Separation-Individuation

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To appear in:

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Separation-individuation is a fundamental organizing principle of human growth that has implications for adaptive functioning across the lifespan. In its most general sense individuation refers to a process “by which a person becomes increasingly differentiated from a past or present relational context” (Karpel, 1976, p. 66). Mature differentiation resolves the relational tension between agency and communion. Regarding communion, individuation requires maintaining a sense of attachment and connection to others—children and parents, mentors and protégés, friendship dyads, romantic partners and spouses --- but without enmeshment and fusion with them. Indeed, the extent to which one experiences the self as fused with another is an indicator of how well communion is differentiated from enmeshment. Regarding agency, individuation requires a mature sense of autonomy and independence, but without isolation and alienation. Hence the goal of individuation is the capacity for autonomous selfhood in the context of ongoing relational commitments.

Separation-individuation in the narrow sense refers to specific developmental challenges of early childhood and adolescence. During infancy this process is likened by Margaret Mahler to a “psychological birth” that unfolds over several phases (Mahler, Pine & Bergman, 1977). In the differentiation phase the infant is alert to events, objects and persons and so begins to “hatch” from the symbiotic orbit with his or her caregiver. Differentiation is advanced in the practicing phase as the child’s developing motor skills permit far-ranging exploration of the environment. The affective tone of the practicing toddler is one of pleasure, energy and narcissism as the child revels in his or her motor autonomy, although the child occasionally returns to the caregiver for reassurance, encouragement and “re-fueling.” In the rapprochement phase the toddler must resolve mounting ambivalence over the advantages of autonomous functioning, as he or she invariably runs into impediments and frustrations when parents scale back their vigilant monitoring of the child’s explorations. The affective tone of the rapprochement crisis includes tantrums, sad moods, and anger ---the terrible twos have arrived---and the child may resort to transitional objects (“blankies”) and defense mechanisms (“ego splitting” of the object world into “good” and “bad”) to cope with new demands for ego...
maturity. By 36 months the child enters the consolidation phase whereby the split maternal image of the good and bad mother is now consolidated into a stable intrapsychic representation that is comforting to the child in mother’s absence, an outcome called “object constancy.”

Adolescence is the “second phase of separation-individuation” (Blos, 1979). The adolescent must disengage from or transcend the internalized representations of caregivers formed in early childhood and establish a sense of self that is distinct and individuated, thereby reducing psychological dependence on parental intrjects for approval, self-esteem, and standards of conduct. The adolescent must learn to take over for oneself the tasks of self-esteem regulation and self-definition. Josselson (1980) suggested that Mahler’s infancy phases are recapitulated during adolescent separation-individuation, particularly the rapprochement phase and its ambivalence over autonomy. Mourning (over the loss of childhood identifications) and a surge of narcissism (to sustain the impoverished ego until self-esteem is regulated from internal sources) are affective reactions that are attributed to the adolescent phase of separation-individuation.

Disturbances in separation-individuation are manifested in a range of clinically significant problems, including borderline and narcissistic personality, family and marital dysfunction, suicidal ideation, and college adjustment. Pine (1979) distinguishes higher- and lower-order forms of pathology of separation-individuation. Lower-order disturbances include the experience of fusion or merger with another and the general lack of self-other boundaries. Higher-order disturbances are manifested as intolerance of being alone, the use of coercion to gain omnipotent control over others as an extension of the self, and defects in object constancy.

Empirical research relies upon a small number of extant assessments. The Psychological Separation Inventory assesses the functional, conflictual, attitudinal and emotional independence of the young person from his or her parents. The Separation-Individuation Test of Adolescence measures key aspects of Mahler’s theory using 7 or 9 subscales, including a healthy separation scale. The various SITA scales appear to be associated robustly with MMPI and other indices of psychological adjustment, although it does not seem suitable as a clinical or diagnostic screen. An assessment of pathology of separation-individuation has been used successfully in several studies (Lapsley, Aalsma and Varshney, 2001). Other assessments include the projective Separation Anxiety Test and the Emotional Autonomy Scale, which is considered a measure of adolescent detachment.

There have been attempts to link separation-individuation with both attachment and family systems theory. Attachment theory also provides resources for understanding the early relational foundation of the healthy effective self and periodic revision of internal working models across the lifecourse may point to the process of separation-individuation. Moreover, individuation unfolds within family systems that vary in their tolerance for separation, autonomy and independence. Poorly differentiated families, on this account, view individuation as a betrayal of the family or as a threat to its stability, and so require individuals to sacrifice agency for communion, or individuality for belongingness. In contrast, well-differentiated families flexibly balance the need for individuation with renegotiated boundaries and stage-appropriate degrees of connectedness. Once again, the dialectic between individuation as a psychological process and differentiation as a property of family systems underscores the fundamental duality of agency and communion in human development.

References


as manifested in later clinical work: An attempt at delineation.