St. Thomas Aquinas:
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14 ("On faith")

Article 2: What is faith?

In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument (argumentum) of things that are not apparent.

IT SEEMS THAT IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY THIS:

1. No quality is a substance. Faith is a quality, since it is a virtue, i.e., a good quality of the mind, etc. Therefore, faith is not a substance.

2. Further, spiritual being is added to natural being and is its perfection; hence, it must be similar to it. But in the natural being of a human being the substance is said to be the very essence of the soul, which is a first act, but not the power of the soul, which is the principle of a second act. Therefore, in a spiritual being one should not say that the essence itself is faith or any other virtue, since a virtue is a proximate principle of an operation and hence perfects a power. Rather, one should say that the essence is grace, from which (i) spiritual being derives as from a first act and which (ii) perfects the very essence of the soul.

3. Someone will claim that faith is called a substance because it is the first among the different virtues. -- Against this one should reply that virtues are considered in three ways, viz., (i) as regards their habits, (ii) as regards their objects, and (iii) as regards their powers. But as regards their habits, faith is not prior to the others. For the definition under discussion seems to be a definition of faith only insofar as faith is formed, since it is only in this sense that it is the foundation, as Augustine says; but all the gratuitous virtues are infused simultaneously. Similarly, as regards their objects, faith does not seem to be prior to the other virtues. For it is not the case that faith tends toward the true itself, which seems to be its proper object, more than charity tends toward the highest good or more than hope tends toward what is most difficult thing or toward the God's supreme liberality. Similarly, as regards their powers, faith does not seem to be prior to the other virtues, since all the gratuitous virtues seem to be referred back to desire. Therefore, faith is in no way prior to the other virtues, and so faith should not be called the foundation or the substance of the other virtues.

4. Further, things to be hoped for subsist in us more through charity than through faith. Therefore, the definition under discussion seems to belong to charity rather than to faith.

5. Further, hope is generated from faith, as is evident in the Gloss on Matthew 1:2, since 'faith' is posited in the definition of hope. But 'hope' is posited in the definition of a thing to be hoped for. Therefore, if 'a thing to be hoped for' is posited in the definition of faith, there will be a circularity in the definitions--which is absurd, since in that case there will be something that is prior to and better known than itself. For it will be possible for the same thing to be posited in the definition of itself when the definitions are substituted for the names [defined], and it will also be possible for the definitions to be infinite.

6. Further, diverse habits have diverse objects. But a theological virtue has the same thing for both its end and its object. Therefore, among the theological virtues it is necessary that the diverse virtues have diverse ends. But a thing to be hoped for is the proper end of hope. Therefore, 'a thing to be hoped for' should not be posited in the definition of faith either as an object or as an end.

7. Further, faith is perfected more by charity than by hope; that is why it is said to be formed by charity. Therefore, in the definition of faith one ought to posit the object of charity, which is a good or a thing to be loved, rather than the object of hope, which is a thing to be hoped for.

8. Further, faith is related precisely to the articles themselves. But the articles do not all pertain to things to be hoped for--just one or two do, viz., the resurrection of the flesh and life everlasting. Therefore, 'a thing to be hoped for' should not be posited in the definition of faith.

9. Further, arguing is an act of reason. But faith pertains to things that are beyond reason. Therefore, it should not be called an argument.

10. Further, in the soul there are two movements, viz., toward the soul and from the soul. Now in a movement toward the soul the principle is extrinsic, whereas in a movement from the soul the principle is intrinsic. But it is impossible for the same thing to be both an intrinsic principle and an extrinsic principle. Therefore, it is impossible for the same movement to be both toward the soul and from the soul. But cogitation is perfected in a movement toward the soul, whereas desire is perfected in a movement from the soul. Therefore, neither faith nor anything else can be both a principle of desire and a principle of cogitation. Therefore, in the definition of faith it is incorrect to posit both something that pertains to desire, viz., 'the substance of things to be hoped for', and something that pertains to cogitation, viz., 'the argument of things that are not apparent'.

11. Further, a single habit cannot belong to diverse powers. But the affective power and the intellective power are diverse powers. Therefore, since faith is a single habit, it cannot pertain both to cognition and affection; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

12. Further, a single habit has a single act. Therefore, since two acts are being posited in the definition of faith, viz., (i) to make the things that are hoped for subsist in us, in accord with which act one says 'the substance of things to be hoped for', and (ii) to convince the mind, in accord with which one says 'the argument of things that are not apparent', it seems that faith is not being correctly described.

13. Further, understanding is prior to desire. But the phrase 'the substance of things to be hoped for' pertains to desire, whereas what is afterwards joined to it, viz., 'the argument of things that are not apparent', pertains to understanding. Therefore, the parts of the definition in question are incorrectly ordered.

