POLS 30201, USFP, Lecture 1:

1. Around the World
2. Intro To Politics and Arguments
3. M & Fs
4. Introduce Course
5. Introduce Myself and TA
6. Review Syllabus: requirements and readings

7. Mini-Lecture:
   a. What is USFP?
      i. A means-ends chain for increasing security and wealth.
   b. The setting for USFP
      i. anarchy
      ii. change and evolution
      iii. What is the setting?
   c. The process of USFP: Peeling the Onion
      i. Two themes:
         (1) many actors, different interests
         (2) control and flow of information
   d. Making arguments about USFP
      i. The need for theory and methodology
   e. Intellectual goals of course:
      i. Writing clearly
      ii. Thinking critically
         (1) What is the argument?
         (2) Why is it being made?
(3) What are the counterarguments?

1. Lessons:
   a. Beware image of Authority
   b. Politics is about power: getting it, keeping it, increasing it.
      i. Thus, almost everything in Politics is said with Spin, often
         with an ulterior motive. People are trying to motivate you one
         way or the other.
      ii. Many arguments have some kernel of truth, so be careful of
          seduction by half truths.
   c. Critical thinking and argumentation is the point of this course.
      i. Carry an Edge
      ii. Be Skeptical
      iii. Think Analytically; Push the Course Around
d. Participate!
Myths and Fears about Class
Participation Dan Lindley, v. 1.1

1. Myth/fear: I will ask a stupid question and everyone will find out that I am dumb.
   a. Fact: 98.7% of questions are not dumb\(^1\)
   b. Fact: 99.6% of questions motivated by curiosity are not dumb
   c. Fact: Most other students will be thinking: thank goodness someone asked that question because they didn't understand it either (you will be a hero)
   d. Fact: Most people fear that they will be found out to be dumb

2. Myth/fear: I will ask a good question but this will challenge the professor and this will upset him and he will lower my grade, especially if he is wrong.
   a. Fact: those who challenge me are courageous heroes (unfortunately, b/c it should be normal). Hero-dom is also assured by the following:
   b. Fact: those who correct me make me more accurate and truthful
   c. Fact: those who criticize me help me (try to) be excellent
   d. Fact: those who ask hard questions usually help me learn.
   e. Fact: Students engaged in any of the above often demonstrate admirable intellectual acuity.
3. Myth/fear: I will interrupt the lecture by asking a question.
   a. Fact: it's true, but so what?

4. Myth/fear: I will answer a question poorly and I will look like an idiot.
   a. Fact: 97.2% of answers are not dumb, virtually none are idiotic. Sincerity and trying one's best wards off dumbness.
   b. Fact: 98.9% of all answers are greatly appreciated by this professor. Even the very few dumb answers are usually appreciated as they are a jumping off point for further discussion and debate. Of the less appreciated answers (1.1%), 97.6% create annoyance because of ego-centrism and social maladjustment, not dumbness.²
   c. Fact: Most students will also greatly appreciate your answer as it helps them learn how their peers are thinking about the issue. Debate and discussion helps even non-participators think about the course materials with greater depth and perspective.

5. Jervis bowling shoe exercise: Why is Lindley in this business?
   a. To help students learn, to help himself learn, to debate and be intellectually stimulated. Questions are part of why I am here!!

1. Factz I. Makemup, "Spuriating the Factoid," Journal of

1. Model of the Policy Process

Agenda Setting

Option Formulation

Decision Making

Implementation

Credit to Professor Meyer

Irreproducible Results, Vol. 0, (Y2K), page 3.
2. Blenderized Model of the Policy Process

- NGOs
- Bureaucratic Dynamics
- DoD
- House
- Allies
- Pressure Groups
- Organizational Dynamics
- International Businesses
- Psychological Dynamics

Some Influences on the Policy Process

- Agenda Setting
- Option Formulation
- Decision Making
- Implementation

- President
- Public Opinion
- Government Agencies
- Senate
- Universities
- Lobbyists
- International Organizations
- Adversaries
1. Main aims for today:
   a. unpack the means-ends chain
   b. develop args and ctr-args
   c. learn to parse problems into component parts

   a. Money, Military Force, Symbols, Business, Travel, Communications, Propaganda.....

