Chapter 6: United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia p. 208

Appendix 2: Transparency and the Open Skies, Strategic Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation Regimes p. 308

Table 2-2: Effects of Opacity and Transparency on Mis/calculation, Deterrence, and Warp. 56

Scholar and Practitioner Assessments of UNDOF and the Role of Transparency p. 200

Chapter 6: United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia p. 208

Appendix 2: Transparency and the Open Skies, Strategic Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation Regimes p. 308

This book began when my initial dissertation topic underwent creative implosion. The original idea, “The Formation, Effectiveness, and Demise of Collective Security Systems,” looked at the Concert of Europe, League of Nations, and United Nations and tried to explain the life-cycles of collective security systems. It was a huge topic, and it muddied the issue of most interest, that of effectiveness. There is a lot of great power politics in the formation and demise of collective security systems, and looking at their ebb and flow is a good way to take the pulse of great power politics. But what do these systems actually do to promote peace while they are around?

With an abiding interest in applying institutional theories to issues of war and peace, the clarifying revelation that came to me was to see if transparency might be a contribution of security regimes. Informational arguments occupy a large place in the institutionalist repertoire, but how well do they apply in the realm of security?

This book attempts to answer that question. I have run hypotheses about transparency up the flagpole, testing them by seeing if, and how well, two of the most prominent security regimes used transparency to manage problems and promote peace. Here, I report the results.

Whatever I have achieved, it would not have been possible without the help of a large number of people. I owe the greatest debt to Professors Stephen Van Evera and Barry Posen. Their many comments and marginalia over the years epitomized scholarly insight and the time they spent trying to make me make sense well exceeded their professional responsibilities. They have more than earned their pay, my respect, and my gratitude. Professor Kenneth Oye, my third reader, was always helpful, constructive, and to the point. The contribution of these three to my education goes well beyond thesis and paper comments and continues to this day. I am still trying to figure out what mental algorithms they bring to bear when they construct and parse apart arguments. Their ability to quickly get to the core of arguments is formidable.

My graduate student colleagues never failed to help when asked. I was lucky to go to school with Taylor Seybolt and Jane Kellett as well as Eric Heginbotham, Clifford Bob, Jonathan Ladinsky, and Daryl Press. David Nickles of the Harvard History Department commented several times on my pre-Concert and Concert chapters. In addition, I frequently availed myself of Professor George Rathjens and the New Directions in Security Studies Working Group to sharpen my ideas.

Looking back, I must thank Professor Martin Sherwin at Tufts who helped teach me about nuclear weapons. In Washington, everyone I ever worked for reaffirmed my faith that working on security issues was the right thing to do and that many good people worked on these issues both in and out of government. This includes Bill Ratchford, Steve Goose, John Pike, Paul Stares, Ken Flamm, and Josh Epstein, all of whom helped me take the next step.

I wish to thank George Rathjens, Harvey Sapolsky, MIT's Defense and Arms Control Studies Program (now Security Studies Program), the MacArthur Foundation, and MIT's Department of Political Science for numerous years of financial support. The International Security Program of the (now Belfer) Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy of School of Government saw me through the home stretch of the dissertation with a two-year fellowship which greatly increased my productivity. The Carnegie Corporation of New York and their Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict supported the project on internal conflicts that I worked on at the CSIA.

Several colleagues at the CSIA provided valuable comments and critiques of my work, especially Mike Brown, as well as Rachel Bronson, Miriam Fendius Elman, Matt Evangelista, Christopher Layne, Sean Lynn-Jones, John Matthews, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Jo Spear, and Bradley Thayer.

Many people at the U.N. helped me with my research. In New York, I owe particular thanks to Lena Yacoumopoulou, as well as Kevin Kennedy, Fred Eckhard, and Henry Breed. In later research, Simon Davies, Eleanor Beardsley, Susan Manuel, Frederick Schottler, and David Wimhurst were all helpful and forthcoming.

On Cyprus, almost everyone I met at UNFICYP was very helpful and generous -- certainly beyond every reasonable expectation. I never figured out why UNFICYP was so forthcoming, giving me access to any operational documents or U.N. officials I wished, so credit must go to those at the top who set the tone. I especially refer to General Ahti Vartiainen who lent assistance in many ways and to Waldemar Rokoszewski, a true expert on Cyprus. I also am grateful to the staff of the operations branch who never seemed to be bothered by my continued note-taking presence. I grew fond of the booming British voice of Lieutenant Colonel Nick Parker, the mellifluous Argentinean accent of Major Marcelo Rozas-Garay, and the laugh of the hard working Major Edgar Wallig from Austria. The three formed a great team and exemplified the multinational ideal of the U.N. I also thank Gustave Feissel, Colonel Ian Talbot, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Snowdon, Lieutenant Colonel Jorges Tereso, Major Andrew Barnard, Major Walsh, and Bombardiers Raymond Cowie and Elwyn Jones.

My visit to UNDOF was assisted by General Johannes Kosters, Captain Ken-Ichi Kawazu, and the enthusiastically helpful Captain Richard Deschambault. Among others at UNTSO, Zenon Carnapas, Anthony French, and General R. M. Kupolati were generous with their time. Mikael Lindvall from UNIFIL came down to Israel during a troubled period to give me a lengthy briefing. I also thank General Kosters and Captain Deschambault for allowing me to take notes on some of UNDOF’s documents.

I also thank Michael Doyle of International Peace Academy, and William Durch and Tory Holt of the Stimson Center. Francis X. Stenger, Deputy Division Chief for Open Skies Treaty at the DoD Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was very supportive and informative.

At Notre Dame, Jim McAdams, Tony Messina, Andy Gould, Keir Lieber, Al Tillery, and David Singer, have all given their time with comments. James Thompson and Matthew Flynn have helped with my research. The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies has been very generous with financial and moral support.

I received many helpful comments during presentations of various aspects of this work. I presented my analysis of the Concert of Europe at the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security, University of Chicago, December 1999 and at the American Political Science Association conference in September 2002. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Charles Lipson, Alexander Wendt, Duncan Snidal, Daniel Drezner, and Charles Kupchan,.

I presented various aspects of my U.N. peacekeeping chapters at the Peace Studies Program of Cornell University in March 1999; at the CSIA of Harvard University in April 1999; at the MIT Security Studies Program in May 1999; and at the Seminar on Protracted Conflict at the Project on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School in May 1998. I presented my research on Cyprus at the Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, North Cyprus in March 1998; at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. in December 1997; at the University of Minnesota in October 1997; and at the Intercollege in Nicosia, Cyprus, in April 1997. Various portions were presented at the American Political Science Association conferences in 1994, 1995, 2000, and 2002; at the New England Political Science Association conferences in 1993 and 1995; and at the International Studies Association Conference in 1999. Research and parts of the book contributed to the following publications: “Avoiding Tragedy in Power Politics: The Concert of Europe, Transparency, and Crisis Management,” Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Winter 2003/4), pp. 195-229; “Untapped Power? The Status of U.N. Information Operations,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 608-624; and “UNDOF: Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned,” Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 153-164. I thank all the discussants, reviewers, and other contributors to the above efforts.

I thank my family, although I hope they already know how much they have helped me over the years.

Graphics/illustrations: There are two maps from the U.N. (maps 4-1, UNFICYP and 5-1, UNDOF). I have received copyright permission for both.

After more than twenty of years of civil war, foreign interference, and massacres by the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia finally seemed ready for peace. In 1991, a peace agreement was signed by the principle parties, and the United Nations sent peacekeepers to Cambodia to help maintain the cease-fire and rebuild the war-torn country. The U.N.’s prime objective was to hold an election to seal the peace with a new democratic government. Success depended on the U.N.’s ability to teach the country about elections, monitor the elections, and legitimize the results with a high turnout. However, a number of wild and false rumors and fears threatened to jeopardize the elections. Some potential voters suspected that the ballot-marking pencils contained radio beacons that broadcast to satellites, revealing who had voted for whom. Others feared spying by secret electronic eyes in the polling places. With radio and other educational efforts, the U.N. defused these rumors about what the Khmer Rouge and others were imagined to be doing to sabotage the elections, assured voters that the ballots would be secret, and taught the Cambodians about democracy. The turnout was a resounding ninety percent.

What happened here? The U.N. used accurate information to calm false rumors. This is but one example of a security regime increasing transparency – what adversaries know about each other’s intentions, capabilities, and actions – to promote peace. There are many ways institutions can increase transparency and promote peace, ranging from providing a forum to broadcasting, inspecting, verifying, and monitoring.

Almost 200 years earlier, transparency also helped one of the first security regimes promote peace – though not in the way many think. At the end of 1814 and into 1815, the great powers of Europe met together in Vienna in what would become the first international crisis management forum in history: the Concert of Europe. Russia’s occupation of Poland and Prussian claims to Saxony caused a growing crisis. Supporting Prussia’s designs on Saxony with blustery belligerence, Tsar Alexander of Russia said in October 1814: “I have two hundred thousand men in the duchy of Warsaw. Let them drive me out if they can! I have given Saxony to Prussia....If the King of Saxony refuses to abdicate, he shall be led to Russia; where he will die.... ”

In December, Prince Hardenburg of Prussia said that Austrian, British, and French resistance to his plans was “tantamount to a declaration of war.” British Viscount Castlereagh termed this “a most alarming and unheard-of menace.”

Talk of war swept Vienna.

On January 3, 1815, Austria, Britain, and France signed a secret treaty to counter Russia and Prussia. Castlereagh revealed the treaty to Alexander the next day. Faced with hardened opposition, Russia forced Prussia to back down, and this quickly resolved the crisis. The great powers used the new forum to communicate threats and reach bargains far more rapidly than they could before. Information exchanged during forum diplomacy clarified the stakes at issue and the balance of power. Increased transparency did not calm fears, the most commonly imagined effect of transparency. Instead, it enhanced coercive diplomacy and bargaining.

International institutions in which states cooperate to prevent war are called security regimes. One of the main tools at a security regime’s disposal is increasing transparency. Scholars and policy makers often assume that increased transparency reduces unwarranted fears, misperceptions, and miscalculation, but few have examined how transparency is provided or how it operates in practice.

This book answers two main questions about transparency: “How and when do security regimes increase transparency?” and “How and when do these efforts to increase transparency promote peace?”

I examine the role of transparency in crisis management by the Concert of Europe, and in several different U.N. peacekeeping operations. While there are many different security regimes, these cases allow examination of the provision and effects of transparency in a variety of contexts. The Concert brought diplomats together in a forum to manage crises, something they had never done before. In U.N. operations, peacekeepers more actively generate and exchange information. Findings based on these cases have global importance. Today, there are many forums from ASEAN to the African Union, and proposals for additional forums often cite the Concert as a model.

In 2005, some sixteen U.N. and ten non-U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world monitor cease-fires and elections, verify disarmament and arms control agreements, patrol buffer zones and other areas of conflict.

The mechanisms for providing transparency vary greatly, as do transparency’s effects. As this book demonstrates, sometimes transparency succeeds in promoting peace, sometimes it fails, and sometimes it makes things worse. By helping figure out how and when security regimes can make transparency work, this book bolsters scholarship on security institutions, advances emerging debates about transparency, and helps policymakers more effectively use regimes to promote peace.

There are three practical and scholarly reasons for studying security regimes and transparency. The first is policy relevance. States have turned to security regimes to help prevent war for the last 200 years. Recent years have seen renewed interest in the two types of security regimes examined here: peacekeeping and forums. Wherever one stands on debates about security regimes’ ultimate influence in international relations, they consume considerable attention and resources from decision-makers. Second, security regimes in general are understudied by academics, and the large policy-oriented literature on peacekeeping remains a surprisingly theory-free zone. Few scholars have used the subject to develop and test international relations theories. Third, transparency is a reasonably manipulable product for security regimes, and transparency in the context of security regimes is understudied. Knowledge about transparency also helps us understand the role and practice of public diplomacy, because it also aims to influence the information environment. Thus, figuring out whether and how transparency contributes to security regimes’ effectiveness will help policy makers use them better, and advance international relations scholarship on several fronts. I discuss these three points in turn, looking first at the topic of security regimes in policy and scholarly debates, then explaining the specific focus on transparency.

Security regimes are of perennial concern to policy makers. Every time a major war ends, the participants set up a security regime to help prevent a “next” war. The Napoleonic Wars were followed by the Concert of Europe; World War I by the League of Nations; and World War II by the United Nations. Similarly, the end of the Cold War rekindled enthusiasm for the U.N. and sparked a number of new peacekeeping operations. Over time, the number of security regimes has grown, ranging from the Open Skies agreement in Europe to the African Union.

Security regimes are of immediate interest to today’s leaders. The 1990s were marked by a surge of debate and new policies focused on the U.N. and other security regimes. To replace the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or supplement the U.N., a number of analysts proposed new security forums modeled after the Concert of Europe.

Others proposed strengthening the United Nations and moving it closer toward being an ideal all-against-any-aggressor collective security system.

These proposals for new forums and the initial post-Cold War enthusiasm for the U.N., followed by the U.N.’s troubles in Bosnia and Somalia, provoked a backlash. Critics charged that peacekeeping is useless or counterproductive: that it only makes peace between those who want peace; that it only works between small countries; or that it prevents adversaries from negotiating an end to their dispute by removing the strongest incentive to compromise, the pain of continuing war.

As a result of these critiques and real-world failures, U.N. peacekeeping declined in the mid-1990s, but demand for these operations soon returned. The number of United Nations military personnel and civilian police jumped from 10,000 in 1987-1991 to 78,000 in mid-1993, falling back to around 10,000 in 1999 and rising again to almost 66,000 in May 2005. Accordingly, costs for peacekeeping rose from the typical Cold War level of less than $300 million per year to $640 million in 1989 to $3.6 billion in 1993, dropping to about $1.0 billion in 1998, and rising to $4.47 billion for the year July 2004 – June 2005.

Despite this history and these policy debates, few scholars have stepped back to take a theoretically-informed look at security regimes. With peacekeeping in particular, much analysis is directed at policy-makers, but the subject is little used to test and develop international relations theories. Some scholarly debates about security institutions are heated, but do not contribute detailed analysis.

The study of security regimes is the study of how institutions affect security policies and the probability of war. This intersection of two core streams of international relations scholarship – liberal institutionalism and security studies – remains largely uncharted. Those who study institutions have contributed a lot to the political science subfield of international political economy, but relatively little to security studies. Few institutionalists have a background in security studies.

Regime theory originated in the subfield of international political economy (IPE), and theoretically-driven work on international institutions continues to be dominated by the IPE subfield. Work here started with the question: do regimes matter? and moved on to the questions: how and under what conditions do regimes matter?

Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons wrote that regimes could be shown to matter if case studies showed that decision makers:

“were actually concerned with reputation, reducing transactions costs, the need for transparency, and so forth, when facing decisions about regime creation and compliance....An even stronger claim [could be made if such analysis showed that regimes] can alter actor’s interests and preferences.....Surprisingly little work of this kind has been done.

That statement is still true, particularly in security studies. That work is the aim of this book.

Robert Keohane, a leading international political economist and proponent of international institutions, laments the lack of attention the field of international relations has paid to security regimes – a concern echoed more recently by David Lake.

The best work on security regimes is by Robert Jervis, Charles Lipson, and Charles and Clifford Kupchan who have used the Concert of Europe to discuss transparency and other peace-promoting effects of institutions such as promotion of rules and norms.

I advance this research program by focusing on transparency and expanding the analysis to U.N. peacekeeping. Other scholars of security regimes examine how institutional momentum, persistence, or form affect states’ policies. For example, John Duffield brings institutional analysis to bear on the contentious issue of weapons procurement within NATO.

Some of the most insightful work on institutions and information comes from literatures on cooperation and bargaining, and security issues are especially prominent in the bargaining literature. Cooperation theorists have identified a number of barriers to cooperation among states and have studied how actors can overcome these hurdles. Barriers to cooperation include deadlock, inability or unwillingness to forecast or take into account the long term consequences of policies (theorists call this inability a short shadow of the future), large numbers of actors that cause collective action problems, uncertainty about the costs and benefits of cooperation, and insufficient capabilities to monitor compliance with agreements and punish defectors (which in turn increases the likelihood of cheating and defection). Regimes can promote cooperation by giving states forums for discussion and helping them bargain and horse trade across different issue areas (issue linkage). Regimes can increase the shadow of the future, reduce transaction costs, and increase the amount of information available to actors.

Bargaining theorists have focused on why states fail to arrive at negotiated settlements to their conflicts, why this sometimes leads to war, and how war is itself a bargaining process. Even though the word transparency may not be frequently or explicitly used, the arguments in this burgeoning literature often hinge on the quality of information available to the actors. For example, war may result if two sides disagree about their relative power, or if both sides can not credibly commit to peace due to an inability to monitor the agreement. In the first case, increased transparency may help states calculate their relative power, better predict the outcome of a possible war, and negotiate to avoid that war. In the second case, increased transparency can help verify an accord, making commitments to that accord more credible and enforceable.

By serving as forums, by monitoring, or by otherwise increasing information, regimes can increase transparency. Transparency in turn can reduce uncertainties about others’ actions, intentions, and capabilities, and can help states calculate the consequences of their policies. Transparency can increase the ability to identify defectors and help states identify the payoffs from cooperation (or defection).

This literature review, and the citations in the methods chapter, make clear that many different literatures talk about the effects of false information and transparency in similar ways despite their different angles and methods. The apparent differences between the political psychologists, rationalists, institutionalists, and qualitative causes of war scholars obscure these similarities, and cross-citations are rarer than they should be.

The first reason I focus on transparency as a tool of regimes is because of its relevance to issues of war and peace. Due to the effects described above, many believe that the promise of transparency can help seal a peace agreement or cease-fire. Transparency may also reduce arms races and security spirals, reduce misperceptions and miscalculations that can lead to war, and help adversaries bargain their way to agreements.

The second reason to focus on transparency is that it should be something relatively easy for security regimes to provide. Realist critics of institutions are correct that the U.N. is incapable of sending divisions of troops to quell a crisis. Security regimes are not that powerful. However, other benefits that regimes may offer should not be ignored.

Increasing transparency means exchanging or providing information. Compared to sending forces, increasing transparency is relatively easy for regimes to accomplish. This is true whether one is looking at cost, logistics, institutional or technical expertise, number of necessary personnel, or political sensitivity.

Transparency is a fairly manipulable variable in the realm of security. Whatever good security regimes can do in a dangerous world should be studied and welcomed.

Finally, transparency is of growing interest to scholars and policy-makers. As mentioned, Jervis, Lipson, and Kupchan and Kupchan have led the study of transparency as applied to security regimes, while John Lewis Gaddis is the leading historian grappling with the subject. They have developed arguments about different peace-promoting effects of transparency ranging from calming arms races to reducing miscalculation.

These arguments are the conventional wisdom for arms controllers and institutionalists.

However, a new wave of scholarship by Ann Florini, James Marquardt, Ronald Mitchell, Bernard Finel, and Kirsten Lord has begun to explore arguments about the potentially negative effects of transparency. They suggest that transparency may exacerbate tensions, make bargaining more difficult, and even lead to conflict.

Bargaining theorists are also developing arguments about the negative effects of transparency and the conditions when transparency helps or hurts cooperation. Some argue that noisy information and uncertainty can hurt cooperation even when the parties want cooperation, but help cooperation when the parties are hostile. Others argue that transparency can remove peace-promoting ambiguity and encourage deadlock or even preventive war.

Within and across various literatures, the debate is engaged between transparency optimists and pessimists. This is one of the first attempts to lay out and test these conflicting contentions about transparency.

To learn about the provision of transparency and its effects in a range of contexts, I study the Concert of Europe and several U.N. peacekeeping operations. The Concert was the first multilateral crisis management forum. I study the role of transparency as the forum handled its first five crises from 1814 into the middle 1830s. While the Concert is 200 years old, its lessons help us predict what will happen when forums convene to confront crises or when adversaries with few means of communication, such as North and South Korea, meet.

The four peacekeeping cases consist of two exemplars each of the two main types of U.N. operations: traditional and multifunctional.

Traditional operations monitor buffer zones and verify areas of limited armaments, as in the cases I examine of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights. Multifunctional (or complex) operations organize and monitor elections, and take on other tasks to administer a conflict area. I assess these in the cases of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

I study these cases for two reasons. First, these cases are historically significant and policy relevant. Second, the crises, incidents, and activities within the cases provide multiple observations of, and variations in, the variables I study: regime activity, transparency, and levels of tension between adversaries. To examine these variables, I first develop a number of hypotheses on the provision and various possible effects of transparency. I then test these hypotheses by process tracing events within each case to see whether the regimes increased transparency, and to assess the effects of any transparency provided. I explain methods and case selection in detail in the next chapter.

Why should these cases have anything to do with transparency? Prior to the Concert, multilateral meetings between states happened at peace conferences, but crisis diplomacy was limited to bilateral exchanges. In contrast, multilateral meetings should increase transparency because they allow more states to exchange information more easily. To assess whether this is true, and to determine the effect of any transparency provided on crisis management, I not only examine five crises confronted by the Concert, but I also compare Concert diplomacy with diplomacy prior its formation. The ability to compare diplomacy before and after the Concert distills the effects of forum diplomacy and makes the Concert a valuable case for understanding how multilateral forums work.

United Nations peacekeepers may increase transparency by patrolling buffer zones, verifying arms control agreements, and monitoring elections. A central purpose of these activities is to generate, provide, or exchange information about adversaries’ capabilities, intentions, and actions. From the very beginning, peacekeeping has been about transparency:

UN OBSERVERS. Their beat—no man’s land. Their job—to get the facts straight. A frontier incident, an outbreak of fighting … Which nation is responsible, whose story is true? The UN must know. So its peace patrols keep vigil to prevent flareups, supervise truces, investigate and report.

Testing hypotheses about transparency across these cases generates a range of findings that indicate when transparency can most easily be increased, and what transparency’s effects will be. These findings advance academic debates on the Concert, peacekeeping, international institutions, cooperation, and bargaining. They also provide the basis for a number of policy recommendations.

I find that the Concert often modestly increased transparency. This made coercive bargaining easier, while sometimes highlighting deadlock. Transparency helped bring peaceful endings to two crises, and led to peaceful standoffs in two other cases. For example, during the Poland-Saxony crisis, three states made a secret alliance, revealed it the next day, and successfully coerced two other states into backing down. I argue that such a quick exchange of information would have been impossible prior to the forum.

With transparency, the Concert made power politics work more quickly and peacefully. This argument occupies the middle ground between Concert optimists who find that the Concert transformed European politics and call it the “best example of a security regime”

and those of recent Concert pessimists who find nothing to support institutional arguments.

Because transparency helped coercion or clarified the existence of schisms, the cases reveal darker sides of transparency that contrast with the conventional wisdom of the arms control and liberal advocacy communities that transparency is a prescription for peace. Transparency did not overcome realpolitik, it just made it work better. At several points, transparency aggravated the crises and heightened the odds of war. While at first this might seem to support transparency pessimists, communication of positions and threats were also necessary to resolve the crisis.

Turning to the peacekeeping operations, I argue that traditional United Nations operations that monitor buffer zones face many previously unidentified barriers to their attempts to increase transparency. Scholars such as Michael Doyle may be too quick to assume that transparency works well in traditional operations.

For example, a close examination at United Nations Disengagement Observer Force’s inspection system reveals a number of deficiencies. The personnel, procedures, and equipment look good on paper, but are not sufficient to adequately monitor the elaborate arms control agreement on the Golan Heights. These flaws suggest that the verification procedures in arms control agreements have to be carefully thought out down to a fine-grained level of detail. This case also shows that it is hard for a regime to increase transparency when the adversaries already know a lot about each other. When this is true, the regime cannot add much value to the flow of information.

The case of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus case reveals that efforts to increase transparency may not be able to overcome strong biases and enemy-imaging of adversaries.

For example, there is sometimes uncertainty about the nature of military construction along the buffer zone: is a fortification being repaired (allowed) or upgraded (not allowed)? Each side often fears the worst about the other. In theory, transparency could reduce these fears when they are unwarranted and exacerbated by uncertainty. In reality, several incidents reveal that each side is so suspicious that UNFICYP may not assuage fears no matter what it says in its reports. On the other hand, UNFICYP often uses information to coerce aggressors and troublemakers into backing down, thus preventing incidents from escalating.

In contrast, multifunctional operations showed more promise. In Namibia and Cambodia where there were scanty media outlets and poorly informed and often illiterate citizens, information campaigns by UNTAG and UNTAC helped these operations succeed. In both cases, harmful rumors abounded, and the U.N. stopped these rumors with superior information firepower. As shown above, during the Cambodian elections of 1991, U.N. radio broadcasts reassured Cambodians that their votes would be kept secret. Other transparency-increasing mechanisms, including puppet shows, singers, and town meetings, taught voters about the U.N.’s mission and refuted rumors of violence that might have thwarted the elections. Transparency helped generate turnouts of 96 and 90 percent in these two operations’ elections.

These peacekeeping missions suggest that efforts to increase transparency work best when:

• there are poor information environments where the regime can more easily add value to existing information;

• adversaries are not so plagued by biases that new information will not shift perceptions;

• adversaries are sufficiently weak relative to the U.N. so that they cannot thwart the U.N.’s efforts;

• the U.N. has sufficient resources and adequate procedures in place to accomplish its mandate.

These conditions for success are also likely apply to information operations and public diplomacy, including efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense and State Department.

The study of forum diplomacy helps predict what will happen when states that do not regularly consult are brought together. Despite the internet and globalization, there are still areas like the Korean Peninsula and parts of Africa where adversaries scarcely communicate. Many analysts extol the virtues of concert-like forums and my findings help make clear what we should expect from their recommendations.

Forums beat the alternative of no forums, but only because forum diplomacy enhances tough bargaining.

The peacekeeping cases offer a number of lessons for both buffer zone-monitoring traditional and democracy-promoting multifunctional operations. While promoting democracy is a task now almost taken for granted at the U.N., the mandates of several recent U.N. and NATO missions include establishing and supervising buffer zones. These include operations in Kosovo-Serbia, Eritrea-Ethiopia, and inter-Congo.

