THE PATHS TO DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, AND TERROR

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The Backyard Front

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“...one of the great ironies of this time is that while we are fighting on the front lines, the majority of the suffering is happening in the civilian areas. They are the ones who are affected the most, and yet we often forget about them...”

Research studies on conflict most frequently focus on ideology and (para)military forces as agents of rational violence directed toward changing an unjust world. Thus a common approach in the ethnography of violence is to identify the reason—if not the reasonableness—in violence and struggle. In fact, as Bibeau (1988:409) notes, “the search for logico-meaningful coherence permeates most theoretical and methodological approaches in North American general anthropology.”

Rather than investigate the logic of the struggling factions, however, I want to explore the phenomenon of sociopolitical violence as experienced by average citizens, to examine how violence is played out in the larger contexts of the lives and life-worlds of civilians who find themselves on the frontlines of today’s dirty wars, wars they did not start and do not control.

The term dirty war is most often used to describe campaigns of state-sponsored terror and repression whose goal is to suppress suspected civilian resistance (Suárez-Orozco 1987). My fieldwork in Sri Lanka and Mozambique suggests, however, that dirty war strategies can be used by all contenders for power. Both states and guerrilla forces use the construction of terror and the absurd as a mechanism for gaining or maintaining sociopolitical control over a population.

The increasing reliance on dirty war tactics has escalated the equation of power and control through fear to a dangerous level. Dirty wars seek victory, not through military and battlefield strategies, but through terror. Civilians, rather than soldiers, are the tactical targets, and fear, brutality, and murder are the foundation on which control is constructed.

By focusing on civilians and exploiting just-war dichotomies, dirty war tactics construct a culture of terror (Taussig 1987). This is accomplished, I suggest, by forcefully deconstructing accepted realities within daily life so as to “disabilize” fundamental meaning and knowledge systems—epistemological and ontological—that define people’s life-worlds and render action comprehensible. Once the “ability” of these socially constructed systems is undermined, essential knowledge frameworks themselves can be disabled so as to be incapable of functioning with normally expected coherence. If culture grounds society, and society grounds the social construction of reality, then the disabilization of cultural frameworks simultaneously disabilizes the civilian population’s sense of a viable reality and individuals’ ability to act, or at least to act with meaning and definition.

Maimed bodies and ruined villages are obvious casualties of dirty wars. Maimed culture—including crucial frameworks of knowledge—and ruined social institutions are not as visible, but they are equally powerful realities and their destruction may have a much more enduring and serious impact than the more obvious gruesome casualties of war.

A WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME . . .:
Mozambique and Sri Lanka

Both Mozambique and Sri Lanka are currently undergoing internal conflicts that are among the most truculent occurring in the world today. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil guerrilla war for “Eelam” (a separate state in the North of the island) continues. The conflict in the country has
escalated with the introduction and dismissal of contentious Indian “peace-keeping forces” intended to control Tamil violence, and with the rise of the People’s Liberation Front (JVP), a Sinhalese nationalist guerrilla group seeking to overthrow both the government and the Tamil fight for “Eelam” (Committee for Rational Development 1984; de Silva 1986; Jayawardena 1985; Kapferer 1988; Manor 1984; Rogers 1987; Tambiah 1986; Wilson 1988). These internal struggles have produced such severe state-level and community-level human rights abuses that Amnesty International (1986a, 1986b) identified Sri Lanka as one of the most serious human rights violators in the world at the time.

Mozambique, in contrast, suffers at the hands of a single opposition force, RENAMO, a particularly lethal rebel movement that has virtually no ideology or popular support; Minter (1989) estimates that some 90 percent of all RENAMO recruits are kidnapped youths. More than half a million of the country’s fifteen million people have died in the past decade of warfare, with Mozambicans blaming RENAMO insurgents for over 90 percent of all atrocities committed (Gersony, 1988a, 1988d).

