strength (*virtus*)"—where 'strength' (*virtus*) is being used for 'fortitude' (*fortitudo*). Therefore, since the name *virtus* is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general virtue.

Objection 2: In *De Officiis* Ambrose says, "Fortitude does not belong to a mediocre mind, but

defends the apparatus of the virtues, guards their judgments, and wages an inexorable battle against all the vices: invincible in its labors, strong in meeting dangers, unyielding in the face of pleasures, avoiding avarice as a corruption that weakens virtue." And afterwards he adds the same sort of thing with respect to other vices. But this cannot be consistent with any virtue that is a specific virtue. Therefore, fortitude is not a specific virtue.

Objection 3: The name *fortitudo* seems to be taken from *firmitas* (firmness). But as *Ethics* 2 says, every virtue involves "behaving firmly" (*firmiter se habere*). Therefore, fortitude is a general virtue.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 22 Gregory enumerates fortitude along with the other [specific] virtues.

I respond: As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 63, aa. 3-4), there are two possible ways to understand the name *fortitudo*:

First, insofar as it implies simply a certain *firmness of mind* (*secundum quod absolute importat quandam animi firmitatem*). And on this score it is a *general virtue*—or, better, *a condition applying to every virtue*—since, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, what is required for a virtue is "operating firmly and consistently" (*ad virtutem requiritur firmiter et immobiliter operari*).

Second, fortitude can be understood insofar it implies a firmness of mind *in enduring and repelling those things in the case of which it is especially difficult to maintain firmness*, viz., certain grave dangers. Hence, in *Rhetorica* Tully says, "Fortitude involves deliberately taking on dangers and bearing up under hardships" (*considerata susceptio periculorum et perpessio laborum*). And on this score fortitude is posited as a *specific virtue* with a determinate subject matter.

Reply to objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *De Caelo* 1, the name 'virtue' (*virtus*) refers to the upper limit of a power (*ad ultimum potentiae*). Now, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 5, a natural power is called a virtue (*virtus*) in one sense insofar as someone is able to resist things that corrupt him, whereas it is called a virtue (*virtus*) in a second sense insofar as it is a principle of acting. And so, since this latter sense is the more common, the name 'virtue' is a common term insofar as it implies the upper limit of such a power, since a virtue taken in the common sense is nothing other than a habit by which an individual is able to act well. On the other hand, insofar as 'virtue' implies the upper limit of a power in the first way explained above—which, to be sure, is a more specific mode—it is attributed to a special virtue, viz., fortitude, which involves standing firmly against all sorts of attacks (*contra quaecumque impugnantia*).

Reply to objection 2: Ambrose is taking 'fortitude' in a broad sense insofar as it implies a firmness of mind with respect to every sort of opposition. And yet even insofar as it is a specific virtue with a determinate subject matter, it helps one to resist the attacks of all the vices. For if someone is able to stand firmly in the face of those attacks that are the most difficult to bear, it follows that he is able to resist other attacks that are less difficult.

Reply to objection 3: This objection goes through for the case of fortitude taken in the first way explained above.

Article 3

Does fortitude have to do with instances of fear and daring?

It seems that fortitude does not have to do with instances of fear and daring (*non sit circa timores et audacias*):

Objection 1: In *Moralia* 7 Gregory says, "The fortitude of the just is to conquer the flesh, to go against one's own desires, to snuff out the pleasure of this life." Therefore, fortitude seems to have to do more with instances of *pleasure* than with instances of *fear* and *daring*.

Objection 2: In *Rhetorica* Tully says that fortitude involves "taking on dangers and bearing up under hardships." But this does not seem to pertain to the passion of fear or the passion of daring; instead, it seems to pertain to a man's laborious actions or to dangerous exterior things. Therefore, fortitude does not have to do with instances of fear and daring.

Objection 3: As was established above when we were talking about the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 23, a. 2), it is not only *daring* but also *hope* that is opposed to *fear*. Therefore, fortitude should not have to do with daring more than hope.

But contrary to this: The Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, "Fortitude has to do with fear and daring."