The first lesson is that policy makers and U.N. officials should recognize the value of increasing transparency to the success of some of their peacekeeping operations. There is institutional resistance to wielding information in ways that may affect conflicts. These fears remain, even though many in the U.N. recognize the successes of UNTAC and UNTAG. These missions showed that active information operations and transparency can reduce tensions, defuse crises, and help peacekeepers fulfill their mandates.

As a result, U.N. information efforts remain deficient. For example, in the U.N. Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), the U.N. broadcasts about its mission for one hour a week on Eritrean radio, is denied access to Ethiopian radio, and has no independent radio facilities. This study suggests that conditions in UNMEE’s area of operations might be ripe for increased information efforts and transparency: the local information environment is poor, and uncertainties appear to remain about the mission, the border, and perhaps the activities of the adversaries.

Second, peacekeepers can expand their transparency-increasing roles to new roles and missions. For example, peacekeepers could go beyond often passive border patrols and post-hoc incident reports and try to increase transparency proactively. By monitoring each sides’ policies and statements, peacekeepers and truth squads could combat dangerous falsehoods, rumors, and myths with relevant facts. This would combat false fears and fear-mongering, and help get the adversaries operating with more common and accurate information.

Third, the U.N. should experiment with limited peacekeeping operations that seek only to increase transparency in cases where a full scale peacekeeping operation is not possible or desirable. A U.N. news radio located near a troubled area might do some good if it helped reduce fears, correct misperceptions, and deflate myths held by each side.

In all cases, new doctrines, procedures, and equipment would have to be provided to bolster the small in-house information and media departments organic to most peacekeeping operations. Operations need enhanced expertise and information gathering capabilities to adequately separate myth from fact and provide tension-reducing information. Unfortunately, there is resistance within the U.N. to the development of these capabilities. Perhaps this book will bolster the forces of change.

Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the subject, the hypotheses, and the methodology. Chapter 3 begins by reviewing diplomacy and crisis management before the Concert of Europe. This provides a baseline, which I then use to assess how well the Concert used the new tool of forum diplomacy to manage its first five crises. Chapters 4 and 5 examine traditional buffer zone monitoring operations and the cases are the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, respectively. Chapters 6 and 7 shift the peacekeeping focus to multifunctional operations that sponsor and monitor elections. I examine the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), respectively. Chapter 8 concludes the book, summarizing my findings and presenting their implications for scholars and policy-makers.

To help extend my findings and explore their limits, one appendix assesses the state of information operations by the U.N. in several recent missions while a second appendix looks at the role of transparency in mini-cases ranging from the Open Skies regime and strategic arms control, to the non-proliferation regime.

Methods help us answer “What causes what?” questions about politics more systematically and with greater replicability. Methods establish standards for testing hypotheses, measuring variables, and making valid arguments about how the world works. Replicability and validity are tough to come by, but achieving them is a noble aim because they help scholars cumulate knowledge, and provide policy makers with more reliable insights.

Some variables like gross national product and geographic proximity are fairly easy to measure, while others such as ideas and norms are harder to visualize and evaluate. Transparency lies on the opaque side of this continuum. It is difficult to see transparency in action because it is about who said what to whom, and how information affects the outcomes of crises and incidents. The trick in studying transparency, then, is to define terms precisely, to clearly lay out hypotheses about the causes and effects of transparency, and to explain their observable implications. Those are the main goals of this chapter.

Transparency describes the availability of information about potential adversaries’ actions, capabilities, and intentions. If information about potential adversaries is easy to obtain, and the amount and accuracy of information is high, then the world is said to be transparent. As transparency increases, completeness of information increases. If information about threats is difficult to acquire, the world is less transparent or more opaque. As transparency decreases, opacity increases, and incomplete information and uncertainty also increase.

The hypotheses spell out the different ways that transparency can affect the probability of cooperation or deadlock, war or peace. Perhaps the effect of transparency that first comes to many people’s minds is that it can calm arms races and reduce enemy-imaging between adversaries. A prevalent view in the liberal and arms control communities is that arms races are caused or exacerbated by incorrect worst-case analyses and that hostile relations are aggravated by exaggerated fears of the enemy.

When analyses and fears are indeed based on misperceptions, then transparency may reduce tensions and promote peace.

To those who think conflict is frequently based on misperception, transparency is viewed as an elixir of peace. Stephen Van Evera argues that “anything that makes the world more transparent will reduce the risk of war.”

As we shall see, transparency has more complex effects.

There are four types of transparency, each corresponding to one of the four general ways states obtain information about their potential adversaries: cooperative, ambient, coerced, and unilateral.

I focus on cooperative transparency, which is the domain covered by most security regimes. Cooperative transparency is caused by states’ institutionalized and cooperative efforts to increase transparency. Various cooperative mechanisms can be used to increase transparency, including sharing of information, meetings, discussion forums, buffer zones, verification provisions in treaties, and shared intelligence. These institutional mechanisms vary according to their formality – the extent of the regime’s rules, bureaucracy, procedures, and functions. As a result, cooperative transparency has two main variants, informal cooperative transparency and formal cooperative transparency. For example, discussion forums like the Concert of Europe are less formal than U.N.- monitored buffer zones or on-site inspections.

The other three types include ambient transparency, which is caused by factors including the extent of global media coverage, relative ease of travel, and amount of trade and telecommunications, as well as information generated by non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and universities. Although these factors are hard for policy makers to manipulate, an increase in any of them generally increases transparency. Coerced transparency occurs when states are forced to open up, as Iraq was forced to do after the Gulf War.

Unilateral transparency has three forms. The first is intelligence transparency which is a state’s independent and directed efforts to collect information. These efforts include satellites, spies, and other such methods to gather and assess information. The second is confrontational transparency which is caused when states communicate in order to coerce or deter. When states coerce or deter, they may clarify their stakes in a given situation, clarify what actions they are willing to take to preserve their interest in those stakes, and clarify what capabilities (and allies) can be brought to bear to support those actions (and they may also be bluffing).

The third is proffered transparency which is when states unilaterally reveal information in an effort to despiral conflicts and reassure others.

There is sometimes overlap between the categories. For example, some security regimes such as UNSCOM generate coerced transparency.

Bargaining during Concert crises was often confrontational. Even though states cooperatively joined in the forum’s meetings, they often used the meetings to issue threats. It is also very important to note that just because the press or intelligence can be sources of transparency, they may also be prone to spreading misinformation, fostering and spreading biases, and so forth.

Moreover, the relationships between these types of transparency offer insight into how and when regime-provided transparency works best. A major finding of this book is that regimes can more easily provide transparency between adversaries when unilateral/intelligence and ambient transparency is low. This increases the ability of the regime to provide new and more accurate information.

Table 2-1 summarizes these types of transparency, underscoring that there are many sources of transparency and that this book focuses on cooperative transparency as provided by security regimes:

The questions this book answers are: Do security regimes increase transparency and does transparency promotes peace? If so how and when? This means that the causal chain I am investigating is:

The first independent variable is security regimes. Transparency is a dependent and, then, an independent variable. The ultimate dependent variable is peace.

To examine this causal chain systematically and explore the possible effects of transparency on conflict, I lay out and test hypotheses that explain the principal ways that transparency may reduce or increase tensions and affect the probability of war. Transparency may affect bargaining about regime formation, decisions for war, crisis bargaining, threat assessments, likelihood of cheating on agreements, behavior of rogues and spoilers, and the functioning and operations of the regime itself.

These hypotheses are largely derived from the literatures on arms control, the security dilemma, international regimes, cooperation, and bargaining. For example, much thinking about transparency in security studies is found in the scholarship on arms control.

Advocates of arms control believe that regimes can increase transparency, and that the effects of transparency are to promote cooperation, reduce unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions, and reduce miscalculation. While these assumptions sum up the conventional and optimistic views of transparency, it is possible that their opposites are true. Perhaps regimes find it hard to increase transparency or end up spreading misinformation. Perhaps transparency confirms or increases fears instead of reducing them. As mentioned above on page 20, arguments about the negative and counter-intuitive effects of transparency are emerging in the arms control, bargaining, and other literatures.

Where these negative effects seem plausible, I match hypotheses about the positive conflict-reducing effects of transparency with primed or counter-hypotheses about the negative effects of transparency. However, this should not be construed as setting up a horse-race between positive and negative effects of transparency. As we shall see, whether transparency has positive or negative effects can not be determined on a blanket basis because transparency’s effects are often highly dependent on prior conditions. Further, the Concert demonstrates that even when transparency seems to aggravate crises, the ability to make clear threats can also help resolve crises.

To test my hypotheses, I infer predictions (observable implications) about what behavior one should expect in the cases if the hypothesis were true. I then examine the cases to see if they contain evidence of the predicted behavior(s). Predictions tell us what to look for when examining the evidence and they answer the question “how do we know transparency and its effects when we see them?” Within a case study, determining how well the predictions fare is the best way to measure variables. My methods for testing the hypotheses are explained in more detail after I present the hypotheses.

The first hypothesis is that security regimes provide transparency. Transparency is about information, specifically how much is known about a potential adversary’s political and military capabilities and intentions. Transparency does not just happen; an agent or mechanism is always required to generate information, provide information, or facilitate the flow of information between the states or parties involved. Examples of mechanisms include peacekeepers, forums, buffer zones, and others listed below. Without this hypothesis, I would be assuming , not examining, the first half of the causal chain that security regimes do in fact increase transparency: Security Regimes –> Transparency –> Peace.

Because security regimes must use mechanisms to generate, provide, or facilitate the exchange of information, I will look for their use in the cases. The use of information mechanisms is the main observable implication of H1. If no mechanism is used, the security regime can not be increasing transparency. Security regimes could use a variety of mechanisms, alone or in combination, to provide transparency. They include:

Observable implications extend beyond identification of the mechanism. If the security regime provides new information or facilitates the exchange of information, then the actors to or between whom the information is distributed should also be identifiable. Further, the content of the information provided or exchanged should be identifiable and describable. For example, the information might be about the numbers and disposition of forces in buffer zones and limited force areas, might determine the exact location of a border, might help chains of command within countries to identify rogue actors, might outline the various different interpretations of an incident and show which versions are supported by the facts gathered during the post-incident investigation, and so forth. Finally, the information provided will show up in the statements and assessments of the actors involved.

If the content of the information is hard to identify, then post-hoc assessments by the actors involved and by historians and analysts assume greater importance. These assessments can be used to fill in the blanks and answer questions that would help indicate whether or not the regime provided information. When a transparency mechanism is used, I want to determine what did the actors learned and how it affected their behavior? Actors should recount history using the information the regime provided and this history should describe the role of the information provided (for H1 and some combination of the other hypotheses to be confirmed).

This hypothesis would be discredited if the security regime tried to use a mechanism to increase transparency and it provided little or no information. Finding that transparency had little or no effect would also serve to discredit the other hypotheses. However, this is not a horse race to determine winning and losing hypotheses. It is an endeavor to tell the truth about transparency in order to advance scholarship and help policy makers.

One should not assume that regimes only generate or transmit accurate information. Regimes may be used to spread misinformation, or they may themselves spread misinformation. If this happens in the cases, we should identify specifics instances of misinformation in the transparency mechanisms. Support would be bolstered if the actor who spread the misinformation and his or her intent can be identified.

The second hypothesis is that the promise or anticipation of transparency promotes cooperation. States create regimes to take advantage of their benefits, and one benefit is increased transparency.

The anticipation of increased transparency provided by a security regime promotes cooperation by increasing states’ incentives to enter into agreements, and form a regime or accept a role for a security regime.

To illustrate how this works, fears of cheating diminish the willingness of states to enter into or stick with peace treaties, confidence-building measures, arms control, and other agreements. Transparency reduces fears of cheating and increases the incentives to cooperate by increasing the ability to detect cheating.

While this is perhaps the primary way anticipated transparency would help the formation of a regime, a number of other possible benefits of transparency may spur regime formation, including reduced miscalculation, reduced fears and worst-casing, and better ability to detect and deter rogues and spoilers on either side. These regime-provided effects are covered by separate hypotheses below, and I defer discussion of their logics until then.

Although I focus on transparency, transparency and incomplete information are not, of course, the sole causes of war or impediments to bargaining. States may be bent on war and some problems are indivisible. Commitment problems and some conflictual aspects of power transitions may have little to with information, though often both are related to uncertainty and incomplete information about the future. Likewise, there are a number of non-transparency related ways of solving commitment problems, promoting peace, and facilitating bargaining. These include security guarantees, economic or political incentives, and coercion, any of which may supplement or supercede transparency in sealing bargains or deterring war.

To assess hypothesis H2, I will look for evidence in the cases that states’ willingness to sign an agreement increased after the promise of increased transparency by a security regime was extended. The reasons for this willingness will be found in the potential benefits the regime and increased transparency will bring. For example, states may be seeking cooperation but must not trust each other enough to come to an agreement – much like a prisoners’ dilemma. When this is so, states will fear cheating, and will insist on adequate verification or monitoring before signing a peace, a cease-fire, agreeing to an election, or other tension reducing agreement. This insistence will be evinced in speeches, negotiations, policy statements, debates, and so forth. States may also seek increased transparency to control rogues or reduce security spirals.

The anticipation of increased transparency may hinder cooperation, and lessen the likelihood of regime formation. For example, militaries and politicians may fear that intrusive verification or monitoring by peacekeepers will hinder their operational flexibility or their ability to keep classified information private. The conventional wisdom of arms controllers is that insufficient monitoring makes bargaining harder because it increases fears of cheating. Similarly, many cooperation and bargaining theorists write that private or incomplete information makes it harder to locate bargains.

These views suggest that transparency will generally promote cooperation, but this hypothesis explores counter arguments.

Transparency is about who knows how much about whom and thus transparency has potentially severe distributional consequences.

This can hinder cooperation in a number of circumstances. Increases in transparency will be more likely to hurt cooperation if the parties are in the domain of relative gains,

while they will be more likely to spur cooperation in the domain of absolute gains. Revisionist states and actors may have little to gain and much to lose from transparency, especially if their plans depend on secrecy and surprise.

Defenders also have large incentives to bluff and act determined to impose high costs in case of an attack. These bluffs may help deterrence, but they may also increase the odds of conflict because they raise tensions, and because their associated audience costs make it hard to back down.

Weak states may depend more on bluffing than strong states, so strong states will tend to value transparency, while weak states are more threatened by transparency.

Military issues are acutely permeated by a sense of relative gains, boosting states’ incentives to guard private information, misrepresent themselves to others, and fear transparency.

These points are not necessarily consistent – there may be strong states who are revisionists and who want to bluff – but they do highlight a number of conditions under which states may fear transparency.

Two pieces of evidence must be found in the cases to support this contention. First, parties must hesitate or refuse to form a regime or use its services. Second, the basis for this refusal or hesitation will be because they fear that the effect of the regime to be will deepen information asymmetries, or that resulting transparency will disproportionately benefit others or hurt their ability to keep information private.

The third hypothesis is that increased transparency promotes peaceful outcomes from ongoing strategic interactions, including bargaining, coercion, and decisions for war. The qualitative causes of war and rationalist bargaining literatures contain a number of arguments in which uncertainty and miscalculations about threats, capabilities, actions, and resolve hinder negotiations and increase the likelihood of conflict and war. When incomplete information and miscalculation worsen strategic interaction, transparency can facilitate bargaining and promote peace.

For qualitative causes of war scholars such as Van Evera and Blainey, anything that makes calculations of coercive and deterrent power less accurate increases the probability of deterrence failure through offensive or defensive optimistic miscalculation.

For rationalists such as Fearon and Powell, incomplete information and uncertainty hinders bargaining that would prevent costly war.

I discuss these two schools and their arguments in turn.

Optimistic miscalculation, the belief that one is stronger than one actually is, takes two forms. First, revisionist powers may believe their target for conquest is less powerful than it really is. This is offensive optimistic miscalculation and it may cause deterrence to fail because the revisionist does not know enough about its victim’s capabilities or willpower to be deterred. For example, Germany’s hope that Britain would not enter the coming war made it more belligerent than it otherwise would have been in the crisis leading up to World War I. Had Britain been clearer about its commitments, or had Germany possessed better information, the crisis might not have led to wide-scale war. Second, a status quo power may believe it enjoys greater safety than it really does, and this is defensive optimistic miscalculation. Here, deterrence fails because the status quo power is defensively overconfident, underestimates its adversary, and does not take enough action to successfully deter or prepare for attack. An example is India’s optimistic assessment of Chinese intentions and capabilities prior to the unexpected and devastating Chinese attack of October 1962.

Blainey sums up his miscalculation argument with this: "most wars were likely to end in the defeat of at least one nation which had expected victory." He later adds: "Any factor which increases the likelihood that nations will agree on their relative power is a potential cause of peace."

Transparency is one of those factors.

Rationalist bargaining scholars highlight a number of mechanisms by which incomplete information can increase conflict and lead to war. The main argument they make is that war is such a costly enterprise that if states had perfect information about each other’s capabilities, resolve, and intentions then they could reach a deal before incurring the costs of war. The ex post costs of war create an ex ante bargaining space. The only reason a bargain is not realized is incomplete information and inability to calculate the costs of war, ex ante.

Sources of this incomplete information include deliberate misrepresentation to either hide or exaggerate capabilities for political or military effect, secrecy, misperceptions, and opacity.

For these scholars, war is itself an extended bargaining session which reveals information. Over time, wars end when enough information is exchanged for one side to realize it must capitulate.

Despite different language, rationalist arguments about incomplete information leading to war have much in common with Blainey’s conclusion that miscalculation results in at least one side ending up with an unexpected outcome that could have avoided with better information.

Rationalists also argue that incomplete information can make bargaining slower, inefficient, and less likely to be successful. Incomplete information and uncertainty hurt the ability of adversaries to signal their positions, actions, capabilities, intentions, and resolve during negotiations. When this is so, increased transparency should be able to improve signaling and facilitate bargaining.

Similarly, incomplete information can lead states to demand too much in a negotiation, increasing the odds of deadlock and conflict.

Ken Oye argues that deadlock may result more often from the absence of mutual interest than from unwarranted fears, security dilemmas, accidents, or miscalculations.

However, even when cooperation seems impossible, this does not mean war is inevitable or that transparency is irrelevant. By helping sides understand that they have deadlocked and how they got to that point, transparency can help two ways. First, transparency can improve each side’s assessment of the other’s relative commitment and strength. This might help each side live with deadlock if they came to realize that escalation would be too costly, and both sides were deterred. Second, such an understanding can break the deadlock by helping one side successfully coerce short of the use of force. Coercion is a bargain of sorts.

Cases will confirm H3 if negotiations succeed or if wars are prevented occur because of new information provided by the regime. This new information will reduce incomplete information and miscalculation, and increase the range of acceptable bargaining outcomes (“win-sets”) of the parties.

This should speed bargaining, and increase the likelihood of success. Although it is hard to ascertain specific odds of success in negotiations, cases studies and process tracing can provide examples of regime-provided information causing turning points in negotiations.

Those who have offensively optimistically miscalculated will come to more fully recognize the costs of war, and these higher costs will be a factor in spurring negotiations and locating a bargain. Those who are on the verge of aggression due to optimistic miscalculation will change their plans and desist once they learn through the regime that those plans were based on faulty assumptions and information. The readiness of forces may be relaxed, forces pulled back, and alerts canceled.

States who have defensively optimistically miscalculated and who are more vulnerable than they thought will change their bargaining positions and plans accordingly once they learn from the regime that those plans were based on faulty assumptions and information. Such states may make concessions, appease, or bandwagon or they may balance. Concessions, appeasement, and bandwagoning are marked by conceding to the demands of the revisionist or joining it in carrying out its plans. Signs of balancing include building up forces, redeploying forces to better counter the newly recognized threat, and making new alliances. War may be prevented and conflict reduced through enhanced deterrence, or finding a bargain.

In all cases, H3 will hold true only if policy changes occur due to information provided by the regime. This information will be about the capabilities, resolve, and bargaining positions of adversaries, and it may have been deliberately obscured prior to the use or actions of the regime. Support will be strengthened if actors explain these changes with reference to this new information.

Transparency may cause war or hinder cooperation by removing ambiguities that bolstered deterrence and sustained deadlock, smoothed negotiations, or helped parties maintain blissful (calming, anyway) ignorance. Transparency may also help a revisionist plan its attack. I discuss these points in turn.

Rationalists and others are increasingly exploring the extent to which noise, incomplete information, and uncertainty actually help cooperation and prevent conflict. For example, uncertainty can lead a state to overestimate its adversary, and this would help deterrence.

In such cases, transparency would hurt deterrence as it reduced positive overestimation and revealed a more easily conquered prize for a revisionist state. States may also underestimate their adversaries, and new information that revealed a more powerful adversary could increase incentives for preventive war.

Likewise, incomplete information may help maintain a deadlock or standoff. Non-optimal, but still short of war.

Morrow notes that incomplete information is a necessary precondition to have something to bargain about; it is a key cause of inefficiency and conflict.

However, incomplete information and shaded truth can also help adversaries reach a compromise. In part, this is because parties are tempted, especially in the opening phases of negotiations, to start with overly ambitious opening gambits. This can lead to deadlock or spikes in tension. The essence of mediation can be to filter information as both sides learn more about each other and themselves.

As shown in the UNDOF case, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger prevented deadlock by limiting information exchange as he mediated between the Syrians and Israelis after the 1973 War. Because each side initially took positions the other would find unacceptable, he feared that too much information would lead each side to walk away.

Negotiations are often marked by phases in which things seem to get worse before they get better. This is due to the multiple effects of transparency. It can first clarify how bad things are with respect to relative power, grievances, or resolve and/or it may reveal how unrealistic initial goals may have been. However, once these costs and clarifications are on the table, they may then increase the incentives to compromise – if the negotiations survive.

Transparency may remove a related form of peace-promoting ambiguity. Some ‘secrets,’ such as Israel’s undeclared nuclear capability are less irritating because of their ambiguous status. When norms and standards are not shared, familiarity can breed contempt, and transparency can make things worse.

It is also possible that transparency and too much information can create deadlock in negotiations, or overload leaders, making it hard to read their adversary's signals and making crisis management harder.

Looked at more generally, noise and uncertainty cause a regression towards the mean among actors caught in repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. Among populations of players with non-nice strategies who would otherwise defect, incomplete information can lead to ‘accidental’ cooperation. On the other hand, among populations of players with otherwise nice strategies, uncertainty can lead to accidental defections. In both cases, noise dilutes strategies and average outcomes veer towards a mean of mixed strategies. Incomplete information can hurt cooperation even when the parties want cooperation, but potentially help cooperation when the parties are hostile.

In other words, transparency helps nice players stay nice, but at the cost of keeping mean players mean. While this may not be an irrelevant contribution in a world fraught with noise (and assuming mean players are mean to the bone), this reflects the critiques of those who think peacekeeping and institutions more generally are symptoms rather than causes in international relations.

At its most brutal, Barry R. Posen argues that transparency may help a revisionist plan an attack by identifying enemy weaknesses or plans. He suggests that intrusive inspections could help attack planning by revealing the lay of the land, secret defensive positions, and so forth.

To confirm H3', the cases should show that when the regime increased transparency, this weakened deterrence, pushed deadlock into conflict, and/or deadlocked negotiations. Evidence would be strengthened if it were also shown that incomplete information and uncertainty bolstered deterrence, sustained deadlock, or facilitated negotiations. If transparency does help plan aggression, then information provided by the regime should be shown to contribute to the offensive military planning of a state or adversary, leading it to an attack it previously thought unwise.

According to many deductively sound arguments, transparency (or incomplete information) can correlate with any outcome: peace, war, or somewhere in between. So if incomplete information can produce war, deadlock, or help negotiations, and if transparency can reverse these effects, how do we know what is causing what and whether H3 or H3' is being confirmed? This conundrum is more apparent than real because there is a continuum of conflict severity between successful bargaining, deadlock, and war. I am analyzing processes along this continuum where things are either getting better or worse because of transparency (or incomplete information and uncertainty). If process tracing shows that increases in transparency push towards successful bargaining and away from war, then H3 is confirmed. If transparency increases conflict, then H3' is confirmed.

It is clear by now that transparency and its inverses of opacity, incomplete information, and uncertainty can have a variety of different effects depending on whether opacity causes over or under estimation, and whether the actors are status quo (nice) or non-status quo (revisionist or mean). This is the logic behind the laying out of both positive and negative hypotheses about transparency. The following table shows some of the major ways over, under, and accurate calculation can affect the probability of war between status quo and non-status quo actors. I could make a similar table for most of the effects of transparency, but this one makes the point: transparency can help or hurt, depending on the circumstances.

Casting debates about transparency as being engaged between transparency optimists and pessimists is useful because it reflects the literature. However, this table serves as a reminder that such casting can oversimplify, and that the effects of transparency can be highly dependent on prior conditions.

Table 2-2: Effects of Opacity and Transparency on Mis/calculation, Deterrence, and War

Ña multilateral outcome and that multilateral diplomacy was not necessary to do so.

To what extent do these results offer a baseline for measuring increases in transparency provided by the Concert, and thus help assess the hypothesis that regimes can increase transparency (H1)? The first partition of Poland suggests that there was already some transparency and diplomatic nimbleness without forum diplomacy. On the other hand, the first partition of Poland took a long time to negotiate. In contrast, several disputes during the Concert were resolved with relative alacrity. They probably would not have been resolved so fast without the use of multilateral forum diplomacy.

The Concert of Europe: Five Crises

This section investigates how much the early nineteenth century’s new practice of multilateral crisis-management - called the Concert of Europe - helped states manage crises. I examine the five most significant crises the Concert confronted in its early years: the crisis over Poland and Saxony in 1814/15, the rebellions in Naples and Spain in the early 1820s, the revolt in Greece also in the early 1820s, and the establishment of Belgian independence and neutrality in the early 1830s. According to most scholars of the Concert, it was most effective and coherent during its earliest years: 1814-15 through the early 1820s.

