DISPUTATION 32
The reason is explained why it is not God but
created free choice alone which is the cause of sin
1. Concerning the matter under discussion there is no doubt among Catholics;
still, they ask for an explanation of why, even though God as the First
Cause has an immediate efficient influence on the bad actions of created
free choice in such a way that the whole action in question is from God
and the whole action is from free choice, nonetheless the viciousness and
deformity of that action is attributed not to God but to created free choice.
. . . .
10. Unless I am mistaken, a justifiable and clear explanation is gathered
from what was said in the preceding disputations about God's general concurrence.
For since (i) God's general concurrence is a concurrence of God's not on
the secondary cause but on the action of that cause, and (ii) is of itself
(de se) indifferent in such a way that it is because of the diversity
of the influence of the secondary cause that an action of this species
rather than of some other species follows (indeed, it is a concurrence
which does not determine the influence of the secondary cause but is rather
determined by that influence to a species of action), when free choice
concurs with it, it is because of the varying influence of [free] choice
that there follows a willing rather than a willing-against and a willing
of a just object rather than of a shameful object. It follows that the
actions of free choice (as also of any other secondary cause) have it not
from God's general concurrence but rather from free choice itself that
they are such-and-such actions in particular and hence that they are upright
or vicious.
. . . .
11. But there are not wanting those who object as follows to the opinion
just proposed:
First objection. God's general concurrence with secondary causes
is called general not because (i) in the real esse which it has
outside of God it is numerically or specifically one and the same thing,
common to all secondary causes and indifferent with respect to each of
their effects, but because (ii) by a common and general law God has decided
to concur in diverse modes and yet as the nature of each [secondary cause]
requires. For the concurrence by which God concurs with a fire is distinct
in species from the concurrence by which He concurs with a horse, since
God's concurrence with the fire is nothing other than the very effect produced
insofar as it is from God, under which aspect it is counted as a
type of external divine action in relation to that effect; and God's concurrence
with the horse is nothing other than, once again, the effect produced insofar
as it is from God, under which aspect it is again counted as a different
species of external divine action in relation to such an effect. And since
(i) these effects are distinct in species from one another and (ii) the
actions are distinct in species because of the diversity of their termini,
it follows that these general concurrences of God's are distinct in species,
and it follows further that the specifically distinct effects that emanate
from the secondary causes have such-and-such esse not only because
of the diverse influences of the secondary causes but also because of the
diverse modes of divine influence on those same effects.
12. Second objection. Even though God is determined by the secondary
causes to concur by means of this species of concurrence rather than another,
still, granted that He concurs by numerically this concurrence by which
He concurs with the fire, it must necessarily be said that the effect produced
is numerically such-and-such not just because of the concurrence of the
secondary cause but also because of numerically this concurrence of God's--even
though we admit that God would not have used this particular concurrence
if he were not concurring with such-and-such a secondary cause.
13. Third objection. This concurrence of God's is a cause of
the total being which is found in the effect, as everyone admits, even
of that being through which the effect is such-and-such in species and
number. Therefore, it is not only from the secondary cause but also from
God's general concurrence that the effect is such-and-such; and, consequently,
there is no reason why that which follows the effect, insofar as it is
such an effect, should not be attributed to God, who concurs by a general
concurrence with respect to that effect.
14. These arguments arise from a false understanding on the part of
[our] adversaries. For even though they agree with us that God's general
concurrence is not an influence of God's on the cause but rather
an influence of God's with the cause on the effect, an effect which
they claim the concurrence is identical with, still they think that God's
universal concurrence is an action numerically distinct from the concurrence
of the secondary cause--even though there is nothing but a single action
which, insofar as it from God, is called God's concurrence and, insofar
as it is from the secondary cause, is called the concurrence of the secondary
cause, as was explained in the previous disputations. Otherwise, if they
were distinct actions, then since the secondary cause's concurrence is
from the secondary cause alone, it would have to be conceded that there
is some action (or formal and real type of action) which is not from God
as an efficient cause but only from the secondary cause--which is not to
be conceded in any way.
15. So to the first argument (§ 11 above) one should reply
that it posits something false, viz., that God's general concurrence has
in reality some real esse that is either numerically or specifically
distinct from the concurrence of the secondary cause. For there is nothing
in reality--either the action or the action's effect--which is from God
influencing through His general concurrence and not from the secondary
cause simultaneously influencing through its own particular influence.
Nor can there be any such thing; for these two causes influencing in this
way unify both the effect and the action in reality, and for this reason
they mutually depend on one another in acting in such a way that the influence
of the one cannot, even by the divine power, exist by itself without the
influence of the other. And these influences cannot be distinguished in
reality except by comparing numerically one and the same action to different
causes which in diverse modes have an influence on the whole of that action.
Even though, of these two causes, the one which is a universal cause confers
the total esse on the action as a partial cause, still it is not
from this cause's mode of influence that the action has it that it is an
action of such-and-such a species. On the other hand, from the other cause,
as from a particular cause and similarly partial cause, the action has
its total esse; but just as the action has it from the mode of influence
of this latter cause that it is the proper and peculiar action of that
same cause, so too it has it that it is such-and-such an action, distinct
in species from other actions. Hence it should be denied that by His general
concurrence God concurs in diverse modes with diverse secondary causes.