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the virtue of fortitude involves removing an impediment by which the will is drawn back from following reason. But the fact that an individual is drawn back from some difficulty pertains to the nature of fear, which, as was established above when we were talking about the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 41, a. 2), implies a certain sort of stepping back from something bad that involves difficulty. And so fortitude mainly has to do with the fear of difficult things that draw the will back from following reason.

Now it is necessary not only to endure with firmness the onslaught of this sort of difficult thing by inhibiting fear, but also to attack it with moderation, viz., when it is necessary to wipe it out in order to have security later on. This seems to pertain to the nature of daring.

And so fortitude has to do with instances of fear and daring in the sense that it restrains fear and moderates daring.

Reply to objection 1: Gregory is here talking about the "fortitude of the just" insofar as it relates generally to every virtue. Hence, he begins, as was quoted [in the objection], with certain things that pertain to temperance, and then adds what pertains properly speaking to fortitude insofar as it is a specific virtue when he says, "... loving the difficulties of this world for the sake of eternal rewards."

Reply to objection 2: Dangerous matters and laborious acts draw the will away from the way of reason only insofar as they are feared. And so it must be the case that fortitude has to do (a) *immediately* with instances of fear and daring and (b) *mediately* with dangers and laborious deeds as the objects of the aforementioned passions.

Reply to objection 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of its object, since hope is of something good, whereas fear is of something bad. Daring, on the other hand, has to do with same object [as fear] and, as was established above, it is opposed to fear as regards approach and withdrawal (*secundum accessum et recessum*). And since, as is clear from Tully's definition, fortitude properly speaking looks to temporary evils that draw one back from virtue, it follows that, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 45, a. 2), fortitude properly speaking has to do with fear and daring, and not with hope except insofar as the hope is connected with daring.

Article 4

Does fortitude have to do just with the danger of death?

It seems that fortitude does not have to do just with the danger of death (*non solum sit circa pericula mortis*):

Objection 1: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says that fortitude "is love easily undergoing all things because of what is loved." And in *Musica* 6 he says that fortitude "is an affection which fears no adversities or death." Therefore, fortitude has to do not only with the danger of death but with all other adversities as well.

Objection 2: All the passions of the soul must be brought to a mean through some virtue. But it is impossible to name any other virtue that brings the other instances of fear to a mean. Therefore, fortitude

has to do not only with instances of fearing death but also with the other instances of fear.

Objection 3: There is no virtue that lies at the extremes. But the fear of death lies at an extreme, since, as *Ethics* 3 points out, it is the greatest of fears. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude does not have to do with fearing death.

But contrary to this: Andronicus says, "Fortitude is the irascible virtue that is not easily shocked by fears that surround death (*non facile obstupescibilis a timoribus qui sunt circa mortem*).

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), the virtue of fortitude involves guarding a man's will in order that it not withdraw from the good of reason due to fear of bodily evil. Now it is necessary to hold on firmly to the good of reason in opposition to every sort of evil, since no bodily good is equal to the good of reason. And so fortitude of the mind has to be that which firmly keeps a man's will within the good of reason against the greatest of evils, since if an individual stands firm against what is greater, it follows that he stands firm against what is lesser, but not vice versa. Again, the nature of virtue involves looking to the upper limit (*ut respiciat ultimum*).

Now among all bodily evils the one that is especially terrible is death, which destroys all bodily goods; hence, in *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, "The soul's connection with its body shakes it with fear—fear of toil and pain, lest it be stricken and vexed, and fear of death, lest it be done away with and altogether destroyed." And so the virtue of fortitude has to do with fears about the danger of death.

Reply to objection 1: Fortitude behaves well in undergoing all sorts of adversity. However, a man is thought of as courageous *absolutely speaking* (*simpliciter fortis*) not because he undergoes just any sort of adversity, but only because he endures well even the greatest of evils. By contrast, on the basis of the other sorts of adversity an individual is called courageous *in a certain respect* (*fortis secundum quid*).