I begin by sketching the origins and legal framework of the Concert. This will help determine the extent to which the promise of transparency to be provided by the Concert helped motivate the Concert’s founders. To the extent this is true, it supports H2 which contends that the promise of transparency promotes cooperation. Then I examine the five crises to see if the Concert actually provided transparency (H1) and what effect this transparency had on crisis management. Whether transparency is found to help bargaining or calm fears bears on H3 and H4. Because the Concert is an informal regime with relatively few rules and procedures, cheating and self-transparency (H5 and H6) are not likely to be as important.

The Formation of the Concert

The Concert of Europe took form through a series of military, political, and ideological treaties. Tracing these treaties shows that the Concert had its roots in the wartime alliance against Napoleon. It owes much of its existence to the momentum of that alliance, to continued fear of a resurgent and possibly revolutionary France, and to the fear of liberal revolution more generally. These fears bound the Concert and thus Walt’s balance of threat theory explains most of the Concert’s origins.

However, hopes for increased transparency played a supporting role in spurring the Concert into existence. Because of this, H2, which contends that the anticipation of regime-provided transparency can promote cooperation, receives modest support. Britain’s Foreign Minister Viscount Castlereagh, the prime architect of the Concert, expressed hope in his first trip to the continent in 1814 that the Concert-to-be would increase transparency:

many pretensions might be modified, asperities removed, and causes of irritation anticipated and met, by bringing the respective parties in unrestricted communications common to them all, and embracing in confidential and united discussion all the great points in which they were severally interested.

This statement confirms H2 because Castlereagh expressed a general belief that a regime could promote peace with transparency. More specifically, Castlereagh’s statement also indicates an understanding that transparency would enhance bargaining as predicted by H3, and reduce fears, as predicted by H4. Confirmation would be even stronger if I had found evidence that Castlereagh used these arguments to persuade others to sign on.

The first concrete step towards the Concert of Europe was the Treaty of Chaumont, signed by Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia just prior to Napoleon’s first defeat and abdication in March 1814. The allies agreed to continue the war against France, each maintaining 150,000 troops in the field for service against France, and “most important, [it] united them for twenty years in jointly maintaining peace.”

In September 1814, the Congress of Vienna met to chart Europe’s future and this meeting is widely recognized as the birthplace of the Concert of Europe. The Congress’ Final Act of June 1815 - a lengthy, formal, and detailed document - covered over one hundred territorial, governance, legal, and other issues.

The defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo marked the next evolutionary step, when the Allies signed the Second Treaty of Paris, on November 20, 1815. While singling out the dangers of Bonapartism, the allies also expressed more general fears about liberal revolution:

And as the same revolutionary principles which upheld the last criminal usurpation, might again, under other forms, convulse France, and thereby endanger the repose of other States; under these circumstances the High Contracting Parties...engage...to concert themselves...for the safety of their respective states, and for the general tranquillity of Europe.

Further, the Allies pledged to “renew their Meetings at fixed periods...for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests” to promote prosperity and maintain the “Peace of Europe.” The Concert of Europe thereby received formal recognition and its role as a discussion forum was codified. The Quadruple Alliance was expanded to include France by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in October 1818. [[expand? any other purposes?]]

Next, the Treaty of the Holy Alliance was signed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia on September 26, 1815. The most ideologically motivated of the various treaties of the period, it marked the beginning of the European Eastern-Conservative vs. Western-more-liberal schism. The Treaty stated that the “Three Contracting Monarchs” agreed to “take no other rule for their guidance” than the precepts of Christianity - “Justice, Charity, and Peace” and to give each other aid and assistance “on all occasions and in all places.” Even though they did not take it seriously, all other European governments subsequently adhered to this treaty, except Turkey, the Papal States, and Great Britain.

Two liberal revolutions in 1820 (Spain, January; Naples, July) prompted Russia’s Tsar Alexander I to call a conference of the great powers in Troppau in October, 1820. The resulting Troppau Protocol endorsed the use of force against revolutionary states, and was signed only by Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The rejection of the Protocol by the British Government created “an open and public breach with the Alliance.”

By formalizing commitments and making states more explicitly express their views by voting on them, the Concert reduced ambiguity and heightened tensions with England. However, this incident only mildly supports hypotheses about regimes increasing transparency (H1), and transparency increasing conflict during bargaining (H3') because Britain would probably have distanced itself from any conservative intervention, regardless of procedures. Despite these initial schisms, Castlereagh said in 1816 that the practice of meeting together reduced what otherwise would have been a “cloud of prejudice and uncertainty.” Although it is not clear what uncertainties (H3) or unwarranted fears (H4) were reduced, his assertion offers modest support for H4 due to the specificity of the word “prejudice” and the presumed effects of removing its cloud.

First Crisis: Poland and Saxony, late 1814 - early 1815

In this crisis, forum diplomacy helped Austria, France, and Great Britain quickly make an alliance and coerce Russia into ending the conflict. Clear diplomacy prevented Russia from miscalculating and led it to back down. This offers support for H3, which contends that transparency can reduce miscalculation and help bargaining achieve peaceful outcomes. Forum diplomacy increased transparency, and the effect of this increased flow of information was to facilitate power-political bargaining.

The most difficult and dangerous problem that arose during the Congress of Vienna involved the ultimate governance of the Duchy of Warsaw (Poland) and the Kingdom of Saxony. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had already signed treaties (Teplitz, Kalisch, and Reichenbach) to peacefully partition Saxony, Poland, and other territories when the war was over. Russia, the dominant power in the region, wanted Poland and had 200,000 troops stationed there at war’s end. But some of Poland had been part of Prussia, so to placate Prussia, Russia backed giving it long-coveted Saxony in exchange.

Russia’s plan amounted to a fait accompli and raised fears in England and Austria. If Russia obtained Poland, Russian power would be projected deep into central Europe. Central Europe would then no longer be strong enough to serve as a counterweight either to French or Russian expansion. Austria was concerned that Prussian expansion into Saxony would boost its influence throughout greater Germany and give Prussia a much longer border with Austria.

As resistance mounted from England, Austria, and France, Alexander became increasingly adamant. During an October 22 ,1814 meeting between Alexander and France’s representative Prince Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord: Alexander said, “I have two hundred thousand men in the duchy of Warsaw. Let them drive me out if they can! I have given Saxony to Prussia; and Austria consents.” Talleyrand replied, “I do not know that. I should find it difficult to believe, it is so decidedly against her own interests. But can the consent of Austria give to Prussia what belongs to the King of Saxony?” Talleyrand had, “reminded [Alexander] of the treaty by which the allies had agreed that the duchy of Warsaw should be shared by the three courts,” and Alexander retorted that, “If the King of Saxony refuses to abdicate, he shall be led to Russia; where he will die.... You are always speaking to me of principles. Your public law is nothing to me: I don’t understand all that. What do you think are all your parchments and treaties to me?”

Thus Talleyrand and Alexander clarified their differences, made claims about relative power on the ground, and indicated how each viewed the stakes in the crisis. At this point, transparency was increasing tensions, as suggested by H3'.

Talk of impending war swept the Congress from October on into December. Despite quickly rising tensions, it became clear that Russia would not budge and would eventually receive the lion’s share of Poland. The prospect of Russia’s inevitable success in Poland frightened Prussia’s Prince Carl Vincent von Hardenberg, as the agreed-upon support from Austria and Britain for his claims to Saxony were conditional on a less lopsided outcome in Poland.

Having lost on Poland, Austria dug in its heels on Saxony and tensions rose between Austria and Prussia. Castlereagh proposed to Prussia that it accept a limited part of Saxony and receive compensation elsewhere. This outcome was unacceptable to Prussia, and on December 30, Hardenberg stated that refusal of others to recognize its annexation of the whole of Saxony was “tantamount to a declaration of war.” Castlereagh termed this “a most alarming and unheard-of menace.” Here is another instance of clarification of positions increasing conflict, supporting the predictions of H3'.

Meanwhile, Talleyrand had offered an alliance with Austria and Britain on December 23. These rising tensions made Austria and Britain accept. On January 3, 1815 the three powers signed a secret treaty in which each promised to supply 150,000 troops in case of attack. The treaty strengthened the resolve of Metternich and Castlereagh in their continued discussions with Hardenberg, and Hardenberg began to yield.

Castlereagh met with Alexander on January 4, just one day after the treaty was signed. At this meeting, Alexander asked him if the rumors of the treaty were true and Castlereagh answered in a way that “could have left him little doubt...and henceforward the Russian plenipotentiaries worked their hardest for a settlement.” Alexander withdrew Russian support of Prussia’s all-or-nothing position and urged a compromise partition of Saxony. Prussia, the weakest of the great powers, lost its ally and was forced to accept a compromise in which it received two-fifths of Saxony and portions of the Rhineland. The quick formation and even quicker leak of the secret alliance was the turning point.

Coercion was successful. Plans were changed based on new information whose provision was facilitated by the regime, reducing miscalculation that might otherwise have caused Russia and Prussia to persist with their demands in the face of ever more determined opposition. Russia’s bargaining position became more pliable, once the costs of its hard line were raised and made evident – all effects of transparency that support H3.

Assessment

To assess the role of transparency in this crisis, one must look at how the two problems that created the crisis were resolved: Russia’s annexation of Poland and Prussia’s claims to compensation. Russia succeeded while Prussia’s claims were clipped back. In both cases, albeit with some risk, power relationships were made clear and then were no longer contested.

At first, the forum increased transparency, as hypothesized by H1, because it helped states clarify their positions. This increased tensions, as predicted by H3', and led to balancing. The most crucial turning points were the events leading up to Prussia’s diplomatic retreat. Concert diplomacy facilitated the making of the secret alliance and Concert diplomacy also let news of the alliance reach Alexander efficiently. As this would have been very difficult to achieve with such speed prior to forum diplomacy, this is clear evidence that the Concert increased transparency, supporting H1. Russia was successfully coerced and when Prussia then backed down, its aggressive optimism was revealed to be something of a miscalculation; thus transparency reduced miscalculation and helped bargaining as predicted by H3. The complex dance between rising tensions, balancing, and successful coercion is simply realpolitik, aided by transparency.

Were norms or other institutional effects at work helping to resolve the crisis? Schroeder rejects the realpolitik argument altogether, arguing that “balance of power tactics were tried and failed.” Yet he also says that Russia prevailed “hands down” with its fait accompli due to its “big battalions,” and that power helped “force” concessions from Prussia. If that is not realpolitik, what is? Schroeder writes that Russia forced concessions to save the alliance, but that boils down to saving the alliance from Russia’s own belligerent policy. Russia reduced the costs of its fait accompli by transferring those costs onto Prussia (by making Prussia accept less than it sought and less than it had been promised). Kissinger and Schroeder agree that no state truly wanted war, so some credit for the peaceful outcome of this episode is due to the shared moderation of the Concert states. However, perhaps more remarkable is all the talk of war from states who had just endured and fought together during the Napoleonic Wars.

Second and Third Crises: The Rebellions in Naples and Spain

The liberal rebellions in Naples and Spain highlight the ideological jockeying over the purposes of the Concert. The crises made Britain’s opposition to joint intervention against liberal revolution even more explicit. This created a schism in the Concert. As a result, these cases offer modest support for the predictions of H3', that transparency may increase conflict.

When a military-led revolution broke out in Spain in January of 1820, the only great power concerned at first was Russia. Having for years advanced the idea, particularly at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, that the alliance should evolve into an anti-revolutionary league, Russia soon called for a great power congress to confront the Spanish revolt. Russia’s call languished until another revolt broke out in Naples in July. Naples adopted the same liberal constitution as that taken up by the Spanish revolutionaries. Austria wanted to intervene in Naples to restore conservative order in its Italian satellite. For France, this plan heightened the Franco-Austrian competition for influence in Italy, so it began to seek a congress in order to restrain Austria. As at Aix, Britain opposed any allied steps towards a general policy of suppressing revolutions and it opposed a congress

Despite British opposition, a congress was held at Troppau in late 1820, with Russia, Austria, and Prussia represented by plenipotentiaries and France and Britain by observers. The three Eastern powers issued the Troppau Protocol on November 19 which stated in part:

Any state forming part of the European Alliance which may change its form of interior government through revolutionary means, and which might thus become a menace to other states, will automatically cease to form a part of the Alliance.... The Allied Powers ... will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within the sphere of the Alliance. Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted to, and if this fails, coercion will be employed.

Lord Charles Stewart, the British representative, returned from a visit to Vienna to find himself presented with the Protocol already signed by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. He protested this fait accompli. Britain and France refused to sign. This shows how a document which was intended to express and consolidate norms instead ended up highlighting rifts in the Concert, as predicted by H3'.

Nonetheless, Austria’s plans were blessed by the Troppau Protocol and Austria sent troops to crush the Naples revolt in early 1821. In theory, this joint blessing may have reduced miscalculation, promoted cooperation, and supported H3. In reality, there was little threat of war due to the intervention, blessing or not, hence little potential for miscalculation.

With regard to the revolt in Spain, Russia offered to lead an international army to quash the Spanish rebellion by sending its troops across Europe and into Spain. This was a threatening prospect for the other powers, especially Austria, and preventing Russian intervention was one reason that Metternich so quickly supported action by France. France at first wanted to keep the matter out of alliance hands, but ended up supporting a Congress at Verona which convened starting in October 1822.

Britain again objected to intervention. However, France won the backing of the three Eastern powers, invaded Spain, and restored Ferdinand VII in April 1823. Canning, Castlereagh’s successor, obtained French assurances that the invasion would be temporary and that Portugal’s independence would be respected.

The joint blessing to France made action in Spain more predictable, and helped keep Russia from marching across Europe. Thus, it is possible that forum diplomacy mildly reduced fears of Russian or French actions, and reduced any resulting miscalculation. This would support the predictions of H4 and H3. But the clearest result of the diplomacy surrounding these revolutions was to highlight schisms in the Concert caused by Britain’s objections to the interventions, and this supports H3' which contends that transparency can increase tensions when it reduces uncertainty and clarifies positions.

The revolutions showed that “common action was no longer possible ... because the insular and the Continental conceptions of danger had become incompatible.” When Britain rejected the Troppau Protocol, it started a “doctrinal controversy and propaganda war [that] would last for decades [and produced] the first open break between Britain and the Holy Alliance.” Canning wrote of Verona: “The issue of Verona has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts as distinct as the constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy...and so things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all.” According to Temperley, Metternich thought the breach with England might end the Congress system.

Assessment

Concert diplomacy helped clarify the great powers’ intentions and it is possible, although unlikely, that the chance of war was diminished in the Spanish case. However improbable, Russia’s scheme to march a Russian army through Europe to Spain raised tensions and the risks of accident and miscalculation. Concerted diplomacy helped dissuade Tsar Alexander from following through with his plan. By clarifying actions, the potential for miscalculation and unwarranted fears was possibly reduced, extending mild support to H3 and H4, respectively. With regard to the possible conflict between France and Austria over Italy, discussions, the Troppau declaration, and Russia’s backing of Austria all made the small possibility of Franco-Austro conflict even more remote.

However, it is not clear that Concert diplomacy added much to what regular diplomacy could have achieved. Other than when Britain was presented with a pre-signed declaration, I cannot identify moments where crisis resolution was greatly accelerated or where specific information really altered the course of events. In the end, the most threatened powers (Austria and France) intervened against the threats and the least threatened power (Britain) stayed on the sidelines. No serious problems were averted or were even at stake. Britain’s liberal position was known before hand, and despite some grave language, Britain came back to the Concert in later episodes. Thus, it is not clear that the Concert did much to increase transparency (H1). And if H1 is not really confirmed, this weakens support for the other hypotheses.

Fourth Crisis: The Revolt in Greece

The case of the early 1820s revolt of the Greeks against the Turks offers hints that the Concert facilitated a deception campaign. Britain and Austria used misinformation to persuade Russia not to intervene on behalf of the Greeks. However, support for the contention that regimes can spread misinformation (H1') is diminished by the fact that the Britains and Austrians mostly used bilateral means and not the forum for transmitting false reports.

In early 1821, Christians in Greece and in the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia rebelled against their Muslim Turkish rulers. By March 1821, over one-third of the forty thousand Turks in Morea (Southern Greece) had been killed. This quickly led to Turkish counter-atrocities, including the killing of the Orthodox Greek Patriarch of Constantinople at the door of his cathedral on Easter Sunday in April 1821.

Had this been another liberal revolution similar to those in Naples and Spain, the Concert powers might have been content to see the Sultan suppress the revolution. But Russia had traditionally viewed itself as the protector of the Orthodox faith and was motivated to intervene to protect its fellow faithful. Moreover, Russia and the Ottoman Empire had been competing for influence throughout the Balkans, the Caucasus, and around the Black Sea for years. Instead of wanting to crush the Greek rebellion, Russia wanted to intervene for solidarity and gain.

Austria feared Balkan turmoil on its doorstep, and wanted to keep Russia at arms-length. Britain preferred a weak Ottoman Empire to a strengthened Russia moving South into the Mediterranean. France favored restraining Russia as well.

In July 1821 Russia issued an ultimatum to the Turks insisting that they protect the rights of Christians, and breaking relations with the Turks. War seemed imminent. Austria’s Metternich set out to convince the Tsar not to intervene. As British interests were now threatened, Castlereagh put the schisms over Naples and Spain aside and added his voice to Metternich’s.

With Metternich in the lead, they appealed to the Tsar’s pro-Concert and anti-revolutionary feelings. They reminded him of his pledges not to act unilaterally. They gave the Tsar credit for creating the European Alliance and urged him not to wreck it. At the same time, they also tried to convince Alexander that the rebels were not Christian victims in need of being saved by the Muslim Turks. Instead, they painted the rebels as ordinary but dangerous liberal revolutionaries, whom Turkey was justified in crushing. Metternich arranged to send numerous slanted and exaggerated (if not false) diplomatic and police reports from around Europe to Alexander attesting to the spread of revolutionary sentiment and the dangers of revolution. Patricia Kennedy Grimsted wrote that Metternich used “gross exaggeration and underhanded tactics” as part of his campaign. For example, he ordered the interception of diplomatic dispatches looking for evidence to undermine the Tsar’s most influential advisor, the pro-Greek Count Ioannis Capo d’Istria (or Capodistrias), by tying him to the Greek rebellion. Metternich met Castlereagh in Hanover in October 1821 and they concocted to send similar messages to Russia.

If this deception and propaganda plan were much aided by forum diplomacy, it might offer support for the hypothesis that regimes can spread misinformation (H1'). However, H1' is undercut because Concert diplomacy itself should be downplayed. For example, Alexander had hoped that he could dominate the 1822 Congress of Verona with the subject of the revolt. He was foiled and the Greek Revolt took a back seat to the situation in Spain, described above. While not completely off the table, “it was a matter of common courtesy not to mention Turkish difficulties at Verona.” What was discussed regarding Greece was “anticlimactic,” though the Conference did give Metternich the chance to continue spinning his tales of Greek-inspired revolutionaries in Europe to Alexander. Instead of Concert diplomacy, it was non-forum communication such as Metternich’s meeting with Castlereagh in Hanover and the exaggerated reports to Alexander that most influenced the course of events.

However, this incident is one of the clearest examples of pro-Concert, non-unilateral norms actually affecting behavior and leading to an outcome that would not have happened in the absence of those norms. Ironically, the norms were part of the deception campaign.

By mid-1822, Alexander had been persuaded not to go to war, however morally satisfying or lucrative it might have been. He acted to save the alliance, his Holy Alliance. This is the turning point in the crisis, and it casts doubt on the value of Concert diplomacy in doing anything other than facilitating the deception that helped stop Alexander.

If forum diplomacy was not crucial, was Alexander a norm-driven idealist, or was he duped by others’ misinformation? The answer bears on the issue of whether the Greek crisis is an information story at all, and whether there were such a thing as Concert norms as claimed by the optimists.

Schroeder calls Alexander’s decision a “triumph of diplomacy over the use of force” and the “easiest and simplest” counter-realist example of a state that has “foregone concrete material advantages for the sake of moral principle.” On the other hand, Kissinger makes the Tsar out to be a dupe and quotes Metternich as holding Alexander’s pliability in contempt:

After having robbed the world of a few months of peace, the Emperor Alexander takes his head in his hands and presents himself before me with the request that I explain its content to him....[He] wants to find his way in a labyrinth and asks his old Ariadne for yarn.

The Tsar’s most influential advisor, the pro-Greek Count Ioannis Capo d’Istria (or Capodistrias), seemed to agree. After Alexander decided not to intervene, he resigned and said that “with friends like Austria, Russia did not need enemies.”

On the question of whether or not Alexander was an norm-driven idealist or a dupe, the truth probably lies somewhere in between. According to Matthew Anderson, Alexander was willing to have his hands tied.

Assessment

The main turning point in this crisis occurred when Alexander was convinced not to intervene. This episode hints that mechanisms which are supposed to increase transparency may be used to manipulate the truth. As H1' suggests, it is likely true that anything that either transfers or generates information can also transfer or generate false information. In this case though, the forum was probably not used to spread misinformation, and thus H1' does not apply. However, questions that deserve more research are: when, how often, and under what conditions do mechanisms that increase transparency make deception easier?

The example of the Greek crisis alone is not sufficient to fully answer these questions, but Alexander’s gullibility suggests that the degree to which transparency helps or hinder deception depends to a large extent on the vigilance of states and their leaders.

Fifth Crisis: Independence of Belgium

As with the Poland-Saxony episode, the crises surrounding the independence of Belgium show how Concert diplomacy speeded communications, helped states communicate threats, and helped avert miscalculation. Because of this, the case provides evidence H3 which contends that transparency can clarify bargaining positions and reduce conflict. But evidence for the contributions of forum diplomacy and transparency is by the considerable amount of bilateral diplomacy, which also helped resolve problems.

For hundreds of years, the area of the Netherlands/Belgium/Luxemburg had been a source of tension and a flashpoint for European wars. The 1815 Vienna settlement attached Belgium to the Dutch Netherlands in order to create a stronger buffer against France. But, in August of 1830, the Belgians began to rebel against Dutch rule. At the end of September, the Dutch had appealed to all the great powers save France for military help in suppressing the revolt. Russia and Prussia, the conservative Eastern Powers, were most favorable to intervention. In October, the Belgians declared their independence and on November 4, all five great powers met in London to discuss the problem.

Remembering Napoleon and aware of France’s perennial appetite for Belgium, the rest of Europe feared French intervention. France in turn feared the consequences of a British or Prussian intervention. Russia mobilized intervention forces, but would not act unilaterally and was soon distracted by more proximate problems when Poland rebelled against it in November 1830. With everyone fearing intervention more than rebellion, the conference agreed in fairly short order to allow Belgium’s separation. By late January 1831, the great powers had issued several joint Protocols specifying Belgium’s new borders, guaranteeing its independence (primarily from the French), and providing for freedom of navigation on rivers.

Despite progress in the negotiations over Belgian independence at the London conference, Luxemburg remained occupied by Belgian troops and this caused a crisis by summer 1831. On August 2, the Dutch attacked Belgium, and this time Belgium appealed to France for help. France quickly entered Belgium and convinced Holland to take its troops home. France then reversed a promise to withdraw its own troops and left its forces in Belgium pending a full settlement between Belgium and Holland and resolution of France’s concerns over fortresses on the Belgian border with France.

Alarmed by the French move, the British thought that continued occupation would lead to war. France’s King Louis-Philippe, a generally pacific leader, waffled in responding to British concerns. At the urging of Britain’s foreign office, George Granville Leveson-Gower Granville, Britain’s ambassador in Paris had a blunt discussion with France and made clear that continued French occupation risked serious consequences. At first, the French did not budge. Britains’ foreign minister Viscount Henry Temple Palmerston wrote to Granville: “One thing is certain, the French must go out of Belgium, or we shall have a general war, and war in a few days.” Prussia threatened to move into the Rhine Provinces, and Russia’s threats to intervene regained their credibility as they came nearer to crushing the Polish revolt. Britain’s Granville took the diplomatic lead and, with the support of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian ambassadors to France (in Paris), convinced the French to leave Belgium in early September.

This was a turning point. The others powers were able to clarify and underscore their desire to have France leave. Here we see the regime providing transparency (H1), helping states signal their positions, and reducing conflict (H3). However, support for these hypotheses is tempered by the fact that much of the diplomacy seemed to take place in Paris, not at the on-going London conference. It is hard to discern the relative contributions of forum diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy to the resolution of the crisis in this instance.

Even though the French occupation had been dealt with, matters between Belgium and Holland were unresolved. On October 15, 1831, the London conference put forward another plan for settling the situation. Among its numerous provisions, the Twenty-four Articles called for Luxemburg to be partitioned between Belgium and Holland.

A year later, the Dutch still rejected the Articles and were hindering shipping on the Scheldt river. Holland still occupied Antwerp; Belgium still occupied Luxemburg. To prevent escalation between Holland and Belgium, the Concert powers agreed to step up pressure on the Dutch. The Eastern powers wanted to apply economic pressure on Holland, but the British and French thought that these measures were insufficient. The French were prepared to unilaterally remove Holland from Antwerp by force. Unilateral French action risked wider war, while inaction risked unilateral Prussian intervention. Omond says this about the possibility of European-wide war, with France poised to move unilaterally against Antwerp:

One Prussian Corps was at Aix-la-Chapelle, and another was posted in reserve on the Rhine.... The danger of an explosion was increased by the temper of the Belgians; for it was quite possible that, if the two Western Powers did not act immediately, they might break loose and attack the Dutch. If so, Prussia would rush in to the help of Holland and, should she be victorious, would take from France Alsace and Lorraine... all of which she tried to obtain during the Congress of Vienna. If Prussia was defeated, France would endeavor to annex the Rhine Provinces and ... Luxemburg. Austria and the other States of the Germanic Confederation would be drawn into the struggle. Russia would intervene.... Great Britain, unless she deserted France, would find herself at war with more than one Continental Power; and soon not only Europe, but half the world, would be at war.

With such a prospect, hesitation would have been fatal. If Great Britain and France acted together...Prussia, it was known, would not oppose the coercion of Holland.

Prussia made this known in Paris, not at the London conference.

