

QUESTION 16

What Belongs to Christ with respect to His *Esse* and *Coming-to-exist*

Next we have to consider what follows upon the union: first, what belongs to Christ in His own right (questions 16-19); second, what belongs to Christ in relation to God the Father (questions 20-24); and, third, what belongs to Christ in relation to us (questions 25-26).

On the first point there are two things to consider: first, what belongs to Christ with respect to His *esse* and *coming-to-exist* (question 16); and, second, what belongs to Christ regarding the notion of oneness (questions 17-19).

On the first topic there are ten questions: (1) Is *God is a man* true? (2) Is *A man is God* true? (3) Can Christ be called a Lord-like man? (4) Can the things that belong to the Son of Man be predicated of the Son of God, and vice versa? (5) Can the things that belong to the Son of Man be predicated of the divine nature, and can the things that belong to the Son of God be predicated of the human nature? (6) *The Son of God was made man* true? (7) Is *A man was made the Son of God* true? (8) Is *Christ is a creature* true? (9) Pointing to Christ, is *This man began to exist* true, or is *This man has always existed* true? (10) Is *Christ as a man is a creature* true? (11) Is *Christ as a man is God* true? (12) Is *Christ as a man is a hypostasis* (or: *a person*) true?

Article 1

Is *God is a man* true?

It seems that *God is a man* is false (*haec est falsa, Deus est homo*):

Objection 1: Every affirmative proposition that involves some sort of remote matter (*in materia aliqua remota*) is false. But the proposition *God is a man* involves remote matter, since the forms signified by the subject and the predicate are distant from one another to the highest degree. Therefore, since the proposition in question is affirmative, it seems that it is false.

Objection 2: The three persons [of the Trinity] agree with one another more than a human nature agrees with the divine nature. But in the mystery of the Trinity it is not the case that one person is predicated of another; for instance, we do not say *The Father is the Son*, or vice versa. Therefore, it seems that neither can human nature be predicated of God, as when one says *God is a man*.

Objection 3: Athanasius says, “Just as soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ.” But *Soul is body* is false. Therefore, *God is man* is likewise false.

Objection 4: As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 39, a. 4), what is predicated of God absolutely and not relationally (*non relative sed absolute*) belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the persons. But the name ‘man’ is absolute and not relational. Therefore, if *man* is predicated truly of God, then it follows that the whole Trinity and each person is a man. But this is clearly false.

But contrary to this: Philippians 2 says, “... who, though He was in the form of God, emptied Himself, taking on the form of a servant, made in the likeness of man and being found in human form.” And so He who is in the form of God is a man. But He who is in the form of God is God. Therefore, God is a man.

I respond: The proposition *God is a man* is granted by all Christians, but is not granted by all for the same reason.

For some grant this proposition, but not in accord with a proper understanding of the terms. For instance, the Manicheans say that the Word of God is a man—yet not a *real* man, but a *simulated* man, insofar as they claim that the Son of God assumed an imaginary body (*corpus phantasticum*), with the result that God is said to be a man in the same way that a bronze figure is called a man because it bears a likeness to a man.

Similarly, those who claimed that the soul and the body were not united in Christ did not hold that

God is a real man, but claimed instead that He is called a man figuratively by reason of His parts.

However, both of these opinions were disproved above (q. 2, a. 5 and q. 5, a. 1).

By contrast, others posit the truth on the side of the man, but deny the truth on the side of God. For they claim that Christ, who is the God-man, is not God *naturally*, but is instead God by *participation*, viz., through grace, in the way that all holy men are likewise called ‘Gods’ (cf. Psalm 81:6 and John 10:34)—though Christ is more excellent than the others because of His more abundant grace.

Accordingly, when one says *God is man*, ‘God’ does not supposit for the real and natural God. And this is the heresy of Photinus that was disproved above (q. 2, aa. 10-11).

Still others grant the proposition in question, positing the truth on both sides, but they do not preserve the truth of the predication. For they claim that *man* is predicated of *God* because of some sort of connection, whether of dignity or of authority, or, again, of affection or of indwelling. And thus Nestorius claimed that God is a man in such a way that nothing is thereby signified other than that God is conjoined to the man by a connection which is such that the man is inhabited by God and united to Him by affection and by participation in God’s authority and honor. And those who posit two *hypostases* or two *supposita* in Christ fall into a similar error. For it is impossible to make sense of the idea that of two things that are distinct in suppositum or *hypostasis*, one is properly predicated of the other; instead, one can be predicated of the other only by some figurative way of speaking insofar as they are conjoined in some way—as, for instance, if we were to claim that Peter is John because they have some sort of connection with one another. And these opinions were likewise disproved above (q. 2, aa. 3 and 6).

Hence, presupposing, in accord with the truth of the Catholic Faith, that the real divine nature was united with a real human nature, not only in a person but also in a suppositum or *hypostasis*, we claim that the proposition *God is a man* is true and proper—not only because of the truth of the terms, i.e., because Christ is true God and true man, but also because of the truth of the predication. For a name that signifies a common nature in the concrete can supposit for any of the individuals contained within that common nature, in the way that the noun ‘man’ can supposit for any individual man. And so, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 39, a. 4), the name ‘God’, by the very mode of its signification, is able to supposit for the person of the Son of God. And a name that signifies a nature in the concrete can be truly and properly predicated of any suppositum of that nature, in the way that *man* is truly and properly predicated of Socrates and Plato. Therefore, since the person of the Son of God, whom the name ‘God’ supposits for, is the suppositum of a human nature, the name ‘man’ can be truly and properly predicated of the noun ‘God’, insofar as the latter supposits for the person of the Son of God.