3. Ends: What is the National Interest?
   a. Security and wealth are two obvious choices, but how are they defined and how are they best promoted and pursued?
   b. What is the role of values in defining interests?
   c. A "vital" interest is one for which you would be willing to go to war.
   d. Historical variations and tensions in the US national interest:
      i. **Realism vs. Idealism and Liberalism**
         (1) Realism: nations interests are power and wealth; their influence is based on power and wealth. Dangerous to overplay values or ideals.
         (2) Idealism and Liberalism: values significantly help define our interests
            (a)not liberalism necessarily domestically defined
         (3) Which is more moral?
      
      ii. **Interventionism and Globalism vs. Isolationism**
         (1) Interventionism and Globalism
         (2) Isolationism
2. Ends and Means: Who decides what the national interest is?

And how is the national interest pursued?

a. Four-step model:
   i. Agenda Setting -->
   ii. Option
   Formulation -->  iii.
   Decision Making -->
   iv. Implementation

b. There are many influences on each step in the model.
   i. Psychology, allies, domestic politics, etc.
   ii. A key question: If one assumes that the goal of foreign policy is to promote U.S. interests, does the foreign policy process yield optimal, near optimal, or even good enough results? What explains sub-optimal results?

c. Theories and Methodology are needed to think analytically about this blender of influences
   i. Theory: A causal statement, with an explanation. (A causes B)
      (1) That can be arrow-diagramed (A---->B)
   ii. Methodology: Tools to prove as best as one can that A causes B.
      (1) Theories create predictions about what evidence would support them.
d. The model applied to decision for Syria/Iraq/?? War
   i. Note many alternative explanations at each step. What evidence would support each argument?

(3) The Readings

a. Obama’s National Security Strategy
   i. What is it? What is new? Is it useful? What is truly felt and what is pablum? What would you change?

b. New World Coming

c. Global Trends 2025
   i. Both are breathtaking in scope, scary, almost haunting.
   ii. Go through GT boxes
1. Jervis and the Security Dilemma
   a. Starting point for realism: structure
      i. anarchy vs hierarchy
   b. Anarchy leads to:
      i. War is always possible
         (1) Self-help (aka, sort of, functional similarity)
            (a) Concerns for Relative Gains
               (i) security dilemma
            (b) Collective action problems
               (i) tragedy of the commons

c. What is the security dilemma?
   i. See other slide
   ii. Often only means weapons, but I think it also describes a general level of fear and threat assessment

d. Manipulating the severity of the security dilemma:
   i. the Offense/Defense Balance
      (1) Influences on the Balance
When threatened do you deter or appease?

i. Deterrence
   (1) capability
   (2) resolve
   (3) communication
   (4) rationality

ii. Costs of Deterrence = spirals
   (1) security dilemma

iii. How to Choose?

*******************************************

*** Deterrence Model:
↑ Strength ---> Back Down (Prevent War)

Spiral Model:
↑ Strength ---> Rear Up (Arms Races, Security Spirals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reward</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deter (sometimes similar to balancing)</td>
<td>Deterrence works: no war</td>
<td>Backfires: leads to spiral, arms race, tension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appease (sometimes similar to bandwagoning); or despiral</td>
<td>Appeasement works: no war</td>
<td>Fails: whets appetite of aggressor, so not just war, but war against stronger adversary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Continuum of non-balancing policies:
Bandwagon <-- Appease <-- Despiral

Continuum of balancing policies:
Pre-empt <-- Misc. denial <-- Build up/Ally w/others POLS 30201 -

Responses to Threats: Walt and Balance of Threat

a. Q. Where do friends and alliances come from?
b. A. Balancing against threats.
   i. vs. bandwagoning
   ii. any other options/strategies?

c. Four components of (influences on) threat are:
   i. aggregate power
   ii. geography
   iii. offensive power
   iv. intentions

d. Note competing explanations and structure of argument

e. Note policy implications
1. Jervis, Misperception
   a. How does psychology influence decision-making?
      i. Newtonian Psychology hypothesis
      ii. pre-Copernican Psychology
      iii. Bowling Shoe hypothesis
   
   b. How do these relate to other theories?