RENAMO was formed by Rhodesia’s Ian Smith in the 1970s and supported by South Africa’s Military Intelligence after Rhodesia’s fall (Hanlon 1984; Issacman and Issacman 1983; Johnson and Martin 1986; Legum 1988). The primary intent of these two countries was to destabilize Mozambique in order to thwart any challenge the resource-rich Marxist-Leninist country might pose to their political and economic hegemony in southern Africa.

Despite the differences between the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Mozambique, the emotional landscapes of the two countries, especially outside the capital cities, are similar. One sings the carcasses of burned-out villages and communities that got in the way of the war—that became the war. The bullet holes of the battlefields are in the houses and shops of the villages and towns; the people are frightened by any show of force, by any uniform.

The wars in Mozambique and Sri Lanka represent markedly different parameters of politicomilitary activity, but one truth seems to emerge as paramount for both countries: it is the civilian who stands at the heart—and on the frontline—of war today.

**VOICES FROM THE FRONTLINES**

A middle-aged Tamil woman living in Jaffna relayed the following to me in discussing the trauma of daily life in a war zone: “I never know what will happen from one day to the next, from one minute to the next. When my husband leaves for work, I never know if he will return. . . . I am terrified everyday when I send my children off to school that something will happen to them, that they will be caught in a crossfire, that they will be taken or killed. I suppose I should worry about myself too, but I have too many other things to worry about. The [Sinhalese] soldiers always did harass and rape women, but now that the war has heated up so much here, things are much worse. The soldiers do house to house searches for information, but it is the innocent people they ‘question’—they can’t find the guerrillas. The house just down the street, they hurt their daughter really bad, trying to find out information about the guerrillas: I guess they thought her brother was in with them, but he is just a schoolboy. The soldiers aren’t the only ones, our boys [Tamil guerrillas] have done things too. The other day, maybe you saw, there was a young girl killed for supposedly talking to the Sinhalese soldiers, but I don’t think she did. How can you say what is talking and what is not when the [Sinhalese] soldiers beat and even torture and kill people when they want something? Maybe it is easier to do this to women, we are at home and we don’t fight. You know they came to my home, too, you know they ‘interrogated’ us and took my child.”

The dirty war has assumed the level of spectacle in Mozambique and Sri Lanka. The rape, mutilation, and murder of civilians is often conducted as public performance to communicate dread-threat to all. In both countries the seveng of civilians’ ears, noses, and lips is a frequent tactic; sometimes limbs and genitals are the preferred targets. In Sri Lanka, during a trip to Jaffna, I was shown a woman whose breasts had been hacked off with a machete—her body left as a public exhibition. She was returning home from the market with her children. The same day I witnessed a man whose skull had been shot off, his brains left exposed. His crime: waiting at a bus stop. More recently, right-wing death squads in southern Sri Lanka severed the heads of scores of Sinhalese youths “suspected of left-wing collusion” and placed them around a lake in the center of a major city.

In Mozambique, the following story is not considered unusual. A woman arrived at a refugee camp in Safala province from an area under attack by RENAMO. She appeared physically unharmed, but she had been forced to watch her son being killed. Her son’s murderers then chopped up the corpse, cooked it, and threatened to kill her if she refused to eat the portion they served to her. . . . “I did as they asked. I was scared. I did not know what else to do.”

The mere construction of terror no longer seems sufficiently terrifying to those who wage dirty wars. The public performances become
more grotesque, more aberrant; the horror rendered is sharpened by enacting violence simultaneously absurd and hyperreal (Baudrillard, 1989).

Sometimes the individual is bypassed to create a metamessage of absurd destruction: the obliteration of whole villages and towns. Water sources are polluted; crops are destroyed; hospitals, schools, and social services centers are burned, often with people still inside. In Mozambique, communities are ransacked for all useful items—food, clothing, medicines, electrical wire, railroad ties—and the rest is destroyed. Civilians are often forcibly conscripted by RENAMO to porter what has just been confiscated from them, to provide the cook for the camps, and to render sexual services for the soldiers.