Reply to objection 1: When diverse forms cannot come together in one suppositum, then the proposition involves remote matter, where the subject signifies one of the forms and the predicate the other. By contrast, when the two forms can come together in one suppositum, the matter is not *remote* but is instead either *natural* or *contingent*, as when I say *The white thing is musical*. Now even though the divine nature and a human nature are distant from one another to the highest degree, they nonetheless, in the mystery of the Incarnation, come together in one suppositum in which neither of them exists as an accident (*per accidens*), but instead both exist in it in their own right [as natures] (*cui neutra illarum inest per accidens, sed secundum se*). And so the proposition *God is a man* does not involve either *remote* matter or *contingent* matter, but instead involves *natural* matter. And *man* is predicated of *God*, as of its own *hypostasis*, in its own right and not as an accident (*non per accidens sed per se*)—not, to be sure, by reason of the *form* signified by the name ‘God’, but by reason of the *suppositum*, which is the *hypostasis* of a human nature.

Reply to objection 2: The three persons agree in nature but are distinct in suppositum, and this is why they are not predicated of one another.

Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the natures, since they are distinct, are not predicated of one another insofar as they are signified in the *abstract*; for the divine nature is not the human nature. Instead, they are predicated of one another in the *concrete*, since they agree in suppositum.

Reply to objection 3: Soul and flesh are being signified here in the abstract, as are the divine nature (*divinitas*) and human nature (*humanitas*).

In the concrete, however, one says ‘ensouled’ (*animata*) and ‘enfleshed’ (*carneum*), or ‘embodied’ (*corporeum*), just as, on the other side, one says ‘God’ and ‘man’. Hence, in both cases it is not the abstract term that is being predicated of the abstract term, but only the concrete term that is being predicated of the concrete term.

Reply to objection 4: The name ‘man’ is predicated of God by reason of the union in a person, and this union involves a relation. And so this case does not follow the rule governing those names that are predicated absolutely of God from eternity.

Article 2

Is *A man is God* true?

It seems that *A man is God* is false (*haec est falsa, homo est Deus*):

Objection 1: *God* is an unshareable name (*nomen incommunicabile*). But in Wisdom 14:21 idolaters are criticized for imposing the name *God*, which is unshareable, on rocks and pieces of wood. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it seems to be inappropriate for the name *God* to be predicated of a man.

Objection 2: Whatever is predicated of the predicate is predicated of the subject. But *God is the Father*, or *God is a Trinity*, is true. Therefore, if *A man is God* is true, then it seems that *A man is the Father*, or *A man is the Trinity*, is likewise true. But these two propositions are clearly false. Therefore, so is the first proposition.

Objection 3: Psalm 80:10 says, “There shall be no new God among you.” But a man is something new, since Christ was not always a man. Therefore, *A man is God* is false.

But contrary to this: Romans 9:5 says, “... from whom is Christ according to the flesh, Who is over all things, blessed God forever.” But according to the flesh Christ is a man. Therefore, *A man is God* is true.

I respond: Presupposing the reality of both natures, viz., the divine nature and the human nature, and presupposing their union in a person and *hypostasis*, the proposition *A man is God* is true, just as *God is a man* is true. For the name ‘man’ can supposit for any *hypostasis* of a human nature, and so it can supposit for the person of the Son, which we claim to be the *hypostasis* of a human nature. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 39, a. 4), it is clear that the name ‘God’ is truly and properly predicated of the person of the Son of God. Hence, it follows that *A man is God* is true and proper.

Reply to objection 1: The idolater attributed the name of the deity to rocks and pieces of wood insofar as they are thought of in their own nature, since they believed that something of the divine existed in them (*putabant in illis aliquid numinis esse*). We, on the other hand, attribute the name of the deity to a man not because of His human nature, but, as has been explained, because of the eternal suppositum which is also, through the union, the suppositum of a human nature.

Reply to objection 2: The name ‘Father’ is predicated of the name ‘God’ insofar as the name ‘God’ supposits for the person of the Father. But the name ‘Father’ is not predicated in this way of the person of the Son, since the person of the Son is not the person of the Father. As a result, it is not necessary for the name ‘Father’ to be predicated of the name ‘man’, of which the name ‘God’ is predicated, because ‘man’ is suppositing for the person of the Son.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the human nature in Christ is something new, the suppositum of the human nature is eternal and not something new. And since the name ‘God’ is predicated of the man by reason of the suppositum and not by reason of the human nature, it does not follow that we are

positing a new God. However, this would follow if, in accord with what those who posit two supposita in Christ must say, we claimed that ‘man’ presupposes a *created* suppositum,.

Article 3

Can Christ be called a Lord-like man?

It seems that Christ can be called a Lord-like man (*Christus possit dici homo dominicus*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “We have to be reminded to hope for the goods which existed in that Lord-like man (*in illo homine dominico*).” But he is talking about Christ. Therefore, it seems that Christ is a Lord-like man.

Objection 2: Lordship (*dominium*) belongs to Christ by reason of His divine nature, in the way that manhood (*humanitas*) belongs to His human nature. But God is said to be ‘humanized’ (*humanatus*), as is clear from Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, where he says, “Being humanized (*humanatio*) shows a connection with man.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, one can say, while pointing, *That man is Lord-like*.

Objection 3: Just as ‘Lord-like’ is said denominatively of the Lord, so ‘divine’ is said denominatively of God. But Dionysius call Christ “the most divine Jesus.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, Christ can be said to be a Lord-like man.

