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Dismantling the Cyprus Conspiracy: The US role in the Cypriot Crises of 1963, 1967, and 1974

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INTRODUCTION

What was the extent of United States involvement during the three crises on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus in 1963, 1967, and 1974? After two Turkish threats to invade in 1963 and 1967, a Greek-sponsored overthrow of the Cyprus government led to Turkish military intervention in 1974. The ethnically Greek Cypriot population was left with less than 63% of the island they had once controlled in its entirety. Was the U.S. to blame for these events?

A number of authors say yes, the U.S. is culpable, and accuse the government of explicitly encouraging the Greek coup and Turkish invasion in order to preserve three U.S. communications facilities and two British Sovereign Base Areas (SBA's) established by treaty on the island. Their argument is best described as a "conspiracy theory," because it attributes the chain of events on Cyprus to secret decision-making by American policymakers in order to achieve strategic U.S. goals. Indeed, journalists Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig explicitly refer to their argument as a "conspiracy by America."¹ Other major proponents of this theory include Christopher Hitchens, Lawrence Stern, and William Mallinson.

This thesis analyzes the intentions and motivations of the U.S. government during the Cyprus crises of 1963-4, 1967, and 1974 with two goals: to assess the validity of this particular conspiracy theory and then present the policy implications of these findings. Specifically, this thesis sheds light on the danger of assuming that U.S. covert Cold War operations occurred without thorough research. It also illustrates the negative implications of conspiracy theories on the negotiation processes, both in Cyprus and more generally. As O'Malley and Craig aptly note in their introduction, "Greek Cypriots have long believed the

¹ Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1999), VII.

Americans were to blame for failing to prevent the bloody events of 1974, which left the island ‘ethnically cleansed’ long before the phrase was ever conjured up.” Exclusively blaming the U.S. government has consistently misconstrued the events of that summer through ultra-nationalist propaganda. These tactics have diverted the focus away from a constructive solution to the problem by encouraging hard line positions and a rejection of compromise. The subsequent negotiations have also been tainted with an air of suspicion and mistrust. A clarification of U.S. foreign policy can only benefit both sides by discrediting a misinterpretation of facts and encouraging leaders to instead work on the core issues of the conflict.

Based on primary document research and analysis of the secondary source material on the subject, it is clear that the conspiracy theories are unsatisfactory explanations of the events leading up to the crisis in 1974. While it is certainly the case that the U.S. government merits criticism for its inactivity and focus on its own reputation and interests, no grand scheme existed to encourage a Greek coup or Turkish intervention in order to institute partition on Cyprus. Rather, the development of U.S. policies from the 1960s up to 1974 can be best described as, in the words of Monteaule Stearns, “firefighting operations designed primarily to prevent general hostilities between Greece and Turkey or secure other short-term objectives.”² Thus the U.S.’s role in Cyprus during the 1974 crisis can be best described as a sin of omission, rather than a sin of commission.

I develop this argument in four parts. First, I provide a brief historical background of the events leading up to the initial crisis in 1963. Second, I introduce the conspiracy theories and describe my two major criticisms of their argument: primarily that the U.S. did not have a consistent policy over this ten-year period and second that the communications facilities

² Monteaule Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 11.

and SBA's were helpful, but not vital to the government's covert monitoring of Soviet activity.

The third portion will be divided into three sections: the crisis from 1963 to 1964, the turmoil of 1967, and the final explosion in 1974. Each section will begin with a more specific outline of the conspiracy theories' arguments regarding U.S. involvement in each crisis. I will then describe what I argue was the true evolution of U.S. foreign policy toward Cyprus in a chronological, narrative format through primary documents. This section will emphasize that, rather than driving the events on the island, the U.S. was in a reactive position where the only consistent goals were to prevent a war between NATO allies and use negotiations rather than weapons to resolve the issues and create stability.

Fourth, in the conclusion, I summarize my argument against the conspiracy theories and describe its historical and political implications. I will elaborate on the way this thesis argues that conspiracies theories must be carefully questioned and analyzed, especially in regards to the U.S. and the Cold War. In addition, it expands on the negative impact that conspiracy theories may have on the negotiating process for those involved.