An insightful narrative about the toll of terror-warfare was told to me by a middle-aged man in the Zambezia Province of Mozambique, one of the worst areas of fighting at the time I spoke with him. He had arrived at a "safe" area (ostensibly under the control of the government and not RENAMO) only the day before we spoke: "We were under RENAMO control for several years. They came in and took everything, including us. We were forced to move around a lot, carrying heavy weights for RENAMO here, being pushed there for no apparent reason. People died, people were killed, people were hurt, cut, assaulted, beaten... there was no medicine, no doctors, no food to help them. My family is gone, all of them. Only I am here. But the violence and the killing is not necessarily the worst of it. Worst of all is the endless hunger, the forced marches, the 'homelessness'... day in and day out a meager and hurting existence that seems to stretch on forever."

These stories abound in Mozambique and Sri Lanka: told, reconfirmed, retold. They become public narratives. Some become institutionalized. Lina Magaia is a well-respected government worker in Mozambique. She was so appalled by the extensive stories of RENAMO brutality told to her by peasants in the outlying districts where she worked that she collected them for publication in a book. The opening story is of a village assault by RENAMO. All the villagers are rounded up and warned not to resist in any way. The threat: the leader of the group attempts to rape an eight-year-old girl. Unable to do so because of her small size, he finishes the deed with his knife, leaving the child to bleed to death in front of her family and friends who were forced to look on (Magaia 1988:19).

The promulgation of narrative may well serve an important function. If, indeed, hegemonic ideals are imparted below the level of critical consciousness (Bourdieu 1977), and thereby maintain a powerful hold on a community until some level of critical discourse within a framework of conscious endeavor becomes possible, then narrative can come to serve as critical commentary. The same process of narration, however, can serve to reinforce the cultural incultation of terror (Taussig 1987). Spectacle and narrative together constitute a process of construction of social action that "may serve to both consolidate existing hegemonies... and to give shape to resistance or reform" (Comaroff 1985:6).

From beleaguered towns and villages throughout Mozambique and Sri Lanka civilians had differing levels of knowledge of who was involved in the aggressions, and why. While the ideologues and (para)militaries waging the conflict viewed the distinction of sides and the application of right and wrong to each as lying at the core of the conflict, civilians often had difficulty distinguishing sides, especially according to ideological considerations of just and unjust. Indeed, many of the victims of war—torn from comfort and community, family, and home, too often wounded or bereaved—do not know what the conflict is about or who the contenders are.

From a refugee camp outside the Trincomalee, Sri Lanka came the following lament: "I don't know who burned my village and killed seventeen people, including my brother's son. They came at night with guns and torches as we were sleeping. They set our houses and shops on fire and shot us as we ran. Who would do such a thing? We are just farmers, we are not at war with anyone. I have heard of these people called Tigers [the most prominent Tamil political guerilla force], and that the army [predominantly Sinhalese] can be violent and uncontrollable... But I don't know, I don't know what it is all about. All I know is I want a gun to protect my home and my family—that is, when I get one. How can I get a gun when everything I own is burned and destroyed? But how can I get a home without a gun to protect it?"

These words were spoken to me by a new arrival in an abandoned schoolhouse that was serving as a makeshift refugee center. They were echoed by the nearly 200 people who came to join in the conversation. From refugee camp to refugee camp, at both Tamil and Sinhalese camps, I heard almost identical conversations taking place. For nonpolitical noncombatants, Tamil and Sinhalese alike, the conflict was a time of trial, terror, deprivation, and bereavement.

From a remote village in Zambezia, Mozambique, a similar complaint is voiced: "Mozambique what? I am from the M. people, from my father's land and the land of my ancestors—over there, beyond those hills. They came through, the armed bandits [RENAMO], I'm told. They took things and they took people, and those of us that could, ran.
Everything is destroyed, I have no home, no clothes, only the bark you see. And still these bandits circle. It is always the children who hear them first. My children, they grow up with the priority of listening for bandit armies and avoiding gunshots. And for what? I don’t know. I don’t know why these people fight. There is no sense to it. I don’t think anyone knows.”