But contrary to this: In *Retractationes* Augustine says, “I do not see that Jesus Christ is rightly called Lord-like, given that He is the Lord without qualification (*cum sit utique dominus*).”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), when Christ Jesus is called a man, what is being designated is an eternal suppositum that is the person of the Son of God, because there is one suppositum for the two natures. But ‘God’ and ‘Lord’ are predicated *essentially* of the Son of God, and so they should not be predicated [of Him] *denominatively*, because this detracts from the reality of the union. Hence, since ‘Lord-like’ is derived as a denominative from ‘Lord’, it cannot be truly and properly said of *that* man that He is Lord-like; rather, it is truly and properly said of Him that He is the Lord. (If, on the other hand, in calling Christ Jesus a man, one were thereby designating a *created* suppositum—in keeping with those who posit two supposita in Christ—then that man could be called ‘Lord-like’ insofar as He is taken up into a participation in God’s honor, in the way that the Nestorians claimed.)

Also, along these same lines, the human nature is essentially said to be *deified* (*deificata*) rather than to be *God-like* (*dea*)—not, to be sure, through its conversion into the divine nature, but through its being conjoined with the divine nature in one *hypostasis*. This is clear from Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3.

Reply to objection 1: In *Retractationes* Augustine retracts these words and similar ones. Hence after the passage cited above from the *Retractationes* he adds, “Wherever I have said this”—viz., that Christ Jesus is a Lord-like man—“I wish that I had not said it. Afterwards I saw that it should not be said, even though it could be defended by a certain argument, since one could claim that ‘Lord-like man’ is said by reason of the human nature, which the name ‘man’ signifies, and not by reason of the suppositum.”

Reply to objection 2: The one suppositum which is the suppositum of the divine nature and of the human nature was, to be sure, first the suppositum of the divine nature, i.e., from eternity, whereas afterwards, in time, it became, through the Incarnation, the suppositum of the human nature. And for this reason it is said to be ‘humanized’—not because it assumed a man, but because it assumed a human nature.

However, it is not true, conversely, that the suppositum of the human nature assumed a divine nature. Hence, it cannot be said that the man is deified or Lord-like.

Reply to objection 3: The name ‘divine’ (*divinum*) is customarily predicated also of things of which the noun ‘God’ is predicated essentially. For instance, we say that the divine essence is God, by reason of identity; and that the essence is God’s or is divine, because of the diverse modes of signifying; and that the Word is divine, even though the Word is God. And, similarly, we call a person divine—for instance, the person of Plato—because of the diverse modes of signifying.

By contrast, ‘lord-like’ (*dominicus*) is not said of those things of which ‘lord’ is predicated. For it is not customary to say that a man who is a lord is ‘lord-like’. But that which in any way belongs to a lord is called lord-like, e.g., a lord-like volition or a lord-like hand or a lord-like possession. And the man Christ, who is the Lord, cannot Himself be called ‘Lord-like’, though His flesh can be called Lord-like flesh, and His passion can be called a Lord-like passion.

Article 4

Can the things that belong to the human nature be said of God?

It seems that the things that belong to the human nature cannot be said of God (*ea quae sunt humanae naturae de Deo dici non possint*):

Objection 1: It is impossible for opposites to be predicated of the same thing. But the things that belong to the human nature are contrary to things that are proper to God; for instance, God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, whereas it belongs to the human nature to be created, temporal, and mutable. Therefore, it is not the case that the things that belong to the human nature can be said of God.

Objection 2: To attribute to God what involves a weakness seems to detract from God’s honor and to involve blasphemy. But the things that belong to the human nature involve some sort of weakness, e.g., dying, suffering, and other things of this sort. Therefore, it seems that there is no way in which the things that belong to the human nature can be said of God.

Objection 3: To be assumed belongs to the human nature. But it does not belong to God. Therefore, it is not the case that the things that belong to the human nature can be said of God.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “God took up those things that are *idiomata*”—i.e., properties —“of the flesh, given that God is called passible and the God of glory was crucified.”

I respond: On this question there was disagreement between the Nestorians and the Catholics.

For the Nestorians wanted to divide the words that were predicated of Christ in such a way that those that pertain to His human nature were not said of God and those that pertain to His divine nature were not said of the man. Hence, Nestorius said, “If anyone tries to attribute passions to the Word of God, let him be anathema.” On the other hand, if there are any names that can belong to both natures, e.g., the name ‘Christ’ or the name ‘Lord’, they predicated of them the things that belong to both natures. Hence, they conceded that Christ was born of a virgin and that Christ existed from eternity, but they did not concede that God was born of a virgin or that a man existed from eternity.

The Catholics, on the other hand, claimed that names of this sort that are said of Christ, with respect to either His divine nature or His human nature, can be said both of God and of the man. Hence, Cyril said, “If anyone divides between two persons or substances”— i.e., *hypostases*—“the words that are in the evangelical and apostolic writings, whether they are said of Christ by the saints or by Christ Himself about Himself, and if he believes that some of them are to be applied to the man, and assigns some only to the Word, let him be anathema.” The reason for this is that since the *hypostasis* is the same for both natures, the names that belong to each of the two natures supposit for the same *hypostasis*. Therefore, regardless of whether one says *God* or *man*, the *hypostasis* of the divine nature and the human nature is being supposit for. And so things that belong to the divine nature can be said of *man* and

things that belong to the human nature can be said of *God*.