14. Further, what is called an argument is that which induces the mind to assent to something. But the mind is induced to assent to given things because those things are apparent to it. Therefore, there seems to be an opposition in the phrase that it is added, when one says 'the argument of things that are not apparent'.

15. Further, faith is a kind of cognition. But every cognition is about something that is apparent to the one who is cognizing. For by means of a cognition something is apparent both in the sentient part of the soul and in the intellective part of the soul. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that faith is of things that are not apparent.

I REPLY:

One should reply that, according to some people, the Apostle intended by this definition to show not what faith is but rather what faith does.

However, it seems better to reply that this explanation of faith is the most complete definition of it--not in the sense that it is rendered in the form appropriate to a definition, but rather because it adequately touches upon all the things that are required for a definition of faith. For sometimes it is sufficient for even philosophers themselves to touch upon the principles of [given] syllogisms and definitions, and once these principles are had, it is not difficult to reduce them to forms that are in keeping with the doctrine of the art [of logic].

Now there are three indications of this point.

I. The first is the fact that all the principles on which the existence of faith depends are touched upon in the definition under discussion.

For since, as was said above, the condition of one who believes is such that his intellect is determined to something by his will, whereas the will does nothing except insofar as it is moved by its object, which is a desirable good and an end, [it follows that] two principles are required for the end. One [A] is the good that moves the will, and the second [B] is that to which the intellect assents when the will makes it [assent].

A. Now there are two ultimate goods of a human being which move the will primarily as ultimate ends.

One of these goods is proportionate to human nature, since natural powers are sufficient to obtain it. And this is the happiness that philosophers have spoken about, be it (i) contemplative happiness, which consists in the act of wisdom, or (ii) active happiness, which consists primarily in the act of prudence and derivatively in the acts of the other moral virtues.

The other good for a human being exceeds a proportion to human nature, since natural powers are not sufficient to obtain it, or even to cogitate about it or desire it; instead, this good is promised to a human being by God's liberality alone--1 Corinthians 2:9: "Without you, O God, eye has not seen the things which you have prepared for those who await you"--and this good is eternal life. And it is by this good that the will is inclined toward assenting to those things which it holds on faith; thus it is said in John 6:40, "Whoever sees the Son and believes in him has eternal life."

Now nothing can be ordered to an end unless some sort of proportion to the end preexists in it, a proportion from which there arises in it a desire for the end. And this happens insofar as a sort of inception of the end comes to exist in it, since it desires nothing except to the extent that it desires some likeness of that [inception]. And so it is that in human nature itself there is a sort of inception of that good which is proportionate to [human] nature. For in human nature there naturally preexist (i) principles of demonstration, known per se, which are seeds of wisdom, and (ii) certain principles of the natural law, which are seeds of the moral virtues.

Hence, in order for a human being to be ordered toward the good of eternal life, it is also necessary that a sort of inception of that good should come to exist in the one who is promised eternal life. But eternal life consists in the full cognition of God, as is evident from John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they should know you, the only true God." Hence, it is necessary that some inception of this supernatural cognition should come to exist in us. And this inception comes through faith, which on the basis of an infused light holds fast to things that by nature exceed our cognition.

Now in wholes that have ordered parts it is customary for the first part, in which there exists an inception of the whole, to be called the substance of the whole, e.g., the foundation of a house and the keel of a ship. This is why the Philosopher claims in Metaphysics II that if being were a single whole, its first part would be substance. And so it is that faith, insofar as it is a sort of inception within us of the eternal life that we hope for because of God's promise, is called the substance of things to be hoped for. And so here one touches upon the relation of faith to the good that moves the will when it determines the intellect.

B. Now the will, moved by the aforementioned good, proposes something that is not apparent to the intellect as being worthy of its assent, and it determines the intellect to that which is not apparent in such a way that [the intellect] assents to it. Therefore, just as an intelligible thing that is seen by the intellect determines the intellect and because of this is said to convince the mind, so too something that is not apparent to the intellect determines it and induces it necessarily to assent to it by the very fact that it is accepted by the will. This is why another reading has 'conviction' (convictio), since it convinces the intellect in the way just explained. And so in saying 'the argument of things that are not apparent' one touches upon the relation of faith to that which the intellect assents to.

So, then, we have (i) the matter or object of faith from the fact that he says 'about things that are not apparent', (ii) the act of faith from the fact that he says 'the argument', and (iii) the ordering of faith to its end from the fact that he says 'the substance of things to be hoped for'. Now on the basis of the act one also grasps (i) the genus, viz., habit, which is known through the act, as well as (ii) the subject [of the habit], viz., the mind. And nothing further is required for the definition of a virtue.