Most civilians share these sentiments: the devastation caused by the war is undeniable, but that it has sense is another matter altogether. Possibly the most astute observation on the ideology of the violence-afflicted citizens came from a young man living in Beira, Mozambique: “the only ideology the *people* have is an anti-atrocity ideology.”

THE DIRTY WAR: PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION

Whether overt or covert, the dirty war is essentially a message directed not toward contending militaries, but to a more amorphous “enemy”: the population at large. The victims themselves become the template on which power-loaded scripts are inscribed. The message can be conveyed through the “silent space” left by the simply disappeared and by the implication, but never the verbalization, of torture so horrifying that it cannot be contained within the framework of normal social dialogue and cultural metalegacy. Or the message can be grotesquely visible—a social advertisement of dread and a symbolic threat of terror—as in cases where people are routinely maimed and returned to the community as a reminder and a reinforcement of the powerlessness of the general population.

As we have seen, “sense” and the “sense organs” alike are assaulted: the world they normally perceive is rendered meaningless, chaotic. The attack is both literal and symbolic: the cutting off of sense organs (ears, noses, lips) is a powerful metamessage: the war attacks all sense, leaving the population “senseless.” They are thereby left without the means to perceive and reason—and, more importantly, to criticize and resist the forces confronting them.

The processes maintaining sociopolitical ideologies and hegemonic constructs are wed to the phenomenology of the body and the experience of identity in a fusion Bourdieu (1977) labels “embodiment.” Embodiment has epistemological and ontological, as well as practical, ramifications: fundamental orientations are produced and reproduced throughout many levels of personal and cultural undertaking.

The dirty war focus on “disembodiment” in this context becomes a perverse double entendre representing the social construction of a reality of “impairment”: a public process cum spectacle aimed at the garnishment of conceptual as well as sociopolitical control. “Disembodiment” is thus embodied: simultaneously producing constructs of terror and the absurd in a hegemonic diatribe and, at the same time, a mechanism attempting to “sever” the body from the body politic—at least that of the opponent’s.

The political identity of the body is manipulated in dirty war torture such that “at least for the duration of this obscene and pathetic drama, it is not the pain but the regime that is incontestably real, not the pain but the regime that is total, not the pain but the regime that is able to eclipse all else, not the pain but the regime that is able to dissolve the world” (Scranny 1985:56). For the victims of such assaults it is not difficult to figure out, as Scranny (1985:207) concludes, that “to be intensely embodied is the equivalent of being unrepresented and is almost always the condition of those without power.”

Most scholars concerned with dirty wars, Scranny included, tend to equate the use of torture with institutionalized regimes. In Mozambique, however, the regime has remained remarkably restrained in the use of dirty war tactics; as I have pointed out, it is the opposition that has coopted them. The sociopolitical association of body and state begs the question of boundaries. Challenges to the state are contests about the parameters of who controls definitions of “right” and the ability to enforce these parameters. Severing the actual boundaries of human bodies through maiming and torture can simultaneously serve to portray an assault on the boundaries of the body politic. Both a human body and a state without boundaries are inherent paradoxes—each a conceptual as well as geopolitical absurdity.

Just as “disembodiment” is a double entendre in the power-terror dyad, “re-membering” is also a symbolic double entendre (Gusterson n.d.). Boundaries can be reestablished, bodies and identities reaffirmed—all as sociopolitical process. Re-membering can provide socioconceptual coherency—the identification of something rendered whole—and with this epistemological meaningfulness, can be imparted. The reverse side of the process of re-membering should also be recognized: returning the limbs to the body politic rests on the recognition of stories of immense cruelty against the bodies of average people, a process capable of inculcating the very terror it seeks to overturn.