Reply to objection 2: Since *fear* arises from *love*, if any virtue moderates the love of certain things, it follows that it moderates fear of the contrary evils. For instance, generosity, which moderates the love of monetary wealth, likewise moderates the fear of losing that wealth. And the same thing is clear in the case of temperance and the other virtues. But it is natural to love one's own life. And so there had to be a specific virtue that would moderate the fears surrounding death.

Reply to objection 3: In the case of the virtues, the extreme consists in *exceeding* right reason. And so if an individual undergoes the greatest dangers *in accord with* reason, this is not contrary to virtue.

Article 5

Does fortitude properly have to do with the danger of death that occurs in battle?

It seems that fortitude does not properly have to do with the danger of death that occurs in battle (*non consistat propie circa pericula mortis quae sunt in bello*):

Objection 1: Martyrs are especially commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not commended for their battle deeds (*de rebus bellicis*). Therefore, fortitude does not properly have to do with the danger of death that exists in battle (*in bellicis*).

Objection 2: In *De Officiis* 1 Ambrose says, "Fortitude is divided into affairs of war and domestic affairs." Likewise, in *De Officiis* 1 Tully says, "Although many think that affairs of war are greater than civic affairs, this opinion should be moderated; instead, if we want to judge correctly, many civic affairs are greater and more important than affairs of war." But greater fortitude has to do with greater matters. Therefore, fortitude does not properly have to do with death in battle.

Objection 3: Wars are ordered toward preserving the temporal peace of the republic; for instance, in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, "It is with the intention of peace that wars are waged." But it does not seem that anyone should expose himself to the danger of death for the sake of the temporal peace of

the republic, since such a peace is the occasion of much licentious behavior (*multarum lasciviarum occasio*). Therefore, it seems that the virtue of fortitude does not have to do with the danger of death in battle.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher claims that fortitude has to do especially with death in battle (*circa mortem quae est in bello*).

I respond: As has been explained (a. 4), fortitude strengthens a man's mind against the greatest dangers, which are the dangers surrounding death. But since fortitude is a virtue, and since the nature of a virtue involves always tending toward the good, it follows that it is for the sake of pursuing some good that a man will not flee from the danger of death.

Now the sort of danger of death that arises from illness, or from a storm at sea, or from an incursion by robbers, or from other things of this sort, does not seem to be immediately imminent to anyone by reason of the fact that he is pursuing some good. By contrast, in battle the danger of death is immediately imminent to a man because of some good, viz., insofar as he is defending the common good by means of a just war.

Now there are two ways in which something can be a just war:

The first way is *general*, as when individuals fight it out along a battle line.

The second way is *particular*, as, for example, when a judge—or even a private person—does not shy away from a just judgment out of fear of an impending sword or of any sort of danger, even if it is life-threatening (*etiam si sit mortiferum*).

Therefore, fortitude involves bringing to bear a firmness of mind against the dangers surrounding death—not only dangers which threaten in general warfare, but also dangers which threaten in a particular fight, both of which can be called by the common name 'battle'. And, accordingly, it should be conceded that fortitude has to do, properly speaking, with the danger of death that exists in battle.

Still, the courageous individual behaves well in the face of the danger of any other sort of death, especially since a man can, for the sake of virtue, be subjected to the danger of any sort of death—as, for instance, when an individual does not withdraw from a sick friend because he fears a life-threatening infection, or when he does not, out of fear of shipwreck or of robbers, avoid traveling in order to pursue some pious enterprise.

Reply to objection 1: Martyrs sustain personal attacks for the sake of the highest good, viz., God. Therefore, their fortitude is especially commended. Nor does this lie outside of that genus of fortitude which has to do with battles. Hence, they are said to have been made courageous in battle.

Reply to objection 2: Domestic or civil affairs are being distinguished here from matters of war, i.e., from matters that pertain to *general* wars. However, in these domestic or civil affairs themselves it is possible for the danger of death to be imminent because of certain sorts of attacks, viz., certain *particular* battles. And so there can be fortitude properly speaking that has to do with matters of this sort.

Reply to objection 3: The peace of the republic is good in its own right (*secunda se bona*), and it is not rendered bad by the fact that certain individuals make bad use of it. For there are many other individuals who make good use of it, and the evils that are prevented by it, e.g., homicides and sacrileges, are much worse than those which are occasioned by it and which mainly involve vices of the flesh.

