

## QUESTION 29

### Peace

We next have to consider peace. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is peace (*pax*) the same as concord (*concordia*)? (2) Do all things seek peace? (3) Is peace an effect of charity? (4) Is peace a virtue?

#### Article 1

##### Is peace the same as concord?

It seems that peace (*pax*) is the same as concord (*concordia*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “Peace among men is ordered concord.” But we are speaking here of nothing other than peace among men. Therefore, peace is the same as concord.

**Objection 2:** Concord is a certain union of wills. But the essence of peace (*ratio pacis*) consists in such a union; for in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 11 Dionysius says, “Peace is what unifies all and is an operative consensus.” Therefore, peace is the same as concord.

**Objection 3:** Things that have the same opposite are the same as one another. But the same thing, viz., dissension (*dissensio*), is opposed both to concord and to peace; hence, 1 Corinthians 14:33 says, “He is not a God of dissension, but a God of peace.” Therefore, peace is the same as concord.

**But contrary to this:** There can be concord among wicked men with respect to something evil. But as Isaiah 48:22 says, “There is no peace for the wicked.” Therefore, peace is not the same as concord.

**I respond:** Peace includes concord and adds something else to it. Hence, if the name ‘peace’ is being taken properly, then wherever there is peace, there is concord, but it is not the case that wherever there is concord, there is peace.

For concord, taken properly, is had in relation to someone else (*ad alterum*)—more specifically, it is had insofar as the acts of will of different hearts come together at the same time in a single consensus (*inquantum diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt*).

In addition, it happens that the heart of an individual man tends toward diverse things, and this in two ways:

One corresponds to diverse appetitive powers, in the way that the sentient appetite very often tends toward what is contrary to the intellective appetite—this according to Galatians 5:17 (“The flesh lusts against the spirit”).

In a second way, insofar as one and the same appetitive power tends toward diverse desirable things which cannot be attained simultaneously. Hence, there has to be conflict among the appetitive movements. Now the union of such movements is of the essence of peace (*de ratione pacis*); for even if a man possesses something that he wants, he does not have a peaceful heart (*pacatum cor*) as long as there is still something that he wants and cannot have at the same time.

By contrast, this sort of union of movements is not of the essence of concord. Hence, concord implies a union of desires among different individuals (*unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium*), whereas, over and beyond this union, peace implies a union of desires within a single individual.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is here talking about the peace that exists between one man and another. And he says that this peace is concord—not just any sort of concord, but concord that is ordered by the fact that the one man agrees with the other on something that is fitting for both. For if one man agrees with another not by a spontaneous willing but by being, as it were, coerced by the fear of some imminent evil, than such a concord is not genuine peace, since the order within the two who are agreeing is not preserved, but is instead disrupted by whatever inflicts the fear. And this is why Augustine, before this, had said that peace is a tranquility of order, and this sort of tranquility consists in all the appetitive

movements within an individual man being at rest together.

**Reply to objection 2:** If one man consents to the same thing as another man, his agreement is not altogether unified unless all of his own appetitive movements likewise agree with one another.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two sorts of dissension, viz., (a) dissension between a man and himself and (b) dissension between one man and another. It is only the second sort of dissension that is opposed to concord.

## Article 2

### Do all things seek peace?

It seems that not all things seek (*appetant*) peace:

**Objection 1:** According to Dionysius, peace is a “consensus that makes for unity” (*unitiva consensus*). But in things that lack cognition there cannot be a unified consensus. Therefore, things of this sort cannot seek peace.

**Objection 2:** An appetitive power does not tend toward contraries at the same time. But there are many who desire war and dissension. Therefore, not everyone desires peace.

**Objection 3:** Only what is good is desirable. But a certain sort of peace seems to be bad; otherwise, our Lord would not say in Matthew 10:34, “I have not come to bring peace.” Therefore, not all things seek peace.