On October 22, the British and French agreed to joint sea and land operations to get the Dutch out of Antwerp, free up shipping, and restore other territories in the low countries to their allotted Belgian or Dutch owners. Russia left the conference, Austria and Prussia protested, but French troops re-entered Belgium on November 15 while the British blockaded the Scheldt. According to Schroeder, this affront to the Eastern powers “caused suspension of the conference and created a war scare more serious than any earlier one.” It also resolved the crisis.

It is difficult to judge whether tensions would have been higher or lower without the Concert. Problems in Belgium are problems in the center of Europe, and would have drawn in most of the great powers anyway. That said, diplomacy at the London conference, in Paris, and elsewhere did clarify the stakes and stances in the crisis. As this happened, tensions rose as predicted by H3' but then fell as the crisis broke; this later development supports H3. Depending on the dynamics of a crisis and the interests of the actors, reducing uncertainty about positions and stakes can raise tensions, reduce conflict, or both.

Because the bilateral and multilateral bargaining prevented unilateral action, it is possible (or even likely given the threats and fears of war) that the bargaining lessened miscalculation and prevented war. This is predicted by H3 which contends that transparency can reduce uncertainty and miscalculation, thereby promoting peaceful outcomes from strategic interaction. However, support for these hypotheses only exists to the extent that forum diplomacy helped achieve these results by speeding up the flow of information.

In the face of Franco-British actions, the Dutch quickly withdrew from Antwerp and the French pulled out their troops. This ended the immediate crisis, but the blockade persisted until May 1833. The Belgian situation was not fully resolved until, after nearly a decade of diplomacy, coercion, and 70 great power protocols, a treaty was finally signed by Holland and Belgium on April 19, 1839.

Assessment

There were two turning points in this crisis. The first was getting France to leave Belgium on September 9, 1831. This result was certainly aided by concerted diplomacy, but not necessarily by forum diplomacy. Inasmuch as it was the European diplomats to Paris who took the lead in convincing France, the key diplomacy therefore took place in Paris, and not in London where the conference was being held. To the extent that the forum was not used to speed the information flow, this undercuts support that would otherwise be generated for H1, which contends that regimes provide transparency.

The second turning point was when Britain and France joined forces to coerce the Dutch on October 22, 1832. Britain and France knew of the impending dangers of war and, calculating correctly, took joint action to prevent it. To calculate the danger of war correctly, the French and British had to know of Belgium’s impending threat to attack Holland and of Prussian intentions to support the Dutch in case the French intervention crossed onto Dutch territory. Letters between Prince Talleyrand, the French envoy to the London Conference, and Victor Duc de Broglie, a French Foreign Ministry official, reveal that the French and British exchanged key information about their own intentions and capabilities and on the dangers of Prussian intervention in London and in Paris. Further, the Prussians had made their intentions clear in direct communications with French government representatives in Paris.

Here, the conference at London (or at least the diplomacy that took place in London) appears to have been helpful, but perhaps not crucial, in clarifying the situation. Thus, there is some modest evidence that forum diplomacy increased transparency (H1). Clarification of dangers and signaling of intentions first raised tensions (H3'), then led to Franco-British cooperation (H3). However, the most important clarifier in this episode was the fact of joint British and French action, not the diplomacy surrounding it. This action deterred Prussia and/or reduced its incentives to intervene, coerced the Dutch, and obviated Belgian action. Finally, the amount of diplomacy that happened outside of the London forum weakens support for the contention that forum-based diplomacy speeded communications, as predicted by H1.

It is plausible that war might have resulted had the powers been forced to undertake the time-consuming bilateral dance that characterized the partition of Poland in the 18^th century. Even though the big picture is that the Belgium crisis persisted for years, some key aspects of it were resolved with relative alacrity, a possible indicator that transparency was increased. The best example is the speed with which the French were persuaded to leave Belgium in the summer of 1831, a major turning point. This crisis shows transparency enhancing realpolitik. The Concert modestly and with limits enabled coercive transparency which in turn helped reduced miscalculation and helped keep the peace (H3).

Conclusion

The Concert increased transparency in varying degrees at turning points in most of the five crises. When it did, the effect was often to facilitate coercive bargaining. The Concert’s institutional effects lie not with rules or norms, as the frequent war scares, blunt language, and forceful bargaining make clear. Instead, the Concert sometimes increased transparency, and transparency in turn helped realpolitik lead to peaceful outcomes. Crises often had to get worse as bargaining clarified the differences (H3'), before coercion worked and broke the deadlock (H3). There was little evidence that transparency ever seriously lessened unwarranted fears (H4), a notable finding because this is supposed to be a main peace-promoting benefit of transparency.

Castlereagh, the prime mover behind the Concert, expressed some hope that forum diplomacy would increase transparency and thereby reduce tensions. I am not sure how much this view persuaded others to form the Concert, but Castlereagh at least believed that increased transparency was a reason to form a regime; this evidence supports H2.

The mechanism of the forum diplomacy was used often. However, states often supplemented Concert diplomacy with meetings in other locations, bilateral contacts, side-meetings, and so forth. These may be valuable supplements to or byproducts of forums, and they may serve to increase transparency. But they may also serve to generate private information or diminish the importance of the forum in helping states communicate. While the Concert was clearly helpful in some instances, the Concert did not increase transparency as much as it might at first appear, so the first hypothesis (H1) receives only modest support.

The Concert helped states conduct power-political diplomacy and in three instances the increased speed of communication helped reduce miscalculation (in the Poland-Saxony crisis and twice in the Belgian crisis). This provides support for H3, but because it is not clear that the states would have miscalculated in the absence of the Concert, I code this support as moderate to moderate/strong despite the gravity of these three instances.

There is only one bit of evidence that Concert diplomacy reduced fears, so H4 is only weakly supported. Instead, transparency often reduced uncertainty by helping states learn about the extent of the problems they faced, of new counter-coalitions, or that deadlock existed. When states clarify their positions and stakes, and it increases conflict, this supports H3'. However, in several instances during the Poland-Saxony and Belgian crises, this clarification was just a stage that then led to further action or resolution. When clarification of stakes, stances, and options during bargaining helps resolve a crisis, it supports H3, the contention that transparency promotes peace by reducing incomplete information and helping bargaining and coercion.

Thus, H3 and H3' may help describe different phases of a crisis. For example, in Poland-Saxony, forum diplomacy helped states make threats and for a while this increased the chance of war (H3'). In the end though, a final coercive threat broke the deadlock and this supported H3.

Table 3-1 summarizes the main findings by hypothesis:

Table 3-1: Findings by Hypothesis

ling his supervisor. A Turkish Forces soldier was then seen running back towards Turkish lines. At some time prior to this, Panayi, unarmed and off-duty, had apparently gone into the buffer zone. Proceeding toward the scene of the shooting at 6:35, the UNFICYP soldier was told by a National Guard soldier that a National Guard soldier had been shot. The UNFICYP soldier tried to approach Panayi but was ordered to halt by Turkish Forces who pointed their weapons at him. By 6:40 the UNFICYP soldier had returned to his observation post to report the incident and call an ambulance. When a U.N. captain and another soldier reached the scene, the three UNFICYP personnel tried to approach but were again told to halt. As the peacekeepers continued forward, the Turkish Forces fired a warning shot and UNFICYP backed off. They tried to move forward two more times, but each time backed off after warning shots were fired. The captain’s efforts to negotiate with the Turkish Forces were unsuccessful.

Between 7:05 and 7:10, UNFICYP soldiers escorted a civilian ambulance forward to the closest National Guard observation post. Two of the three UNFICYP soldiers who tried found a faint pulse on Panayi but he was pronounced dead at the hospital. A National Guard cap with the name of another National Guard soldier was found near Panayi and another cap was found in his pocket. UNFICYP’s investigation later revealed the Panayi had entered the buffer zone intending to trade caps with a Turkish counterpart.

In the meantime, both sides were rapidly built up their forces in the immediate area. Up to ninety Turkish Forces soldiers had arrived by the time the body was removed. Machines guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers were brought in by one or both sides. Both sides built down their forces rapidly as well. UNFICYP’s chief operations officer noted that the situation was calm at 8:45.

At 11:08, a TV news flash broke the news of the killing to the Greek Cypriots. Before noon, Cyprus President Clerides issued a televised statement expressing sympathy to Panayi’s parents and calling the shooting “cold blooded murder.” The parents were shown crying at the hospital.

As the Cypriot press geared up for the story, rumors became mixed with facts, and UNFICYP tried to figure out exactly what happened - how many shots were fired, where the body was found, where the shots came from, how many soldiers from each side were in the buffer zone, why Panayi entered the buffer zone, and so forth. In UNFICYP’s operations center, officers sorted through incoming reports that contained conflicting answers to many of these questions. UNFICYP’s Spokesman Rokoszewski could not address many of the rumors because UNFICYP had yet to complete its own investigation. Many rumors cast the Turkish Forces in the worst possible light (the light was pretty grim already, but the rumors consisted of false reports of multiple shooters and multiple bullet wounds, making it seem like a slaughter). The rumors outpaced fact-finding activities such as the autopsy as well as UNFICYP’s abilities to coordinate the information it was receiving.

This shows that the provision of transparency (H1) depends on the availability of correct information in the first place. Had UNFICYP had complete information from the start, perhaps some of the rumors could have been dispelled (H4). Instead, it had to wait for its investigations to yield results.

The National Guard and Government of Cyprus vigorously protested the killing. That afternoon, UNFICYP’s Force Commander met with the commander of the Turkish Forces to protest the incident - both the killing and the warning shots. The commander of the Turkish Forces expressed sadness about the death, but said that the soldiers were acting according to standard operating procedures. The Force Commander followed up with a letter of protest on June 5. And on June 7, the Turkish Forces commander counter-protested with a letter claiming that the whole incident took place on “TRNC” territory. He tried to support his claims with photographs and a map, and it was amusing watching the UNFICYP operations staff uncover all the inaccurate and misleading elements. While UNFICYP protested the Turkish story at the highest levels, especially the claims that the shooting was not in the buffer zone, the Greek Cypriots were never told of this letter and its errors. The “TRNC” political authorities continued to insist that although the incident was unfortunate, Panayi was to blame for failing to heed warning shots and for crossing into “TRNC” territory.

On the Greek side, there was initial dismay and anger at UNFICYP’s slow response. This sentiment changed after UNFICYP made it clear to the Greek Cypriots that repeated warning shots prevented UNFICYP from reaching Panayi. The Cyprus Mail wrote “No UNFICYP officer in his right mind would risk walking into the buffer zone after warning shots were fired.” Here, UNFICYP’s efforts to clarify why it responded as it did to the multiple warning shots reduced anger at the operation. When clarifying the actions of the operation helps calm local perceptions of the operation, this effect of self-transparency is evidence for (H6) .

The overall reaction of the Greeks was muted, and contrasts with the protests and shootout after Athanasios Kleovoulou’s death in 1993. An UNFICYP investigation revealed that Kleovoulou had gone into the buffer zone to trade brandy with the Turks, and this caused the National Guard to crack down on their troops. In 1996, the mood in the Greek Cypriot press and in the streets soon combined a sullen ‘Turks will be Turks’ attitude with a recognition that the Panayi had made a fatal mistake. Newspapers and government authorities spoke of the poor training of Greek Cypriot soldiers. The Cyprus Mail editorialized: “It may seem insensitive, but in the final analysis, the guardsman died because he disobeyed army orders.”

UNFICYP and its investigations can take some credit for this rare level of blunt introspection and learning. UNFICYP’s information has helped the Greek Cypriots realize the dangers of their own lax discipline along the buffer zone. While not justifying the Turkish shootings of Panayi or Kleovoulou, UNFICYP helped the Greek Cypriots understand their soldiers’ unwise actions, calming their reactions to the killings. There is no transparency hypothesis for this effect, but it combines elements of H4 (reducing fears) and H5 (coercing better behavior) because the Greek Cypriots came to place some blame on themselves and thus take responsibility for their own actions.

Finally, the killings illustrate how quickly things can escalate on Cyprus, and shows that UNFICYP’s presence is critical in rare circumstances. Immediately following the June 3 killing, for example, both opposing forces quickly built up their forces. What if UNFICYP had not been there? What if the Turkish warning shots had been fired at National Guard soldiers coming into the buffer zone to pick up the body, rather the UNFICYP soldiers?

Moves Forward and Local Agreements

Moves forward include instances when the opposing forces enter the buffer zone, and these account for about 20% of all violations. As seen in the deaths of Kleovoulou and Panayi, going into the buffer zone sometimes results in shooting. However, most moves forward into the buffer zone are minor. UNFICYP’s response is usually just hustle the violators back to their side. Little transparency is needed or used in these instances.

Two quite serious forms of moves forward threaten the status quo and challenge UNFICYP’s authority and freedom of movement in the buffer zone. First, the opposing forces may challenge the status quo by trying to move the actual cease-fire lines forward. Second, they may contest UNFICYP’s right to patrol in a given area. For example, these sorts of challenges probably explain why the Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus went from describing the minimum width of the buffer zone as 20 meters in the June 15, 1995, (S/1995/488 report p. 3), to describing it as a “few” meters in the next report on December 10, 1995, (S/1995/1020 p. 1).

“Local agreements” makes these challenges even worse by codifying new borders of the buffer zone. A local agreement is when new lines are drawn or patrol routes adjusted in the buffer zone by lower-level officers. These agreements essentially legitimize a new status quo. Local agreements are very difficult for UNFICYP to deal with because the local commanders often do not notify their superiors or successor rotations.

According to one of UNFICYP’s folders on moves forward, local agreements are due to a “lack of understanding and weakness of UNFICYP at [the] local level” over time. And it is “clear that local agreements and understandings have far reaching effects when changes are made to activities within the buffer zone without clearance from HQ UNFICYP.” UNFICYP’s spokesman echoed these concerns, saying that local agreements are “hell in this mission.”

Moves forward and local agreements blur the base truth about the status quo and thus reduce UNFICYP’s ability to increase transparency (H1). UNFICYP can not easily facilitate bargaining, reduce misperceptions, or coerce better behavior (H3, H4, H5) if they can not establish a base truth. Without a base truth, there is no way to refute either side’s claims, no way to help move each side closer to the truth and away from miscalculation and misperception, and no way for UNFICYP to press its side with certainty.

Moves forward are often accompanied by arguments about the true location of the cease-fire lines. UNFICYP should be able to win these arguments hands down, but sometimes it does not and this is because of ambiguities about the base truth. As mentioned, UNFICYP has no comprehensive database of photographs or videos of the whole buffer zone, and the cease-fire lines were drawn ambiguously. When UNFICYP cannot master the facts, it has a harder time providing transparency.

The extent of the difficulties posed by local agreements are hard to judge because they are a self-concealing phenomenon. Who would admit to making a side-deal that reduced UNFICYP’s authority? Yet local agreements and disputes about patrol tracks and the delineation of the cease-fire lines came up in a number of my interviews, and were also covered in several folders I reviewed.

For example, UNFICYP’s Chief Operations Officer, Lt. Colonel Parker, said that different maps revealed three different cease-fire lines in the “4 Minute Walk” area of the buffer zone in central Nicosia. He noted more generally that he had huge files on unresolved cease-fire line interpretations. Parker said that if the cease-fire line problems could be resolved, this would calm both sides and generate lots of peace. In other words, establishing and monitoring a base truth (H1) would go a long way toward reducing unwarranted fears (H4), as well as limiting accidental and intentional cheating (H5). It is hard for each side to negotiate agreements to limit these fears and incidents when there is no base truth, and this uncertainty helps cause these fears and incidents in the first place. This implies that transparency would promote cooperation (H3) if it could be established (H1).

Government officials not fully aware of the tactical rough and tumble in and along the buffer zone, so it would take a fairly drastic change in incidents along the buffer zone for them to view the peacekeeping mission differently. For example, Government of Cyprus officials believe UNFICYP successfully maintains control of the buffer zone, preserves the status quo, and keeps small things small. Dr. Pantelides of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called UNFICYP “extremely successful.” Thalia Petrides, Director for European Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought that UNFICYP helped keep the Turkish side from gaining ground in the buffer zone.

On the “TRNC” side, Dr. Plumer, an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense was much less supportive. Even though he said that UNFICYP’s job had gotten easier since the creation of the buffer zone in 1974, he thought that the Turkish Forces were doing the real peacekeeping on Cyprus and that UNFICYP was not big enough to do its job adequately. He also noted with displeasure the U.N.’s reluctance to recognize the “TRNC” and said that UNFICYP was 70% paid for by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Thus, he argued that UNFICYP’s benefits appear to accrue more to the Greek than Turkish side.

Demonstrations and Crowd Control

Although not counted by UNFICYP as “violations,” a major problem confronted by UNFICYP is demonstrations. Most demonstrations are held by Greek Cypriots to protest the Turkish invasion and occupation. The demonstrators create havoc for UNFICYP as they frequently try to cross into the buffer zone. Some throw rocks, bottles, and occasional molotov cocktails at Turkish Cypriots or other targets of opportunity, including UNFICYP personnel. Injuries can result, and as happened in 1996, even death.

UNFICYP’s responsibility during the demonstrations is to protect the integrity of the buffer zone. The Cyprus police (CYPOL) are supposed to help control the demonstrators and protect UNFICYP. UNFICYP learns about demonstrations from a variety of sources, including the media and the protesting groups themselves. The Cyprus police are supposed to notify UNFICYP of upcoming demonstrations, although the Cyprus police’s level of cooperation in this and other ways is spotty at best. Occasionally, UNFICYP is taken by surprise by demonstrations.

The Turkish Cypriots often learn of demonstrations through liaison with UNFICYP. According to Colonel Talbot, UNFICYP tells the Turkish side what they are going to do about the upcoming demonstration and this helps build trust. He said it was very important for him to say “I’m doing this” about the demonstration and ask about their (Turkish) concerns and respond to them. He believed the trust this engendered may help disengagement over the long-term. UNFICYP’s information gathering about demonstrations and Colonel Talbot’s remarks about using this information and self-transparency to build trust support H1, which contends that regimes can increase transparency by providing new information and H6 which predicts that information about the regime’s activities can calm fears.

The number of demonstrators can vary from several tens to the low thousands, and demonstrations vary in their level of hostility and danger. Motorcycle protests are the most violent and troublesome for UNFICYP to confront. With belligerence, speed, walkie-talkies, and portable phones, these demonstrators often run around and outwit UNFICYP troops. With UNFICYP’s “limited resources, the protestors just entangle you.”

In 1996, the demonstrations became lethal. On the morning of August 11, 1996, as many as 7000 motorcyclists were set to cross the buffer zone from the South into the North. The demonstration was in part a deliberate provocation whipped up by escalating rhetoric from the Government of Cyprus. Members of the Turkish mainland militant right-wing group the Grey Wolves came to confront the demonstration, and were joined by many Turkish Cypriot civilians. In the ensuing violence, Greek Cypriot Tasos Isaac was clubbed to death, and 50 or more other Greek Cypriots, about 12 Turkish Cypriots, and 12 UNFICYP personnel were injured. On August 14, Isaac was buried and at his funeral, the “heroic death” of this “symbol of freedom” was eulogized as a “source of inspiration” by the Primate of the Church of Cyprus. Another demonstration followed the funeral. Several hundred Greek Cypriots charged the cease-fire lines and entered the buffer zone. As the protestors threw stones, Solomos Solomos, a cousin of Isaac, began to climb a flagpole to take down a Turkish Cypriot flag. He was killed and four others were wounded (including two UNFICYP personnel) when Turkish Forces opened fire and shot 25-50 rounds into the crowd. Lots of protests from the U.N. and Greek Cypriot ensued, culminating in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1092, December 23, 1996, which deplored the deaths.

Transparency played a role in preventing the violence from getting even worse during the August 1996 demonstrations. According to UNFICYP’s journal, The Blue Berets:

UNFICYP played a unique role in defusing tension between the two parties. During the height of the crisis, rumours and disinformation were rampant on both sides which could easily have triggered military clashes. UNFICYP’s liaison officers attached to the police and military headquarters were instrumental in keeping both sides informed of developments and in quickly clarifying any misperceptions.

In tactical terms, UNFICYP appears to have increased transparency by keeping both sides informed, as predicted by H1. By so doing, they reduced misperceptions and miscalculations which were worsening tensions and heightening risks of escalation; these are the effects of transparency predicted by H3 and H4. That said, each side maintains dramatically different interpretations of the August demonstrations. For example, the dead Greek Cypriots are hailed as hero patriots by their side.

Despite UNFICYP’s success with near-real time transparency during these exceptionally violent demonstrations, transparency generally does not play a large role in demonstrations. The facts of the case in demonstrations are fairly clear, as are each side’s interpretation of them.

The limits of UNFICYP’s ability to wield information to coerce the adversaries into more helpful behavior are shown in UNFICYP’s repeated scoldings of the Cyprus police who frequently aid the protestors and not UNFICYP. No amount of criticism from the U.N. provokes anything more than temporary improvement in cooperation. This weakens support for H5 which contends that disclosure of information can coerce better behavior.

Humanitarian Activities and Societal Transparency

Part of UNFICYP’s mandate is to help Cyprus “return to normal conditions.” Accordingly, UNFICYP engages in a number of humanitarian activities on the island designed to bring the two sides together to foster communication and cooperation. These are called bicommunal activities and they range from concerts to coordination of the electrical, water, and sewer systems (which are still linked between the North and South). Embassies (especially the U.S. and British) and businesses also sponsor and promote bicommunal events, but these often have be coordinated with UNFICYP since they involve crossing the buffer zone.

UNFICYP promotes these exchanges believing that:

Bicommunal contacts can contribute significantly to facilitating an overall settlement. It is obvious that the encouragement of tolerance, trust and reconciliation between the two communities through increased contact and improved communication is an essential part of the peace process.

This quotation evokes H1 with its emphasis on communication, and especially H4 as communication is seen to reduce the lack of trust, racism, and enemy-imaging (fears and worst-case assumptions) hindering peace.

Bicommunal activities are efforts to increase what I dub societal transparency – what societies know about each other. It is important to figure out the provision and effects of societal transparency. For example, the issue is at the center of debates about whether globalization is increasing cross-cultural understanding, and societal transparency informs the hopes of scholarships like the Fulbright and the Rhodes that support international educational exchanges.

Unfortunately, on Cyprus it is hard to tell whether bicommunal activities increase transparency, promote peace, or reduce misperceptions. Organizers of bicommunal activities claim that the various activities do have positive effects on participants’ views toward the other side, yet acknowledge that these effects are hard to measure more concretely. Moreover, while thousands of people may attend a concert, far fewer attend more lengthy and intensive workshops. It is hard to discern any changes in behavior or attitude associated with these events and whatever large-scale effects bicommunal activities may have are likely to take place over a very long time. This does not make bicommunal events irrelevant or unworthy of pursuit; they have a lot of intuitive appeal. It just means that there is little hard data with which to measure the impact of bicommunal contacts.

In addition to measurement difficulties, bicommunal activities are often politically manipulated, whether being used for propaganda by the South, or cancelled or attended by plants and plainclothesman by the North. Further, pervasive bias, especially in the press and schools hinder societal transparency. Much of the press is politically affiliated, highly nationalistic, and one-sided. With twenty-five newspapers for a country the size of Indianapolis, journalists “go off the deep end” and blow small things way out of proportion. General Vartiainen, UNFICYP’s Force Commander, said that “what they know [about each other] is what is in the newspapers and that is bullshit.” Initially segregated into separate Greek and Turkish systems by the British, the schools continue to inculcate malignant nationalism. Feissel said it was “education that made things bad” on Cyprus, while Vartiainen said that the schools teach the children to view the other side as “beasts.” Teachers often lead their students to the demonstrations. It is hard to expect lasting peace in a situation where, as pithily summed up by General Vartiainen, “the Greeks don’t remember what happened before 1974 and the Turks can’t forget it.”

Even after the opening of the intra-Cypriot border in 2003, the communities remain distant. ““There are no results of all those 20 years of citizens being involved...There are no pages on our newspaper on the life of the other side. The Green Line is open physically for us to move but there is an invisible barrier that stops us.” says Greek Cypriot Katie Economidou, a bi-communal activist.”

Conclusion

UNFICYP enjoys considerable success patrolling the buffer zone and keeping small incidents small. A modest amount of UNFICYP’s peacekeeping effectiveness depends on transparency, and UNFICYP also relies on cajoling, interposition, deterrence, mediation, and getting violators in trouble. These tools are not mutually exclusive, and many incidents are calmed by some combination of them.

With respect to each side’s overall assessment of the other’s capabilities and intentions, UNFICYP adds very little. It is possible, but hard to prove, that UNFICYP’s general presence on the island helps deter aggression by increasing the probability that the initiating aggressor would be identified.

This chapter offers four main lessons about transparency. First, the variation in the importance of transparency by category of violation and by incident within categories of violations underscores a simple, but fundamental point: that transparency can not be of use unless there is some underlying uncertainty or lack of information to begin with. For example, construction may create more suspicion than slingshotting because the uncertainties surrounding construction are likely to be larger. Likewise, transparency may be of help combating rumors during crises. Second, it is hard to move adversaries toward a common truth if the base truth itself is not well-identifiable by the regime. As transparency is fundamentally about reducing misperceptions and moving parties toward a base truth, the inadequately established base truth hinders UNFICYP’s ability to provide transparency (H1). This in turn hurts UNFICYP’s ability to help the sides make bargains to reduce tensions (H3), to reduce unwarranted fears, and to coerce the opposing forces into compliance (H5).

A number of policy recommendations for UNFICYP result from this observation, and are applicable to many other peacekeeping operations. Local agreements should not be recognized and should be prohibited unless signed by the UNFICYP Force Commander and opposing forces counterparts. UNFICYP should set up a commission that would work with the opposing forces to identify and resolve different interpretations of the cease-fire lines and the status quo. Video and photographic records could help establish the agreed-upon status quo, the location of patrol tracks, and so forth. UNFICYP should also delineate the cease-fire lines more clearly with rocks, barrels, barbed wire, and so forth. They should use the global positioning system (GPS) to indicate positions of these markers on the markers themselves and in record books. This would deter the opposing forces from trying to move the markers, and help accurately replace those that do get moved. Finally, to increase UNFICYP’s ability to investigate and gather facts, audio triangulators could help UNFICYP figure out where shots came from, how many were fired, and so forth. Remote video and sensor monitoring could leverage UNFICYP’s stressed resources. UNFICYP’s night vision capability should be augmented and upgraded.