Article 6

Is the act of enduring the principal act of fortitude?

It seems that the act of enduring (*sustinere*) is not the principal act of fortitude:

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 2 puts it, virtue "has to do with what is difficult and good." But it is more difficult to attack (*aggredi*) than to endure (*sustinere*). Therefore, the act of enduring is not the principal act of fortitude.

Objection 2: Something's acting on another seems to take more power than its not itself being changed by another. But to attack is to act on another, whereas to endure is to persevere unchanged. Therefore, since 'fortitude' names the perfection of a power, it seems that fortitude involves attacking more than enduring (*magis ad fortitudinem pertineat aggredi quam sustinere*).

Objection 3: One of two contraries is more distant from the other contrary than is its simple negation. But the individual who endures something is only such that he *does not* fear it, whereas the individual who attacks it moves in a way *contrary to* one who fears it. Therefore, it seems that since fortitude draws the mind back from fear to the greatest extent, it involves attacking rather than enduring.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "It is in enduring afflictions that certain individuals are called courageous to the highest degree."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3) and as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, fortitude has more to do with repressing fear than with moderating daring. For it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring, because the very danger which is the object of daring and fear contributes in its own right (*de se*) to a repression of daring but operates to increase fear. Now attacking belongs to fortitude insofar as fortitude moderates daring, whereas it is enduring that follows upon the repression of fear. And so the more principal act of fortitude is to endure, i.e., to remain steadfast in the midst of dangers, rather than to attack.

Reply to objection 1: To endure is more difficult than to attack, and this for three reasons:

First, it seems that someone endures an aggressor who is stronger, whereas someone who attacks invades in the manner of the one who is stronger. But it is more difficult to fight with someone who is stronger than with someone who is weaker.

Second, someone who endures already senses imminent danger, whereas someone who attacks thinks of the danger as future. But it is more difficult not be moved by things that are present than by things that are future.

Third, enduring implies a long stretch of time, whereas someone can attack with a sudden motion. However, with respect to something arduous, it is more difficult to remain firm for a long time than to move with a sudden motion.

Hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "There are some who fly into danger at first, but then withdraw in the midst of danger; by contrast, courageous individuals behave in just the opposite way."

Reply to objection 2: Enduring does, to be sure, imply that the body is being acted upon (*importat passionem corporis*), but it also implies the act of a soul that is clinging very strongly to the good. And from this it follows that it does not yield when the body's being acted upon is already imminent (*non cedat passioni corporali iam imminenti*). But virtue has to do more with the soul than with the body.

Reply to objection 3: An individual who endures does not fear even though the cause of fear is now present, whereas an individual who attacks does not have the cause of fear present to him.

Article 7

Does the courageous individual act for the sake of the good of his own habit?

It seems that the courageous individual does not act for the sake of the good of his own habit (*non operetur propter bonum proprii habitus*):

Objection 1: In the case of things to be done, even if the end is prior in intention, it is nonetheless posterior in execution. But in its execution an *act* of fortitude is posterior to the *habit* of fortitude. Therefore, it cannot be the case that a courageous individual acts for the sake of the good of his own habit.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, "The virtues, which we love for the sake of

beatitude alone, are such that some dare to convince us"—viz., by claiming that we should desire the virtues for their own sake—"that we do not love beatitude itself. But if they do convince us, then we will surely cease to love the virtues themselves, since we will not love that for the sake of which alone we have loved them." Therefore, the act of fortitude is not aimed at fortitude itself, but should instead be traced back to beatitude.

Objection 3: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says that fortitude is "a love that bears all things easily for the sake of God." Now God is not the very habit of fortitude, but something better, in the way that an end must be better than the means to that end. Therefore, a courageous individual does not act for the sake of his own habit.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "Fortitude is the good for the courageous individual, and as such is his end."

I respond: There are two sorts of end, viz., *proximate* and *ultimate*.