PART I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO 1963

Cyprus spent much of its historical existence under the rule of imperial powers. The Ottomans, who had control for three centuries beginning in 1571, laid the basis for the island's future problems by introducing a Turkish Cypriot minority.³ Groups on both sides of the conflict argue that strife between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities dates back to the period of Ottoman rule. The formative years of the island's troubles, however, were during the colonial period in the 19th and 20th centuries.⁴

In 1878, the British Empire took control of the island and instituted a policy of support for the Turkish Cypriot minority population in an alliance against the Greek Cypriot struggle for *enosis*, or union with Greece.⁵ The Greek Cypriots spearheaded this movement because of their dissatisfaction with British rule. This led to heightened tensions between the Greek Cypriot majority and both the Turkish Cypriots and the British. It was at this point, then, that Greece and Turkey became involved in support of their respective communities on the island: Greece and Greek Cypriots desired unification, while Turkey and Turkish Cypriots began to support *taksim*, or partition, after 1957 with the continuation of British rule as a possible second option.⁶ The involvement of these two "outside" nations was further complicated by the history of animosity between Greece and Turkey themselves, which has played a role in this conflict since its inception. Thus even the early stages of the struggle were characterized by deeply polarized positions that appeared irreconcilable.

³ Barbara Koremenos, "Sustainable Peace Agreements in the Age of International Institutions: The Case of Cyprus." In *No More States? Globalization, National Self-Determination, and Terrorism*, ed. Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 208.

⁴ Nathalie Tocci and Tamara Kovziridze, "Cyprus." *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery*, ed. Bruno Coppieters, et al., (Gent: Academia Press, 2004), 65.

⁵ Lindley, Daniel, "Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from Partition in Cyprus," *International Studies Perspectives*, 2007, 229.

⁶ Coufoudakis, Van, *Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective*, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, Minneapolis, MN, 4.

Confrontation over colonial rule was initiated by the EOKA (Ethniki Oranosis Kyprion Agoniston), a Greek Cypriot guerrilla organization. During the mid-1950s, the British responded in part by recruiting Turkish Cypriots for an Auxiliary Police Force to help manage the *enosis* riots and militant violence. This policy of “divide and rule” further polarized the communities. The immediate struggle over control of Cyprus ended with neither community achieving their goals; Britain adjusted their imperialist policy on the island and agreed to a republic in the late 1950s. The Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios III, also agreed to accept independence, rather than *enosis*. The “homeland” countries of Greece and Turkey became diplomatically involved once more in the creation of a Constitution for the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960.⁷

The Constitution of 1960 was an extremely complicated agreement that failed to unite either the government or its people under a united Cypriot nationality. Rather its consociational elements reinforced the separation of the two communities. The structure of the presidency and legislature helped create these sharp divisions along cultural lines by defining politicians, positions, and representation as either strictly “Turkish Cypriot” or “Greek Cypriot.”⁸ Part of this separation developed in negotiations, when Turkish Cypriots demanded recognition as an equal entity alongside the Greek Cypriot majority with a corresponding division of power in order to protect their political rights and interests. In order to satisfy these demands the Constitution created a Greek Cypriot Presidency and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-Presidency with veto rights. In addition, the agreement required that Turkish Cypriots comprise 30 percent of all civil service positions and 40 percent of the army. These ratios contrasted sharply with their percentage of the island’s demographics of

⁷ Tocci, 66-67.

⁸ Coufoudakis, xii.

about 18%.⁹ The Constitution was therefore designed for the security of group rights rather than individual Cypriot rights and established a constitution prone to gridlock.¹⁰

An additional important point about the Constitution of 1960 involves the three major treaties attached to the agreement: The Treaties of Establishment, Alliance, and Guarantee. The Treaty of Establishment is most significant for the conspiracy theories because it created the 99 square mile Sovereign Base Areas (SBA's) that would maintain the military bases at Episkopi and Dhekelia under British sovereignty. The conspiracy theories argue that these bases, along with the U.S.'s communications facilities on the island, were valuable enough to the American intelligence during the Cold War to encourage a Turkish invasion.