Hence, in accord with what has been said it is easy to formulate the definition in an artful way. So we may say that faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life begins in us, a habit which makes the intellect assent to things that are not apparent.

II. The second indication is that through the definition in question faith is distinguished from all other things.

For by saying 'of things that are not apparent' one distinguishes faith from knowledge (scientia) and understanding (intellectus). Again, by saying 'the argument' one distinguishes faith from (i) opinion (opinio) and doubt (dubitatio), in which the mind is not convinced, i.e., not determined to some one thing, and also from (ii) all habits which are not cognitive. Again, by saying 'the substance of things to be hoped for' one distinguishes [faith in the proper sense] from (i) faith as it is commonly understood (fides communiter accepta), in accord with which we are said either to believe that which we strongly opine or to believe in the testimony of some human being, and also from (ii) prudence (prudentia) and the other cognitive habits, which are not ordered toward the things to hoped for or which, if they are so ordered, are not such that a proper inception of the things to be hoped for comes to exist in us through them.

III. The third indication is the fact that none of those who have wanted to define faith has been able to define it otherwise than by positing this whole definition or some part of it in different terms.

For when Damascene says, viz., "Faith is the hypostasis of things that are hoped for and the proof of things that are not seen," it is manifestly obvious that this is the same thing that the Apostle says. On the other hand, when Damascene goes on to add, "The unshakable and unquestionable hope in the things that have been announced to us by God and in the efficacy of our prayers," this is a sort of explication of what the Apostle had said, viz., "the substance of things to be hoped for." For the things to be hoped for are, first of all, the rewards that have been promised to us by God and, secondly, any other things we seek from God as necessary for [obtaining] those rewards, things with respect to which a firm hope is had through faith. This hope cannot fail, and this is why it is called unshakable; nor can it be justifiably be reprehended as a vain hope, and this is why it is called unquestionable.

Now when Augustine says, "Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed," and, again, when Damascene says, "Faith is not an examined consent," and when Hugo of St. Victor says, "Faith is a sort of certitude of the soul with respect to absent, a certitude that is superior to opinion and inferior to knowledge," this is the same thing that the Apostle means by "the argument of things that are not apparent." For faith is said to be inferior to knowledge because, unlike knowledge, it does not include vision, even though it does include firm adherence; on the other hand, faith is said to be superior to opinion because of the firmness of the assent. And so faith is said to be inferior to knowledge to the extent that it is of things that are not apparent, and superior to opinion to the extent that it is an argument. And from what has been said it is evident [what one should say] about the other [authorities].

Moreover, when Dionysius says, "Faith is the enduring foundation of those who believe, putting them in the truth and putting the truth in them," this is the same thing that the Apostle means by "the substance of things to be hoped for." For the cognition of truth is a thing to be hoped for, since beatitude is nothing other than a rejoicing in the truth, as Augustine says in the Confessions.

AD 1. To the first objection one should reply that faith is called a substance not because it is in the genus of substance, but because it bears a certain similarity to a substance, viz., insofar as it is a first inception of and, as it were, a sort of foundation for the whole spiritual life--in just the way that a substance is the foundation of all beings.

AD 2. To the second objection one should reply that the Apostle means to be comparing faith not to those things that are within us but to those things that are outside us. Now even though in natural being it is the essence of the soul that is the first thing and the substance with respect to the powers and the habits and all the resulting things which are in [the soul], one nonetheless finds a relation to external things not in the essence but primarily in the power; and, similarly, one finds a relation to external things not in grace [itself] but in virtue, and primarily in faith. This is why he was not able to say that grace, rather than faith, is the substance of things to be hoped for.

AD 3. To the third objection one should reply that faith is prior to the other virtues (i) on the part of its object and (ii) on the part of its power and (iii) on the part of its habit.

It is prior on the part of its object not because it tends toward its object more than the other virtues do, but because its object naturally moves [the soul] before the object of charity and the objects of the other virtues do. This is evident from the fact that what is good never moves the appetite except through the intellect, as is said in On the Soul III. By contrast, in order for what is true to move the intellect, it does not need any movement on the part of the appetite. And this is why the act of faith is naturally prior to the act of charity; and the same holds for the habit of faith, even though [the habit of faith and the habit of charity] exist together when the faith is formed faith. And for this same reason a cognitive power is naturally prior to an affective power.

Now faith exists in a cognitive power. This is evident from the fact that the proper object of faith is the true and not the good. However, faith does in a certain sense have its completion in the will, as will be explained below in articles 4 and 9.

AD 4. To the fourth objection one should reply that it is already evident from what has been said that the first inception of the things to be hoped for comes to exist in us not through charity but through faith. Nor, again, is charity an argument. Thus, the description under discussion does not in any way belong to charity.