The *proximate* end of a given agent is such that it induces a similitude of its own form in another, in the way that the end of a fire that heats is to induce a similitude of its own heat in the thing being acted upon, and in the way that the end of a builder is to induce a similitude of his skill or art in the material. And any good that follows from this can, if it is intended, be called a *remote* end of the agent. Moreover, just as, in the case of things that are *made*, the exterior matter is disposed by the art or skill, so, too, in the case of things that are *done*, human acts are disposed by prudence.

So, then, one should reply that a courageous individual intends as his proximate end to express in actuality a similitude of his own habit, since he intends to act in agreement with his own habit. On the other hand, his remote end is beatitude, or God.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the objections. For the first objection proceeds as if it were the very essence of the habit that is the end and not, as has been explained, its similitude in the act. On the other hand, the other two objections go through for the case of an ultimate end.

Article 8

Does the courageous individual take pleasure in his act?

It seems that the courageous individual takes pleasure in his act (*fortis delectetur in suo acto*):

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 10 explains, "Pleasure (*delectatio*) is the unimpeded operation of a connatural habit." But the operation of a courageous individual proceeds from his habit, which acts in the manner of a nature. Therefore, the courageous individual takes pleasure in his act.

Objection 2: In commenting on Galatians 5:22 ("The fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace ..."), Ambrose says that the works of the virtues are called fruits "because they refresh a man's mind with holy and sincere pleasure (*sancta et sincera delectatione*)." But a courageous man performs works of virtue. Therefore, he takes pleasure in his act.

Objection 3: The weaker is overcome by the stronger. But a strong or courageous individual (*fortis*) loves the good of virtue more than the good of his own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore, pleasure at the good of virtue wipes out bodily pain (*evacuat dolorem corporalem*). And so [the courageous individual] operates completely with pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that in his act the courageous individual "seems to have nothing pleasurable."

I respond: As was explained above when we were talking about the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 31, a. 3), there are two kinds of pleasure (*delectatio*), one of which is *corporeal* (*delectatio corporalis*) and follows upon the bodily sense of touch (*consequitur tactum corporalem*), and the other of which is *spiritual*

(*delectatio animalis*) and follows upon the soul's apprehension (*consequitur apprehensionem animae*). And it is the latter that properly follows upon the works of the virtues, since the good of reason is being thought of in them.

However, the principal act of fortitude is (a) to endure what is disagreeable to the soul's apprehension (*sustinere aliqua tristia secundum apprehensionem animae*), e.g., a man's losing his bodily life (a life that the virtuous individual loves not only insofar as it is a natural good, but also insofar as it is necessary for works of virtue) and what belongs to it, and, again, (b) to endure what is painful to the bodily sense of touch, e.g., wounds and stings.

And so the courageous individual has pleasure from the one side, viz., *spiritual* pleasure with respect to the act of virtue itself and with respect to its end, whereas on the other side he has something that pains him—both with respect to what is *spiritual*, when he considers the loss of his own life, and with respect to what is *corporeal*. Hence, as we read in 2 Maccabees 6:30, Eleazar said, "I am suffering dire bodily pains, but as regards my soul, I suffer them willingly because I fear You."

However, the body's sensory pain brings it about that the spiritual pleasure is not sensed—except, perhaps, because an abundance of God's grace elevates the soul more forcefully to the divine things in which it takes pleasure than it is affected by the bodily pain. This was the case with Saint Tiburtius, who, while walking barefoot over hot coals, said that it seemed to him that he was walking on roses. Still, the virtue of fortitude brings it about that reason is not absorbed with bodily pain. And the pleasure of virtue overcomes spiritual sadness, insofar as a man prefers the good of virtue over his bodily life and all that belongs to it. This is why in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that for a courageous individual, it is not required that he should take pleasure in the sense of feeling pleasure; instead, it is sufficient for him not to be sad.

Reply to objection 1: The vehemence of acting or being acted upon that belongs to one power impedes the other power in its own act. And so the mind of a courageous individual is impeded by sensory pain from feeling pleasure in its own operation.

Reply to objection 2: The works of virtue are pleasurable mainly because of the end, whereas they can be disagreeable by their own nature. And this happens especially in the case of fortitude. This is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, "Outside of the fact that one attains the end, operating with pleasure does not exist in the case of all the virtues."