Third, the provision of transparency faces barriers when there are large amounts of ingrained bias, or when adversaries already know a lot about each other.

Finally, this chapter confirmed the necessity of including H5 in this study, the hypothesis which contends that information can be used to deter and coerces cheaters, rogues, and spoilers.

Table 4-1 summarizes the findings by hypothesis:

Table 4-1: Findings by Hypothesis

Ãâåèated to do so, because this forbidden zone often contains good grazing land. Sheep are technically not violations, but as shepherds often follow their sheep, errant sheep are often good indicators of soon-to-be errant humans. At least two sources said they constituted ninety-nine percent of all violations (the other one percent are unidentified civilians, sometimes defectors, according to one of these sources). Another source indicated that there were 100-130 sheep and shepherd violations a week. And at the UNTSO morning briefing I went to in Tiberias (May 30, 1996), the briefer said that there had been six civilian and twenty-one shepherd violations in the last day.

UNDOF’s response to these violators is to send out a patrol and persuade the shepherds to return to their side of the line. UNDOF’s patrols use various placards with appropriate messages in local languages to help them with this and other tasks. These incidents are reported to UNDOF, but typically not to the U.N. in New York.

These incidents can be serious, especially for the sheep and shepherds involved. Often, they move into heavily mined area, and the sheep or shepherds become purple clouds (in the words of UNDOF soldiers). Sometimes the shepherds move the mines onto UNDOF patrol paths. In other cases, Israeli soldiers will shoot warning shots to shoo away the approaching sheep and shepherds. Sheep are shot on a fairly regular basis by Israelis wary of terrorists and bombs which can appear in any guise. When UNDOF sends out a ready reaction patrol to reign in shepherds, it is more of a humanitarian than peacekeeping gesture.

The reason that there are so few problems on the Golan is that neither side wants problems. This point was underscored when Israel fought Syria in Lebanon in 1982, and while Israel built up its forces on the Golan, Syria actually drew down its Golan forces. It is implausible to believe that Syria did this because UNDOF’s 1200 troops provided a shield or contributed to Syria’s threat assessments. Instead, war itself on the Golan appeared implausible to Syria, despite the fact that Syria and Israel were fighting heavily only a short distance away. Likewise, both sides seemed to gloss over a shooting incident on January 8, 2003. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) shot two Syrian soldiers in civilian clothing who had passed beyond the AOS and were approaching the Israeli technical fence. One died and one was wounded. UNDOF recovered the body from the IDF the next day; and Israel returned the wounded Syrian to Syria via UNDOF. The Syrians were apparently in a wadi they had used for washing clothes for years, so something went wrong somewhere. There were perfunctory protests, but both sides cooperated readily with the U.N., and a U.N. official noted that neither side allowed the incident to escalate.

Finally, it may be that the fact of physical distance provided by the Areas of Separation and Limitation promotes peace. Physical distance, coupled with the UNDOF-monitored arms control agreement of the Areas of Limitation, offers some assurance to each side that the other side was not building up for an attack. Breaking the AOL’s limits could signal an impending attack, and avoiding that signal complicates attack planning. Seen this way, monitored physical distance offers stability in part because transparency is helping each side calculate more clearly (H3), calming fears (H4), while helping deter attacks as UNDOF might identify the aggressor (H5). Distance also shifts the offense/defense balance towards the defense by making it easier for the defense to anticipate and plan. The case of Cyprus demonstrates that physical proximity allows the opposing forces a number of ways to harass each other, methods that would not be available if the buffer zone was wider (slingshotting, stone throwing, verbal insults, etc). Incidents are most frequent where the buffer zone is narrow (as in Nicosia) and diminish where it is thicker. The 2½ mile wide buffer zone in Korea certainly does not prevent all antagonisms and more severe incidents, but things would likely be worse if it were narrower.

Scholar and Practioner Assessments of UNDOF and the Role of Transparency

If UNDOF is supposed to provide transparency, it must be able to add value to each side’s own threat assessments. Thus, a central question is how much transparency UNDOF can add to what each side already knows or can learn. Mackinlay argues that when UNDOF was deployed in 1974, UNDOF’s monitoring ability may have been “as effective as that of the Syrian and Israeli armies.” This situation has changed as both sides rebuilt and improved their intelligence-gathering capabilities, while those of UNDOF remained largely stagnant. Mackinlay says that this means that neither side relies much on UNDOF’ monitoring, except to the extent that it serves as a backup. However, he adds that the two sides can communicate through UNDOF if there are problems in the Areas of Separation and Limitation (as shown above, this does not happen much). Mackinlay and UNDOF’s Force Commander (and several other UNDOF and UNTSO officers in interviews) agree that, even though both sides have adequate intelligence, the Israelis have a much better picture of what goes on on the Golan than the Syrians. This discussion suggests that, in terms of strategic threat assessment, there is little that UNDOF can add to each sides’ unilateral capabilities, especially to the Israelis.

One high ranking UNDOF officer said that “UNDOF clarifies all real or supposed violations, but we don’t have many serious violations here.” He added that both sides are aware that serious violations would threaten the peace process. Lieutenant Colonel Torping, whose experience with UNDOF spanned eleven years, said that Syria and Israel “want a guarantee that the other side won’t take unexpected steps and they know that neither side has tried anything for 20 years.” He also said that the U.N. has been doing its job in a good way, but that it was more important that both sides want peace and trust the U.N. Major-General Kosters cautioned not to make too much of the confidence-building effects of UNDOF; the chance of conflict is very low and UNDOF’s force is only “barbed wire and nothing more.” Zenon Carnapas, UNTSO’s Senior Advisor, said that with UNDOF/UNTSO the two sides get an objective opinion about each side respecting the Geneva agreement. He thought that if UNTSO were withdrawn it might serve as a political trigger. With the exception of Force Commander Kosters, the general sense I got from high level U.N. staff was that they believed they were increasing transparency (H1), and thereby lowering already low levels of fear about supposed violations and unexpected steps (H4).

Alan James says that the inspections “are a means of helping to keep anxiety at a somewhat lower level than it would otherwise reach and as such are of value” (H4). Mackinlay argues that UNDOF’s liaison system provides a “limited but important diplomatic link between the Syrians and the Israelis.” By facilitating communication, this may be another way UNDOF increases transparency (H1). He notes that UNDOF “will certainly cry the alarm to the whole world if either opponent force attempts to maneuver to regain the Golan.” If fears of the alarm deterred the attempt, it would support H6 as an example of information deterring or coercing aggressors.

Something like this happened in the case of the U.N. Emergency Force I. When Egypt asked UNEF I to leave the Sinai/Gaza armistice line with Israel in 1967, it helped signal impending conflict and helped identify the aggressor.

Conclusion

UNDOF is the most formal arms control and verification mission in this study, and it offers a number of insights about transparency. First, the promise of transparency was not crucial to each side’s willingness to accept U.N. forces on the Golan, and mostly seemed a factor only for Israel. Thus, the hypothesis that the anticipation of transparency promotes cooperation, H2, received modest to weak support. Superpower leverage was the biggest factor that led to the U.N. monitoring of the cease-fire.

Second, there was evidence that the management and selective communication of information promoted peace. Kissinger edited and withheld information as he shuttled between Israel and Syria. Indeed, these adversaries might have deadlocked had they known how far apart their respective positions were at certain points. This supports H3' because here incomplete information promotes cooperation. One way to view Kissinger’s diplomacy is as an active forum where the information between states is transmitted and manipulated by an outside actor; he also had the leverage and power of the U.S. at his disposal.

Third, even though H2 receives little support, the buffer zone created by UNDOF’s deployment helped each side make territorial compromises. Because of what I called the figleaf effect, they could give up territory to the U.N. zone that they would not be willing to concede to each other.

Fourth, UNDOF’s day-to-day operations on the Golan do not increase transparency very much. Both sides, but especially the Israelis, know a lot from their own sources about the other side’s forces. Information from UNDOF can add little. While UNDOF’s elaborate monitoring and verification mechanisms in the Areas of Separation and Limitation would seem to be able to increase transparency considerably, in fact they do not. There are numerous manpower, equipment, and procedural difficulties. Both Syria and Israel have taken steps to block and limit UNDOF’s capabilities. The relative power and capabilities of UNDOF compared to the OPFORs is limited, and this in turn reduces its effectiveness. Despite appearances, UNDOF is unable to add much information and its ability to provide transparency is less than meets the eye; H1 receives only moderate/weak support.

Fifth, there are virtually no tension-raising incidents on the Golan and the sides never dispute UNDOF’s observations. These tranquil conditions preclude much of a role for transparency to reduce fears, as contended by H4. After the initial disengagement, H4 receives only moderate/weak support, and this strength is less due to evidence that I found than to the arguments of other scholars that UNDOF exerts a calming effect.

Sixth, the distances and limitations created by the Areas of Separation and Limitation may alter the offense/defense balance somewhat in favor of the defense and this may reduce miscalculation. If true, this means that distance rivals or perhaps surpasses transparency in reducing miscalculation. Further, as war has so far been virtually off the table on the Golan, there has been little opportunity for calculation or miscalculation. For these reasons, after the disengagement, only very weak support is offered for (H3), the hypothesis that contends that transparency can reduces miscalculation, reduce uncertainty, and promote cooperation.

Seventh, the last two points reinforce important preconditions for regime-provided transparency to be effective. The sides have to have incomplete information, uncertainty, or harbor unwarranted fears for regime-provided transparency to have a shot at reducing miscalculation (H3) or lowering misperceptions (H4).

Eighth, despite all these caveats, analysts tend to concur that UNDOF’s presence promotes peace. Although the peace-promoting effects of transparency may be less than all the AOS/AOLs and monitoring imply, physical distance and the presence of the U.N. and international community likely add some marginal increment towards peace.

The basis for these findings are summarized in Table 5-2:

Table 5-2: Findings by Hypothesis

ities, and Transparency

UNTAC’s mandate falls into two broad categories: a military component and a civilian component. I review these two areas and assess the role that transparency played in UNTAC’s performance.

UNTAC’s Military Component

In military affairs, UNTAC was mandated to:

1. Monitor the cease-fire and disengagement of forces.

2. Monitor withdrawal of foreign forces (Vietnamese forces) from Cambodia.

3. Facilitate and monitor the demobilization and disarming of seventy percent of each factions’ forces.

4. Facilitate and monitor the cantonment of the remaining thirty percent of each factions’ forces.

5. Conduct mine clearance.

In theory, transparency should have contributed significantly to UNTAC’s military missions. From the cease-fire and disarming to cantonment, UNTAC’s monitoring and verification could have given each side the assurance that others were indeed adhering to the accords, which could have further increased compliance and helped build peace. Unfortunately, obstructionist policies primarily by the Khmer Rouge (but also by Hun Sen’s party, the State of Cambodia or SOC) torpedoed most of UNTAC’s military mandate and made efforts to increase transparency in this area irrelevant. A transparency lesson here is regimes cannot provide transparency (H1) when adversaries reject the regime and do not want to cooperate in the first place.

UNTAC’s military mission fell apart in several ways. First of all, fighting continued sporadically throughout UNTAC’s tenure, albeit at a lower level than before. No one needed UNTAC to tell the factions that fighting and violence continued. A major exception to this was during the election, discussed below. UNTAC’s ability to tell the people that there was no electoral violence greatly increased the turnout and the overall success of the elections.

Second, UNTAC lacked the power to enforce or effectively coerce demobilization, disarming, and cantonment. As Schear points out, UNTAC was between a rock and a hard place. UNTAC would look bad if it tried to coerce the parties because UNTAC’s relative weakness and inability to resort to force meant that it would inevitably fail. On the other hand, voluntary compliance was likely to fail as well because the Khmer Rouge resisted the military aspects of UNTAC’s mandate almost from the start. Seeing the writing on the wall, UNTAC made cantonment voluntary and partial. By November 1992, UNTAC had completely suspended its efforts to disarm, demobilize, and canton the factions.

Because of these failures, there was little to verify with respect to demobilization, disarming, and cantonment and transparency was not relevant. Again, the factions did not need the U.N. to tell them the agreements had been violated.

Related to this problem were deficiencies in gathering military intelligence. The U.N. is wary of intelligence gathering, fearing for its image of peaceful impartiality. Because of this, much of whatever intelligence U.N. operations do collect is comes from the press and information components of the operations. UNTAC could not determine the real strength of the Khmer Rouge, definitively refute Khmer Rouge claims that Vietnamese forces were still in Cambodia, or even adequately monitor its own operation. Within the military component, there were many ways in which UNTAC failed to obtain information, making it impossible to provide transparency (H1).

Third, there were a number of ways in which UNTAC’s specific efforts to increase transparency failed. For example, the Khmer Rouge simply did not believe potentially calming reports (H4) from UNTAC’s Strategic Investigation Teams that monitored the presence of foreign forces and cease-fire violations. Although its intelligence capabilities were weak, UNTAC found almost no evidence of Vietnamese or Vietnam-controlled forces in country. The Khmer Rouge disputed these findings, disagreed with the definition of foreign forces, never provided to UNTAC the required information on the manpower and materiel of its own forces. Willful disbelief, preformed judgements, resistance to UNTAC, and UNTAC’s inadequate intelligence capabilities all undermined the peacekeepers’ ability to provide transparency (H1) and exploit transparency to reduce fears and lessen tensions (H4).

Fourth, some 50,000 troops were sent into cantonment and as many weapons were turned over to the U.N. Most of these were from the SOC. However, many of the weapons were not operable and the troops (if they were soldiers at all) were of such poor quality that the SOC actually improved its army by getting rid of them. Many of these soldiers left the cantons on agricultural leave. Hence, even here, there was little calming news for the U.N. to spread.

Fifth, UNTAC made serious efforts to start de-mining Cambodia. It trained 2300 Cambodians and disposed of 37,000 out of six to ten million mines. Admirable as this was, de-mining’s success has little to do with transparency.

In sum, where UNTAC could have increased transparency in the military mission, non-compliance meant that there was little to verify or monitor. Investigative and monitoring capabilities were weak with respect to military intelligence. For this reason, and bias, the Khmer Rouge dismissed UNTAC’s reports that foreign forces had left Cambodia. Failures in the military mission and weakness in transparency-mechanisms (H1) left no hope that fears could be assuaged (H4). Given this, the peaceful elections seem remarkable and the later failure of democracy predictable.

UNTAC’s Civil Components

In civil affairs, UNTAC was mandated to:

1. Repatriate approximately 360,000-370,000 refugees.

2. Restore and rehabilitate aspects of Cambodia’s infrastructure in areas including housing, transport, utilities, education, and so forth.

3. Control most major aspects of civil administration (defense, foreign affairs, finance, public security, and information) and supervise those other aspects of governance that could influence the elections.

4. Promote human rights with an education campaign, monitoring, investigations, and supervision of local law enforcement.

5. Organize and conduct free and fair elections, including civic education and election monitoring.

6. Conduct an information program to support UNTAC’s activities and educate Cambodians about the Peace Accords and the UNTAC’s missions.

UNTAC’s civil mandate was complex, had mixed results, and each element depended in varying degrees on transparency for its success. In the order outlined, I assess UNTAC’s effectiveness with its civil mandate and the role of transparency in whatever was achieved. Information/education was explicitly part of several aspects of UNTAC’s civil mandate: in human rights and especially in preparing Cambodians for the election – the sine qua non of UNTAC’s mandate. In contrast to the military component, transparency played a large role in UNTAC’s success in sponsoring the elections.

Refugee repatriation

Refugee repatriation worked well. Slightly more than the estimated 360,000-370,000 refugees returned to Cambodia. There were many reasons for this success. The refugees’ desired to return. Thailand, where most refugees were, wished to get them out. The Cambodian factions cooperated with their return. And the U.N. offered cash, jobs, food, and/or land to returning refugees. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees helped logistically, and this engendered cooperation from the Khmer Rouge who were much more willing to cooperate with the UNHCR than with UNTAC. In addition, Cambodia’s factions all saw the refugees as returning members or as potential new members. There was not a single deliberately disruptive incident in the whole endeavor.

Despite all these interest and incentive-based reasons for the success of repatriation, transparency played a modest role in UNTAC’s success. “Making certain that all factions were apprized of developments in the repatriation process, which entailed endless dialogue and negotiation, helped allay their suspicions and gain their cooperation.” In other words, UNTAC increased transparency (H1) and reduced apprehensions (H4).

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction did not work out as well as planned and the results had little to do with transparency. Although the international community ended up pledging $880 million for Cambodia’s reconstruction, well over the $593 million planned, disbursement of funds was slow. Only $100 million had been spent prior to the election. Logistical and political difficulties plagued planned projects.

Long-term, large scale projects were difficult to start, much less complete, during UNTAC’s short tenure. Much of the aid ended up being focused on the Phnom Penh area simply because that was where it was easier to get things done. This helped the SOC which was dominant in that region and angered the rural Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge blocked some rehabilitation projects, even though considerable funds would have been spent in areas it controlled. On the positive side, jobs were created and the basis was laid for further reconstruction of war-torn Cambodia.

Civil Control

UNTAC’s mandate for civil control called for supervision of the five main branches of government (defense, foreign affairs, finance, public security, and information, as well as any other branch that could affect the elections). This in turn required monitoring and gathering of large amounts of information. To do this, UNTAC attached teams to all major sectors of government and maintained a separate investigations division. The purpose of such massive oversight was to maintain a neutral political environment during the pre-election interim period. According to its mandate, UNTAC should have been in a good position to gather information, correct abuses, introduce transparency in government, and reassure all factions that the interim government was working fairly, effectively and impartially. Because of these roles and intended effects, any success UNTAC enjoyed with its civil control mandate should have depended to a significant degree on transparency (H1) for reassurance (H4), and to deter (or catch) spoilers (H5).

As it turned out, UNTAC faced numerous difficulties in civil control, many of which affected its ability to provide transparency (H1), calm the factions (H4) and stop spoiler (H5)s. First, the parties varied in their cooperation with UNTAC. The Khmer Rouge, as usual, resisted UNTAC’s efforts. The smaller factions, including Sihanouk’s FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif), had very little structure to monitor at all. As a result, UNTAC focused its monitoring on the SOC in Phnom Penh. The SOC viewed this disproportionate attention as discriminatory and it became uncooperative. UNTAC’s greatest failure in this respect was its inability to reign in the SOC’s security forces and secret police. Their continued activity endangered the neutral political environment UNTAC was trying to create. The SOC’s resistance to UNTAC’s monitoring supports H2' which contends that anticipated transparency hinders cooperation.

Second, despite its relatively elaborate and formalized organization, the SOC did not govern in ways that could be effectively monitored. Power often resided with army officers, provincial governors, local officials, relatives of bureaucrats, and so forth. Many decisions were made informally and without written record.

Finally, UNTAC was simply overwhelmed by this very sophisticated task. UNTAC was slow to assert its authority and never caught up. The quality of its personnel varied and was sometimes poor.

All of these factors meant that UNTAC did not do very well at civil control, had difficulty monitoring government functions, and therefore could not provide much transparency. While this is a near failure for H1, UNTAC did introduce “a fair amount of transparency into Cambodia’s institutions,” and this might in turn have deterred abuses through by helping identify fraud or partisan use of government power or facilities. Had this worked, it would have provided evidence that information disclosure deters or coerces cheaters and spoilers (H5). However, it did not work very well because the SOC in particular “evaded UN controls” and often prevented information from being gathered in the first place. Thwarting of monitoring by the U.N. Civilian Administration Component included creative use of wireless phones by government officials and switching of government functions to agencies not under U.N. supervision.

Despite this, analysts agree that without UNTAC attempts at civil control, the situation would have been worse. Even more abuses, violence, and political harassment would have occurred. Some analysts suggest that UNTAC planted a seed for further maturation of Cambodia’s political institutions. Nonetheless, the litany of problems lead me to code this as “weak/failure” for H5 because U.N. efforts to monitor cheating, rogues, and spoilers were so frequently thwarted, and the U.N. could not use information to coerce better behavior.

Promotion and Protection of Human Rights

UNTAC had limited success with its mandate to promote and protect human rights. Although information and education were central to UNTAC’s efforts to promote human rights, transparency appears not to have played much of a part.

Human rights abuses continued throughout UNTAC’s tenure, though no where near the level of Pol Pot’s murderous regime. UNTAC’s small human rights staff documented a number of abuses, but could not arrest violators or fire them from government posts. Although the Secretary-General’s Special Representative could transfer personnel found to be hindering the peace agreements, UNTAC mainly had to rely on the SOC to police and judge the human rights violators it had identified. This often amounted to the bad guys watching the bad guys, so enforcement was rare. Asia Watch harshly criticized UNTAC for failing to take concrete actions to defend human rights and punish abusers. This represents a failure for H5, because UNTAC did not even try to stop cheaters, rogues, and spoilers even though it knew violations were occurring.

Further, UNTAC often had to work with violators in other areas of its operations, so antagonizing these officials (or others) on the basis of human rights violations jeopardized other aspects of the mandate. UNTAC therefore focused more on human rights education, than on accusing human rights violators. While UNTAC tried to train judges and lawyers, it did not have the resources to conduct a more sweeping overhaul of Cambodia’s judicial system. Most lawyers and judges and others with any sort of higher education and training had been killed by Pol Pot’s regime, leaving Cambodia ill-prepared to govern itself.

On the positive side, all four major factions including the Khmer Rouge signed onto major international human rights agreements. UNTAC helped gain the release of several hundred political prisoners. UNTAC undertook a large-scale, country-wide human rights education campaign. Using a wide range of information tools from radio to puppets and cartoon flyers, UNTAC raised awareness in Cambodia about human rights. About 150,000 Cambodians joined human rights groups. Cambodia also gained what Doyle called the freest press in Southeast Asia and the citizens enjoyed what was for them unprecedented freedom of movement and association. UNTAC’s ability to teach Cambodians peace-promoting ideas such as human rights supports H6 which says that regimes can use information to promote the purposes of their missions and increase effectiveness.

Elections

Organizing and conducting free and fair elections was the centerpiece of UNTAC’s mandate and it was here that UNTAC enjoyed its most prominent success. This success depended to a large degree on the provision of transparency. I will discuss UNTAC’s effectiveness with the elections in this section and leave most of the discussion of transparency for the next section on information and education.

Ninety-six percent all eligible voters were registered before the May 23-28, 1993, elections. Ninety percent of Cambodia’s eligible voters then voted. Despite considerable violence and intimidation prior to the election, Cambodia was surprising peaceful during the actual voting. Since March 1, there had been 200 deaths, 338 injuries, and 144 abductions attributed to politically motivated pre-election violence. The Khmer Rouge committed most of the violence. However, the Khmer Rouge, for reasons still unknown, did not disrupt the elections and the polling period was one of the “least violent in Cambodia for years.”

UNTAC operated and monitored some 1400 fixed polling stations and 200 mobile stations. U.N. peacekeepers guarded most of these stations and the collected ballots were even more heavily guarded.

Sihanouk’s FUNCINPEC won the election with 45.47 percent of the vote. Hun Sen’s SOC party, called the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) won 38.23 percent. The Buddhist party got 3.81 percent of the vote and seventeen other parties split the remaining 12.56 percent. As a result, FUNCINPEC won fifty eight seats in the new Constituent Assembly, while the CPP won fifty-one. There was some post-election bickering about vote-counting and so forth. Control of the executive was disputed. In the end, Sihanouk’s son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and Hun Sen shared the executive and became co-prime ministers, the former as “first” prime minister and the latter as “second” prime minister.

The election calmed the civil war, lessened the power of the Khmer Rouge, and brought, at least temporarily, a multiparty system into a traditionally one-party ruled state.

Information/Education and Transparency

The Information/Education Division of UNTAC had a number of diverse tasks and is widely recognized by analysts as being extremely successful in its support role. Among these tasks were educating Cambodian journalists on establishing a free press, helping candidates get out their messages, educating Cambodians about what UNTAC was doing and how elections worked, countering propaganda and rumors, and addressing unwarranted fears. The Information/Education Division served other aspects of UNTAC’s mandate including promoting human rights, repatriation, and so forth.

Information conditions prior to the start of Radio UNTAC and other UNTAC information efforts were poor. The media in Cambodia had been controlled by the political parties and factions. The SOC dominated with a wide ranging but sporadically broadcasting radio and television network out of Phnom Penh, as well as an established newspaper. The opposition parties of FUNCINPEC, the Khmer Rouge, and the Khmer People’s People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) began the UNTAC period with radio facilities in Thailand or near the Thai border. By mid-1992, some opposition bulletins and newsletters began to be published out of Phnom Penh, but radio and television were particularly important because fifty-two percent of the men and seventy-eight percent of the women in Cambodia were illiterate. Radio was key for reaching the countryside, because the broadcast range of television only reached seventy-five kilometers out of Phnom Penh.

It took until July 1992 for more independent sources such as the English language Phnom Penh Post to begin to appear. Newspapers and newsstands proliferated in early 1993, although many newspapers folded quickly, were intimidated or bribed into partisanship, and/or were biased from the outset. In February 1993, FUNCINPEC began broadcasting radio from Phnom Penh; their TV programs began in April.

More generally, Cambodia had suffered from years of isolation and inadequate education. It was a “traditional society dominated by rumors.” Cambodians knew little of the outside world, or of how the elections and campaigning of democracy were supposed to work. UNTAC was a novelty and many Cambodians did not know why it was there and were suspicious of the new operation.

Given the poverty of quality information, considerable level of uncertainties, as well as longstanding suspicions between the various factions, the need for information and education was critical, and the situation was ripe for the provision of transparency. As it turned out, UNTAC successfully calmed many fears about itself, taught Cambodians about elections, and calmed fears of election-period violence.

The initial paucity of competing media outlets, and their technical backwardness, limited reach, partisanship, and limited credibility made it relatively easy for UNTAC to dominate the news flow. People were eager to hear credible, frank, and well-presented news and information. UNTAC became “the one source of news and information they [Cambodians] felt they could rely on.”

