1. Introduction
   a. Pop Quiz
      i. How many people died because of 9/11 (not including subsequent wars)?
      ii. What is the most dangerous country in the world?
   b. Some remarks on the global war on terror (GWOT)
      i. We have lost Iraq
      ii. We may well lose Afghanistan
      iii. We are losing the GWOT

2. Concepts to help us understand international relations
   a. What is an international relations (IR) concept (theory/model/hypothesis)?
      i. Lessons based on observing patterns.
   b. What is the goal of learning these concepts?
      i. To be an IR doctor. To identify patterns faster and at greater depth.
      ii. The hope is that awareness of problems is the first step towards fixing them.
      Diagnosis precedes remedy. Causes of problems are related to causes of solutions.
   c. Anarchy
      i. What is different about International Relations?
      ii. Hierarchy in domestic politics; Anarchy in international politics
         (1) The HUGE questions in IR scholarship are: how anarchic is IR; how much do the effects of anarchy make IR prone to war and inefficiency; and what can be done to reduce the ill effects of anarchy?
      iii. Relative gains concerns vs. Absolute gains concerns
         (1) The Security Dilemma = relative gains concerns in the security arena. The security dilemma means that an increase in one side’s security decreases the security of the other side.
            (a) In other words, an extra tank for me helps me and hurts you. I gain relative to you, and relative strength counts.
            (b) If economic growth benefitted both parties, even if one grew faster, that would be absolute gains. We would not care so much about the relative strength of the other, just that we were doing well.
   d. Responses to Anarchy (threats)
      i. Balancing vs. Bandwagoning
         (1) What are they?
         (2) What do they entail? States can balance against threats by forming alliances and/or by arming, or can try to side with the most powerful / threatening state for gain or self-preservation.
(3) A balancing world is more peaceful.

ii. **Deterrence vs. Appeasement**
   (1) What are they?
   (2) What do they entail? Do you understand the adversary’s goals, fears? Can you communicate with the adversary? Are you both rational?
   (3) How hungry is the adversary?
   (4) Negotiations occur along this continuum: giving nothing or giving all.

e. **Perceptions and Misperceptions**
   i. Newtonian Psychology hypothesis in which once a state adopts images, models, and analogies about how the world works and who its friends and enemies are, then it is very hard to change this image. An image 'at rest' remains at rest unless a very strong and persuasive alternative image knocks it away. A derivative of the Newtonian Model is that it is hard to understand another’s images, and it is hard for them to understand your images (see Bowling Shoe, below).
   ii. Pre-Copernican Psychology hypothesis in which one (incorrectly) sees oneself as the center of a hostile, well-organized universe.
   iii. The **Bowling Shoe** hypothesis says that it is hard to wear another's shoes, and vice-versa. This is based on the saying that you can not understand someone if you do not walk in their shoes.²
   iv. **Groupthink** is a group variant of Newtonian psychology which says that groups often adopt party lines, do not change views readily, and silence dissenters.³
   v. **Glossy view of organizations and bureaucratic politics**
      (1) Organizations act in their own self-interest.
      (2) Government decisions often result from bureaucratic infighting, which in turn depends on the relative power of individuals and the information they control.

3. So what happens when the bureaucratically powerful are victims of groupthink and Newtonian psychology?

4. How these concepts apply to international relations and our current problems:
   a. Balancing vs. Bandwagoning?
      i. How did states align themselves during the Cold War? **By balancing or by bandwagoning?**
      ii. How have states responded to President Bush’s strength-first foreign policy? How does President Bush think the world works, mostly **by balancing or by bandwagoning?**
         (1) How does the Iraq war differ from the first Gulf War?
   b. Deterrence vs. Appeasement?
      i. Are there rogue states that can not be deterred? What do adversaries want? Can we satisfy them? Or should we even try?
(1) We need to know them. See **Bowling Shoe**.