Reply to objection 3: In the case of a courageous individual, spiritual sadness or pain (*tristitia animalis*) is overcome by the pleasure that belongs to the virtue. But because bodily pain is sensed to a greater degree and because sentient apprehension is more manifest to a man, it follows that spiritual pleasure, which has to do with the end of virtue, is dissipated, as it were, by the magnitude of the bodily pain.

Article 9

Does fortitude have to do especially with sudden occurrences?

It seems that fortitude does not have to do especially with sudden occurrences:

Objection 1: What happens suddenly seems to be what arises unexpectedly (*ex inopinato*). But in *Rhetorica* Tully says, "Fortitude involves deliberately taking on dangers and bearing up under hardships." Therefore, it is not the case that fortitude has to do especially with sudden occurrences.

Objection 2: In *De Officiis* 1 Ambrose says, "The courageous individual does not overlook anything that is imminent, but instead anticipates it; and from the watchtower of his mind, as it were, he confronts future events with his forethought, lest he should say afterwards, 'These things happened to me because I did not think they could occur'." But when something is sudden, it cannot be provided for as something future. Therefore, the operation of fortitude does not have to do with sudden occurrences.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that the courageous individual is "of good hope." But hope looks forward to something as future, and this is incompatible with its being sudden. Therefore, the operation of fortitude does not have to do with sudden occurrences.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that fortitude "has to do especially with whatever inflicts death, when it occurs suddenly."

I respond: In the case of the operation of fortitude there are two things that have to be taken into consideration:

One has to do with the *act of choosing that operation*. And on this score fortitude does not have to do with sudden occurrences. For the courageous individual chooses to think ahead of time about the dangers that are possibly imminent in order that he might be able to resist them or endure them more easily. For as Gregory puts it in a certain homily, "Spears that are foreseen strike with less force, and we are able more easily to bear the evils of the world if we are fortified against them with the shield of foreknowledge."

The second thing to be taken into consideration in the operation of fortitude has to do with the *manifestation of a virtuous habit*. And on this score fortitude has to do especially with sudden occurrences, since according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3, it is in sudden dangers that the habit of fortitude is especially made manifest. For a habit acts in the manner of a nature. Hence, if an individual does what pertains to the virtue without premeditation when necessity threatens because of sudden dangers, this especially shows that fortitude is habitually rooted in his soul.

Now even an individual who lacks the habit of fortitude can prepare his mind ahead of time against dangers by means of lengthy premeditation. The courageous individual likewise makes use of this sort of preparation when there is time.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: From this the replies to the objections are clear.

Article 10

Does the courageous individual make use of anger in his act?

It seems that the courageous individual does not make use of anger in his act :

Objection 1: No one should employ as an instrument of his action something that he cannot use as he pleases. But a man cannot use anger as he pleases in the sense of being able to employ it when he wills to and to set it aside when he wills to; for as the Philosopher points out in *De Memoria*, when a bodily passion is stirred, it does not calm down as soon as the man wants it to. Therefore, a courageous individual ought not employ anger for his operation.

Objection 2: An individual who is of himself sufficient to do something should not employ as an aid what is weaker and less perfect. But reason is of itself sufficient to execute a work of fortitude, whereas irascibility is deficient. Hence, in his book on anger Seneca says, "Reason is by itself sufficient not only to prepare one but also to carry out the action. And what is more stupid than for reason to seek assistance from anger: the stable thing from the unstable, the trustworthy thing from the untrustworthy, the healthy thing from the sick?" Therefore, fortitude ought not to employ anger.

Objection 3: Just as it is because of anger that some individuals execute the works of fortitude more vehemently, so it is also because of sorrow or because of concupiscence; hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "Wild beasts are enticed into doing dangerous things because of sorrow or pain, and adulterers do many daring deeds because of concupiscence." But fortitude does not employ either sorrow or concupiscence for its act. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it ought not to employ anger.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "Wrath helps the courageous."