The Treaty of Guarantee was intended to “ensure the independence, territorial integrity, and security” of the Republic and prevent the two communities from achieving *enosis* or *taksim*.¹¹ The key portion of this Treaty is Article 4, which states that: “Each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty.”¹² This became crucial in 1974 when Turkey utilized this article to legitimize its military intervention and claimed force was used in order to re-establish the security of Cyprus. The Treaty of Alliance was designed as a defensive pact to maintain peace and security on the island that allowed for the presence of Greek, Turkish, and British troops.¹³

The Constitution of 1960 brought an end to the bitter anti-colonial struggle, but did not bring a lasting peace to the island. Greek Cypriots, under the leadership of President Makarios, were unhappy with the agreement because it was externally imposed, “a betrayal of the *enosis* cause,” and made “overgenerous” concessions to the Turkish Cypriot

⁹ Lindley, 229.

¹⁰ Lindley, 224; Coufoudakis, 76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹² Carment, 183.

¹³ Tocci, 67.

community.¹⁴ The Turkish Cypriots, led by Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk, were also unhappy with the final agreement and remained concerned about the security of their community's existence and political rights. This dissatisfaction and the structure of the Constitution reinforced the division between the two groups. As a result, a conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots continued at the political level as the two communities struggled to create a police force, army, and civil service that conformed to the required ratios and satisfied the interests of both sides. In addition, Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not agree on taxes, the boundaries of the Turkish-speaking municipalities, or the lawmaking process within the legislature.

In the meantime, Makarios began a campaign to build international support for changes to the Cypriot Constitution through visits to non-aligned and Soviet countries. He also developed internal support from the Cypriot Communist party, AKEL, which had gained strength in the rural areas of the country since independence. Both moves increased U.S. concerns about Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, which impacted later events during the crises when the U.S. made decisions based on maintaining the strength of NATO and countering Soviet influence. In November of 1963, Makarios publicly proposed thirteen changes to the Constitution and the stage was set for the first Cypriot crisis.

¹⁴ Tocci, 68.

PART II. INTRODUCING THE CONSPIRACY THEORIES

In this section, I lay out the conspiracy theories before I assess their validity in light of available documentary evidence. The theories themselves range from a suspicion of ulterior motives to a clearly outlined thesis that directly accuses the U.S. of explicit support of Greek and Turkish intervention, and thus complete responsibility for the events in 1974. Several authors, such as Christopher Hitchens, John L. Scherer, and Laurence Stern, have raised the question of U.S. complicity in their respective books. They suggest that if the U.S. had the capability to call off a coup or deter invasion in 1963-4 and 1967, the government could have authorized either action in 1974.¹⁵ Scherer also claims that, since Henry Kissinger was able to engineer a ceasefire after Turkey's first invasion on July 20, 1974, he should also have been able to do so after the second phase of the invasion on August 14.¹⁶ Thus the authors claim the U.S. at the least failed to act effectively against the Greeks and Turks and at worst explicitly supported their actions.¹⁷ These arguments rely primarily on testimony from those involved in the State Department at the time and the author's own personal experiences, as many of the now available primary documents had not yet been released.

The most recent addition to the literature on the conspiracy, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage, and the Turkish Invasion* by British journalists Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, charges the United States with complete knowledge of the Greek coup and Turkish invasion plans. According to the authors, the U.S. had a consistent plan over a ten-year period, based on a proposal developed by Dean Acheson during the 1963-4 crisis under

¹⁵ Christopher Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (New York: Verso, 2001), 84; Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York: Times Books, 1977), 80.

¹⁶ John L. Scherer, *Blocking the Sun: The Cyprus Conflict* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 1997), 39.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

President Lyndon B. Johnson, to partition the island into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot areas. These actions were allegedly motivated by the island's value as a military and intelligence base in the Eastern Mediterranean combined with U.S. concerns over the "twin threats of a communist takeover or British withdrawal."¹⁸ The introduction states that the book "reveals an astonishing international plot, developed from a blueprint evolved first under British rule, then by U.S. President Johnson's officials, the goals of which were finally realised in 1974."¹⁹ O'Malley and Craig's work uses primarily British sources, several State Department papers, and interviews to support their argument.