**Objection 4:** What all things seek seems to be the highest good, which is the ultimate end. But peace is not this sort of thing, since it is had even in the present life; otherwise, in Mark 9:49 it would have been useless for our Lord to command, “Have peace among you.” Therefore, not all things seek peace.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says that all things seek peace. And Dionysius says the same thing in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 11.

**I respond:** From the very fact that a man desires something, it follows that he desires the attainment of what he desires and, as a result, he desires the removal of anything that can impede that attainment. Now the attainment of a desired good can be impeded by a contrary desire either on the man’s own part or on the part of others and, as was explained above (a. 1), both of these obstacles are removed by peace. And so it must be the case that anything that has an appetitive power seeks peace, viz., insofar as everything that has an appetitive power seeks to arrive with tranquility and without impediment at that which it seeks—and this is what peace, which Augustine defines as “a tranquility of order,” consists in.

**Reply to objection 1:** Peace implies not only a unification of the intellectual (or rational) appetite or a unification of the animal appetite, both of which have to do with a consensus, but also a unification of natural appetite. This is why Dionysius says that peace “effects both consensus and connaturality,” so that ‘consensus’ implies a unification of appetitive powers that proceed from cognition, and ‘connaturality’ implies a unification of natural appetitive powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who seek war and dissension desire only a peace which they do not think that they have. For as has been explained, it is not peace if someone agrees with another against something that he wills to a greater degree. And so by making war, men seek to shatter this latter sort of concord as something lacking in peace, in order that they might arrive at a peace in which nothing is contrary to their will. And for this reason, all those who make war seek to arrive through war at a more perfect peace than they previously had.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since peace consists in the quieting and unification of the appetitive power, it follows that just as a desire can be either for the good absolutely speaking or for a merely apparent

good, so too peace can be both genuine and apparent. There cannot be a genuine peace unless what is desired is a genuine good (*nisi circa appetitum veri boni*), since every evil, even if it appears good in some respect and hence partly quiets the appetite, nonetheless has many defects because of which the appetitive power remains restless and perturbed. Hence, a true peace can exist only in good individuals and among good individuals. By contrast, the peace that belongs to bad individuals is an apparent peace and not a genuine peace. Hence, Wisdom 14:22 says, “Those living in a great war of ignorance took so many evils, and such great evils, to be peace.”

**Reply to objection 4:** Since genuine peace exists only with respect to the good, it follows that just as a true good is had in two ways, viz., perfectly and imperfectly, so there are two sorts of genuine peace.

One is *perfect peace*, which consists in the perfect enjoyment of the highest good and through which all desires are unified by coming to rest in a single good. And that is the ultimate end of a rational creature—this according to Psalm 147:3 (“He has made peace within your borders”).

The other is *imperfect peace*, which is had in this world. For even though the principal movement of the soul comes to rest in God, there are nonetheless conflicts, both interior and exterior, which disturb this peace.

### Article 3

#### Is peace a proper effect of charity?

It seems that peace is not a proper effect of charity:

**Objection 1:** Charity is not had without habitual grace (*sine gratia gratum faciente*). But peace is had by some individuals who do not have habitual grace; for instance, the gentiles sometimes have peace. Therefore, peace is not an effect of charity.

**Objection 2:** Something whose contrary can exist with charity is not an effect of charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace, can exist with charity. For we see that even the sacred doctors, e.g., Jerome and Augustine, disagree in some of their opinions, and it is written in Acts 15:37 that even Paul and Barnabas disagreed. Therefore, it seems that peace is not an effect of charity.

**Objection 3:** It is not the case that the same thing is the proper effect of diverse things. But peace is an effect of justice—this according to Isaiah 32:17 (“The work of justice is peace”). Therefore, it is not an effect of charity.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 118:165 says, “Much peace have they who love your Law.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), there are two unifications that are of the essence of peace. One of them has to do with the ordering of one’s own appetitive powers into a unity, while the other has to do with unifying one’s own appetite with the appetite of another. And charity effects both of these unifications.