c. Perceptions and misperceptions
   i. International Relations Questions:
      (1) Why are surprise attacks common (Pearl Harbor, 9/11 and surprise attacks generally)? **Newtonian/Bowling shoe, bureaucratic politics, organizational politics**
      (2) Why did we miss the Indian Nuclear test? **Newtonian/Bowling shoe**
      (3) Why did we not understand Iraq? **Newtonian/Bowling shoe**
   ii. IRAQ Questions:
      (1) Why did we not question the slam dunk? **Newtonian, Bur Pol**
      (a) (why did we set up a separate intel unit in DOD for Iraq? **Bur Pol**)
      (2) Why did we think we were the focal point for Iraq’s designs? **Precopernican**
      (3) Why did we think the occupation would go well?
      (4) Why are we so inflexible in our strategy and tactics?

5. How these concepts apply to our day to day lives:
   a. Do not lie or be mean, or you will be balanced against whenever possible.
      i. As Greenspan said, you need to be honest to succeed in business.
   b. Be aware that groups often act to homogenize members’ views.
   c. Try to understand other people’s motives.
   d. Try to understand your own cognitive blinders.
   e. Try to be flexible in your worldview and views towards others.
   f. Try to realize joint gains with people, and not treat them solely as adversaries.

6. From International Relations to Montessori, and hopefully back to International Relations....

7. Reactions?
   a. Chiding psycho babble; Common sense?

8. Questions, comments, discussion?
THE REACH OF WAR; U.S. Central Command Charts Sharp Movement of the Civil Conflict in Iraq Toward Chaos
November 1, 2006, Wednesday
By MICHAEL R. GORDON (NYT); Foreign Desk
Late Edition - Final, Section A, Page 12, Column 1, 981 words
DISPLAYING ABSTRACT - Classified briefing prepared two weeks ago for US Central Command portrays Iraq as edging toward chaos; color-coded 'Index of Civil Conflict' runs from green for peace to red for chaos, and shows sharp escalation of sectarian violence since last February, placing current situation almost to red zone at end photo; index takes account of factors like ineffectual Iraqi police and dwindling influence of moderates; other variables include 'hostile rhetoric,' assassinations and sectarian attacks; analysis was prepared by intelligence unit under Brig Gen John M Custer just before Gen John Abizaid met in Washington with Pres Bush and other leaders
One way to look at the history of the Cold War, and at China today.

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Why the Iraq War as already lost, why we may well lose Afghanistan, and why we are losing the war on terror

Dan Lindley, 10/2/06

via: http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/

The Iraq War is lost unless the military force on the ground is tripled. As this will not happen, and because the Iraqi forces being trained are as much or more sectarian fighters than they are supporters of the central government, the War is likely already lost from a US point of view. Iraqis, however, face years of civil war. We are also on the way to losing the war in Afghanistan and, and we are losing the war on terror. Why is the Iraq War lost for the US?

1. This is no longer mostly an insurgency, but a civil war. Civil wars are long and brutal, and do not lend themselves to outcomes that result in power sharing, much less democracy. See: Fearon Testimony http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/handouts/FearonIraqCongressionalTestimony.htm . This is congressional testimony from James Fearon, one of the top political scientists and experts on civil war in the U.S.

2. The situation in Iraq is getting worse at a fairly rapid rate. The simplest definition of victory is stability. Thus, the simplest indicator of a war in the process of being won is that stability is increasing. Losing means that instability is increasing. We are losing. As there is little sign that anything on the ground will change for the better, this war is lost. On increasing violence and sectarian militia infiltration of the Iraqi Army see: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060927_iraq_evolving.pdf a report from the right of center CSIS by Anthony Cordesman, frequent ABC TV commentator, former DoD and Congressional official, and author of 20 books on defense issues ( http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_experts/task,view/type,34/id,3/ ). Note that Cordesman calls the level of violence short of civil war.

3. We need 20 troops per 1000 population to stabilize Iraq. We currently have about 6 troops per thousand, and the likelihood of ramping up is essentially nil. Thus, we will lose. Since we know we will lose, we have lost. On force requirements for stability operations and nation-building see: http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/burden.html and http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/1995/quinliv.htm by James T. Quinlivan, an analyst at the Rand Corporation, which is a think-tank funded by the U.S. DoD. I have advocated ramping up for several years, but it will not happen.