Notice, however, that in a proposition in which one thing is predicated of another, one pays attention not only to what the predicate is predicated of, but also to the respect (*secundum quid*) in which it is predicated of it. Therefore, even though the things that are predicated of Christ are not distinguished, nonetheless, the respects in which each is predicated are distinguished. For things that belong to the divine nature are predicated of Christ with respect to His divine nature (*secundum deitatem*), whereas things that belong to His human nature are predicated of Him with respect to His human nature (*secundum humanam naturam*). Hence, in *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, “Let us distinguish what in the Scriptures is consonant with the form of God and what is consonant with the form of a servant.” And later on: “The discerning and diligent and pious reader understands what is said because of what and what is said in what respect.”

Reply to objection 1: It is impossible for opposites to be predicated of the same thing and in the same respect (*opposita predicari de eodem secundum idem est impossibile*), but nothing prohibits them from being predicated of the same thing in different respects (*secundum diversa*). And it is in this latter way that opposites are predicated of Christ—not with respect to the same nature, but with respect to diverse natures.

Reply to objection 2: If things involving weakness were attributed to God with respect to His divine nature, it would be blasphemy in the sense of involving a lessening of God’s honor; however, it does not involve an injury to God if these things are attributed to Him with respect to His human nature. Hence, a discourse from the Council of Ephesus says, “God thinks nothing of an injury that is for men an occasion of salvation. For nothing abject that He chose for our sake does injury to that nature which cannot be subject to injuries. Instead, He makes lower things His own in order to save our nature. Therefore, given that things which are abject and vile do not harm the nature of God but instead contribute to the salvation of men, why do you claim that what causes our salvation has been for God an occasion of injury?”

Reply to objection 3: Being assumed belongs to the human nature by reason of its very self and not by reason of its suppositum. And so it does not belong to God.

Article 5

Can the things that belong to the human nature be said of the divine nature?

It seems that the things that belong to the human nature can be said of the divine nature (*ea quae sunt humanae naturae possint dici de natura divina*):

Objection 1: The things that belong to the human nature can be predicated of the Son of God and of God. But God is His own nature. Therefore, the things that belong to the human nature can be predicated of the divine nature.

Objection 2: Flesh belongs to the human nature. But as Damascene says in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, “According to Saints Athanasius and Cyril, we say that nature of the Word is enfleshed or incarnated (*incarnatam*).” Therefore, it seems, by parity of reasoning, that the things that belong to the human nature can be said of the divine nature.

Objection 3: Things that belong to the divine nature belong to the human nature in Christ, e.g., having cognition of the future and having salvific power. Therefore, it seems, by parity of reasoning, that things that belong to the human nature can be said of the divine nature.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “When we say ‘the divinity’ (*deitatem dicentes*), we do not predicate of it the *idiomata*”—i.e., the properties—“of the humanity (*idiomata humanitatis*). For we do not say that the divinity (*deitas*) is passible or creatable.” But the

divinity (*deitas*) is the divine nature. Therefore, the things that belong to the human nature cannot be said of the divine nature.

I respond: A thing that belongs *properly* to one thing cannot be truly predicated of anything except of what is the same as that thing; for instance, *risible* does not fit with anything except what is a man. Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the divine nature and the human nature are not the same, but the *hypostasis* of the two natures is the same. And so the things that belong to the one nature cannot be predicated of the other nature insofar as the natures are signified in the *abstract*.

By contrast, the *concrete* names supposit for a nature's *hypostasis*. And so the things that belong to either nature can be predicated indifferently of the *concrete* names, regardless of whether the concrete name of which they are said involves an understanding of (a) both natures, like the name 'Christ', in which both "the anointing divine nature and the anointed human nature" are understood, or (b) just the divine nature, like the names 'God' or 'Son of God', or (c) just the human nature, like the names 'man' or 'Jesus'. Hence, in *Epistola ad Palaestinos* Pope Leo says, "It does not matter from which substance Christ is named. For as long as the oneness of the person remains inseparably, the whole of the Son of Man with His flesh is the same as the whole of the Son of God with His one divine nature with the Father."

Reply to objection 1: In divine matters, the person is really the same as the nature, and by reason of this identity the divine nature is predicated of the Son of God.

However, the mode of signifying is not the same. And so some things are said of the Son of God that are not said of the divine nature. For instance, as was established in the First Part ((*ST* 1, q. 39, a. 5), we say that the Son of God is generated, but we do not say that the divine nature is generated. And, similarly, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the Son of God suffered (*est passus*), but we do not say that the divine nature suffered.

Reply to objection 2: 'Incarnation' implies a union with the flesh rather than a property of the flesh. But each nature exists in Christ united to the other in the person, and, as was explained above (q. 2, a. 1, ad 3), by reason of this union it is both the case that the divine nature is said to be incarnated and also the case that the human nature is said to be deified.

Reply to objection 3: The things that belong to the divine nature are said of the human nature not insofar as they belong *essentially* to the divine nature, but in the sense that they flow into the human nature *by participation*. Hence, those things which cannot be participated in by the human nature, e.g., being uncreated and being omnipotent, are in no way said of the human nature. By contrast, the divine nature does not receive anything from the human nature by participation. And so the things that belong to human nature can in no way be said of the divine nature.

Article 6

Is *God was made a man* true?

It seems that *God was made a man* is false (*haec est falsa, Deus factus est homo*):

Objection 1: Since *man* signifies a substance, to be made a man is to be made absolutely speaking (*fieri hominem est fieri simpliciter*). But *God was made absolutely speaking* is false. Therefore, *God was made a man* is false.

Objection 2: To be made a man is to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of a change—this according to Malachi 3:6 ("I am the Lord, and I do not change"). Therefore, it seems that *God was made a man* is false.

Objection 3: Insofar as *man* is said of Christ, it supposits for the person of the Son of God. But *God was made the person of the Son of God* is false. Therefore, *Christ was made a man* is false.