This theory is supplemented by other sources that cite its findings, such as William Mallinson's *A Modern History of Cyprus*. His book is intended to provide historical context for the current crisis regarding Cyprus' entrance into the European Union and imply the correct policy for the international community. His history of the Cyprus conflict borrows heavily from the work of O'Malley and Craig, however, when discussing the 1974 invasion. He argues:

The two-state Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the Summer of 1974 was the culmination of ten years of planning by various U.S. government sectors, initiated with the 'Ball/Acheson' plan for double *enosis* in 1964, in secret connivance with the Turkish armed forces, with the British government looking on...²⁰

Mallinson's use of the word "conspiracy" in his work reinforces the legitimacy of the overall theory.

There are two primary counterarguments to all of these authors I will emphasize in my presentation of Cyprus' crises. First, the U.S. did not have a coherent policy or a single plan to drive events on the island during the ten-year period cited by the conspiracy theorists. Rather, the U.S.'s policy toward Cyprus was shaped by events on the island, as the State Department reacted to the crisis and relied heavily on contingency planning. The only

¹⁸ O'Malley, X.

¹⁹ O'Malley, VII-VIII.

²⁰ William Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2005), 75.

consistent policy throughout each Cypriot crisis was that there must not be war between NATO allies Greece and Turkey, and that any established solution must be the result of negotiation and acceptable to all parties.

The second counterargument concerns U.S. interests both on Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean. I argue that the U.S. was not focused on the military or strategic value of the island as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” through the use of the Sovereign Base Areas or the communications facilities for intelligence purposes.²¹ The U.S. had already established their facilities on the island before Cypriot independence, including two at Mia Milia and Yerolakkos, a Naval Facility that also included a Radio Relay Station, and a Foreign Broadcast Information Service station.²² An agreement with the Cypriot government concluded in 1968 extended their functions for the next ten years.²³ This indicates that Makarios’ presidency and the status quo on the island would be better for the facilities’ operations than disruption in the form of a coup or an invasion. In addition, the U.S. had access to similar Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ’s) under the UKUSA agreement at Gibraltar and Sinop, Turkey, in addition to their own NATO facilities in Turkey and the Sixth Fleet home-ported in Athens.²⁴ On the contrary, the U.S. concentrated on the need to contain the Soviet bloc and strengthen NATO’s southeastern flank against the perceived Communist threat. As mentioned above, the U.S. observed the activities of Makarios and his friendship with the Soviets with unease in the context of the Cold War. Regardless, concern about the SBAs and communications facilities was not significant enough to encourage the 1974 coup and subsequent invasion of an independent country as

²¹ O’Malley, 77.

²² “U.S.-UK Installations in Cyprus,” Memorandum by Thomas Hughes to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, February 13, 1967, Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, Cyprus Crisis Files, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD [hereafter cited as NARA, MD].

²³ O’Malley, 129.

²⁴ Jeffrey Richardson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKU.S.A Countries – the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand* (Winchester: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1985), 19, 194.

well as a potential war between two of its own allies. These two arguments will be clarified and supported through an analysis of the conspiracy theory's specific statements regarding each crisis followed by a description of the more accurate chronology of events using primary documents.

PART III. 1963-4: The Crises Begin

Chapter 1

The Collapse of the Constitution and the Conspiracy Theorist's Interpretation

On November 30, 1963, Archbishop Makarios revealed his thirteen point proposal to amend the Cypriot Constitution. The amendments included controversial revisions to the ratios within the armed forces, police forces, and civil services to reflect the actual division of the population; the removal of the President and Vice-President's veto rights; the abolishment of the separate Turkish-speaking municipalities; and other adjustments to the legislature. Turkey, speaking for the Turkish Cypriots, rejected the proposals outright and tensions skyrocketed all across the island. The Turkish Cypriots left the Government of Cyprus in protest and regrouped within their enclaves. According to O'Malley and Craig, the intercommunal battles began on December 21st and escalated through Christmas Eve.²⁵ On January 1, 1964, Makarios declared that the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee were no longer valid.²⁶ By now, the conflict had grasped the attention of both Turkey and Britain who decided to meet at a January peace conference in London, along with Greece, in order to fulfill their roles as Guarantor powers.