2. Janis, Groupthink
   a. How do group dynamics influence decision-making?
   b. Groupthink: For a variety of reasons, working in groups constrains options.
      i. Groups $\rightarrow$ less options
   c. Janis argues that Groupthink accounts for/subsumes/helps explain these factors:
      i. Time pressures
      ii. Bureaucratic detachment
      iii. Stereotypes of communists and Asians
      iv. Overcommitment to defeat of enemy
      v. Domestication of dissenters
      vi. Avoidance of opposing views
   
   d. Recent research: often groups or amalgamated preferences are wiser....
POLS 30201: Ostrom and Problems of Cooperation, viewed through Game Theory

1. Three problems that hinder cooperation, all caused or exacerbated by anarchy:
   i. Tragedy of the Commons
   ii. Prisoners’ Dilemma
      (1) Note the assumptions of the game....
   iii. Collective Action Problems

2. How can one fix these problems?
   i. hints: enforcement, communication, reciprocity, shadow of the future/concern for reputation. (from 241/141)
POLS 30201: How Domestic Politics Influences Intl Politics, Putnam and the Two-Level Game

1. Two main arguments:
   a. domestic politics influences FP
   b. FP can be used to manipulate domestic politics

2. Win sets: what are they?
   a. Size determined by Level II preferences and coalitions, Level II institutions, and Level 1 negotiator’s strategies
   b. Role of (private information)
   c. Role of Linkage
   d. Role of Domestic Institutions

3. Cool observations:
   a. small win-sets increase collective action problems
   b. weakness can be a strength
   c. negotiators may want their opponent to be strong and popular
   d. hardliners may find it easier to make soft-lines deals.
Byman and Pollack: Great Men

1. Introduction:
   a. Personalities count: Fredrick the Great and Prussia's win in 1763, also Hitler, Stalin, Lenin, FDR, Churchill, Mao, Ghandi, Putin, etc.
   b. Recognizing importance of individuals is SOP for policymakers, but not for academics who set aside fortuna and virtu. Political scientists tend to insist that:
      i. anarchy, dom pol, and insts drown out the indiv.
      ii. and/or it's hard to generalize about indivs.
      iii. and/or hopeless to study indivs – what to measure?
      iv. BUT: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Morgenthau all focused at least in part on indivs

2. Rebutting Theoretical Objections
   a. Waltz, Man, State and War: dealt with 3 images (system, state, leaders/people)
      i. Waltz argues that human nature is a constant, but IR varies. So HN can't explain war. If HN was a constant, war would be constant.
      ii. BP argue:
          (1) BUT HN not a constant. Straw man.
          (2) But lots af aggressive leaders – see above
   b. Waltz argued that one can't be parsimonious with HN.
      i. BP say one can be and that parsimony is overrated (fake, bad, sad).
         (1) Need accuracy too. Prefer accurate complexity to inaccurate or vague parsimony.
      c. Waltz (and others) argued that state intentions not germane to theories of IR because states can all be assumed to have security as main goal.
         (1) BP argue that some states are revisionist, others not.
         (2) And that Walt factors in intentions when discussing balancing.

3. Indivs matter
   a. Hitler drove to Germany to total war. Attacked France and Russia, self-destructed against others advice.
      (1) Bis = diplo smarts, prevented balancing.
      (2) Wil = no more restraint 123 Messed in Balkans w/ Austria. Risk fleet. Morocco. Caused balancing against Germany.
   d. Hussein vs. Asad. (Both no longer) Asad = modest goals for Syria; Hussein reckless self destruction.
4. Hypotheses on Individuals in IR 133
   a. Foundational
      i. Indivs set ultimate and secondary intentions of a state.
      ii. Indivs are an important part of diplomatic influence and military power.
      iii. Leaders shape strategies.
      iv. Leaders shape other states reactions.
   b. Hypotheses on personality traits
      i. Risk tolerance causes wars.
      ii. Delusional leaders start and prolong wars.
      iii. Leaders with grandiose visions more likely to destabilize the system.
      iv. Predictable leaders have stronger and more enduring alliances.
   c. Hypotheses on indivs and enabling factors
      i. The more power is concentrated, the more individuals gain influence.
      ii. Indivs matter more when systemic, domestic, or bureaucratic influences are more ambiguous.
      iii. And indivs matter more when circumstances are fluid. Can react more decisively.
   d. Interacting images.
      i. Indivs can shape 2nd image.
      ii. And shape 3rd image. See above.