But contrary to this: John 1:14 says, “The Word was made flesh” (*Verbum caro factum est*). And as Athanasius says in *Epistola ad Epictetum*, “He said, ‘The Word was made flesh’; it is like saying, ‘He was made a man’.”

I respond: Each thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it anew (*de novo*). But as has been explained (a. 1), *being a man* is truly predicated of *God*, and yet in such a way that it belonged to God to be a man not from eternity, but from a given time through His assuming a human nature. And so *God was made man* is true. Yet this is understood by different writers in different ways—just as with *God is a man*, which was discussed above (a. 1).

Reply to objection 1: Being made a man is being made absolutely speaking in all those respects in which a human nature begins to exist in a suppositum that has been newly created. Now God is said to be made man from the fact that a human nature begins to exist in a suppositum which belongs to the divine nature and which pre-existed from eternity. And that is why God’s being made a man is not God’s being made absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, *being made such-and-such (fieri)* implies that something is predicated anew (*de novo*) of something else. Hence, whenever something is predicated anew of another, accompanied by a change in the thing of which it is predicated, then being made involves being changed. And this is fitting in the case of all things that are predicated *absolutely (absolute)*; for instance, a whiteness or a size cannot come to anything anew except through that thing’s being changed anew with respect to whiteness or magnitude.

By contrast, things that are said *relatively or relationally (relative)* can be predicated anew of a thing without that thing’s being changed, as when a man is made to be to the right because of the movement of something that is made to be to the left of him. Hence, in such cases it does not have to be the case that what is said to be made such-and-such is changed, since this can occur because of a change in something else. And it is in this way that we say to God, “Lord, you have been made our refuge” (Psalm 89:1).

Now it is fitting for God to be a man by reason of the union, which is a relation. And so *being a man* is predicated anew of God without any change in Him, through a change in the human nature that is assumed into a divine person. And so when one says *God was made a man*, change is understood not on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature.

Reply to objection 3: *Man* supposits for the person of the Son of God, not taken by Himself (*non nudam*), but taken insofar as He subsists in a human nature. And even though *God was made the person of the Son* is false, nonetheless, *God was made a man* is true by the fact that God was united to a human nature.

Article 7

Is *A man was made God* true?

It seems that *A man was made God* is true (*haec est vera, homo factus est Deus*):

Objection 1: Romans 1:2-3 says, “... which He had previously promised through His prophets, in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son, who was made for Him from the seed of David according to the flesh.” But Christ as a man is from the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore, a man was made the Son of God.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, “... such was the assumption (*susceptio*) that made God a man and a man God.” But it is by reason of the assumption that *God was made a man* is true. Therefore, similarly, *A man was made God* is true.

Objection 3: In *Epistola ad Chelidonium* Gregory Nazianzus says, “God was humanized

(*humanatus est*) and man was deified (*deificatus*), or whatever else one might call it.” But God is said to be humanized by reason of the fact that He became a man. Therefore, a man is said to be deified by reason of the fact that he was made God. And so *A man was made God* is true.

Objection 4: When one says *God was made a man*, the subject of the making or the uniting is not God, but a human nature, which the name ‘man’ signifies. But the subject of a making seems to be that to which the making is attributed. Therefore, *A man was made God* seems to be true rather than *God was made a man*.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* Damascene says, “We do not say that a man was deified, but we do say that God was humanized.” But being deified seems to be the same as being made God. Therefore, *A man was made God* is false.

I respond: There are three ways in which the proposition *Homo factus est Deus* (*A man was made God*) can be understood:

In the first way, the participle *factus* (*was made*) determines in an absolute way (*determinat absolute*) either the subject or the predicate. And on this reading the proposition is false, since, as will be explained below (aa. 8-9), it is not the case that the man of whom *factus* is predicated was made, and neither is it the case that God was made. And on this reading *God was made a man* is likewise false. But this is not the reading that we are asking about here concerning these propositions.

On a second reading, *factus* can be understood as determining the composition, so that the meaning of *A man was made God* is *It was made the case that a man is God*. And on this reading both propositions are true, viz., *A man was made God* and *God was made a man*. But this is not the proper sense of these locutions—unless, perhaps, one understands *man* to have simple supposition rather than personal supposition. For even though *this* man was not made God because *this* suppositum, the person of the Son of God, was God from eternity, still, speaking generally, it was not always the case that a man is God.

On the third reading the proposition is understood properly, insofar as the participle *factus* posits *being made* as regards the man with respect to God as the terminus of the making. And on this reading, presupposing that, as was shown above (q. 2, aa. 2-3), in Christ there is the same person and suppositum for God and the man, the proposition in question is false. For when one says *A man was made God*, ‘man’ has personal supposition, since *being God* is made true of the man not by reason of His human nature but by reason of His suppositum. But that suppositum of the human nature by which it is made true that He is God is the same as the *hypostasis*, i.e., the same as the person, of the Son of God, which has always been God. Hence, it cannot be said that this man *began to be God* (*incoepit esse Deus*) or that He *becomes God* (*fiat Deus*) or that He *was made God* (*factus est Deus*).

If, by contrast, the person or *hypostasis* of God were different from the person or *hypostasis* of the man, so that *being God* were predicated of the man, and *being a man* were predicated of God, through a sort of conjoining of the supposita—a conjoining either of personal dignity or of affection or of indwelling, as the Nestorians claimed—then by parity of reasoning it could be claimed that a man was made God, i.e., was conjoined to God, in the same way that God was made a man, i.e., was conjoined to a man.

Reply to objection 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative pronoun ‘who’, which refers to the person of the Word, should not be understood as part of the predicate, as if someone existing from the seed of David according to the flesh was made the Son of God. It was on this reading that the objection proceeded.