AD 5. To the fifth objection one should reply that since the good that inclines us toward faith exceeds reason, it does not have a name. And so by a sort of circumlocution one substitutes 'things to be hoped for' for [this good]. This frequently happens in definitions.

AD 6. To the sixth objection one should reply that even though every power has an end, which is its good, nonetheless not every power, but only the will, is related to the nature of an end or a good insofar as it is good. And this is why the will moves all the other powers; for every motion begins with the intending of the end. Therefore, even though the true is the end of faith, still 'the true' does not express the nature of an end; hence, it is not the true, but rather something pertaining to desire, that should be posited as the end of faith.

AD 7. To the seventh objection one should reply that a thing to be loved can be either present or absent, whereas only what is absent is a thing to be hoped for. Romans 8:24: "For who hopes for what he sees?" Hence, since faith is of absent things, its end is more properly expressed by 'thing to be hoped for' than by 'thing to be loved'.

AD 8. To the eighth objection one should reply that an article [of the faith] is, as it were, the matter of faith, whereas a thing to be hoped for is posited not as the matter but as the end. Hence, the argument does not follow.

AD 9. To the ninth objection one should reply that 'argument' (argumentum) is said in many ways.

For (i) sometimes it signifies the very act of reason by which one reasons discursively from principles to conclusions. And (ii) because the whole force of an argument consists in the middle term, the middle term is also sometimes called an argument. Further, (iii) it is also the case that the introductions to books, which contain a sort of foretaste of the work that follows, are called arguments. And (iv) because something is made manifest through an argument, the principle of manifestation, as well as the very light by which something is cognized, can be called an argument.

And faith can be called an argument in each of these four ways.

It can be called an argument in the first way to the extent that reason assents to something because it is said by God. And so because of the authority of the speaker an assent is effected in the one who believes, since in dialectics it is also the case that some arguments are taken from authority.

Now in the second sense faith is called the argument of things that are not apparent either (i) to the extent that the faith of believers is a middle term for proving that things that are not apparent exist, or (ii) to the extent that the faith of our fathers is for us a middle term that induces us to believe, or (iii) to the extent that faith with respect to one article is a middle term for faith with respect to another article, in the way that Christ's resurrection is a middle term with respect to the general resurrection, as is evident from 1 Corinthians 16:12.

Faith is called an argument in the third sense to the extent that faith is a sort of meager foretaste of the cognition that we will have in the future.

And faith is called an argument in the fourth sense as regards the light of faith itself, through which the things believed are cognized. Now faith is said to be beyond reason not because faith does not involve an act of reason but rather because the reason involved in faith cannot lead one to see the things which pertain to faith.

AD 10. To the tenth objection one should reply that the act of faith consists essentially in cognition, and therein lies its perfection as regards its form and species. This is evident from its object, as was explained in the body of this article. But it is in affection that faith is perfected as regards its end, since it is because of charity that faith is meritorious with respect to the end. The inception of faith also lies in affection to the extent that the will determines the intellect to assent to the things which pertain to faith. But that act of will is neither an act of charity nor a species of charity, but is instead a certain desire for the promised good. And so it is evident that faith does not exist in two powers as in a subject.

AD 11. The reply to the eleventh objection is evident from this.

AD 12. To the twelfth objection one should reply that in saying 'the substance of things to be hoped for' one touches upon not the act of faith but only upon its relation to the end. One touches upon the act of faith when one relates faith to its object by saying 'the argument of things that are not apparent'.

AD 13. To the thirteenth objection one should reply that that to which the intellect assents moves the intellect not because of its own power but because of the inclination of the will. Hence, the good which moves the desire is like a first mover in the act of faith, whereas that to which the intellect assents is like a moved mover. And this is why in the definition of faith the relation of faith to the good of the desire is posited before its relation to its proper object.

AD 14. To the fourteenth objection one should reply that faith convinces or induces the mind not because of the evidentness of the matter but rather because of the will's inclination, as was explained in the body of this article. Hence, the argument does not follow.

AD 15. To the fifteenth objection one should reply that 'cognition' can convey two things, viz., (i) vision and (ii) assent.

Insofar as it conveys vision, cognition is distinguished from faith. This is why Gregory says that things that are seen have cognition rather than faith. According to Augustine in On Seeing God, those things are said to be seen which are present to the senses or to the intellect. But things that are said to be present to the intellect do not exceed its capacity.

However, as far as the certitude of the assent is concerned, faith is a cognition, a cognition by virtue of which it can be called a knowledge and a vision, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: "We see now darkly through a mirror." And this is what Augustine says in On Seeing God: "If it is not improper to say that we know that which we believe most certainly, then from this it follows that we are rightly said to see with the mind the things that are believed, even though they are not present to our senses."

Translated by
Alfred J. Freddoso
University of Notre Dame