In early February, the situation on the island had again deteriorated and intercommunal clashes were increasing in intensity. O'Malley and Craig argue that, at this time, the Americans and British "began colluding to support Turkish attempts to separate the two communities and create the conditions that would make partition a practical military objective."²⁷ U.S. Secretary of State George Ball, President Johnson, and other Washington officials reportedly drew up a contingency plan that would "allow Turkey to invade Cyprus

²⁵ O'Malley, 91-92.

²⁶ Alan James, *Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 68.

²⁷ O'Malley, 94.

and occupy a large area of the north of the island...to protect Turkish Cypriots.” This invasion was to be a “deliberate and carefully controlled movement” consistent with Turkey’s rights under the Treaty of Guarantee, in order to convince Makarios to accept a joint U.S.-UK peace-keeping force on the island, protect the lives of the Turkish minority, and avoid an armed clash with Greece. According to the plan, the Ambassador in Athens would tell the Greeks to avoid military action against Turkey and allow Washington to control the situation.²⁸ O’Malley and Craig state that their information came from one State Department memo sent to George Ball from Assistant Secretary of State Philips Talbot on February 14, 1964.²⁹

The Guarantor powers agreed on a Joint Force, primarily made up of British troops already on the island, to establish peace and end the clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.³⁰ O’Malley and Craig argue that this peacekeeping force was in accordance with Ball’s contingency plan and utilized tactics that made partition the most practical option. They quote a news article from the *Guardian* in which Ball reportedly told the head of the truce force patrols, “You’ve got it wrong son. There’s only one solution to this island and that’s partition.”³¹ In addition, they cite a quote from a senior British intelligence officer, which stated “We were helping to bring about a crude form of partition under which the Turkish Cypriots occupied and administered certain parts of the island.”³² The British forces attempted to maintain order on their own for three months.

Meanwhile, negotiations began on a NATO peacekeeping force that Makarios rejected in favor of a neutral UN force. In early March, the UN agreed to create a UN peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) “in the interest of preserving international peace and security,”

²⁸ O’Malley, 98-99; Mallinson, 36-37.

²⁹ O’Malley, 246.

³⁰ James, 60.

³¹ O’Malley, 102; Mallinson, 36.

³² O’Malley, 103.

that would “use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”³³ After significant pressures and negotiations, the force was composed of British (2,750), Canadian (1,000), Finland (1,000), Swedish (1,000), and Danish (1,000) troops.³⁴ In addition, UN sponsored mediation would be conducted by Dr. Galo Plaza, a former president of Ecuador.

The conspiracy theorists note here the influence of American strategic interests on UNFICYP’s operations and policies based on the fact that the U.S. covered 35 percent of the operation’s costs.³⁵ In addition, they claim that the UN force “assisted the grouping and organisation of Turkish Cypriots that made the separate Turkish and American contingency plans for Ankara’s troops to temporarily occupy a large portion of the island a more practical option.”³⁶ The British embassy in Washington also reported that:

...we could not agree to UNFICYP’s being used for the purpose of repelling external intervention, and the standing orders to our troops outside UNFICYP are to withdraw to the sovereign base areas immediately if any such intervention takes place.³⁷

These quotes are intended to support the argument that the U.S. and the British were working together to make partition and a Turkish invasion a viable contingency plan in order to further their strategic interests on the island.

Intercommunal tension continued throughout the spring, however, despite the presence of UNFICYP. The periodic battles for strongholds were highlighted by the struggle for the Kyrenia road and Castle of St. Hilarion in April and a reported kidnapping of Turkish Cypriots in early May. Relations on the island reached a breaking point at the beginning of June, however. On June 1, 1964, Makarios declared that all Greek Cypriots between the ages of eighteen and fifty were now on standby for conscription in order to create a new

³³ UN Security Council, *Resolution 186, Article 5*, March 4, 1964, Found In *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 566-567.

³⁴ James, 117-119.

³⁵ O’Malley, 104.

³⁶ O’Malley, 105.

³⁷ Mallinson, 37.