Instead, the relative pronoun should be understood as part of the subject, so that the sense is that the Son of God was made for Him—viz., “to the honor of the Father,” as a Gloss explains—to exist from the seed of David according to the flesh, as if to say, *The Son of God was* made* to have flesh from the seed of David to the honor of the Father*.

Reply to objection 2: The passage from Augustine should be understood in the following sense: In

accord with the assumption involved in the Incarnation, it was made the case that a man is God and that God is a man. And, as has been explained, on this reading both locutions are true.

Reply to objection 3: A similar reply should be given to the third objection, since *to be deified* is the same as *to be made God*.

Reply to objection 4: A term posited in the subject is taken *materially*, i.e., for a suppositum, whereas a term posited in the predicated is taken *formally*, i.e., for the signified nature. And so when one says *A man was made God*, the *being made* is attributed not to the human nature, but to the suppositum of the human nature. And this suppositum is God from eternity and so it is absurd for Him to be made God.

Now when one says *God was made a man*, the making is understood to be terminated in the human nature itself. And so, properly speaking, *God was made a man* is true, whereas *A man was made God* is false. For instance, if Socrates, since he was at first a man, was later made white, then *This man was today made white*, pointing to Socrates, is true, but *This white thing was today made a man* is false.

However, if a name signifying human nature in the abstract were posited as the subject, then a human nature could in this way be signified as the subject of the making—if, for instance, one were to say *A human nature was made to belong to the Son of God* (*Natura humana facta est filii Dei*).

Article 8

Is Christ is a creature true?

It seems that *Christ is a creature* is true (*haec est vera, Christus est creatura*):

Objection 1: Pope Leo says, “A new and unheard of covenant, God, who is and was, became a creature.” But what the Son of God became through the Incarnation can be predicated of Christ. Therefore, *Christ is a creature* is true.

Objection 2: As was explained above (a. 3), the properties of both natures can be predicated of a *hypostasis* that is common to both natures, no matter what is signified by the name in question. But it is a property of a human nature to be a creature, just as it is a property of the divine nature to be a creator. Therefore, both can be said of Christ, viz., that He is a creature, and that He is uncreated and the creator.

Objection 3: The more principal part of a man is the soul rather than the body. But by reason of His body, which He drew from the virgin, Christ is said without qualification (*simpliciter*) to have been born of a virgin. Therefore, by reason of His soul, which was created by God, it should be said without qualification that Christ is a creature.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* Ambrose says, “Was Christ made by a word? Was Christ created by a command?”—as if to answer, “No!”. Then he adds, “How can there be a creature in God. For God has a simple nature and not a composite nature.” Therefore, *Christ is a creature* should not be conceded.

I respond: As Jerome says, “Heresy is incurred by words spoken in a disordered way.” Hence, we should not share words in common with heretics, lest we appear to be favoring their error.

Now the Arian heretics claimed that Christ is a creature and not as great as the Father (*minorem patre*), not only by reason of His human nature but even by reason of His divine person. And so it should not be said without qualification (*absolute*) that Christ is a creature, or not as great as the Father. Instead, these things should be said with a qualification (*cum determinatione*), viz., *with respect to His human nature*.

On the other hand, those things that cannot be suspected of belonging to a divine person in His own right can be said of Christ without qualification by reason of His human nature; for instance, we say without qualification that Christ suffered, died, and was buried. Indeed, even in human and bodily matters, we do not attribute to the whole anything that is such that a doubt can arise about whether it

belongs to the whole or to a part. For instance, we do not say simply, i.e., without qualification, *An Ethiopian is white*, but instead we say *An Ethiopian is white with respect to his teeth*. On the other hand, we say without qualification that he is curly-headed, since this cannot belong to him except with respect to his hair.

Reply to objection 1: Sometimes the holy doctors, omitting the qualification for the sake of brevity, use the name ‘creature’ with respect to Christ. However, the qualification should be understood in what they say.

Reply to objection 2: All the properties of the human nature, as well as those of the divine nature, can be said of Christ in some way. Hence, in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “Christ, who is called God and man, is creatable and uncreatable, divisible and indivisible.” Still, those things that raise a doubt about one or the other of the natures should not be said without qualification. Hence, Damascene himself later adds something different: “The one *hypostasis*”—i.e., Christ’s *hypostasis*—“is uncreated in its divinity and created in its humanity.”

In the same way, conversely, it should not be said without qualification that Christ is incorporeal or impassible, in order to avoid the error of Manes, who claimed that Christ did not have a real body and did not really suffer; instead, it should be said with a qualification that Christ is incorporeal and impassible *with respect to His divinity*.

Reply to objection 3: As regards being born of a virgin, there can be no doubt that this belongs to the person of the Son of God, in the way that there *can* be a doubt about His being created. And so the two lines of reasoning are not similar.

Article 9

Did *this* man, pointing to Christ, begin to exist?

It seems that *this* man, pointing to Christ, began to exist (*ille homo, demonstrato Christo incoeperit esse*):

Objection 1: In *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “Before the world existed, we did not exist and neither did God’s mediator Himself, the man Jesus Christ.” But what has not always existed began to exist. Therefore, *this* man, pointing to Christ, began to exist.

Objection 2: Christ began to be a man. But to be a man is to exist absolutely speaking. Therefore, *this* man began to exist absolutely speaking.

Objection 3: ‘Man’ imports the suppositum of a human nature. But Christ was not always the suppositum of a human nature. Therefore, *this* man began to exist.