The only hope I see for a quicker and positive end to the civil war is that the Sunnis will continue with their ongoing realization that the power balance is against them, and make sufficient concessions to prevent further war. Even though peace would help all sides economically and otherwise, and there is therefore an objective mutual interest in peace, there is too much mutual fear too many intra-sectarian divisions for this to happen. One piece of good news is the 94% of Iraqis do not want Al Qaeda in their country. 65-80% of Iraqis also want the U.S. out of Iraq immediately: http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/09/what_iraqis_wan.html (a blog by Williams College professor Marc Lynch with further links to a Washington Post article citing, for example, US Dept. of State polling data).

What will happen in Iraq? The civil war will rage on and get worse, until there is either a decisive victory (75% chance, see Fearon, above) or a stalemate. The victory will go to the Shiites (who have 60% of the population) over the Sunnis (20%), and perhaps over the Kurds (20%) as well. Shiite rule will likely be brutal because Sunni rule was brutal to them. Iranian influence will be greater after years of supporting fellow Shiites after years of war than it already is today without that much support for so long. The Kurdish situation of relative autonomy and peace looks good today, but once the war hits full tilt, they may get crushed by both the Shiites and Sunnis, backed by Iraq and Turkey respectively. Iraq and Turkey are powerful neighbors who have a great shared interest in seeing the Kurds get crushed and thus head off Kurdish independence movements in their own countries. If it's a stalemate will result in de facto partition. Objectively, there is enough self interest to drape a confederation over the partition to share oil wealth, create a more general peace, and thus increase profits and investments, but any
sort of power sharing is difficult after years of war (see Fearon, above).

Thus, like it or not, we are on the way out because A. the war has shifted from mostly counterinsurgency to mostly civil war and we do not want to sit atop a civil war; B we are losing the war no matter how it is defined; C. instability has been increasing dramatically since at least last February 22 (the Samarra shrine attack); D. the Iraqis do not want us there; and E. ramping up and/or internationalization will not happen. As more people come to realize these points (if I am right), then we will leave because staying makes little sense. How fast we leave and what we do with our remaining influence are the relevant issues. Winning is not an option.

If we wish to end the war sooner than later, our only choice is to help the war get to one of its two most likely 'natural' outcomes sooner then later: Shiite victory and brutal dictatorship or stalemate and partition. As we draw down, we can use our leverage to try to achieve one of those outcomes. We may not succeed. The Iraqis may have to fight their way to an outcome.

The U.S. should want the war to end sooner than later because of the risks of regional instability, danger to the world economy, relatively less Iranian influence, and less blood spilled. Of the two distasteful options, in a situation where there are no options that are both good and realistic, the US should prefer partition. In addition to the benefits of ending the war sooner than later, a partition will also allow some counterweight to the Iranians, and allow for some US leverage in part/s of Iraq. Partition is no panacea, and Turkey may intervene in the Kurdish area no matter the scenario. It is possible that we have a narrow, and brutally-interpreted, self interest in seeing the war rage on with no definitive winner. That may be the best way to lessen Iranian influence, but the risks of regional instability will remain high and the blood price will be maximized.

Why we are on the way to losing in Afghanistan

Two reasons. First, as mentioned, we need 20 troops per thousand population to stabilize a country. In Iraq we have about 6 per thousand. In Afghanistan, we have less than 1 (see the first Quinlivan piece, above). Even at the recent troop level of 20,000, we have less than 1 per thousand because Afghanistan's population is 27,000,000 (larger than Iraq's). Second the violence is spiking fast, and is unlikely to get better. It will worsen because Pakistan is withdrawing its armed forces from its Western provinces (N. and S. Waziristan, with more to come), essentially handing them over to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Taliban is assassinating tribal leaders in these areas and consolidating its power. Hence, the Taliban and AQ are gaining strongholds and safe-havens to conduct operations in Afghanistan (and elsewhere; the Western provinces are becoming pre-9/11 Afghanistan, shielded by the sovereignty of Pakistan). Because of this, the situation in Afghanistan will only get worse. These two blogs have extensive coverage of this under-reported situation: http://counterterrorismblog.org/ and http://billroggio.com/. Most but not all of the bloggers in the first seem credible to me, and Roggio seems credible to me. For more info on who these bloggers are, see: http://counterterrorismblog.org/about/ and http://billroggio.com/about/.