5. Concs
   a. Giants still walk the earth
   b. International relations is not inevitable. A huge IR myth.
   c. Autocracies becoming rarer, so future will see less power of indivs.
   d. Should explore roles of indivs not just war and alliances.
1. Misc M&P
   a. Other lens to understand USFP: Theme: lots of different perspectives:
      i. hegemonic decline, marxist/imperialist, racist, exceptionalist, liberal institutionalist, classicist, gendered, etc

   \[ X_m \quad [\quad Y_1 \quad [\quad Y_2 \quad X_1 \quad [\quad Y_3 \quad Y_m \quad \]

   **Figure 1. Effects of reducing win-set size**

   WIN SET DIAGRAM, Putnam, 442

   Win-set = acceptable range of outcomes for a given party. Acceptable includes factoring in domestic politics.

   Deal = when there is overlap between win-sets
Decoding: $Y_m = Y$’s maximum goals, $X_m = X$’s maximum goals, the rest are bargaining positions with $Y_3$ being $Y$’s smallest win set (ie smallest distance between maximum and acceptable goals). Deals can be found anywhere between $Y_1$ and $X_1$.

$Y$ is decreasing win-set size by moving to the right, from $Y_1$ to $Y_2$, and then killing the deal with $Y_3$.

For example, $Y_m$ is $Y$ (Israel) getting all of Golan Heights and $Y_1$ is getting only $\frac{1}{3}$ of Golan, while Syria gets $\frac{2}{3}$.

The trick to the article is specifying all the influences that affect win-set sizes (aka ability to bargain and reach deals).

**Prisoner's Dilemma**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prisoner #1</th>
<th>Prisoner #2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silent</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confess</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Prisoner #1**
Silent      Confess
$C=\text{Cooperate}; \ D=\text{Defect}$

$CC=\text{both silent, nailed on minor charge, both get 1 year in jail}$

$DC, CD=\text{one confesses (rats), the other silent. Silent guy is major league}$

$evil, gets 15 years. Rat gets time served.}$

$DD=\text{both rat, both pretty evil, both get 10 years.}$

It is logical for both to Defect – Individual rationality trumps joint gains.

What are barriers to cooperation? Game highlights basic incentives to defect/cheat given certain assumptions: No verification, no communication, one shot iteration, no concern for future, distrust (?).

How to overcome those barriers?

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
-15 & -10 \\
-.25 & -10 \\
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
-10 \\
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
100 \\
-50 \\
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
0 \\
0 \\
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
5 & -10 \\
15 & -5 \\
-10 & -5 \\
\end{array}$$
The Security Dilemma

The dilemma: "An increase in one state's security decreases the security of others."

Anarchy ---> Fears ---> Security dilemma

Security dilemma is: $\uparrow$ My security = $\downarrow$ Your security

Security dilemma ---> Arms Races, Security Spirals

$\uparrow$ Offense Dominance ---> $\uparrow$ Arms Races, Security Spirals (and vice versa with defense dominance)

$\uparrow$ Offense Dominance ---> $\uparrow$ Instability (and vice versa with defense dominance)
Prisoner's Dilemma Story: Two prisoners have been arrested for a petty crime, but the police suspect that both are involved in more nefarious criminal activity. The police separate the two prisoners, and offer to reduce the jail term of each in return for ratting out the other prisoner. If both stay silent, each serves a short term for the present crime. If both rat each other out, each serves a longer term due to the greater evidence of nefarious criminal activity, but less than it would have been due to the cooperation in ratting out the other. If one rats the other out but the other stays silent, the rat walks free while the silent prisoner serves the full term for the nefarious criminal activity. (Note: How does this game change if both prisoners are members of the Mafia, which will kill any member who rats out another member? Or if they take into account moral considerations? Both of these change the game from a Prisoner's Dilemma to something else, because they change the payoff structure.) (IR Applications: Arms races)

Stag Hunt Story: A pair of hunters is tracking a majestic stag, which requires their combined effort to kill. Each wants to kill the stag to get the most meat, but each also wants to avoid being left with no meat if the stag escapes. A hare crosses each hunter's path, and the hunter must decide whether to stay on the trail of the stag or capture the hare instead. If both hunters stay on the stag, they each get a large share of its bountiful meat. If both hunters capture hares instead, they each get a smaller amount of meat. If one hunter captures the hare while the other keeps on the stag, one receives the hare-meat while the other receives nothing. (Note: How does this game change if the group of hunters is larger than two? It does not change the payoff structure, but in practice it makes it harder for each hunter to trust the others to stay on the stag.) (IR Applications: Public Goods)