But contrary to this: Hebrews 13:8 says, “Jesus Christ, yesterday and today, and Him forever.”

I respond: If nothing is added, it should not be said that *this* man, pointing to Christ, began to exist. And this for two reasons:

First, because the proposition (*locutio*) is false absolutely speaking—this according to the judgment of the Catholic Faith, by which we posit in Christ one suppositum and one *hypostasis*, as well as one person. For according to this, it is necessary that what is said here—viz., *this man*, pointing Christ—designates an eternal suppositum, the eternity of which is incompatible with its beginning to exist. Hence, *This man began to exist* is false. And it does not matter that beginning to exist is fitting for the human nature that is signified by the name ‘man’, since, as was explained above (a. 8) a term posited as the subject is not taken *formally* for the nature, but is instead taken *materially* for the suppositum.

Second, because even if the proposition were true, it would still be the case that it should not be used without a qualification, in order to avoid the error of Arius, who, just as he attributed to the Son of God that He was a creature and that He was less than the Father, so, too, he attributed to Him that He

began to exist, claiming that “there was time when He did not exist (*erat quando non erat*).”

Reply to objection 1: This passage has to be understood with a qualification, as if we were to say: *The man Christ Jesus did not exist before the world existed, with respect to His human nature.*

Reply to objection 2: In the case of the word ‘begin’, an argument from the less general to the more general (*argumentum ab inferiori ad superius*) does not follow; for instance, this does not follow: *This thing begins to be white; therefore, it begins to be colored.* And the reason for this is that *to begin* implies *now and not previously*; but this does not follow: *This thing was not previously white; therefore, it was not previously colored.*

Now to exist absolutely speaking (*esse simpliciter*) is more general than *to be a man*. Hence, this does not follow: *Christ began to be a man; therefore, He began to exist.*

Reply to objection 3: Even though the name ‘man’, as taken for Christ, *signifies* a human nature that began to exist, nevertheless, it *supposits* for an eternal suppositum that did not begin to exist. And so the reason why *The man Christ began to exist* is false, whereas *Christ began to be a man* is true, is that insofar as ‘man’ is posited as the subject, it is taken for the suppositum (*tenetur ad suppositum*), whereas insofar as it is posited as the predicate, it is referred back to the nature (*refertur ad naturam*).

Article 10

Is this true: *Christ as a man is a creature (or: began to exist)*?

It seems that this is false: *Christ as a man is a creature (or: began to exist) (haec est falsa, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura; vel incoepit esse)*:

Objection 1: There is nothing created in Christ except His human nature. But *Christ as a man is a human nature* is false. Therefore, *Christ as a man is a creature* is likewise false.

Objection 2: The predicate is predicated more of the term that is posited in the reduplication than it is of the subject itself of the proposition; for instance, if one says *A body as colored is visible*, it follows that what is colored is visible. But as has been explained (a. 8), *The man Christ is a creature* should not be conceded without qualification. Therefore, neither should *Christ as a man is a creature*.

Objection 3: Whatever is predicated of any man as a man is predicated of him *per se* and absolutely speaking; for as Metaphysics 5 explains, *per se* is the same as *with respect to itself (secundum quod ipsum)*. But *Christ is per se and absolutely speaking a creature* is false. Therefore, *Christ as a man is a creature* is likewise false.

But contrary to this: Everything that exists is either the creator or a creature. But *Christ as a man is the creator* is false. Therefore, *Christ as a man is a creature* is true.

I respond: When one says *Christ as a man (Christus secundum quod homo)*, the name ‘man’ (*homo*) can be taken up into the reduplication either by reason of the *suppositum* or by reason of the *nature*. If it is taken up by reason of the *suppositum*, then since in Christ the suppositum of the human nature is eternal and uncreated, *Christ as a man is a creature* will be false. On the other hand, if it is taken up by reason of the human nature, then the proposition is true, since, as was explained above (a. 8), by reason of the human nature, or with respect to the human nature, it belongs to Him to be a creature.

However, note that a name taken up into a reduplication in this way is more properly taken for the nature than for the suppositum. For it is taken up into the scope of the predicate, and a predicate is taken *formally*. For saying *Christ as a man* is the same as saying *Christ, insofar as He is a man*. And so *Christ as a man is a creature* should be conceded rather than denied. However, if something were added by which ‘man’ were drawn toward the suppositum, then the proposition would have to be denied rather than conceded—as, for instance, if one were to say *Christ as this man is a creature*.

Reply to objection 1: Even though Christ is not a human nature, He is nonetheless one who has a

human nature. But the name ‘creature’ is apt to be predicated not only of abstract terms but also of concrete terms. For instance, we say that a human nature (*humanitas*) is a creature and that a man is a creature.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, insofar as ‘man’ is posited as the subject, it looks more to the suppositum (*magis respicit suppositum*), whereas insofar as it is posited in a reduplication, it looks more to the nature (*magis respicit naturam*). And because the nature is created, whereas the suppositum is uncreated, *Christ as a man is a creature* is conceded, even though *This man is a creature* is not conceded without qualification (*non concedatur simpliciter*).

Reply to objection 3: It belongs to each man who is a suppositum of a human nature alone that he has *esse* only with respect to a human nature. And so it follows in the case of each such suppositum that if he is a creature insofar as he is man, then he is a creature without qualification (*sit creatura simpliciter*).

By contrast, Christ is a suppositum not only of a human nature but also of the divine nature, with respect to which He has uncreated *esse*. And so it does not follow that if He is a creature insofar as He is a man, then He is a creature without qualification.

Article 11

Is Christ as a man God?