The disruptions of war far exceed the physical casualties and material destruction. If the foundations of culture are jarred in a war turned dirty, ontology is thrown open to question and people’s sense of reality
itself is rendered tenuous. If we accept the premise that reality is socially constructed (Berger and Luckman 1966; Schutz 1962, 1964), then the disruption of the basis of social relations and the shared epistemological truths on which it rests necessarily imperils people's ability to continue to construct a significant reality. As a Mozambican peasant eloquently pointed out to me, identity itself is then jeopardized: "This is my third 'place' [he does not use the word for home] in several months. My home was attacked and everything destroyed, and I escaped and ran to a new area. There I started to work the land again, but this place, too, was attacked and burned out, and I was lucky to escape with my life. Not all of my family are here with me. We all ran to escape the attackers, and we lost one another in the confusion—ran different ways. I hope the others are alive, safe somewhere else. Now I am here, and I am trying to farm again, but my heart is not in it—when will they attack again? When will all my labor go up in smoke, and I find myself reduced to having nothing yet one more time? Maybe they will take even my life next time. Before this situation the majority of people had homes, animals. Now, here, they have nothing. So we are always thinking 'yesterday I was different—I had my own liberty because I had my own things; my house, my animals, my land . . . .' Now it is different. Yesterday I was a person, I had my own personality, now I have nothing. All that I feel, all that I own now, is my suffering."

Possibly the most destructive aspect of dirty war tactics is the creation of the culturally destabilized space. The disappeared, the incised body parts, the family scattered and missing, the smoking husks of burned-out towns on the landscape leave a void in sociocultural process and conception that horrifies by its senselessness as much as by its brutality.

The dirty war is enacted as a cultural metalanguage encoded on the body and the social geography of the community. In its most basic terms, it plays on a fundamental horror of the body rendered unwhole—absurdly so—that produces a concomitant horror of a cultural reality rendered unwhole. For the victims of this process, the result yields what might be termed a skeletal epistemology.

Since culture and epistemology are a naturally regenerating phenomena, the disabling of cultural knowledge per se does not represent irreconcilable devastation. There is a danger in this process, however.

Schutz and Luckman (1973) have postulated that life-worlds—socially constructed knowledge systems so essential to cultural viability they are taken to represent reality in its most fundamental sense—ground human endeavor, conceptual and actual. While knowledge systems are not inherently consummate, the reality of the life-world(s) resting on them depends on the illusion that their integrity remains unchallenged. When the viability of the life-world is challenged, the sense of reality itself is simultaneously challenged.

If one follows Schutz and Luckman's argument, the routine transmission of knowledge and thus of a sense of reality is anchored in social structure and process. In times of crisis, rather than tolerate or critically reflect on gaps in the knowledge that grounds their life-worlds, people seek to "plug" any disjunctions in such a way that the fragility of knowledge does not become apparent and demonstrate that reality is in fact simply a social construction, one among a plethora of possibilities. Thus, when people's knowledge frameworks become threatened, they uncritically reconstruct a sense of life-world reality by borrowing from other available epistemological systems that are, or can be made, compatible with the impaired one.

As we have seen, among the main casualties of the dirty war are the basic social institutions that ground everyday life, the structures that substantiate knowledge. But during a war—when families are scattered, communities destroyed, and valued life-world traditions have been bankrupt by difficulty, terror, and need—epistemological systems that would normally provide the raw material for repairing impoverished frameworks of knowledge and meaning are being seriously undermined by the viciousness of the widespread violence.

For populations in areas devastated by fighting, one of the only immediate systems of knowledge and action visibly intact and in operation is the politicomilitary one, in which force is equated with right and violence is seen as instrumental to power. Terrorized civilians thus may increasingly come to absorb and, more dangerously, accept fundamental knowledge constructs that are based on force. The average citizen then comes to "know" that politics, force, and might (and possibly even justice and right) are equal. Violence parallels power. Witness the following conversation: "Talks with the armed bandits will never work unless we can first get to a place where we can crush them militarily—show them we are stronger . . . only then will they feel the pressure to talk." When I reminded the speaker that he had previously told me the many ways his culture had for approaching conflict resolution, he violently shook his head: "I can't believe that, not now, not with things like they are. That was before, now it is different . . . I tell you, the only way to solve these problems is to be the stronger, the more forceful."