Ceding territory to terrorists and religious radicals may be a sign of instability in Pakistan. Extensive US operations in Pakistan may also cause instability in Pakistan. Pakistan has 24-48 nuclear weapons. Instability and radicalization in Pakistan is the most dangerous *potential* situation in the world today. Watch Pakistan carefully.

Why we are losing the war on terror

This is not my judgment, but it is the judgment of the recently declassified National Intelligence Estimate, the combined best estimate by 16 US intelligence agencies. Most reporting on the NIE missed what I think are the central conclusions. Reporting focused on two competing claims about Iraq. First, that the war in Iraq was counterproductively making the war on terror worse by breeding and training terrorists. Second, that victory over jihadists in Iraq would weaken the jihadists (The corollary is that pulling out or loss would strengthen the jihadists). The parts of the NIE that were declassified are here: http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf. These points are not central for reasons indicated above: the Iraq war is mostly not a Jihadi war, but is instead mostly a civil war, and this trend is increasing over time. Moreover, we have lost the Iraq War, like it or not. We may have some influence over what
state we leave Iraq in, but we are leaving.

The real headlines from the report are that we are losing the war on terror, that the war on terror should not even be conceptualized as a war, and that the main tools in the campaign against terror are those which will win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims. Killing and arresting terrorists is helpful, but is not the main focus.

*Why we are losing, two quotes from the NIE:*

"Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion."

"We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate."

*Why we are missing the point and missing the center of gravity, two quotes from the NIE:*

"...the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror."

"Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders."

In other words, things are getting worse and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The main way things will get better is if we go "well beyond" capturing or killing terrorists, and somehow engage the Muslim mainstream in denouncing terror and violence.

We have lost Iraq, are poised to lose Afghanistan, and are losing the war on terror. Where do we go from here?
These two articles demonstrate that the concepts above live, indeed thrive, in real life.

They Won't . . . They Can't . . .
By Meg Greenfield
(C) 1998, Newsweek Inc.

There was a famous article that appeared in the 1960s on the subject of China and its nuclear potential. It was written by an authoritative foreign-policy establishment figure, whose words commanded great respect. But what was to make the article so famous was neither the gravity of the subject nor the distinction of the author. It was the compelling plausibility of its explanation of why the Chinese were not going to develop a nuclear bomb. We all slept better at night -- that is, until a very short time later, when we were awakened by the blast of a first Chinese nuclear explosion. I remember a wise old bird in the national-security apparatus explaining to me why the article ran off the rails. It was all pretty much based on the author's own conception of what was in the Chinese national interest, he said -- what was too costly, what took too many scarce resources from other pressing national needs and set back the progress that was so important to them, etc. All true, my mentor said, but this was the author's view of what was in the interest of the Chinese. It was obviously not the Chinese view of what was in the interest of the Chinese, of what overrode what as a priority.

World power or not, we Americans have managed to stay pretty provincial in this regard. We have recently been taken unawares again by certain momentous developments abroad, the general tumult in Asia and the Indian nuclear tests in particular. Some part of our chronic surprise at the behavior of allies and antagonists alike tends to trace back to misperception of the kind reflected in that ancient explanation of why the Chinese were most unlikely to take up the nuclear option: They wouldn't . . . they couldn't . . . not in their interest . . . far too expensive . . . far too dangerous and they know it. The best illustration of this kind of misbegotten assuming came at the time of the sudden, startling August roll-in to Prague, in 1968, by Soviet tanks and troops determined to put down the rebellious dissent. Dean Rusk, the secretary of state at the time, was in the middle of his testimony to the Democratic platform committee at the Statler Hotel in Washington. He was interrupted and urgently summoned away to deal with the unexpected news, practically in midsentence.