These points about the poor quality of information in Cambodia suggest two preconditions for similar information efforts. First, the U.N. (or other information source) has to be able to compete with the information flow in the target area. This is partly a technical and quantitative issue: it is better to be one radio station among five than among 100, and it is better to have more area coverage than less. Second, the value added and credibility of the new information has to be high. A security regime whose message is implausible and has no impact cannot provide transparency.

Overall, the ability to be an “information competitor” is a pre-requisite for a regime to provide transparency (H1). For example, the U.N. could not hope to make much of a dent in a developed state’s dense news flow. But in Namibia and especially Cambodia, the U.N. became quite influential. These factors offer some hope that the U.N. (or any other information producer) might become influential when there is a media monopoly, if it could penetrate the target area.

To accomplish its information missions, UNTAC availed itself of radio, television, video, puppet shows, billboards, singers, local artists, cartoon flyers, banners, leaflets and other resources. It published guidelines and directives and ran discussion groups. UNTAC brought the candidates together for round-table discussions and gave them access to its television, video, radio, and other facilities to help them spread their messages. UNTAC even ended up running its own radio station, Radio UNTAC, a first for a U.N. operations. All of these are transparency-increasing mechanisms, and are observable implications of H1, which contends that regimes provide transparency.

At its peak, Radio UNTAC broadcast 15 hours a day and was the most popular station in the country. To give some sense of the scale and penetration of UNTAC’s information efforts, Japanese NGOs and political parties contributed 347,804 hand-held radios for distribution throughout Cambodia (along with 849,400 batteries and 1000 radio-cassette recorders). Crowds would gather in marketplaces to listen to U.N. broadcasts. Relay stations were installed by UNTAC so that its broadcasts would reach the whole country, because in-country facilities were unable to do so. Before installation of the relays, UNTAC had to rely on borrowed transmitter time from VOA to broadcast throughout Cambodia. UNTAC’s estimates for its radio station’s audience ranged from almost the entire population to even more than the population (by including listeners in neighboring countries).

To see if UNTAC’s messages were getting through, a six-person Analysis/Assessment Unit of the Info/Ed Division conducted public opinion polls, traveled throughout the country, and monitored Cambodia’s newspapers, radio and television programs, and political newsletters. It synthesized the information it gathered for distribution throughout UNTAC, helping UNTAC prepare its political reports and respond to emerging problems. The Unit’s data helped UNTAC improve its image and credibility, prepare its information programs, and even vet the factions public statements. Gathering information is crucial for UNTAC to be able to provide transparency (H1), while tracking rumors and propaganda are necessary for UNTAC to be able to reduce fears among parties and about itself (H4 and H6).

The main message and function of the Information/Education campaign was to teach Cambodians about the elections, and a major theme was convincing Cambodians that their ballots were indeed secret. Many feared retaliation if they did not vote for one party or another. In response, UNTAC instructed Cambodians about the mechanics of elections and the procedures for insuring ballot secrecy. In doing so, UNTAC made its own system transparent (H6), and also reduced unwarranted fears (H4). Another message involving self-transparency (H6), was UNTAC’s also assurance Cambodians that it was not there to take over the country, and that they would leave.

Sometimes potential voters’ fears were wildly unfounded. Some feared that the pencils for marking ballots contained radio beacons that linked up to satellites and would reveal who had voted for whom. Others feared secret electronic eyes in the polling places. These and other concerns about ballot secrecy and fears of retribution were expressed by Cambodians in letters to the station and in frank discussions on talk shows. UNTAC officials could then respond appropriately with necessary information. Thanks to repeated messages over Radio UNTAC that their ballots would be secret, “People started to whisper around the assurances the UNTAC had given, such that there was no such thing as a secret electronic eye to detect who they were voting for.” The success of UNTAC in reducing these rumors and unfounded fears about retribution and its election again offers strong evidence in support of H4 and H6.

A second function of UNTAC and especially Radio UNTAC was to help all the parties get out their messages. Radio UNTAC gave free air time weekly to all the political parties. In a transparency-related assist to the parties, it also gave a right of response to parties that felt particularly aggrieved by misstatements or lies in other’s broadcasts. These efforts helped defeat the SOC’s media near-monopoly, and increased the fairness of the election. Unfortunately, one downside to opening up the process was that it antagonized the SOC.

Another division of UNTAC, the Control Unit, liaised with the local media, trying to promote higher and more neutral standards of journalism, promulgating media guidelines, and arm-twisting to prevent false and defamatory news stories that were not conducive to the elections and UNTAC’s mission. They also surveyed other campaign materials, and helped enforce the four day, post-campaign cooling off period before the elections. Unfortunately, the unit did not have enough speakers of Khmer to adequately monitor the Cambodian media.

A third function of the Information/Education Division and Radio UNTAC was to reduce Cambodian’s fears, and combat hostile propaganda and rumors, especially about UNTAC, its mission, and the U.N. In accomplishing these various tasks, Radio UNTAC became a “powerful tool.”

The SOC and Khmer Rouge often propagandized against UNTAC, the U.N., and the elections. One of the main messages of the SOC was that UNTAC could not protect the Cambodians and that only the SOC could do so. The SOC accused U.N. soldiers of coming to Cambodia to sleep with “Vietnamese bitches.” The SOC also tried to confuse Cambodians about UNTAC’s role in Cambodia. For example, the SOC claimed to be able to register people to vote, even though this was UNTAC’s sole responsibility. UNTAC successfully combated this sort of propaganda and this show how self-transparency can help the mission (H6).

Similarly, the SOC tried to confiscate people’s voter registration cards in an attempt to intimidate non-supporters. UNTAC used its media resources to convince the people that this was against electoral law and the SOC’s efforts blew up in its face. This embarrassment shows how information can be used to punish those who misbehave, an example of H5 in action. The SOC also coerced people to join their party, then falsely told these people that they had to vote for the party they belonged to. This intimidating misinformation was largely defeated by UNTAC information efforts, offering evidence of transparency reducing fears (H4). Another SOC propaganda message was to try to tie FUNCINPEC and other opposition parties to the Khmer Rouge.

Although UNTAC was forced to confront a number of specific SOC transgressions, one item of craft knowledge for those dealing with media issues in the U.N. is that it is often unwise to combat propaganda with tit-for-tat counterpropaganda. Doing so often degenerates into a war of words and adds credibility to the hostile propaganda. Instead, the strategy is to stick to one’s own message, repeat it a lot, and subtly change the focus as needed to combat whatever rumors are the most pernicious. This is why UNTAC Force Commander General Sanderson remarked that the U.N.’s information campaign allowed UNTAC to “bypass the propaganda of the Cambodian factions.” This is an operational aspect of using information to reduce fears and misperceptions (H4 and H6).

The Khmer Rouge waged a serious information campaign against the elections, with the main message being: do not vote because not all parties are participating (i.e. the Khmer Rouge were not participating). Some of their physical attacks before the elections were conducted with the express purpose of expanding the areas over which they could propagandize. Despite these efforts which ranged from print to radio, Khmer Rouge propaganda was generally unsuccessful in convincing people not to vote. UNTAC’s inability to shut down the Khmer Rouge disinformation campaign was mostly due to were physical challenges to UNTAC’s freedom of movement in Khmer Rouge controlled-areas and escalating authorizations from Khmer Rouge leaders to attack UNTAC personnel. However, because UNTAC’s own information also failed to stop Khmer Rouge propaganda, this is a weak failure for H5.

Sometimes, Radio UNTAC combated fears generated by pre-election violence and rumors of election-time violence. When the Khmer Rouge captured the symbolic town of Siem Reap near Angkor Wat three weeks before the election, Radio UNTAC sent a reporter and broadcasts from the town helped convince Cambodians not to be intimidated and to continue with plans for the elections. Radio UNTAC assured voters that the Khmer Rouge was not tearing up their voting cards.

One source claims that jamming of Khmer Rouge radio (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea) by UNTAC information officers prevented codes from getting to Khmer Rouge operatives and was crucial in preventing election-time violence. This was done apparently without the consent or knowledge of the heads of UNTAC’s info-ed division. However, Timothy Carney, director of Info/Ed and Stephen Heder, deputy director, counter that the jamming had no effect, and called this claim “fanciful” and “fanciful nonsense,” respectively.

At other times, though, news of violence encouraged more fear. When the Khmer Rouge attacked Vietnamese targets in Phnom Penh, news of these attacks reported by Radio UNTAC greatly increased fears in Cambodia. Even though it may have hurt the mission in the short term, UNTAC strove to tell the truth and remain impartial. In the end, Radio UNTAC built up considerable credibility going into the election. This was crucial because fears of election violence ran high.

When the voting began on May 23, Radio UNTAC reporters were stationed around the country. Many Cambodians (as well as UNTAC) anticipated Khmer Rouge attacks on polling places, and many hesitated to vote, fearing for their safety. Radio UNTAC reports that voting was being conducted safely throughout the country are widely credited with helping bring Cambodians to the polls. Thus, during the crucial election period, Radio UNTAC and other UNTAC information efforts successfully lessened unwarranted fears, helped generate the ninety percent turnout, and thus provided clear evidence for H4. The election might have been severely impaired without these information efforts. Of course, the physical presence of the 16,000 peacekeepers also helped calm these fears.

After the elections, Radio UNTAC continued to play transparency-related roles and helped protect the election results from attacks launched by the political parties.

On 31 May 1993, Chea Sim, President of the CPP [Cambodian People’s Party] who controlled the Interior Ministry (and its 40,000 police force) demanded that Radio UNTAC should stop broadcasting the results. Radio UNTAC was accused of misleading and confusing the public. UNTAC rejected the allegations. UNTAC’s stand was broadcast over Radio UNTAC that day:

“The decision to make the progressive results of the counting available to the media, and through the media to the people of Cambodia and of the World, flows from UNTAC’s commitment to the principle of openness and transparency in the administration and conduct of the election. In addition, it reflects the fact that since progressive results are made available to all registered political parties (whose agents have the right to be present at the counting and to observe every aspect of that process), they are in effect already in the public domain.”

The SOC had expected to win the election and became bitter as the results came in showing FUNCINPEC in the lead. Had the SOC gotten away with its anti-election message, the election might have failed amidst recriminations and disagreements about the election’s fairness. Again, Radio UNTAC told the truth, dispelled rumors and lies, and thereby helped consolidate the election results. This is evidence of self-transparency and transparency reducing suspicions (H6 and H4).

Conclusion: Cambodia and Transparency

UNTAC had several failings and shortcomings, but the core of its mandate – the holding of free elections – was a success. In achieving this success, transparency was not a sufficient tool, but it was a necessary tool. UNTAC’s experience offers clear and unambiguous support for the ability of regimes to provide transparency (H1), reduce fears (H4), and especially to clarify the purposes of its own operation (H6).

The promise of transparency (H2) was mildly helpful in getting the Cambodian parties to agree to the Paris Accords. Power politics and historical circumstances were far more important. Hence, H2 receives very modest support.

The Cambodian factions resisted many of the military aspects of the Paris Accords. There was little for UNTAC to monitor and verify. And when it reported what it did successfully verify, the departure and subsequent absence of Vietnamese forces, the Khmer Rouge did not believe UNTAC. As with Cyprus, we see the ability of transparency to reduce suspicions (H4) undercut by willful disbelief and bias.

Turning to the civil part of the mandate, UNTAC failed at civil control. This effort could have depended to a large degree on transparency for its success. But like the military aspects of UNTAC’s mandate, resistance by the factions torpedoed UNTAC before transparency could help.

Information and education played a large role in UNTAC’s human rights campaign, although transparency was not much of an issue. UNTAC had difficulty in this area because of its very limited capabilities for coercion and enforcement.

UNTAC’s greatest success was the election, and here transparency played a large role. Through information and education, with Radio UNTAC in particular (H1), UNTAC defused many rumors, calmed many fears (H4), clarified UNTAC’s role (H6), stopped interference with electoral procedures, and helped end disputes about the election’s results. Without information/education and transparency, the elections might been marred or ruined. Lehmann, citing five scholars and UNTAC officials, says that “Radio UNTAC was, according to most observers, one of the prime success stories of the U.N. operation in Cambodia.” Kevin Kennedy, Chief of the Peace and Security section of the UN Department of Public Information said that Radio UNTAC was “extremely useful” and “critical.”

Table 7-1 summarizes these findings:

Table 7-1: Findings by Hypothesis

o talk to both sides. This means that even the lowest ranked peacekeepers on the line should be educated about the conflict their mission is trying to defuse.

Third, this research, combined with the recognition that hate-mongering is a major cause of ethnic conflict, suggests that information and anti-propaganda campaigns might be effective tools against ethnic conflict. My research shows that the U.N.’s information campaigns, by substituting facts for rumors, helped defuse tensions in Cambodia and Namibia. The U.N.’s radio station in Cambodia became the most popular in the country and competed with stations run by the rival political parties. Research indicates that many ethnic conflicts are started by ethno-nationalist political entrepreneurs who are quick to grab control of the media and use hate-mongering to come to power and/or cause harm to others. These two observations provide the logic for the recommendation that the U.N. and other actors should launch information and anti-propaganda campaigns to try to defang the hate-mongers whose propaganda manipulates ethnic histories and politics and thus fuels many deadly conflicts.

These three sets of recommendations are more likely to apply to smaller and less well-developed states. The active provision of transparency – such as that achieved in peacekeeping operations – will be most helpful to states whose own unilateral abilities to gather intelligence are limited. Similarly, information and anti-propaganda campaigns are more workable and are more likely to succeed in areas with relatively undeveloped media infrastructures.

Appendix 1: Information Operations in Recent U.N. Peacekeeping Missions

Experience from the peacekeeping cases discussed above show that information operations can achieve a number of objectives, including:

• Reducing false rumors that adversaries may have about each other (examples: reducing fears of election-day violence, rumors of troop movements or military construction). This effect is expressed by hypothesis H4, which contends that transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions.

• Confirming or reinforcing positive developments (examples: confirming troop withdrawals or disarmament). This is also H4.

• Disclosing violations by local parties (and the threat of disclosure), which can help spur compliance (example: disclosure reducing pre-election fraud and dirty tricks). This outcome reflects H5, which contends that disclosure coerces aggressors.

• Reducing false rumors that local parties may have about the U.N. operation (example: informing locals that the U.N. is not there to displace people or support one side or another). This result is captured by H6, which contends that transparency about the regime and its mission increases its effectiveness.

• Helping local parties understand why and how to vote, or how to fulfill other functions helpful to society (example: instructions on how to use ballot boxes explaining why votes are secret). This is also H6.

Information is power, and UNTAC and UNTAG show that information in the hands of the U.N. is power to help promote peace. Yet the U.N. remains reluctant or unable to use this form of power. There has been no sustained program to experiment with information operations, and the United Nations' (U.N.) information capabilities and expertise are getting better but remain inadequate. Why do these problems persist more than a decade after the recognized information successes of UNTAC and UNTAG? How can these problems be fixed?

In this appendix, I examine why the U.N. does not use information to maximum advantage, and I note a few positive trends. I begin by reviewing a number of recent U.N. reports and show that information is under-appreciated at the leadership level of the U.N., but that the

U.N. is taking steps in the right direction.

Then, to understand recent trends in the use of information at the field level, I survey three of the most recently launched peacekeeping operations. These operations are the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Without doing field research, and without the time for scholarship to develop on these missions, I cannot tell too many stories about the provision and effects of transparency. I do not have enough details to answer the questions: “who said what to whom and what effects did it have?” However, I can assess the U.N.’s overall commitment to information operations from U.N. documents and interviews. The overall picture is mixed, with some signs of hesitancy and inadequacy, and other signs of innovative uses of information.

Finally, I show how problems ranging from hardware and training to bureaucratic inertia stand in the way of the U.N.’s more aggressive use of information.

The Status of Information Operations at the Headquarters Level

The August 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, better known as the Brahimi report, remains a keystone for assessing and critiquing peacekeeping operations. The report reveals the U.N.’s inadequate appreciation of information operations in peacekeeping operations. The report’s assessment of the causes of conflict does not recognize the information environment as a factor that can affect the difficulty of coming to or implementing a peace accord. The report ignores issues of whether the media in the conflict area is independent or partisan, sparse or dense, or whether the adversaries are illiterate, or full of rumors, fears, and misinformation. If information-related factors are not recognized as parts of the problem, they are less likely to be recognized as parts of the solution. Information tools such as radio and television broadcasting are only mentioned once in a laundry list of expertises that have proven hard to deploy on short notice. The report does not mention broadcasting or print hardware.

The report strongly recommends an Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). This sounds promising for information operations, but the focus of this ultimately unsuccessful recommendation was instead to gather and coordinate information about operations and world events.

Only five of the report’s 280 paragraphs are devoted public information (PI). One is a summary paragraph, and two relate to strengthening internal communications within operations. Only two paragraphs relate to the external face of operations. This is .7% of the report, coincidentally in line with paragraph 149's observation that public information rarely exceeds one percent of an operation’s budget.

The most encouraging paragraph for information operations is number 146:

An effective public information and communications capacity in mission areas is an operational necessity for virtually all United Nations peace operations. Effective communication helps to dispel rumour, to counter disinformation and to secure the cooperation of local populations. It can provide leverage in dealing with leaders of rival groups, enhance security of United Nations personnel and serve as a force multiplier. It is thus essential that every peace operation formulate public information campaign strategies, particularly for key aspects of a mission’s mandate, and that such strategies and the personnel required to implement them be included in the very first elements deployed to help start up a new mission.

While the report is to be commended for recognizing the role of information in dispelling rumors and acting as a force multiplier, the following paragraphs describe how the report led to only one “relatively minor” recommendation for improving information operations.

The Brahimi report’s most critical information-related finding was that “no unit at [U.N.] Headquarters has specific line responsibility for the operational requirements of public information components in peace operations.” They note that the small, but soon expanding, team of four in the Peace and Security Section of the DPI “has had little capacity to create doctrine, strategy or standard operating procedures for public information functions in the field.”

To address this concern, an August 2001 implementation report proposed setting up a team of four information specialists within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions soon blocked this worthy initiative:

The Committee is of the opinion, however, that the Department of Public Information should have a dedicated technical unit to perform the functions described. The operational activities and related programmes should be requested in the context of each peacekeeping mission. Accordingly, the Committee does not agree to the establishment of this functional capacity in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

This assessment implies the improbable: that the DPI is more likely to consider the context of each mission than the DPKO. While the Department of Public Information does much good work, an information unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is more likely to think creatively about using information in ways that go beyond self-promotion or clarification of an operation’s purposes (valuable as those functions are). A subsequent implementation report avoids the issue of the technical unit, perhaps because of bureaucratic politics issues hinted at above. As is, there is currently only one information specialist, David Wimhurst, within the DPKO. I argue below that the U.N. should greatly expand this capacity.

A source close to the initial Brahimi report and subsequent implementation reports thinks the above critique is too strong. He noted that the short mention of information operations was meant to “tee-up” the issue and give reformers license to reform. In this way, a few paragraphs helped lead to the attempted initiative to put an information unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Moreover, he said that the few paragraphs on information should be put in context. Many other important issues received few or even no words at all, including gender, medical support, HIV/AIDS, transitions, and safety of personnel. In the end though, he said that it was still “hand to mouth” with information operations. A response to this comment is that perhaps the information initiative failed because it was not tee’d up more prominently.

An outside report, “Refashioning the Dialogue,” that gathered international reaction to the Brahimi report hints at why the Brahimi report may have shied away from discussion of information operations: governments fear spying or any impingement of their sovereign control. For example, “Refashioning the Dialogue” reported that some member states were “alarmed” by the plan for an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), even though the EISAS is primarily intended to improve the flow of information from the field to headquarters and vice-versa. Many governments in Africa resist even fact-finding missions, so some hostility to EISAS is not surprising. On a general level, information operations and radio stations are “threatening and provoke caution in an organization where sovereignty is king.”

On the other hand, peacekeeping operations are routinely preceded by survey missions and other analysis. It is a bit contradictory that member states fear better information gathering and analysis (as well as active information dissemination) by the U.N., when the executive summary of “Refashioning the Dialogue” said that many simultaneously argued that: “Impartiality should be seen in terms of the fair application of a mandate, not as an excuse for moral equivocation. In Africa in particular, there was strong support for more robust mandates for peacekeepers to deal with spoilers.” Why are information operations so sensitive when there are calls for the U.N. to be strong enough to take on spoilers?

The Status of Information Operations in the Field

A survey of three recently launched operations presents a complex picture, with successes in areas where missions undertake local initiative and innovation, and room for improvement where information operations are under-appreciated. The reason that there is so much variation between missions is lack of leadership and innovation from U.N. headquarters.

UNMEE operates between Ethiopia and Eritrea, where misperceptions run high between adversaries and about the U.N. However, the current chief of mission does not value information, so information efforts are scant. In Kosovo, UNMIK started out with very high UNTAC-like ambitions, but peaked with moderate print and broadcast operations, which were then scaled back. UNMIK appreciates the role of information and is leveraging its limited resources in part by coordinating with and urging stories upon the local media. In Congo, MONUC helps run the most ambitious radio operation in the U.N.’s history, Radio Okapi, developed by an innovative partnership between the U.N. and a Swiss NGO, the Fondation Hirondelle. However, the use of other media by MONUC seems wholly inadequate to the scale of the mission. On the whole, recognition of the potential of information operations is uneven, and information resources are generally insufficient.

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)

Following a successful and bloody 30-year liberation struggle, Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in a referendum in April of 1993. Despite the prior conflict and pervasive insecurity in the Horn of Africa, hopes for a more permanent peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea grew through the mid-1990s. Optimism peaked when President Clinton viewed Ethiopia and Eritrea as exemplars of the African Renaissance. A border dispute re-opened conflict in May of 1998, and the war waxed and waned until December 2000.

In July 1999, the two sides accepted a Framework Agreement mediated by the Organization for African Unity. Although fighting continued, the Agreement called for separation of forces, demilitarization and delimitation of the border areas and monitoring of the new temporary security zone (buffer zone) by international observers. In mid-June 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed an OAU-brokered cease-fire, and on June 31, the U.N. Security Council established UNMEE with resolution 1312. Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a permanent peace agreement on December 12, which required “establishment of a neutral Boundary Commission to ‘delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border.’” UNMEE quickly deployed, reaching and then exceeding its mandated strength of 4,200 troops (including 220 observers) in early 2001. It costs about $231 million per year. The core of UNMEE’s mandate is to monitor the cease-fire, the redeployments of the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, and the subsequent buffer zone, as well as to assist the Boundary Commission and to help with demining and humanitarian activities.

Information operations started slowly, suffered setbacks, and remain inadequate. UNMEE radio first broadcast from Eritrea in January 2001. The broadcasts lasted for one hour, and were repeated twice a week. Eritrea suspended broadcasts in October 2001, and permitted resumption of the one-hour shows in June 2002. Ethiopia does not want to cede control of its airwaves, and refuses to give UNMEE free air time. To help circumvent these local difficulties, UNMEE began shortwave broadcasts from the United Arab Emirates, with one hour shows on Tuesdays and Fridays. Considerably reducing the effective length of its shows, UNMEE divides each hour into English and anywhere between three to five local languages.

The central purpose of the broadcasts, and the two outreach centers originally put in each country, is to explain and publicize the mission’s mandate and work. These goals are on the modest end of the information operations continuum, but UNMEE’s means remain insufficient for the task. For example, the information centers have staff and documentation to help citizens understand the U.N., the peace process, and to increase mine awareness. Before the Eritrean government shut down its two centers in mid-summer, 2003, the center in the Eritrean capitol of Asmara (population: 435,000) served only several hundred people a week. UNMEE’s weekly press briefings are still the “key instrument for disseminating news about the Mission’s activities.” A weekly press briefing does not a meaningful information operation make.

This is unfortunate because, according to Chris Coleman, team leader for UNMEE at the DPKO, there are still many misperceptions and misunderstandings to clear up. A March 2002 U.N. report notes that there remains tensions and suspicions between the two side’s forces. Coleman stressed that the biggest need was for the proactive use of information, to clarify the role of UNMEE and especially that of the Boundary Commission.

Both Eritrea and especially Ethiopia resist U.N. information efforts. However, another U.N. official (not Coleman) placed the blame for inadequate use of information by UNMEE on current chief of mission: he “does not subscribe to the importance of public information on a regular basis.”

U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

On June 10, 1999, Security Council Resolution 1244 created the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK was to help Kosovo move towards autonomy from Serbian-led Yugoslavia. This followed years of tension and sometimes conflict with Belgrade, culminating in the U.S.-led NATO military campaign against Serbia and its leader Slobodan Milosevic in Spring 1999. More specifically, UNMIK was mandated to help with civilian administration and promote self-government in Kosovo, help coordinate the humanitarian efforts of international agencies, help maintain law and order, promote human rights, and assist with refugee repatriation.

The broad range of the mandate requires education of the populace on a range of issues, including the operation of a free market economy to political developments and the new Constitutional Framework. To service these needs, UNMIK produces a weekly 25 minute television broadcast on issues from human rights to health, including “themes that are still too sensitive for local media to cover.” UNMIK also produces a monthly program on crime, and another on the economy.

On radio, UNMIK broadcasts a five minute daily program in Albanian, Serbian, and English, and a six-minute weekly roundup. UNMIK borrows station time for its TV and radio programs from Radio Television Kosovo (RTK). RTK is the national public broadcaster in Kosovo, supervised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and managed by the European Broadcasting Union. UNMIK’s print unit produces a number of items covering a similar range of topics as the broadcast division: a bimonthly magazine, fact sheets, booklets and leaflets, UNMIK newsletters, and they used to produce weekly inserts for the local newspapers.

The print effort is more substantial than the broadcast activities, but all seem to pale before the scope of the mandate, before the number of other information sources in the area (some 92 radio stations, 24 television stations, and seven daily newspapers), and before the precedent set by UNTAC and its variety of information operations – especially Radio UNTAC. This is not an indictment per se; it is difficult for the U.N. to compete in a dense media environment.