Chicken Story: Two crazy teenagers are playing a game of Chicken to try to impress their girlfriends. (Chicken is a game where two cars drive straight towards each other very fast until one driver decides to swerve away, thereby "chickening out.") As their cars near collision, each driver must choose whether to keep driving straight or swerve out of the way. If both drivers keep driving straight, they both die in the resulting car crash. If both drivers swerve away, both survive, but and neither girlfriend is very impressed. If one swerves while the other keeps driving straight, the swerver's girlfriend is disgusted by his cowardly behavior and leaves him, while the bold straight driver's girlfriend is mightily impressed. (Note: How does the prospect of death as the worst-case alternative make this game different from the others?) (IR Applications: Tragedy of the Commons)
**Prisoner’s Dilemma**

Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the other. The police admit they don't have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Each prisoner is given the opportunity either to betray the other, by testifying that the other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other by remaining silent.

*If A and B both betray the other, each of them serves 2 years in prison.*
*If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve 3 years in prison (and vice versa).*
*If A and B both remain silent, both of them will only serve 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Silent</th>
<th>Betray</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silent</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

What are barriers to cooperation? Game highlights basic incentives to defect/cheat given certain assumptions: No verification, no communication, one shot iteration, no concern for future (no further punishment or impact on reputation,
distrust (?). How to overcome those barriers?

It is logical for both to Defect – Individual rationality trumps joint gains.

Can apply to environment, arms races, war if.... boxes are loaded right

Golden Balls/Friend or Foe /Take It All (prize total is 2)

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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Net utility same for all boxes except DD, bottom right. But individual utility is .5 for C; 1 for D.

But.... if you know that is true for both, then...

What behavior is incentivized? Whatever your strategy, you will.....
1. Cuban Missile Crisis
   a. Themes
      i. Near nuclear war (still a nuclear world today)
      ii. Models come to life
      iii. Importance of credibility
      iv. Crisis dynamics

   b. Background
      i. Cold War
      ii. Nuclear Balance

2. Components of Each Model
   a. Actor
   b. Goal(s) and Motivations(s)
   c. Actions determined by...
   d. Other influences on actions
   e. Prediction using this model

3. Components of Each Chapter
   a. Why nuclear weapons brought to Cuba?
   b. Why did the US respond with a blockade?
   c. Why were the missiles withdrawn?
   d. What are the lessons?
   e. Methods issues:
      i. Note use of this for papers and arguments
      ii. Note how like a structured focused comparison
      iii. Note how search for evidence is different under each model.
4. Rational Actor Model

Actor: *unitary* nation-as-a-whole actor

Goal(s) and Motivations(s): Maximize overall strategic national interest (same as inference, really)

Actions determined by: Choices made from wide variety of options

Other influences on actions: Choices reflect a stable, prioritized value system. All information relative to choices is known to actor. Actor is assumed to be *rational*.

Prediction using this model: Requires knowing the actor's values and capabilities. Values are often assumed to be known since actor is motivated by strategic national interest.

5. Questions:
   a. Is the rational actor model really so implicit in most theories and policy assessments?
   b. Can you ‘black box’ FP?

6. Model I, RAM, Applied
   a. RAM arguments about why the missiles were deployed
   b. RAM arguments about what to do about it
   c. RAM arguments about how the crisis was resolved

7. Questions:
   a. How can all those options be rational?

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1. Strategic in this case refers to security, power, and wealth.
b. Did the process and actions as described seem rational?

Pre CMC US/Soviet Arms Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US Nweps</th>
<th>Sov Nweps</th>
<th>US SNDVs</th>
<th>Sov SNDVs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>3057</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>20434</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>27609</td>
<td>3322</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>350</td>
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MRBMs 1100 miles; IRBMs 2200 miles  BAS

“The Soviet Union for its part had only four to six land-based ICBMs in 1962, and about 100 short-range, primitive V-1-type cruise missiles that could only be launched from surfaced submarines” Wikipedia

20 ICBMs, 6 subs w/ msls <600 mile range, 200 bbrs  A/Z
Model II: Organizational Behavior

1. What do Organizations do?
2. How do they do it?
3. The Model:

**Actor:** An organization (one of many within government)

**Goal(s) and Motivations(s):** Organizational health (often measured in terms of size, wealth, and autonomy/power). Reduce uncertainty.

**Actions determined by:** Standard operating procedures (SOPs), routines, and other actions motivated by promotion or protection of the organization and reduction of uncertainty.