I respond: As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 24, a. 2), the Peripatetics talked in one way about anger and the other passions of the soul, and the Stoics talked in a different way. For the Stoics excluded anger and all the other passions of the soul from the mind of the wise, i.e., virtuous, individual. By contrast, the Peripatetics, the chief among whom was Aristotle, attributed anger and the other passions to virtuous individuals, but as moderated by reason.

And perhaps the two sides did not disagree in substance, but only in their manner of speaking. For as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 24, a. 2), the Peripatetics called all the movements of the sentient appetite, however they might behave, 'passions of the soul', and since the sentient appetite is moved by the command of reason to cooperate in acting more promptly, they claimed that anger and the other passions of the soul should be employed by virtuous individuals as long as those passions are moderated by the command of reason. By contrast, what the Stoics call 'passions of the soul' are certain unmoderated affections of the sentient appetite (this is why they call them sicknesses or diseases), and they separated them completely from virtue.

So, then, the courageous individual employs moderated anger for his act, but not unmoderated anger.

Reply to objection 1: Anger that is moderated in accord with reason is subject to the command of reason. Hence, it follows that the man makes use of it by his own will—though this would not be so if it were unmoderated.

Reply to objection 2: Reason does not employ anger for its act in the sense of receiving assistance from it, but rather in the sense that it makes use of the sentient appetite as an instrument, just as it does with a bodily limb. Nor is it inappropriate for an instrument to be more imperfect than the principal agent, in the way that a hammer is less perfect than a carpenter.

Now Seneca was an adherent of the Stoics, and he proposed the quoted passage directly against Aristotle.

Reply to objection 3: Given that, as has been explained (aa. 3 and 6), fortitude has two acts, viz., to endure and to attack, it employs *anger* for the act of attacking and not for the act of enduring, since reason alone, in its own right, performs this latter act. For the act of attacking it employs anger more than the other passions, since anger involves throwing oneself at a thing that is doing damage, and so anger directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking.

On the other hand, *sadness* by its own nature (*secundum propriam rationem*) succumbs to what is harmful, but it does incidentally (*per accidens*) assist in attacking, either (a) insofar as sadness is, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 47, a. 3), a cause of anger, or (b) insofar as an individual exposes himself to danger in order to avoid the sadness.

Similarly, *concupiscence* by its own nature tends toward a pleasurable good, which is of itself incompatible with attacking what is dangerous, but it does sometimes incidentally contribute to attacking to the extent that the individual wants to take on dangers rather than give up something pleasurable.

This is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3 that among the instances of fortitude that arise from a passion, an instance of fortitude that arises through anger "seems to be the most natural, with the man making his choice and acting for a purpose"—that is, for a due end—"and this is fortitude"—that is, genuine fortitude.

Article 11

Is fortitude a cardinal virtue?

It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 10), anger has the greatest affinity to fortitude. But *anger* is not posited as a principal passion, and neither is *daring*, which pertains to fortitude. Therefore, neither

should fortitude be posited as a cardinal virtue.

Objection 2: A virtue is ordered toward the good. But fortitude is directly ordered not toward the good but instead toward evil, viz., in the words of Tully, "toward taking on dangers and hardships." Therefore, fortitude is not a cardinal virtue.

Objection 3: A cardinal virtue has to do with those things around which human life mainly revolves, in the way that a gate turns on a hinge (*sicut ostium in cardine vertitur*). But fortitude has to do with the danger of death, which rarely occurs in human life. Therefore, fortitude should not be posited as a cardinal, i.e., principal, virtue.

But contrary to this: Gregory, in *Moralia* 22, and Ambrose, in his commentary on Luke, and Augustine, in *De Moribus Ecclesiae*, all number fortitude among the four cardinal, i.e., principal, virtues.

I respond: As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 61, aa. 3-4), the virtues that are called cardinal, i.e., principal, virtues are those which principally assert a claim to what pertains generally to the virtues. Now as is clear from *Ethics* 2, among the other general conditions of virtue, one is that a virtue operates with firmness. But it is fortitude above all that asserts a claim to praise for being firm. For the more strongly something is pushing an individual toward falling down or retreating, the more he is praised for standing firm.