Nonetheless, some in UNMIK went in hoping to replicate the UNTAC model – but the resources and political support were not there. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UNMIK divided media responsibilities, but cooperation between the two soon soured. Instead of sharing the information burden, OSCE and UNMIK policies often conflicted and/or their initiatives were redundant.

There are three notable positives about the use of information in Kosovo. The first is UNMIK’s Temporary Media Commissioner who monitors the media and ensures adherence to print and broadcast codes. The aim is to prevent libel, overtly hostile hate radio broadcasts, and the like. The Commissioner has the authority to fine violators, and this appears to be an aggressive effort by the U.N. to control the information flow and reduce tensions.

The second was the cooperation between UNMIK and the Fondation Hirondelle to set up the Blue Sky radio station. Funded by the Swiss government, the station was a step towards increasing the amount of independent journalism in Kosovo. Independent media efforts have been opposed by everything from organized crime to political parties. Blue Sky started up in October 1999, but was folded into RTK in July 2000. Blue Sky covered UNMIK’s activities, and other developments in Kosovo, thus was an information-multiplier for UNMIK and demonstrated productive collaboration between the U.N. and an NGO to meet common goals. However, UNMIK does not coordinate routinely with NGOs about information issues.

Finally, UNMIK officials influence the information flow in a number of peace promoting ways that are more subtle than direct UNMIK broadcasting. According to UNMIK press officer Eleanor Beardsley, in one instance in August 2002, UNMIK began arresting major Kosovo Liberation Army heroes for war crimes. As the anti-Serb KLA enjoys considerable support in Kosovo, there were huge and violent protests in the street involving 10,000 Kosovars. UNMIK got the top police people on the TV that night and shown that those arrested had tortured Albanians (Kosovars and Albanians are cultural brethren or even co-nationals to many). The protests “stopped on a dime.” UNMIK also hosts dinners for editors and intellectuals to talk on background, and they bring journalists along for police operations. This sort of relationship-building gets good stories out. Having locals help produce UNMIK’s print and broadcast output helps build credibility. Ms. Beardsley said “We are in the business of changing society and hearts and minds here....There is so much twisting of information and misinformation out there, especially in the Balkans. So we don’t try to counter all of it. But we do fight back.”

UNMIK’s intentions are good, and they are doing the best they can with limited resources.

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)

Supported by Rwanda and Uganda, Zaire was taken over by Laurent Kabila in 1997 and renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, a schism developed between Kabila and his backers, causing a rebellion in 1998. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sided with Kabila against Rwanda and Uganda, turning the Congo into a multinational war zone. A peace agreement was signed by most of the parties in December 2002. Some foreign forces have withdrawn, but Uganda and Rwanda still appear to control much of Eastern Congo, and there is still conflict between various ethnic groups within Congo.

U.N. involvement in the Congo conflict began to increase in July 1999 when U.N. Security Council resolution 1258 authorized the deployment of up to 90 military liaison personnel to the region. In November, the U.N. formed MONUC at a strength of about 600 (500 observers plus the previous 90 liaison and survey personnel) with resolution 1279. Then in February 2000, resolution 1291 expanded MONUC to more than 5,500 military personnel. The deployed strength as of December 31, 2002, was 4,420 military personnel, 49 civilian police, and 559 international and 675 local civilian personnel.

According to resolution 1291, MONUC was mandated to monitor the cease-fire, establish liaison with all parties, collect information on the parties’ forces, help to disarm and demobilize those forces, supervise and verify the disengagement of forces, monitor the disengagement line, as well as to assist with humanitarian activities and demining.

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) deployed into a violent and complicated ongoing conflict. The situation is fluid, and it is hard to gather data on the information-related activities of MONUC.

However, there are some transparency-related stories and facts: for example, in September-October 2002, MONUC verified that 20,941 Rwandan forces had withdrawn from Congo, but the Rwandan forces claimed the withdrawal of 23,760. This left MONUC to investigate the discrepancy. There are 90 military observer teams at 50 sites, but the bulk of MONUC’s force (3,590 out of 4,258) is assigned to protect MONUC headquarters and other facilities. Overall though, it is hard to discern what MONUC has verified or what effects monitoring and verification has had in prompting the adversaries to trust and cooperate with the peace process. This is not an indictment of MONUC for it is hard to imagine a peace operation facing a more difficult environment.

Turning to its public information efforts, MONUC produced some 60,000 posters and 50,000 bumper stickers from June to October 2002. It puts out a monthly magazine in French with a circulation of 5,000, a weekly newsletter, and a biweekly bulletin; as well as compiling a daily press review with news clippings. MONUC is using information to encourage combatants to disarm and repatriate, and to this end, they are trying to obtain 3 mobile FM transmitters. The population of Congo is about fifty million, and the country covers an area almost equal to one-fourth of the U.S.

There is one significant exception to this otherwise typical and modest information effort, and that is Radio Okapi. Radio Okapi is the most extensive U.N. radio project ever, broadcasting twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and reaching the whole Congo on FM via eight relay stations and on shortwave via three transmitters. Launched in February 2002, Radio Okapi’s content ranges from music to news, and includes material provided by the U.N. or interviews with MONUC officials. The main topics that aim to promote peace are: disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration. According to David Smith, MONUC’s chief of information:

There is no single voice that unites all the Congolese people. This radio project will allow people in the rebel-held territories to speak to people in government-controlled territories for the first time since the war broke out. A big role of the radio will be to convince people that it’s in their interest to lay down their arms and either be repatriated to their home country, if they come from somewhere else, or to find ways to join civil society and leave the war behind.

Radio Okapi is a joint project between MONUC and the Swiss-based NGO Fondation Hirondelle. Smith and David Wimhurst of the U.N. and the Fondation Hirondelle began planning the station in June 2001. The Fondation Hirondelle raised the funds, bought the equipment, and donated it to the U.N. which then deployed it out of Brindisi, Italy (the location of the U.N.’s rapid deployment logistics base (UNLB). The NGO currently pays about eighty-five percent of the operating expenses. The main station is located in MONUC’s Kinshasa headquarters but Radio Okapi is sufficiently independent that, says Smith, it might even criticize the U.N.’s role in the country.

Beyond sheer ambition, Radio Okapi innovated in a number of ways: bypassing the U.N. procurement system, direct ties between the U.N. and an NGO (including legal agreements between them), and speed of deployment: concept to broadcast in seven months. According to Wimhurst, “The U.N. can’t do this by itself. The partnership model is successful for the audience, the donors, the mission, and it will leave behind a well-funded independent radio for the Congo.”

Asked what effect the radio had in the Congo, an official at the Fondation Hirondelle said it was hard to judge as yet, but that in-country polling revealed that it had become the most popular station in the country within six months of its launch.

Conclusion: Impediments to U.N. Information Operations

Despite some areas of progress, there are many hurdles to overcome before the U.N. can use information operations to maximum advantage. These include difficulties with personnel, planning, and hardware, and bureaucratic resistance. There are also fears about keeping information operations impartial, and fears that information operations are tantamount to spying by the U.N. or member states. The fundamental problem for information operations at the U.N. is that they remain ad hoc, with little institutionalized support, and without sufficient planning and resources coming from the highest levels.

Personnel Capabilities: Problems with Recruitment, Staffing, and Training

The major personnel problem is that there is insufficient training for information operations. As a result, it takes too much time to assemble an information team. There is still a long way to go towards developing a useful rapid deployment roster and some of the reported progress in the years-long effort is “just PR” [public relations].

The DPI and the DPKO have organized some public information-related workshops and training exercises, including one in Dakar in late 2003 to train public information officers in Africa how to handle issues that come up with demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR). Unfortunately, the DPKO resisted this effort and sent a lower level staffer than the DPI had wished for.

The U.N. received a grant from the British government’s Department for International Development to train information officers, but has yet to find a teacher. Unfortunately, the few people who could teach the course are too busy helping in the field to teach. Finally, training for public information issues related to tasks such as DDR is worthy, but there is no training for the nuts and bolts of public information: how to set up an office when deployed, logistics, budgeting, procurement, and so forth. Some “fifty percent of staff are not adequately trained or prepared for missions in the field. This is major...the single greatest weakness in public information.” Recruitment is another problem, in part because there are no hiring and recruitment staff with a background in public information.

Information Planning: Becoming a Higher Priority, but Problems with Doctrine and Procedures Remain

Planners must fully integrate information operations when preparing peacekeeping missions. On the positive side, on July 23, 2003, the Secretary-General sent out a “Guidance to Special Representatives of the Secretary-General: Public Information and Media Relations in United Nations Peace Operations,” giving general guidance for how Heads of Mission should work with their respective spokespersons and public information officers and what kinds of information they should be gathering and disseminating. Another positive is a chapter on Public Information in a forthcoming U.N. handbook on multidimensional operations. The book leaves specific operational instructions aside, but goes into admirable depth on the need for information operations to confront hate media, to explain the purpose of the mission to the local population, of developing independent media capabilities in-country, to play a proactive role in countering misperceptions, and to engage in counter-propaganda.

Despite these developments, there seem to be perpetual delays in formulating information standard operating procedures (SOPs), and public information staff face hurdles trying to communicate their needs to the planners. According to one source, the SOPs were in draft form in October 2001, and have been almost done for two years, but the DPI’s Peace and Security Section has been too overwhelmed to finalize them. Another problem in designing information missions and tailoring them once they are in place is that there are no metrics (polling, surveys, etc.) for measuring the impact of various media efforts. The U.N. can get messages out, but it can not assess their effects.

Hardware Capabilities: Considerable Progress and Potential

The U.N. has made considerable progress with hardware in two ways. The first is the pioneering cooperative effort between the Fondation Hirondelle and the U.N. in MONUC to provide radio coverage across the Congo (see above). This is a real hardware (and expertise) multiplier for the U.N., and provides a model for future innovation. Increasing numbers of NGOs such as Search for Common Ground, Clandestine Radio, and the Open Society Institute have joined the information fray and are trying to combat hate radio and promote peace in various areas. Many governments recognize the value of positive information and the necessity of combating hate radio; the British, Swiss, and U.S. governments are the three largest funders of Radio Okapi, and they channel the funds through their support of the Fondation Hirondelle.

The second is the acquisition of Public Information Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) for rapid deployment of media operations, located at the UNLB in Brindisi. The U.N. has procured about $1.5 million in equipment, mostly for radio broadcasting, along with materiel for print and video media. However, the procurement and deployment mechanisms are convoluted and inefficient. Information materiel is procured through two different U.N. entities (supply and communications), and arrives in Brindisi in a haphazard way with no asssurance of compatibility. From there, materiel is stored in different locations, and in part because different departments must release the equipment, it gets sent out from Brindisi in different packages.

The U.N. first used the SDS in its recent deployment to Liberia. The information team barely got a minimal broadcast out the first day. The information officers could not find their main transmitter for seven weeks, and they personally had to unload and search through hundreds of tons of equipment looking for the information materiel. Instead of being rapidly deployable, poor shipping procedures and inventory management meant that equipment languished on the docks.

Bureaucratic Problems

Bureaucratic problems exacerbate several of the above mentioned hurdles facing information operations at the U.N. First, coordination will be hampered so long as the DPKO continues to have only one information officer in its 600 person-strong department. Second, physical distance between the DPI and the DPKO within U.N. headquarters limits cooperation. Third, the DPKO still does not pay enough attention information operations.

Fourth, the DPI focuses almost entirely on producing content, and the DPI has no one who focuses on technical issues (the technical people are outside contractors). The DPI also has no specialists in the logistics chain necessary to support information operations. Finally, many sources lamented that the DPI is over-centralized, lacks innovation, is self-absorbed, is insufficiently focused on peacekeeping (and other) missions in the field, and lacks respect from member nations and other units within the U.N.

One way to ameliorate these problems is to create a strong, dedicated information unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Such a unit is more likely to think creatively about using information in ways that go beyond self-promotion or clarification of an operation’s purposes (valuable as those functions are). The sole focus of the DPKO is the mandates of missions, while the DPI has responsibilities throughout the U.N. Hence, from a bureaucratic politics perspective, the DPKO is more likely to use information aggressively and creatively to serve the mission, and have less institutional incentive or momentum to divert information resources away from the mandate. There are staffers with DPKO experience in the Peace and Security Section of the DPI. This kind of cross-pollinization helps both the DPI and the DPKO, and should be increased, as should rotations between the field and the U.N. in New York.

An information unit within the DPKO would be the kind of bureaucratic shakeup that would lead both units to innovate. For example, if the DPKO gained more control of information operations, the DPI might feel increased competitive incentives to help more aggressively in the field. As is, information operations face greater structural hurdles than they should because most of the DPI is innovation-averse. Likewise, those in the DPKO who undervalue information operations might reassess if the DPKO contained more information advocates. A final argument for more information-resources to go to the DPKO is that for each civilian component in the field (finance, personnel, etc), the DPKO has a corresponding support unit in house – except for public information.

Some may fear increased information operations will cause resource loss from their own divisions. Luckily, information operations are cheap. For example, MONUC cost 608 million dollars from July 2002 through June 2003. Yet Radio Okapi, the most ambitious radio operation in the history of the U.N. costs about four million dollars a year – about two-thirds of one percent of MONUC’s expenses.

Fears of Losing Impartiality and Fears of Spying

A source of resistance for information operations is that member states fear spying by the U.N. and are suspicious of activities with the word “information” in their titles. In addition, many in the U.N. fear that the more active use of information would jeopardize its impartiality. I address these concerns in turn.

First, fears of spying can not be waved away; it will take time and experience with information operations. Those who fear can be reminded that survey missions and strategic analysis routinely precede peacekeeping operations, and all peacekeeping operations collect information (on such topics as the sources and nature of rumors, location and armament of adversaries, etc.), just to be effective. Despite this, some governments, particularly in Africa, resist even fact-finding missions. In this context, it is understandable that information operations and radio stations are “threatening and provoke caution in an organization where sovereignty is king.”

Second, fears that information operations will impair the U.N.’s impartiality are off base. Consider the Brahimi report’s sage advice about operations which may find themselves in violent situations:

Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.

The U.N. will not lose impartiality by using truthful information. In any operation which deploys thousands of peacekeepers, it strains credulity to think that radio broadcasts will be the determining factor that makes the mission seem biased or partial. Indeed, information operations are often necessary to help combat misperceptions of bias.

Where aggressors are determined, little will stop them - including information. But where peace and war hang in the balance, there is evidence that information operations can coerce violators into better behavior. Combined with the clear benefits of explaining the mission, teaching about elections, defusing rumors and misperceptions, there are few if any sound reasons not to proceed with more robust information operations.

This book examined whether information can be used to promote peace. I found that it can, and that it is most likely to be successful in areas such as the Congo or Horn of Africa where U.N. missions are deployed and are likely to be deployed in the future. In this appendix, I showed that the U.N. does not adequately understand the power of information or use information as aggressively as it should. While the U.N. continues to face barriers and problems as it plans for the future of information operations, this book should strengthen the arguments of those who wish to overcome these barriers and use information to more actively promote peace.

Appendix 2: Insights on Transparency from the Open Skies, Strategic Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation Regimes

This appendix surveys other regimes to explore how transparency is provided and what effects it has under different conditions. The aims are to reinforce or weaken my findings, to suggests areas for more research, and to get a sense of how my findings might have been different with different cases. The section on Open Skies is about a Treaty which epitomizes transparency, but whose effects are hard to discern in most cases. However, a bilateral version of Open Skies was signed and implemented between Hungary and Romania. None of my main cases has anything near this clear an example of anticipated transparency motivating cooperation. The section on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaties shows how transparency-related technologies (especially satellites) enabled arms control, but that arms control itself was buffeted by the larger political forces of the Cold War. I argue that the greatest transparency-related benefit of superpower strategic arms control was to make the future more certain and predictable. Finally, the section on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) shows the nonproliferation regime confirming fears (or worse), illustrates how hard it is to monitor evasive parties, and shows that transparency can not calm fears when conditions justify the fears.

This appendix helps demonstrate the tradeoffs in my case selection. My cases let me say a lot about forums, and about the abilities of peacekeepers to monitor buffer zones, arms control agreements, and elections. I examined how multifunctional operations tried to shape their information environments, and explained why they need to explain themselves in difficult environments. This analysis helps me shed light on public diplomacy and information operations more generally because I showed transparency working better when there are relatively few information competitors and when biases are not so high that new information can not penetrate.

Had I focused more on superpower arms control, or arms control and confidence-building more generally, I suspect I would have been able to make stronger arguments about the distributional issues involved with transparency. This is because negotiation and ratification of many arms control agreements are more often accompanied by debates about operational security versus verification, and about security seeking through transparency versus security seeking through secrecy. These issues are less prominent for informal regimes like the Concert, or in the deployment of peacekeeping operations where, at least in my cases, great power politics played a large role in setting up or imposing missions.

Other arguments that the arms control cases open up are the extent to which surveillance and verification technology must precede arms control. To the extent it is a prerequisite, it may diminish the transparency contribution of arms control. They may also be mutually-reinforcing, so this is a question for further research.

The IAEA/NPT cases in particular contained examples in which bargaining (and about transparency, no less) sometimes did lead to hostile deadlock or war. This contrasts with the successful bargaining during the Concert, and again I note that more study needs to be done on what influences these divergent outcomes.

Despite these opportunities suggested by the mini-cases in this Appendix, these cases also present opportunity costs compared to my main cases. I am not sure I would have been able to document as many effects of transparency as well had I used these as main cases, and the other contributions I made would have been diminished by a focus on arms control. With space and time constraints, there are tradeoffs when picking between cases. This is true in terms of target audiences, as well as with the kinds of arguments explored and foreclosed. From what I can tell and with the exception of the IAEA/NPT cases, the transparency-related effects of arms control agreements are often harder to measure than the effects of forums (at least the Concert, thanks to the comparison with pre-forum diplomacy) and peacekeeping operations. It was the variations between and within my cases in both transparency provided and its effects that formed what I hope are my useful conclusions about the provision and effects of transparency under different conditions. Finally, I would like to say more to the arms control community. But I am happy being able to explore cases and make arguments of interest to the security regimes community which is drawn like bees to honey to the Concert, and to those interested in insights about forums, bargaining, peacekeeping, information operations, and public diplomacy.

Open Skies

Perhaps nothing symbolizes transparency as much as the concept of Open Skies, which is agreed-upon surveillance overflights between countries. Analysis of Open Skies regimes highlights several themes. First, negotiations over Open Skies and information-sharing reinforce the argument that transparency has severe distributional consequences. This is not a value judgement, but it is clear that there are legitimate security-seeking arguments held by those who value secrecy and those who value transparency. How can one tell under which circumstances which argument is the more wise? In negotiations over regimes that increase transparency, these distributional questions seem much more severe in arms control agreements between rough equals, than in peacekeeping operations where a major factor for their deployments were shifts in superpower relations, and/or great power pressure. While this is logical, the point is that even though I highlighted distributional issues above in the main text, there are circumstances when they cut even more deeply.

Second, one factor that influences distributional consequences is the extent of prior means of intelligence collection. The less one has, the more valuable Open Skies becomes. This is similar to the argument that transparency in the context of information operations works best when information competitors are scarce. Redundant sources of information make new sources less valuable. Third, transparency and intelligence are complex beasts, and the prior argument is a bit simplistic. Open Skies benefits the U.S. in multiple ways, despite its intelligence advantages. Open Skies allows the U.S. to devote other intelligence assets such as satellites to hot spots, while letting Open Skies flights compensate, and it establishes a bar of openness for the Russians to meet. That bar is itself a transparency-increasing device.

All this said, it is very hard to find documentable examples of threat assessments being altered on the basis of Open Skies overflights. There is one clear case though, and that is the bilateral Open Skies agreement between Hungary and Romania, which I examine at the end of the section.

The idea for Open Skies became public with President Dwight Eisenhower’s July 1955 proposal to the Soviet Union to allow mutual overflights of each other’s territory, and reduce fears of surprise attack. Eisenhower’s proposal was generally welcomed on Capitol Hill, and apparently the few conservative Senators who dissented did so because they were not consulted. Some, such as Eisenhower, supported the proposal as a move to calm tensions and promote peace. However, others including General Arthur Radford envisioned a net intelligence gain for the open U.S. which had more difficulty penetrating the closed Russian security apparatus than vice-versa. While the Soviets publically professed that the proposal did not go far enough to promote peace, they in fact rejected it as a “Western espionage plot.” Eisenhower was motivated by mutual gains, but the Soviets were gripped by fears about relative gains.

The Open Skies proposal lay dormant until May 1989 when President George Bush rekindled the idea in a speech. In the intervening three decades, however, the U.S. had opened the Soviet’s skies with U-2 and SR-71 spy plane overflights and both sides deployed a series of increasingly sophisticated spy satellites. While this may have limited the amount of transparency derived from new aerial photography, the Bush proposal did aim to increase transparency in that he was testing Russia’s commitment to greater openness. He was also countering the good publicity created by Mikhail Gorbachev’s many initiatives. The Canadians subsequently prodded Bush into making Open Skies a multilateral agreement, and it came to encompass the 27 NATO and former Warsaw pact members. Even if Russia and the U.S. could rely mostly on their satellites, the multilateral version of Open Skies would diffuse the transparency benefits of the aerial flights more broadly.

The State and Defense Departments and the intelligence community had to figure out what kind of sensors the surveillance aircraft would use, what kind of restrictions would be placed on flight plans, who would have access to gathered data, and so forth. As these agencies moved to make the proposal concrete and firm up the U.S. bargaining position they split among and within each other between those who wanted intrusive inspections and were willing to give up some secrecy in return, and those who placed a higher priority on secrecy. This conflict of priorities is “central” to aerial surveillance negotiations, and this applies to bureaucracies within countries as well. Ultimately, the U.S. opening position was to have unrestricted flight plans (with limits only for safety), a ban on sensors for signals intelligence (SIGINT), and unlimited types of other sensors.

In the end, the U.S. aimed for an agreement in which flight plans had to be announced in advance, SIGINT sensors were banned, and four types of other sensors were allowed: two cameras, one infrared, and one radar, all with specifically limited resolutions. This proposal went through some intra-NATO discussion and modifications, and the two sides opened negotiations in February 1990.

The Soviets rejected the U.S./NATO proposal because of U.S. sensor superiority, and countered by proposing a common aerial fleet with a central data processing facility. On a number of points, NATO wanted to use its sensors to advantage, while the Soviets sought to prevent spying. Moreover, the Soviets thought that the confidence-building aspects of Open Skies could be accomplished with sensors adequate to detect large scale movements of troops and materiel, while NATO, which maintained low day-to-day readiness and depended on fine-grained advance warning to mobilize reserves and prevent surprise attack, wanted better sensors. As turbulence gripped the Baltics and the Soviet ‘near-abroad,’the Russian military gained a greater voice in the negotiations, and their position hardened. A key sticking point was Soviet resistence to unrestricted territorial access. By late 1991 however, the Soviets acceded to phased-in but more intrusive inspections with no territorial limits. In March 1992, the Open Skies Treaty was signed.

The Treaty was quickly ratified by the U.S. and most of the NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. But it did not come into force until January 1, 2002, after the Russians finally ratified the Treaty. Despite participating in a number of trial flights in the 1990s, the Russians delayed ratification because the Duma was hawkishly suspicious of the Treaty, the Russians did not want any Open Skies scheme in place during the troubles in Chechnya, and they did not want to reveal the depth of their implosion. A number of factors from the election of Vladimir Putin, diplomacy by the U.S. and its allies, to the decline in Russian satellite capabilities turned the Russians around.

The aims of the treaty are well expressed here:

....According to the agreement of 24 March 1992, twenty-five states from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the former Warsaw Pact, and the former Soviet Union will conduct unarmed overflights of one another’s territories to assess the disposition, strength, and preparedness of opposing military forces.

These flights will allow states to evaluate the nature of security threats – based on facts collected independently or collaboratively, not on unfounded suspicions or worst case analyses. They will permit nations to survey the status of events in countries of interest, gleaning early indications and warning of troubling developments or reassurance of a neighbor’s peaceful intent. Thus, the possibility of wars caused by accident, or by a buildup of tensions based on rumor and suspicion can be significantly reduced.

Like almost all the literature on Open Skies, this passage echoes my hypotheses which contend that transparency promotes cooperation by reducing uncertainty and miscalculation (H3) and that transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4).

With the exception of the Hungary/Romania case, it is unfortunately hard to tell from the sparse Open Skies literature what concrete effects Open Skies flights have had on international politics and levels of tension. Tension levels between the U.S. and Russia are now so low that they have now signed a strategic nuclear arms control agreement with no verification provisions at all. In addition, the growth of civil remote-sensing satellites and the diffusion of military surveillance satellites have threatened to make aerial surveillance, and therefore Open Skies, redundant. Another critique of Open Skies is that because flights and flight plans are pre-announced, important secrets can be sheltered from view (or ruses set up).

Arguably however, the Open Skies Treaty succeeded in one of its major political goals which was to test and demonstrate Russia’s commitment to transparency and openness. Officials who negotiated Open Skies, implementing agencies, and other proponents argue that Open Skies still offers a number of transparency and other benefits. Its symbolic importance is said to fuel further cooperation and trust. It helps level the intelligence playing field for participating countries, as all sides have access to the data gathered. Even though satellites have proliferated, most NATO and former Warsaw pact countries do not operate them. Finally, like most arms control agreements, if the time does come when the Treaty is violated (flights denied in this case), then that sends a signal of malign intent. Such signals are less obvious when there are no agreements to break.

Francis Stenger, Deputy Division Chief for implementation of the Open Skies Treaty at the U.S. Department of Defense Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) revealed a number of more specific details. He reinforced the argument that the decline in Russian intelligence assets meant that Open Skies gave them real, hard intelligence. However, even though the U.S. has much greater capabilities, Open Skies lets the U.S. keep more expensive and hard to maneuver assets (satellites) focused on hotspots, while overflights help monitor the Eurasian areas within the Treaty zone. For states that lack overhead reconnaissance platforms, the Open Skies Treaty affords access to otherwise impossible to get data about neighbors.