In reply to the proof that is added to this argument, we concede that
God's concurrence with the fire is distinct in species from God's concurrence
with the horse. But we deny that this follows from the fact that God, just
on His own part, has diverse modes of influence with the fire and with
the horse. Rather, it follows from the conjunction of the influence of
each of these two particular causes on an action which is numerically and
specifically one and the same as God's influence; it is from these particular
causes, as from an efficient cause, that those universal concurrences of
God's have that distinctness in species.
16. To the second argument (§ 12 above) one should reply
that since the numerical unity of an action and an effect varies when a
variation is made in any part of the cause and in any other circumstance
that contributes to the effect, as was shown in Metaphysics 5, certainly
just as the effect's being numerically such-and-such depends on the secondary
cause's having influence here and now, so too, speaking naturally, it depends
on God's having influence here and now and on the other circumstances.
Therefore, just as, if the secondary cause were to have its influence at
another time or with other circumstances intervening, a numerically different
action would follow, so too, if God had His influence at another time or
under different circumstances, a numerically different action would follow.
Nonetheless, it is not the case that God's concurrence here and now is
numerically distinct from the secondary cause's concurrence; rather, they
are numerically one and the same concurrence which is the resulting action
itself and which they are united in, and they are a single concurrence
of both causes, as has been explained. What's more, moral actions have
their moral goodness or badness not from their individuating difference
but from their specific difference and circumstances, which, if they were
absolutely the same in species (albeit numerically different) in any other
action of the same species in the genus of nature or of morality, would
render that action just as morally good or just as morally evil.
17. To the third argument (§ 13 above) one should reply
that the [following two claims] are different: It is also from God's
having influence through His universal concurrence, as from a partial cause,
that the effect has that by which it is such-and-such; and It comes
from God's influence that it is such-and-such. The first of these we
concede, but the second we deny; for it has been shown that [the effect's
being such-and-such] comes only from the mode of influence of the particular
cause, whose proper and particular cause it is. However, since (i) a deformity
of fault follows upon an act only in relation to a cause which, in acting,
deviates from its norm, and since (ii) this is the secondary cause alone,
it follows that even though the being of the act is simultaneously from
God as a universal cause, the deformity follows upon the act as the fault
of the particular cause alone. For it should be carefully noted that formal
notions (e.g., sin, merit, to perceive, etc.) which
in their own intrinsic nature include their being from the secondary cause
can in no way denominate God as their cause--as if God qua God might
sin or merit or perceive. And when formal notions of this sort not only
fall completely outside of God's influence but also (as with fault and
sin) fall completely outside of God's intention when He confers
on a secondary cause His general concurrence along with powers for acting,
God is not called a universal cause of them--even though He is called
a universal cause of the action that is materially denominated a sin; for
by His influence he attains to this action as a universal cause, a point
which will become clearer in a moment.
18. From what has been said we have it only that our morally evil actions
are not attributed to God as to a positive cause who has an influence on
them. This is in accord with the example of the workman who produces swords.
For just as the deeds which are done by those who do not use the swords
rightly are not imputed to the workman (for the swords are indifferent
with respect to good or bad use), but are instead imputed to the free choice
of those who use the swords badly, so too, since God's general concurrence
is indifferent with respect to good and evil actions, the evil actions
should not be attributed to God, but should rather be attributed to those
who abuse God's general concurrence in order to do evil.
19. But someone might object: "Just as one finds fault with a workman
when he hands a sword over to someone whom he knows will probably abuse
it, so too, since God foreknows who is going to abuse His general concurrence,
why won't the fault be attributed to Him for not withdrawing His concurrence,
since in the same way He is able to impede the sin in question and yet
does not will to impede it?"
Nonetheless, one should reply that the story is different with human
beings and with God. For since God is the Lord of all and for a justifiable
reason exposes his creatures, who are empowered with free choice, to examination
and test, so that if they make good use of their free choice, aided by
His grace, they will attain eternal life by their own merits, whereas if
they use it badly, they are subjected to just punishment--since this is
so, He is not obligated to prevent sins but can justifiably permit them.
And it pertains to His providence not to deny to singular entities those
things which are necessary in order for them to operate in accord with
their natures, even if there are some such things which they will use both
well and badly. But human beings, who are subject to God and to divine
laws, are obligated by divine natural law (i) to prevent the sins of their
neighbors, if they are able to do this appropriately, and (ii) not to cooperate
in the defect of another. For just as they are obligated by the natural
law to love their neighbors as themselves, so too by that same natural
law God commands each one to have care for his neighbor. From this it follows
that our sins should not be attributed to God as to a cause that could
have prevented them and did not prevent them, in the way that a shipwreck
is attributed to a sailor if he could have avoided it and yet did not avoid
it. For in order for something to be ascribed to someone as to a negative
cause, it is necessary that he be obligated and able to prevent it and
not prevent it. But God is not obligated to prevent our sins.
Translated by
Alfred J. Freddoso
University of Notre Dame
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