Now both pleasurable goods and painful evils push a man toward departing from what is in accord with reason, but bodily pain pushes one more strongly than does pleasure. For in *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "There is no one who does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we see that even the most untamed beasts are scared way from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain." And among the sorrows of the mind the ones that are feared most are those which lead to death and against which the courageous individual stands firm. Hence, fortitude is a cardinal virtue.

Reply to objection 1: *Daring* and *anger* do not cooperate with fortitude in its act of enduring, in which the firmness of fortitude is especially commended. For through this act the courageous individual holds in check his fear, and *fear*, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 25, a. 4), is a principal passion.

Reply to objection 2: Virtue is ordered toward the good of reason, which has to be preserved against the impulses of evil things. Now fortitude is ordered toward bodily evils as contraries which it resists, whereas it is ordered toward the good of reason as the end which it intends to preserve.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the dangers of death are rarely imminent, still, occasions for these dangers occur frequently, e.g., when mortal enemies are stirred up against a man because of the justice which he pursues and because of other good deeds that he does.

Article 12

Does fortitude surpass all the other virtues?

It seems that fortitude surpasses all the other virtues (*praecellat inter omnes virtutes*):

Objection 1: In *De Officiis* 1 Ambrose says, "Fortitude is, as it were, higher than the rest."

Objection 2: Virtue has to do with what is difficult and good. But fortitude has to do with the most difficult goods. Therefore, it is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 3: The person of a man is worth more than his property. But fortitude has to do with the person of a man, which an individual exposes to the danger of death because of the good of virtue, whereas justice and the other moral virtues have to do with other things that are exterior. Therefore, fortitude is chief among the virtues.

But contrary to this:

1. In *De Officiis* 1 Tully says, "The splendor of virtue is greatest in justice, and good men are named from it."

2. In *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher says, "The greatest virtues have to be those which are most useful to others." But generosity (*liberalitas*) seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore, it is a greater virtue than fortitude.

I respond: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 6, "In things that are great, but not in weight, to be greater is the same as being better." Hence, a virtue is greater to the extent that it is better.

Now according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good of reason is the good of the man. And *prudence*, which is a perfection of reason, has this good *by its essence*. On the other hand, *justice effects* this good, insofar as it involves inserting the order of reason into all human affairs. And the other virtues tend to *preserve* this good, insofar as they moderate the passions, so that those passions do not lead a man away from the good of reason. And in the ordering of these other virtues *fortitude* occupies the preeminent place, since the fear of the danger of death is especially effective in making a man draw back from the good of reason. After this is ranked *temperance*, since, again, the pleasures of touch impede the good of reason most among the other impediments.

Now this is being asserted with respect to the *essence* of these virtues (*essentialiter*) more than respect to their *effectiveness* (*potius est eo quod dicitur effective*), and this, again, more than with respect to what they *preserve* in the sense of removing impediments. Hence, among the cardinal virtues *prudence* is the most important; second is *justice*; third is *fortitude*; and fourth is *temperance*; and after these come the other virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Ambrose puts fortitude ahead of the other virtues because it has a sort of general usefulness, since it is useful both in wartime affairs and in civil or domestic affairs. Hence, in the same place he had begun by saying, "We will now talk about fortitude, which, insofar it is higher than the others, is divided into wartime affairs and domestic affairs."

Reply to objection 2: The nature of virtue has more to do with *the good* than with *the difficult*. Hence, a virtue's greatness should be measured more by the notion of the good than by the notion of the difficult.

Reply to objection 3: A man does not expose his own person to the danger of death except for the sake of preserving justice. And so the praise that belongs to fortitude depends in some sense on justice. Hence, in *De Officiis* 1 Ambrose says, "Fortitude without justice is an occasion for iniquity, since the stronger an individual is, the more ready he is to oppress someone who is weaker."

Reply to argument 1 for the contrary: We concede this argument.

Reply to argument 2 for the contrary: Generosity is useful for certain particular benefits. But fortitude has a *general* usefulness for preserving the whole order of justice. And this is why in *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher says, "The just and the courageous are loved the most, because they are the most useful both in war and in peace."