Stenger noted that no one trusted commercial satellites because images can be manipulated, are hard to read, and do not have as good a resolution as Open Skies platforms. Further, commercial satellites are between extremely expensive to impossible to direct where you want them and when. Because Open Skies planes are manned by the inspecting side, there is a verifiable chain of custody of the images that contrasts with commercial sources, providing insurance of accuracy. For specific instances of tensions calmed and suspicions assuaged, Stenger said that the conflict-ridden history of the central-European region fueled a near-perpetual level of fear. He noted that the Russians take particular care to overfly Poland to make sure they are not threatened by its turn toward the West. Stenger said that the point of Open Skies was to reveal national intentions, such as fleet or mass army movements, not national secrets; it is “Open Skies not Open Spies.” For this reason, the 72 hour warning before flights does not corrupt the purpose of Open Skies because national secrets may be cloaked in that time, but not signals of national intent. Stenger would not discuss any instances of countries trying to use Open Skies flights to perpetrate ruses and spread misinformation.

Finally, Stenger mentioned a number of places where Open Skies overflights might be of use, including between India and Pakistan where the withdrawal of forces beyond mutual firing ranges could be monitored, for starters. Other areas of tension that could profit from Open Skies and confidence-building measures include the Middle East and the Koreas. He also noted that overflights could be used in the “three borders” area between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay to monitor smuggling, and can be used to monitor environmental problems such as flooding and deforestation. Indeed, a number Open Skies flights have been sent over the Balkans, and flights also helped assess the damage from Hurricane Mitch to Central America in 1998, and from the flooding of the Oder River in 1997. Numerous proposals exist to expand Open Skies flights to regions ranging from Central Asia to Africa and for purposes ranging from environmental monitoring to verification of arms control agreements such as the NPT.

Hungary/Romania: Bilateral Open Skies

The area of Transylvania has grown and shrank and gone back and forth between Hungary and Romania several times during the war-torn history of the Balkans. At the end of World War II, Romania gained control of the territory. With the end of the Cold War, hardliners in both Hungary and Romania used the substantial Hungarian population in Transylvania to stir up tensions. The withdrawal of Russia’s heavy hand and fall of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu raised the specter of malignant ethno-nationalism in Transylvania. This threat was underscored by the disastrous experience in neighboring Yugoslavia following the rule of Josip Tito. Hungary and Romania had rich historical ties to Transylvania, and there had was a long tradition of Transylvania’s ‘owners’ reframing history to suit their own glorious past, renaming places and monuments to suit, and other attempts at cultural and political domination.

So it was no surprise when tensions rose and violence broke out, most notably at Tirgu Mures in March 1990 when almost 20,000 ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hungarians fought in a bloody clash. Fortunately, cooler heads began to prevail, and both sides sought to calm tensions within themselves, between themselves, and to demonstrate to the outside world that the region was stable and worthy of investment. As part of this process, Romania proposed a bilateral Open Skies agreement with Hungary in July of 1990. Hungary, though, was more interested in the multilateral version of Open Skies as proposed by Bush. However, with the Bush proposal stalled, Hungary agreed to talk and bilateral negotiations began in February 1991. This was a textbook case of anticipated transparency promotes cooperation (H2), as “the perception by both sides of the immediate need for greater transparency led to rapid negotiation and implementation of an agreement.”

The main points were hammered out in three days, and a Treaty signed on May 11, 1991. The treaty allowed for four eight hour flights per year for each country, with seven day advance notice (and any flights taken under the multilateral Open Skies Treaty add to this number). A demonstration flight with a multinational crew went up in June 1991, and media coverage helped boost popular support for the program. Observers from seventeen of the states participating in the multilateral Open Skies negotiations were on hand “to get the message through to their governments: Hungarian-Romania (sic) relations were stable.”

One analyst cites personal communication with the Hungarian treaty negotiator Marton Krasznai who claims “enormous” impacts of the bilateral Open Skies Treaty. Stenger agreed that the flights had calming effects. As of 1996, the overflights still got glowing press coverage, the flights reassure politicians and people on the street about each side’s peaceful intentions, and helped them in “overcoming or reframing enemy images.” If true, this is transparency reducing unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4) in action.

In the end, although it appears that both sides were interested in increasing transparency, what they got from their four yearly flights was probably as much the appearance of transparency as a real increase in transparency. However, the symbolic importance was a real and significant factor in convincing the respective publics in each country that peace should prevail, in helping the overall bilateral peace process, and helping outsiders perceive the situation as stable.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

Arms control has a number of goals, some of which are aided by transparency. The most important goal of arms control is to reduce the probability of war. Secondary goals are to reduce the costs of preparation for war, and to reduce the consequences of war if it occurs. Arms control can reduce the probability of war reducing offensive weapons and thus increasing crisis stability, by limiting arms races and the tensions they produce, and by embodying or symbolizing improving relations between adversaries and thus prompting better relations.

Transparency can play a role at several junctures to promote peace in the context of arms control. First, no agreement to limit offensive weapons is likely to be signed unless it can be mutually verified (SORT excepted). Further, an agreement that limits specific types of weapons will require far more intrusive verification than Open Skies-type agreements which only seek to verify broad indicators of national intent. The sensitivity of these inspections sharply escalates the tradeoffs between security seeking through transparency versus security seeking through secrecy. Second, agreements can themselves send signals that an adversary is willing to be open or make compromises. Third, a major benefit of arms control (and about regimes in the literature on cooperation more generally) is that it extends the shadow of the future. In this context, proponents argue that strategic arms control, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) in particular, limited arms racing not only by the obvious fact that it limited arms, but also because it reduced worst-case assumptions by making the future more predictable. Finally, an ongoing arms control negotiating process serves as a de facto forum for involved parties – though with very hard to measure effects.

In this space, I can not hope to provide a detailed account of transparency and its effects within the context of strategic arms control. I do, however, survey the negotiations and effects of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (I and II) and the associated ABMT. By 1968, the Soviets and the U.S. came to broad agreement to pursue arms control. After being delayed by the 1968 uprisings in Eastern Europe, formal negotiations started in late 1969. Catalysts included the need to restrain the resources devoted to the growing strategic arms race, as well as growing perceptions that an arms race involving missile defenses would be particularly costly and destabilizing.

Two background factors enabled strategic arms control. First, the U.S. recognized that the Soviets had essentially achieved strategic parity, meaning that arms control would not result in disproportional gains for the Soviets. Likewise, once the Soviets gained parity, arms control would not lock them into perpetual inferiority. The second was advances in satellite and remote sensing technologies. Arms control could not take place in the absence of capabilities for verification. This raises the issue of how (unilateral and ambient) transparency existed before arms control, provided by satellites, and so forth. What increment of cooperative transparency was added by arms control, or were they mutually reinforcing? It seems clear that unilateral transparency came first, and provided perhaps the lion’s share of Cold War transparency, at least up until near the end of the Cold War. Even legitimation of satellite reconnaissance preceded strategic arms control. Gaddis argues that through mid-1963, the Soviets had insisted that satellite reconnaissance was illegal, but they tacitly accepted it by the end of the year - perhaps because of their own growing capabilities. The SALT agreements made tacit acceptance more explicit, and built in a few relatively minor provisions to make verification easier (below). Some argue that it was arms control that led to the "overcoming [of] longstanding Soviet resistance to satellite reconnaissance," but Gaddis' history is convincing. If Gaddis is right that 1963 was a turning point for Cold War transparency, then the contribution of arms control to transparency is less than some believe. It took almost twenty years for arms control to provide transparency breakthroughs on its own, with the on-site inspection provisions of the December 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) being the most notable. By this time though, Gorbachev was at the helm in Russia and the tectonic plates of Cold War politics were shifting. The INF Treaty reflected and helped cause this shift.

Congress overwhelmingly approved SALT I with votes of 88 - 2 in the Senate and 307 - 4 in the House, and it entered into force in October 1972. It limited the number of delivery vehicles and launchers on each side, while allowing a variety of modernization options. The U.S. insisted that MIRV (multiple warheads per missile) technology not be capped as it was in the lead and wanted to exploit this advantage – even though many critics saw MIRVS as destabilizing.

Much more significant was the ABMT, signed alongside SALT I in May 1972. The ABMT limited deployment of missile defenses to 100 defensive missiles at two sites. This capped a defensive and offensive arms race, the latter because ABMs hinder each side’s offense. For both SALT and the ABMT, verification was provided by two main clauses: one that permitted the use of national technical means (NTMs – satellites) and another that prohibited attempts to interfere with verification. SALT II added a provision that each side not encrypt the radio signals (telemetry) sent by test missiles, and it required satellite-observable differences between different aircraft and cruise missile designs. In a sense, SALT II also incorporated some worst-case assumptions in that once a missile type was tested with MIRVs, deployments of that missile were assumed to all be equipped with MIRVs.

Surprisingly, questions about verification did not plague the SALT I talks, at least on the U.S. side. In the midst of the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration was anxious to the point of “hyperbolic...overselling” of SALT I to appear as a peacemaker. And as the Congressional votes above indicate, the Congress and public were eager for good news as well. Public concerns about SALT I compliance were not raised until 1975. The organization created to work out compliance issues, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), was able to resolve six of eight issues raised by the U.S. side in 1978.

SALT II was signed in June of 1979, it reduced the number of launchers slightly, capped warheads on ICBMs to ten, and placed some limits on modernization. SALT II disappointed liberals because it did so little, while it infuriated hawks who were concerned about disproportional limits that they believed favored the Soviets, and about anticipated difficulties with verification. In contrast to SALT I, verification issues were among the “most intractable” in debates about SALT II ratification. During the Senate debate, the Carter administration claimed that every compliance issue raised about SALT I had been successfully resolved. Many disagreed. Moreover, the backdrop for these rising concerns about compliance problems was a general worsening of Cold War tensions. There were Soviet-backed Cubans in Angola, a Soviet brigade reported in Cuba, and hope for ratification of SALT II died with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. SALT II was never ratified, though both countries generally abided by its terms.

During the Reagan administration, concern grew over Soviet compliance with both SALT I/II and the ABMT. The administration accused the Soviets of building an ABM radar at Krasnoyarsk, far away from its permitted location. The U.S. also accused the Soviets of building too many new intercontinental ballistic missiles, and encrypting their missile telemetry. In 1983 when the Cold War seemed to be about as tension-filled as it had been prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution 93-0 requiring the Reagan administration to submit a report on Soviet compliance with existing agreements. In 1986, the U.S. said it would no longer adhere by the SALT structure, and broke out later in 1986 by converting too many B-52s into cruise-missile launching platforms. Just as successful agreements and verified compliance can signal good will, and help good will grow, suspicions about compliance can poison relations. While debates about compliance and verification are about transparency, the successes and failures and ultimate influence of transparency are all hard to discern in the greater ebb and flow of superpower relations during the Cold War.

The subsequent Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II in 1991 and 1993, respectively) did succeed in substantially reducing strategic weapons. Both START Treaties were made possible by the end of the Cold War. But with regard to transparency, neither surpassed the INF Treaty’s on-site verification provisions.

Perhaps the most remarkable evidence for the argument that arms control agreements are symptoms as much as causes of political relations is the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) of May 2002. It cuts nuclear warheads significantly by about one half from START II levels. Yet instead of the minutiae about each weapons system found in previous treaties, the text reads instead: "Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads." For implementation and verification, all SORT has is Article III, which reads in its entirety: "For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission." In other words, the SORT Treaty had no verification provisions at all, another symptom of the low levels of U.S. - Russian tensions.

While arms control was made possible by the confluence of technology, political will, and parity in capabilities, it’s fortunes were clearly tied to overall superpower politics. Yet the counterfactual seems fairly chilling. In the absence of arms control, it is easy to imagine a world of much greater instability, of greater offensive and defensive arms racing, and of greater fear. Arms control put a lid on this possibility. Perhaps the greatest transparency-related contribution of arms control was to make the future more certain and more predictable.

IAEA/NPT: Iran, Iraq, North Korea

This section offers a transparency-eye overview of how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have performed in monitoring and constraining the nuclear weapons activities of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

A theme that runs through all three cases in this section is that no level of inspections, on-site and other, can fully assuage the suspicions of skeptical countries. There are two reasons for this. First and obviously, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea all give countries who would be threatened by them ample reason to feel threatened. Covert programs, lies, and deception all provide sound bases for suspicions. Second, the Iraq case shows that even with on-site inspections, it is very hard to verify to an adequate level of assurance when the inspected country resists inspections.

Iran’s recent experience with the IAEA includes a private arms control group using commercial satellite photography to help discover and publicize illicit proliferation activities.

The story of Iraq involves Israel and the U.S. attacking Iraq because of the IAEA’s inability to provide sufficient transparency, and the 1991 Gulf War ending with a major coercive transparency regime – but one that failed in the face of determined resistance.

The case of North Korea (and Iraq) shows that breaking agreements can send signals, and that regimes can increase transparency, even in their death throes. It is also possible that North Korea is using the regime precisely to send dangerous signals, and increase its leverage at the bargaining table.

Background on the IAEA and NPT

The NPT entered into force in March 1970, with two main provisions known as the ‘grand bargain.’ First, the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) pledged not to obtain nuclear weapons, while the five original nuclear weapons states (NWS) of the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom were allowed to keep their weapons, on condition that they pursue complete nuclear disarmament. In exchange for forgoing nuclear weapons, the second provision under Article IV gave the NNWS the “inalienable right” to acquire and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely, putting an end to periodic review conferences.

Under Article III, signatories had to establish a safeguards inspection agreement with the IAEA. Almost every state has signed and ratified the NPT, with three notable exceptions: Israel, India, and Pakistan. In January 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT.

Right from the beginning, several transparency-related points emerge. First, a deal that prohibits weapons while allowing nuclear power and research is inherently murky. Even though the IAEA is supposed to monitor the civilian programs, civilian programs are a precursor to weapons development for states who so desire. States can go to the brink of a weapons capability, and still be members in good standing of the NPT. Second, as each state negotiates its own safeguards agreement, each agreement is idosyncratic. While this tailoring may be effective, it is also somewhat opaque and uneven. As we saw with UNDOF, inspection agreements that look good on paper, may not necessarily work well in practice.

Third, the IAEA is usually limited to monitoring civilian nuclear programs, leaving any illicit programs essentially in the clear. This led to the rather stunningly obvious insight by Jan Lodding that “Experience with Iraq, DPRK [North Korea] and South Africa underlined the need to focus more on the possibility that States have undeclared nuclear material and activities.” Fourth, the fact that the newer nuclear weapons states of Israel, India, and Pakistan never signed is an indication that at least some countries take obligations seriously and are honest proliferators. As I argued above, making and breaking agreements send signals, and here we see that not signing is also a signal. Likewise, North Korea’s withdrawal from the IAEA and threat to withdraw from the NPT in1993-1994 helped signal its intentions to the world, and galvanize a response. Finally, in response to problems with the safeguards that have appeared over time, the safeguards have been progressively strengthened. Most notably, in 1997, an Additional Protocol to the NPT allowed IAEA inspectors greater access to states’ facilities.

Iran

Iran ratified the NPT in 1970, and has developed a fairly extensive civilian nuclear infrastructure in a program it accelerated during the Iran-Iraq war and then again after the 1991 Gulf War. Russia has been the main supplier, but Iran also purchased equipment and sought aid from China, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Due to the hostage crisis under President Carter, the U.S. has long been suspicious of Iran. Relations deteriorated further after President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union speech where he labeled Iran as a member of the “axis of evil.”

Later that year, secret Iranian nuclear facilities were discovered, in part by an analysis of commercial satellite photography done by the private arms control group Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), whose mission is in part to bring “about greater transparency of nuclear activities worldwide.” U.S. intelligence satellites and Iranian expatriates also helped reveal parts of the Iranian nuclear program. The pioneering use of commercial satellites by ISIS brings what I called Ambient Transparency to a new level, and makes it harder for governments to keep secrets. The proliferation of satellites is why, when I teach about the Gulf War, one of my points is that General Schwartzkopf's surprise left hook might not be possible in today's world.

Iran acknowledged these facilities in December 2002. In early 2003, the IAEA inspected the newly discovered enrichment facility at Natanz, found that it was much more extensive than anyone had thought, and learned of Iranian plans to expand the operation. Iran then admitted having additional facilities, some of which were elaborately concealed. This added to suspicions, already grounded in the puzzle of why oil and gas-rich Iran needed any nuclear facilities at all. From a transparency point of view, one interesting observation is that here we see private groups, national intelligence services, and the IAEA all working together to shed light on what the Iranians are up to.

These revelations helped catalyze a European effort to cap the Iranian programs. In late 2003, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom worked together to put pressure on Iran to fully address IAEA concerns. Russia has been slow to sporadic in wanting to slow the Iranians, while the U.S. has supported the Europeans, but not with much vigor. As I write, a complicated diplomatic dance continues, with the Europeans and the U.S. threatening to push harder unless Iran opens up, and Iran periodically threatening to withdraw any cooperation unless the West backs off.

The endgame remains hard to predict. Muhammad el-Baradei, head of the IAEA, recently said that the Iranians have made some progress but that “There are still some important issues about the extent of the enrichment program, but we are moving in the right direction; and the earlier Iran would allow us through transparency measures to do all that we need the better, of course, for everybody, including Iran.” In response, the U.S. State Department’s head nonproliferation official, Robert Joseph, “told yesterday's conference that Iran has provided a ‘dizzying array of cover stories and false statements’ about its nuclear program. He said the best way to assure its compliance with the IAEA is through UN Security Council pressure.” Although the IAEA has strengthened its safeguards procedures, it seems unlikely that any conceivable level of inspections would satisfy a suspicious U.S. and allies. For example, in late 2003, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency told Congress that "even with intrusive IAEA safeguards inspections in Natanz, there is a serious risk that Iran could use its enrichment technology in covert activities." In response, Iran makes a few good points including noting that its nuclear programs began under the Shah. And, treaty obligations aside, Iran, like Iraq, Israel, India, and Pakistan, all live in tough neighborhoods.

Iraq

Iraq ratified the NPT in 1969, and in the 1970s, it began to build the Osiraq nuclear reactor at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center with French help. Israel destroyed the reactor with an airstrike on June 7, 1981. Israel acted in part because it was “not convinced” by the ability of IAEA safeguards and inspections to prevent diversion of nuclear material and to prevent Iraq from building nuclear weapons. Put another way, distrust in the transparency provided by the IAEA helped spark the bombing. As the world later learned, that distrust was well placed because Iraq engaged in a long term and systematic effort to deceive the IAEA.

Following the Gulf War, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991. The resolution ordered Iraq to declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction, and to do so under international supervision and on-site inspections by the IAEA for nuclear programs, and by a special commission, UNSCOM, for biological, chemical, and missile programs. Iraq accepted – it had no choice – the resolution within days. An exchange of letters granted UNSCOM and the IAEA unrestricted access to all records and all facility above or below ground, with no advance warning. This is perhaps the clearest example of coerced transparency.

From almost the very beginning, UNSCOM and the IAEA were obstructed and lied to. For example, in June 1991, Iraqi forces fired warning shots at an inspection team and inspectors found plutonium and a uranium enrichment program, neither of which had been declared. To make a long story short, much of the 1990s were filled with cat and mouse games in which Iraq would try to obstruct inspectors, and the U.S. and the U.N. would try to pressure Iraq into cooperating. In August 1998, Scott Ritter resigned as head UNSCOM inspector, saying that Iraq “is not disarmed anywhere near the level required by Security Council resolutions,” that Iraq had lied since “day one,” that significant capabilities remain, and that the “illusion of arms control is more dangerous than no arms control at all.” By late 1998, Iraq had made it impossible for the UNSCOM and the IAEA to be effective, the inspectors were withdrawn, and the U.S. and Britain launched a punitive bombing campaign, Desert Fox.

During the 1990s, inspectors nonetheless ended up finding and destroying dozens of missiles and hundreds of tons of chemical weapons agents, and they dismantled extensive biological and nuclear weapons program. Despite this, there were large gaps in the quantities of WMD materials indicated in Iraqi documents, and what was known to have been destroyed. Hence, the consensus of weapons inspectors, and the assessment of many intelligence services around the world was that Iraq retained significant WMD research and weapon capabilities. Inspectors with boots on the ground, aided by U.S. intelligence, could not seem to find sizable portions of Iraq’s WMD programs. This suggests that even under the most favorable circumstances, it is hard to coerce transparency from a resistant party.

After September 11, 2001, the U.S. became increasingly concerned with WMD terrorism, and looked to confront threats from what President George Bush called the “Axis of Evil:” Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Of these, Iraq became the target of particular concern and the U.S. threatened war unless Iraq accepted a new inspection regime and proved that it had disarmed. Although it became apparent after the ensuing war that Iraq did not possess WMD, it was not forthcoming in helping prove that it had no more WMD. For example, it produced a 12,000 page collection of documents to show what it had done to its WMD materials and programs, but these documents were unsatisfying, often recycled from years before. Whether or not the new inspection regime would be able to conclude anything decisive, and how long it would take, was a matter of debate between proponents and opponents of the war. My opinion is that for all the important players, their position on the possible war seemed to dictate their position on the prospects for the new verification regime. Reasonable arguments existed on all sides, but in the end, nothing the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) could do seemed likely to change the course of the Bush administration. Without meaning to open up a debate on the war, the point is that a major declared motivation for war for the Bush administration was the inability to make Iraq transparent. There were indeed plenty of reasons to believe Iraq still had WMD, but I also think that later evidence about Bush’s determination for war highlights a theme from Cyprus: transparency has a hard time influencing those whose minds are already firmly locked into a way of thinking.

North Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) ratified the NPT in December 1985, but did not follow through with IAEA inspections until January 1992. Shortly thereafter, North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect two nuclear waste facilities, while continuing to operate a reprocessing unit. With inspections blocked, tensions rose. As the IAEA was preparing its report to cite North Korea for non-compliance, North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT in March 1993 (the report came out in April). The withdrawal threat galvanized a global response with relative alacrity. The U.N. passed a resolution urging North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA in May, and the US began high level talks with North Korea in June and the North Korean suspended the threat to withdraw. The talks soon deadlocked, and a crisis erupted in May 1994 when North Korea began to take fuel out of a reactor, presumably for reprocessing into weapons grade fissile material. The IAEA began to take a tougher line, and North Korea withdrew from the IAEA. This shows that breaking agreements can send signals, but of course so do actions like removing fuel.

A visit by former President Carter to North Korea rekindled the talks, and the U.S. and North and South Korea made a deal called the Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to abandon its weapons programs and cooperate with the IAEA in exchange for the construction of two proliferation-resistant light water nuclear reactors. This achieved a quasi-‘cease-fire’ between North Korea and the outside parties. There were no major crises until 2002, but no real progress was made by either side in implementing the Agreed Framework. Between 1994 and 2001, seventeen rounds of technical talks were held to try to resolve outstanding issues, but “no progress has been achieved on key issues.”

In October 2002, the DPRK revealed to a U.S. diplomat that it had a program to enrich uranium whose purpose was to build nuclear weapons. The IAEA passed a resolution condemning North Korea, North Korea rejected the resolution, the U.S. cut off heavy oil shipments due North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework, and North Korea responded by cutting safeguard seals, disabling surveillance cameras, kicking IAEA inspectors out of the country, and finally withdrawing from the NPT in January 2003. Later in 2003, North Korea said it had produced enough plutonium to make six nuclear weapons, and in February 2005, the North Korea Foreign Ministry declared that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons.

Alongside these developments were on and off diplomatic efforts by the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China to re-engage North Korea and try to get back on track towards disarmament. The negotiations, known as the six-nation talks, have been going one step forward, one step back since they began in August 2003. However, in September 2005 joint statement, North Korea pledged to give up its nuclear weapons program and rejoin the NPT, while the U.S. promised not to attack. The pledges left many details, including verification, for the future, and the next day, North Korea said it would not give up its weapons program until it had received a civilian nuclear reactor.

Regarding transparency, the continued ups and downs in the bargaining with North Korea are worth more fine-grained study to see how transparency, institutions, uncertainty, bluffing, and posturing affect outcomes. I do not know enough to address these issues confidently. However, I am in good company because no one really knows what the North Koreans are up to, or what their true capabilities are. The main debate about North Korean intent is whether they are trying to bargain/extort for maximum economic gain or whether they are motivated by insecurity or both. Another debate is whether North Korea is really an irrational rogue state or not. North Korea is one of the world’s most closed societies, so answers are nearly impossible to come by. But even U.S. foreign policy was oddly and inexplicably low key for a number of years.

That said, certain transparency arguments may be worth illuminating. It is possible that the North Koreans are playing an exquisite bargaining game, and are using the IAEA inspectors, IAEA safeguards, and the NPT to send dramatic signals, to create tension, and to offer carrots. Hypothesis H5 contends that transparency can reduce cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems in part because regimes can shine the international spotlight on cheaters and coerce better behavior. It is possible that North Korea is playing jujitsu with the spotlight effect and using the regime to send its own messages to the wider world. To what ends, we do not know, but as the 1998 missile test over Japan showed, North Korea does have a flair for signals.

The Bibliography can be found here: http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/handouts/PPIBIBLIO.htm

Type	Definition	Examples
Cooperative	Agreed-upon sharing of information. Two variants:	Security regimes of various types
– Cooperative, informal	Exchanges of information where the nature of information offered or exchanges is not specified formally or in advance	Forums such as the Concert of Europe, military-military cooperation, G-8 meetings
– Cooperative, formal	Treaties and agreements specify the nature of information gathered and exchanged	On-site inspections, election monitoring, border and buffer zone patrols by peacekeepers, open skies agreements
Ambient	System and global level information sources	Mass media, trade, travel, NGOs
Coerced	Information that is coerced	UNSCOM in Iraq
Unilateral	Information gathered or offered by states
– Intelligence	State-level intelligence gathering	Satellites, spies
– Confrontational	Information revealed to coerce or deter during a confrontation, standoffs, or competitions	Reciprocal missile and nuclear tests between India and Pakistan
– Proffered	Information offered to despiral or reassure	Publicized arms reductions, such as Gorbachev’s withdrawal of offensive bridging equipment