How, I later asked an administration official, could this have happened? How could the Soviet military action have come as such a surprise that the secretary was off doing something else? This invasion, after all, hadn't suddenly sprung out of an impenetrable jungle somewhere. It was Soviet tanks lumbering across Central Europe. And was it not true -- it must be true -- that our intelligence agencies were watching that relatively visible and accessible part of the world all the time? Surely, we had seen the tanks coming, so what accounted for our being taken unawares? The answer was classic and, I am fairly certain, truthful: Well, yes, we saw them, but we thought it was some kind of maneuver or trick because we couldn't believe they were going to do something that risky or dumb.

In the aftermath of intelligence failures, this is one of the commonest explanations. Again and again you will hear that someone saw the suspicious traffic, that someone prepared an analysis that was right on the money but not believed or not acted on because it didn't seem as if the threat was imminent or sufficiently substantiated by other evidence. Mostly what you see here is a durable political tendency to let ourselves become captives of our own fixed ideas and longstanding perceptions of what motivates other people.

Consider Iran. It was long an article of faith with most of us that the shah, whom the United States was supporting for strategic reasons in the Middle East, was imperiled by Soviet-connected Iranian opposition in the Tudeh Party that was working assiduously for his overthrow. And no doubt it was hard at work to that end. But by the time the big explosion came, the Tudeh Party and the American-feared Marxist insurgency were off to the side somewhere. It was a nationalist/religious fundamentalist fervor that had overtaken the population, mobilized by mullahs and energized by an Iranian religious man who was in exile in Paris and whose picture we had seen in the
paper. At the beginning, my friends and I made fun of his Bhagwan-like appearance and what we assumed were his megalomaniacal delusions about how he and his followers were going to take over the country. But we stopped laughing pretty fast when he did what he said he was going to -- created enough turmoil to updump the shah and sweep away the interim officeholders and assume firm control of a large, angry, turbulent and profoundly anti-American constituency.

I don't believe the American intelligence agencies were as oblivious to what was rumbling in that society as my friends and I were. They couldn't have been. But they were far from grasping the magnitude of what was going on. And this should be considered against the fact that Iran must have been as drenched in U.S. intelligence agents at the time as any place on earth. Here I think the Iranian problem merges into a larger problem we have, as a country, in addressing these things. It is that we are too much in thrall to our political formulations and our preconceptions of how things work, too ready to believe that whatever we see proves them out (until we can pretend this no more), too little able even to imagine a political sensibility other than our own.

Many important players in our government thought, in 1961, that the Cuban populace would rise up as one and help us to topple Fidel Castro. We thought comparable, misguided thoughts about the Vietnamese for a long time. It was our wisdom that the Cambodians were a uniformly gentle, peaceful people who were not capable of fielding a killing faction like the Khmer Rouge. People in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were never going to rise up, at least not successfully. The Afrikaners would never let go. The Asian "miracle" governments with their formidable economies were going to take over the world.

Stubborn as we are, we must have learned a couple of things by now. One is that when an angry people decide they have had enough repression, they can take to the street and scare the repressors out. The other is never to trust our assumptions about what the other guy assumes is best for him.

New York Times
June 7, 1998
Naivete at the CIA: Every Nation's Just Another U.S.
By TIM WEINER

WASHINGTON -- Niccolo Machiavelli had it right: never assume the other guy will never do something you would never do. Too bad Machiavelli never worked for the CIA.

The world might be less dangerous than it is today had the CIA and its sister intelligence services foreseen India's nuclear tests last month. Armed with that foresight, the United States might have been able to forestall a test, as it did back in 1995, and thus prevent an arms race in one of the planet's least pacific places.

A report last week by retired Adm. David Jeremiah, a former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, blamed the failure on systemic flaws in the way the intelligence community gathers and handles information, trains its thousands of analysts and commands its $27-billion-a-year empire.

But underlying those failures, Jeremiah said, was a classic American cultural assumption: "This 'everybody thinks like us' mind-set."