It effects the first unification insofar as God is loved with our whole heart—so that, namely, we refer all things to God and so all our desires are brought together into a unity.

Charity effects the second unification insofar as we love our neighbor as ourselves, and from this it happens that a man wills to fulfill the will of his neighbor as he wills to fulfill his own will. And it is because of this that sameness of choices is posited as one of the signs of friendship, as is clear from *Ethics* 9; and in his book *De Amicitia* Tully says, “It belongs to friends to like and dislike the same things.”

**Reply to objection 1:** No one falls away from habitual grace except because of sin, by which it happens that a man is turned away from his due end and sets up his end in something unfitting. And on this score his appetitive power adheres principally to an apparent final good instead of to the true final good. And this is why there can only be apparent peace, and not true peace, in the absence of habituating

grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, it is not agreement on opinions that pertains to friendship, but rather agreement on the goods that contribute to life—particularly the big goods, since to disagree on some small matters seems, as it were, not to amount to dissension. And because of this, nothing prevents individuals who have charity from disagreeing in their opinions. Nor is this incompatible with peace, since these opinions belong to the intellect, which precedes the appetitive power that is unified by peace.

Similarly, when there is agreement on important goods, disagreement in small matters is not contrary to charity. For such disagreement proceeds from a diversity of opinions, where one of the individuals thinks the matter over which there is disagreement is relevant to the good on which they agree, and the other individual thinks that it is not relevant. Accordingly, such disagreement over trifles and over opinions is, to be sure, incompatible with perfect peace, in which the truth will be known fully and every desire will be fulfilled, but it is not incompatible with imperfect peace of the sort that is had in this life.

**Reply to objection 3:** Peace is *indirectly* the work of justice, viz., insofar as justice removes obstacles to peace. But peace is *directly* the work of charity, since charity by its proper nature is a cause of peace. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, love is a “unifying force” and peace is the unification of the appetitive inclinations.

#### Article 4

##### Is peace a virtue?

It seems that peace is a virtue:

**Objection 1:** Precepts are handed down only with respect to acts of the virtues. But as is clear from Mark 9:49 (“Have peace among you”), precepts are handed down about having peace. Therefore, peace is a virtue.

**Objection 2:** We merit only by acts of the virtues. But it is meritorious to make peace—this according to Matthew 5:9 (“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God”). Therefore, peace is a virtue.

**Objection 3:** Vices are opposed to virtues. But dissension, which is opposed to peace, is numbered among the vices, as is clear from Galatians 5:20. Therefore, peace is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** A virtue is not itself the ultimate end but is instead a path to the ultimate end. But peace is in some sense the ultimate end, as Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 19. Therefore, peace is not a virtue.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 28, a. 4), when all the acts follow upon one another, proceeding from the agent according to the same reason, then all acts of this sort proceed from a single virtue or power (*ab una virtute procedunt*); nor do the individual acts have individual virtues from which they proceed. This is clear in the case of corporeal entities. For instance, when fire, by giving heat, liquefies and rarefies, there does not exist in the fire one liquefying power and another rarefying power; instead, the fire effects all these acts through its single heating power. Therefore, since, as has been shown (a. 3), peace is caused by charity in accord with the very nature of the love of God and neighbor, it follows that, just as in the case of joy, there is not a virtue other than charity of which peace is a proper act.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reason that a precept is handed down for having peace is that it is an act of charity. And because of this it is also a meritorious act. And this is why it is posited among the beatitudes, which, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 69, a. 3), are acts of perfect virtue. Likewise, it is

posited among the fruits [of the Holy Spirit] insofar as it is a sort of final good having spiritual sweetness.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply to the second objection is clear from what was just said.

**Reply to objection 3:** Many vices are opposed to a single virtue in accord with the virtue's diverse acts. And, on this score, opposed to charity is not just (a) *hate*, by reason of the *act of loving*, but also (b) *acedia* and *envy*, by reason of *joy*, and (c) *dissension*, by reason of *peace*.