To survive, then, is to coopt the force turned against people and to reflect it back on the perpetrators. This is ultimately why the dirty war
TERROR

is doomed to fail, although the violence it has inculcated may be reproduced from one conflict scenario to another across sociopolitical time and space—now increasingly a part of the cultural repertoire for the society at large.

The need to create a counter-life-world construct to challenge the politicomilitary one is not lost on some civilians who, casting a critical eye at the situation they find themselves in, recognize the need to check the tendency of many to incorporate the dirty war paradigm as a survival mechanism. The following is an excerpt from a conversation I had with an eighty-year-old Mozambican traditional medical practitioner. We spoke in a remote district in northern Mozambique, in an area recently liberated from RENAMO control by government forces. Under government protection, supplies could get through, and streams of displaced people came seeking food and protection. The arrival of supplies brought further RENAMO attacks, one of which took place several hours before this conversation: “Wounds can be easily treated,” the old man said. “That is, the physical wounds. Some of these kids have wounds because they have seen things they shouldn’t see, that no child should have to see—like their parents being killed. They change their behavior. This is not like being mad. That we can treat. No, this is from what they have seen—it is a social problem, a behavioral problem, not a mental problem. They beat each other, they are disrespectful, they tell harsh jokes and are delinquent. You can see it in their behavior toward each other: more violence, more harshness, less respect—more breaking down of tradition. There is no medicine for this.”

In a similar vein, several women who belong to the Organization of Mozambican Women explained: “What you call dirty war, we call part of our life today, and we see it tearing us apart, insinuating itself into our lives and ways. But there is something more to us. We survived hundreds of years of barbarous oppression under the Portuguese—and we survived by keeping the seeds of our culture, ourselves, alive. We will do the same now, but we need to be very conscious and directed in this, a great deal of help and work is necessary to offset the problems and pitfalls introduced by these hard and violent times. We know we must do this at the level of the people and the culture.”

The wars in Sri Lanka and Mozambique have become more socially entrenched over the last decade. The violence and brutality have become increasingly widespread in terms of both the (para)militaries fighting and the civilians affected. While grievances and a tendency for revenge run high, there is also a strong counterforce of sheer fatigue and disgust with the violence and its attendant atrocities. There are those, like the old Mozambican indigenous medical practitioner and the members of the women’s organization, who realize ending the war, repairing the damage, and restoring the peace depend not only on ameliorating hostilities but, more importantly, on reconstructing people’s disabled life-worlds in ways that do not reproduce the conditions or ideologies that fueled the conflict.

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NOTES

1. This century has shown a remarkable trend in this regard: in World War I, over 80 percent of battlefield deaths were soldiers; by World War II half of the casualties were military and civilian, while today nearly 90 percent of all war-related deaths are civilian (Bedjiaoui, 1986; SIPRI, annual). It may safely be said that the least dangerous place to be in a war today is the military. With one-third of the world’s countries at war today and two-thirds routinely relying on human rights abuses to control their populations in a bid to consolidate power, generating some twenty million refugees annually—and more than half a million casualties every year (Sivard 1989)—these problems take on an immediate importance of global dimensions.

2. Studies of military governments (Sivard 1988), interventionism (Klare and Kornbluh 1988), modern war dynamics (Foster and Rubenstein, 1986; SIPRI, annual) and human rights abuses (Amnesty International and Cultural Survival records) show a global trend toward increasing civilian decimation in contemporary conflicts.

3. RENAMO is the Portuguese acronym for Resistência Nacional Mozambicana; the English acronym MNR (Mozambique National Resistance) is also in use. In Mozambique, the group is generally referred to as bandidos armados.
(armed bandits). RENAMO, however, is the term most widely used in the literature.

4. The words question here and interrogate below are in quotation marks to denote the inflection the speaker used to convey the irony and anger people felt at the fact that these words actually translate into terror, beating, torture, and, possibly, murder.

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