The "underlying mind-set" was that India "would behave as we behave," he said. "We should have been much more aggressive in thinking through how the other guy thought."

Instead, he said, U.S. analysts decided that the newly elected Hindu nationalist political party, the BJP, couldn't possibly be serious when it campaigned on a nuclear weapons platform. Westerners saw good reasons for India to eschew testing and therefore thought Indians must understand their own best interests the same way.

Intelligence professionals have a name for this kind of thinking: mirror-imaging. It is considered one of the most basic mistakes in the spy manual. "Mirror-imaging -- projecting your thought process or value system onto
someone else -- is one of the greatest threats to objective intelligence analysis," a senior CIA officer, Frank Watanabe, wrote last year in Studies in Intelligence, the agency's in-house journal. "Avoid mirror-imaging at all costs," he advised.

Failing to follow such counsel led the United States to believe that Japan would never attack Pearl Harbor and that Saddam Hussein would never invade Kuwait.

But no analyst in the government imagined India testing a nuclear bomb. "The amazing thing was the unanimity," a senior State Department official said ruefully. "There was nobody anywhere -- no voices -- saying 'Watch out!'"

As Watanabe notes, "When everyone agrees on an issue, something is probably wrong."

There is something peculiarly American about the trap of mirror-imaging. Americans overseas like foreigners to speak, dress, eat and entertain as Americans do. They may well believe that everybody also thinks as they do. The whole world buys Big Macs -- so the ideas must come along with them, like a side of fries. This way of thinking meant that, last month, the United States government looked down at India from its spy satellites -- and saw the United States.

What does this say about the state of U.S. intelligence? First, mirror-imaging filled a void. America had few or no spies in India reporting on the nuclear program. So its analysts had to think without the benefit of facts.

Second, the CIA does not always teach people to think straight, said Mark Lowenthal, a former staff director of the House intelligence committee. "They don't do a lot of training," he said. "They say, 'Congratulations, you're the Mali analyst, have a nice day.' They need to spend some time on thinking about how you think. Very few analysts come by it naturally and almost none are taught to do it. Crisis-driven as they are, they don't have a lot of time to step back and say: 'Have I missed something? Is this the right way of thinking?'"

Third, group think grinds top-secret papers into intellectual pulp, said Angelo Codevilla, a former senior staff member of the Senate intelligence committee. "Our intelligence community thinks in herds -- 'Stay close. Don't get out ahead. Don't be thought of as crazy,'" he said. "There is a tremendous lack of diversity of mind. The most typical phrase in an intelligence estimate is 'We believe' -- the corporate belief, the office view, calibrated to satisfy -- not 'I think.'"

Fourth, "we have a brain-power problem" in American intelligence, said Robert Steele, a former CIA officer. "The average analyst has 2 to 5 years' experience," Steele said. "They haven't been to the countries they're analyzing. They don't have the language, the historical knowledge, the in-country residence time or the respect of their private-sector peers."

In its defense, the CIA was not the only outfit in Washington that had a mirror where its crystal ball should be. So had the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department.

The agency's reporting on Pakistan's subsequent nuclear tests was prescient and precise. But Jeremiah found the CIA misread India's nuclear ambitions because it was short on insight, expertise, training and leadership -- a strange state of affairs for an intelligence agency created to be the deepest think tank in the world.

The CIA, the admiral found, was not thinking clearly, and so deceived itself.

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For you true fans, here are all of:

Jervis' 14 Hypotheses on Misperception

In very short form, the 14 hypotheses are as follows:

1. New information is fit into pre-existing theories and images, especially if the new data is ambiguous and the theory/image is strong. Note: this is not always a bad thing. You should not always be changing your mind every time someone whispers something new in your ear.

2. Actors fit new information into their views more than they alter their theories.
3. Actors are more apt to change images if new information comes in as a big block, rather than bit by bit.

4. The more new information does not fit into existing concepts, the harder it will be to correct misperception (I am not sure my interpretation of Jervis is correct. See Jervis p. 470). The sources of existing concepts are: 1. One's own political system and domestic political structure; 2. personal previous experiences; 3. international history/analogy.¹

5. Misperception is increased if the information sender and receiver are from different backgrounds. The two parties' "evoked sets" (existing concepts; see #4) are different.