**Other influences on actions:** Information and action distorted by parochial priorities and perceptions. Scope of information and action reduced by factored problems and fractionated power. Organizations have limited flexibility and are often slow to learn and change.

**Prediction using this model:** Requires knowing the organization's SOPs. Knowing what they did yesterday \((t-1)\), allows to predict what they will do today \((t)\) and tomorrow \((t+1)\).

4. What affects organizational behavior?
a. Efficiency vs. Culture
b. Interactive complexity
   i. especially risky when matched with tight coupling
      (1) further exacerbated in crises
c. Organizational learning

5. Model II, Organizational Behavior, Applied
   a. Model II arguments about why the missiles were deployed
   b. Model II arguments about what to do about it
   c. Model II arguments about how the crisis was resolved

6. Questions:
   a. How can one create a means-ends chain if organizational behavior is rampant?
   b. Is organizational behavior rampant?
   c. What kinds of things does organizational behavior affect?
      i. Is it taking on RAM directly?
Model III, Governmental Politics Model

1. Bureaucratic or Governmental Politics Model

**Actor:** Actors defined by their *power position* within government. (I think actors can be organizations as well as individuals)

**Goal(s) and Motivations(s):** Maximizing *power and influence* as well as strategic national interest. Values and goals may conflict.

**Actions determined by:** Results of *bargaining* between actors. Bargaining is affected by power of each actor, position within hierarchy, action channels, available information.

**Other influences on actions:** Information and action may be distorted by *parochial priorities and perceptions,* in this case phrased as "*where you stand depends on where you sit.*" Since this model includes individuals, it includes constraints on decision making such as time pressures, misperceptions, and personality.

**Prediction using this model:** Requires knowing the *relative power* of each actor as well as each actor's value system. Organization model often helps explain an actor's values.
2. Model III as a ‘catch-all, NEC’ model
   a. Group and other Processes
      i. Decision Rules
      ii. Framing
      iii. Psychological Theories
         (1) Jervis, etc. for individuals and their idiosyncracies
         (2) Janis and Groupthink for groups.
   iv. Domestic politics
      (1) public opinion
      (2) Congress
   v. Bargaining with allies (if forming joint policy)
   vi. Players in Positions: Chiefs, Indians....
   vii. 51-49

3. Model III, Governmental Politics, Applied
   a. Model III arguments about why the missiles were deployed
   b. Model III arguments about what to do about it
   c. Model III arguments about how the crisis was resolved

4. Questions:
   a. How is this different from RAM?
   b. What is the difference between an output and a resultant?

   Tying EOD together...

1. Questions?
a. Why was this book written?
b. How do the models relate to each other, how can we tie them together?
c. Are "non RAM" decisions necessarily indictable or less wise?
d. Does this book help one think about making decisions to deter or appease, to balance or to de-spiral? How?
e. How reliable is deterrence?
f. What policy recommendations does EOD offer or support?
g. How can government be tweaked to run more effectively and more safely?
h. What are the book’s strengths and weaknesses?
i. Any biases evident? Hidden motivations?

2. Tying it all together with the rest of the course
a. Review of themes and central questions:
   i. What are US interests?
   ii. What is the role of values in defining interests?
   iii. How is policy made and what explains sub-optimal outcomes?

* ***************************************************

1. Blue Team
a. Create an enemy or BoT?
2. Israel Lobby....
   a. values, interests.... which, for who? Treason? Iran?

Integrating Meyer's Framework with Allison's Models:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODELS:</th>
<th>Rational Actor</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
<th>Governmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agenda Setting</td>
<td>Threats/opportunities are perceived and then ranked (++, increases with importance of issue)</td>
<td>Fractionated info gathering =&gt; hit or miss perceptions; Biased perceptions</td>
<td>Biased, parochial perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option Formulation</td>
<td>All options weighed</td>
<td>Determined by pre-set menu; also by bias (+++)</td>
<td>Determined by combo of what is best for self/org and for country (+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision</td>
<td>Best option chosen to promote national interest</td>
<td>Based on either SOP or maximizing organizational health</td>
<td>Result of politics, bargaining, relative power (+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>n/a but assumes Capabilities used to best extent</td>
<td>SOPs (+++)</td>
<td>Infighting leads to inefficiencies and errors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(++) denotes a particularly good fit; relatively strong explanatory power