It seems that Christ as a man is God (*Christus secundum quod homo est Deus*):

Objection 1: Christ is God through the grace of union. But Christ as a man has the grace of union. Therefore, Christ as a man is God.

Objection 2: To forgive sins is proper to God—this according to Isaiah 43:25 (“I myself am the one who blots out your iniquities for my sake”). But Christ as a man forgives sins—this according to Matthew 9:6 (“... but so that you might know that the Son of Man has the power on earth to forgive sins ...”) Therefore, Christ as a man is God.

Objection 3: Christ is *this particular* man and not man in general. But Christ, insofar as He is *this* man, is God, since what is designated by *this man* is an eternal suppositum that is naturally God. Therefore, Christ as a man is God.

But contrary to this: What belongs to Christ as a man belongs to every man. Therefore, if Christ as a man is God, then it follows that every man is God—which is clearly false.

I respond: When the term ‘man’ is posited in a reduplication, it can be understood in two ways:

In one way, with respect to the *nature*. And on this reading it is not true that as a man He is God, since the human nature is distinct from the divine nature by a difference in nature.

In the second way, ‘man’ can be taken for the *suppositum*. And on this reading, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the person of the Son of God, to whom it belongs to be God in His own right (*per se*), it is true that Christ as a man is God.

However, since, as was explained above (a. 10), the term posited in a reduplication is more properly taken for the nature than for the suppositum, *Christ as a man is God* should be denied rather than affirmed.

Reply to objection 1: It is not in the same respect that it belongs to a individual *to be moved toward such-and-such* (*moveri ad aliquid*) and *to be such-and-such* (*esse illud*). For to be moved toward such-and-such belongs to an individual in the manner of a *matter* or *subject*, whereas to be such-and-such in actuality belongs to it in the manner of a *form*. Similarly, it is not in the same respect that it belongs to Christ *to be ordered toward being God through the grace of union* and *to be God*; instead, the first belongs to Him with respect to His human nature, whereas the second belongs to Him with respect to His

divine nature. And that is why *Christ as a man has the grace of union is true*, but not *Christ as a man is God*.

Reply to objection 2: “The Son of Man has the power on earth to forgive sins” not by virtue of His human nature but by virtue of His divine nature; the power to forgive sins lies in the divine nature *authoritatively*, whereas it lies in the human nature *instrumentally* and *ministerially*. Hence, in explaining this passage in *Super Matthaicum* Chrysostom says, “It is significant that He said ‘on earth to forgive sins’, in order to show that He had united the power of His divine nature to His human nature by an indivisible union. For even if He was made man, He nonetheless remained the Word of God.”

Reply to objection 3: When one says “*this man*,” the demonstrative pronoun draws the name ‘man’ toward the suppositum. And that is why *Christ as this man is God* is true rather than *Christ as man is God*.

Article 12

Is Christ as a man a *hypostasis* (or: a person)?

It seems that Christ as a man is a *hypostasis* (or: a person) (*Christus secundum quod homo est hypostasis vel persona*):

Objection 1: That which belongs to any human being belongs to Christ insofar as He is a man; for He is like other men—this according to Philippians 2:7 (“... having been made in the likeness of men”). But every man is a person. Therefore, Christ as a man is a person.

Objection 2: Christ as a man is a substance with a rational nature. But not a universal substance; therefore, a particular substance. But as Boethius explains in *De Duabus Naturis*, a person is nothing other than “an individual substance with a rational nature.” Therefore, Christ as a man is a person.

Objection 3: Christ as a man is (a) an entity with a rational nature and (b) a suppositum and *hypostasis* of that same nature. But every *hypostasis* and every suppositum of a human nature, along with every entity with a human nature, is a person. Therefore, Christ as a man is a person.

But contrary to this: Christ as a man is not an eternal person. Therefore, if, as a man, He were a person, it would follow that in Christ there are two persons, one temporal and the other eternal. But, as was explained above (q. 2, a. 6 and q. 4, a. 2), this is erroneous.

I respond: As was explained above (aa. 10-11), when the term ‘man’ is posited in a reduplication, it can be taken either for the *suppositum* or for the *nature*.

Therefore, when one says *Christ as a man is a person*, if ‘man’ is taken for the *suppositum*, it is clear that Christ as a man is a person, since the suppositum of the human nature is nothing other than the person of the Son of God.

On the other hand, if ‘man’ is taken for the nature, then there are two ways in which it can be understood:

In one way, it is understood that it belongs to the human nature to exist in some person or other. And on this reading the proposition is true, since everything that subsists in a human nature is a person.

In the second way, it can be understood that the human nature in Christ is owed its own personhood, caused by the principles of the human nature. And on this understanding Christ as a man is not a person, since the human nature does not exist in its own right separately from the divine nature—something that is required by the notion of a person.

Reply to objection 1: It belongs to every man to be a person insofar as everything that subsists in a human nature is a person. But it is peculiar to the man Christ that the person subsisting in His human nature is not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is instead eternal. And so, as has been explained, in one way He is a person as a man, and in another way He is not.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Individual substance’, as posited in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting in its own right separately from others. Otherwise, a man’s hand could be called a person, since it is a sort of individual substance; however, since it is an individual substance existing, as it were, in another, it cannot be called a person. And, for the same reason, neither can the human nature in Christ be called a person, even though it can be called an individual or a singular thing of some sort.

Reply to objection 3: Just as ‘person’ signifies something complete and subsisting in its own right in a rational nature, so, too, ‘*hypostasis*’, ‘*suppositum*’, and ‘entity with a nature’ all signify something subsisting in its own right. And so in the sense in which *Christ as a man is a person* is denied, so all these other propositions have to be denied as well.