6. If a state spends time on planning and carefully crafting a message, it thinks the message will be clear.

7. Actors do not understand how others may misperceive their actions. Actions may be mis-executed.

8. States tend to see others as more hostile than they are.

9. States tend to see others as more centralized and coordinated than they are.

10. States overweight information coming from another state's foreign office. (really, this is 9a)

11. If another's behavior seems caused by one's own actions, then it must be so; if their behavior is contrary to one's own actions and pressures, then the state must be acting according to domestic politics (as opposed to its own self-interest).

12. States think others will accurately perceive its motivations. States find it hard to believe that others see it as a menace.

13. States do not understand why other's do not weight issues the same way they do. State A does not understand why state B does not think a certain issue is vital.

14. Facts may be consistent with many theories and states do not understand that.

I think there is a lot of overlap between these models and I boil them down into three main hypotheses. First is the **Newtonian Psychology** hypothesis in which once a state adopts images, models, and analogies about how the world works and who its friends and enemies are, then it is very hard to change this image. An image 'at rest' remains at rest unless a very strong and persuasive alternative image knocks it away. A **derivative** of the Newtonian Model is that it is hard to understand another's images, and it is hard for them to understand your images. The Newtonian model largely subsumes hypotheses 1-7. Second is the **pre-Copernican Psychology** hypothesis in which one (incorrectly) sees oneself as the center of a hostile, well-organized universe. This subsumes hypotheses 8-10. Third, is the **Bowling Shoe** hypothesis in which it is hard to wear another's shoes, and vice-versa. Based on the saying that you can not understand someone if you do not walk in their shoes, this model subsumes hypotheses 11-14. It overlaps with the derivative of the Newtonian model, especially hypotheses 5-7.

Note that Jervis cautions against applying psychological models and theories to whole states, and then does it anyway. My view: the hypotheses seem to offer insight into state behavior some of the time, in some situations. That is all you can ask in this business, so why not apply the hypotheses?

Note how these theories may work with or exacerbate other problems. For example, seeing states as more hostile than they are aggravates the security dilemma and spirals. Seeing other states as centralized makes it harder grasp that a state's actions may in fact be explained by Allison's organizational model.

How can one safeguard against or fix these problems? You must know about these problems. And you

¹ For example, a centralized dictatorship may view democracies as chaotic and thus weak. Is this true? Are democracies chaotic and weak when they are actually fighting dictatorships?
must know yourself.

available here: http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/handouts/models.html

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Dan Lindley Biographical Sketch

Dan Lindley is an assistant professor at the University of Notre Dame. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations and French from Tufts University in 1984. Before starting graduate school in the Security Studies Program at MIT (PhD 1998), he worked for Congressman Ratchford, the Center for Defense Information, the Federation of American Scientists, and the Brookings Institution. Lindley’s book, Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes, is forthcoming in Spring 2007 from Princeton University Press. He has published and spoken on U.N. peacekeeping, internal and ethnic conflict, the Concert of Europe, the Cyprus problem and Aegean security, and pre-emptive and preventive war, with articles in or forthcoming in: Contemporary Security Policy, International Studies Perspectives, Security Studies, International Peacekeeping, Defense and Security Analysis, Hellenic Studies/Études Helléniques, and PS: Political Science and Politics. He is currently conducting research on public diplomacy, and on the extent to which miscalculation and misperception have come to dominate states’ decisions for war. He lectured at MIT and was a fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He started as an assistant professor in political science at the University of Notre Dame in Fall, 1999, where he is also a fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. For more information, please call 631-3226 or consult: http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/

Lindley is also a frequent guest commentator on international relations on WSBT.

A Few Endnotes on Sources:


2. These three notions are adapted from Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Apr., 1968), pp. 454-479. He has fourteen hypotheses, but they boil down to three main ones, so named by me.


4. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists at:
http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=ja06norris