National Guard. Turkey responded with preparations for a full-scale invasion of Cyprus. On June 5, however, President Lyndon Johnson sent Turkish leader Ismet Inonu a “brutal” note stating:

I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention, without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.³⁸

The letter convinced Inonu to wait 24 hours before initiating an intervention plan. During the interim, agreements were reached to begin talks between the Greeks and the Turks without the participation of Makarios. The crisis had effectively been averted.

O’Malley and Craig argue that the U.S. responded with a condemnation of the Turkish intervention because the timing was no longer appropriate for the contingency plan with a UN force in place on the island and a UN mediator working for a solution.³⁹ Mallinson attributes the de-escalation to a firm Soviet stance in support of Cypriot freedom and independence.⁴⁰

Negotiations began between the Greeks and the Turks, but a consensus was impossible to reach between their polarized positions. In addition, the Greek Cypriot National Guard attacked Turkish Cypriot positions in early August and the island erupted in chaos once again. O’Malley and Craig state that Ball and Dean Acheson had grown frustrated with the lack of agreement and developed “an astonishing plot to use NATO to force Greece and Turkey to split their differences over the Acheson proposals and accept the result.”⁴¹ The plan involved the use of NATO pressure on the Greeks and the Turks. If that tactic failed, the U.S. would insist that fighting be confined to the island, not involve U.S. weapons, and not allow Greece and Turkey to use violence against each other. This solution

³⁸ Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu, via telegram, June 5, 1964, Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

³⁹ O’Malley, 108.

⁴⁰ Mallinson, 37.

⁴¹ O’Malley, 117; Stern, 84; Hitchens 2, 57-58.

was described as a *fait accompli* and the only possible way to achieve peace. O'Malley and Craig base these claims on a note contained within a general briefing for President Johnson prior to a National Security Council meeting on August 19. The plan was also reportedly discussed during a lunch on September 8.⁴²

O'Malley and Craig argue that the plan was not used in 1964 because of “concern over the dangerous turn of events in Vietnam.” Thus their discussion of the 1964 crisis ends with the ominous statement that the “secret plans to divide Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, if necessary by force, were left on the shelf—for now.”⁴³ They argue that many of the elements of the 1964 plans would reemerge during the 1974 crisis ten years later.

⁴² O'Malley, 116-117.

⁴³ O'Malley, 119.

Chapter 2

The Realities of U.S. Policy in 1963 and 1964

In this section, I will provide evidence that the U.S. State Department's policy was in favor of an independent, unified Cyprus with a government structure based on the original Constitution. The U.S. made clear that all problems should either be worked out amongst the Turkish and Greek Cypriots or, if necessary, in consultation with the Guarantor Powers. The points raised by the conspiracy theorists will be addressed as well.

State Department documents show that the U.S. was aware of Makarios' potential plans to amend the Constitution in early June. Fraser Wilkins, the U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus during this time, stated in a telegram, "Makarios said that he had reached [the] conclusion in his own mind that it would be necessary to revise [the] Cypriot Constitution."⁴⁴ The State Department responded in early August with a telegram to Ambassador Wilkins. Secretary of State Dean Rusk endorsed Wilkins' views on the "validity [of the] constitution and treaty," as expressed to Makarios in April. In addition, the memo stated:

We continue [to be] convinced [that the] solution overall [to the] Cyprus problem lies in patient piecemeal solution [to] specific problems such as [the] municipalities issue and that this [is] possible [to] achieve on [the] island if both sides [are] willing [to] exercise moderation. We [are] against any attempts [to] by-pass [the] Guarantor Powers or involve [the] U.S. or UN.⁴⁵

The telegram provides a clear statement of U.S. opposition to any drastic changes in the Constitution and treaties as well as the need for the Cypriots themselves to reach an agreement. The State Department would consistently reaffirm their support for the 1960 agreements during the months prior to the eruption of violence on the island. In April, Undersecretary of State George Ball instructed Wilkins to "reaffirm our view, as expressed

⁴⁴ Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, telegram, June 6, 1963, Department of State Central Files [hereafter DSCF], POL 1, NARA, MD.

⁴⁵ State Department to Cyprus, teleg., August 15, 1963, DSCF, POL 15, NARA, MD.

on April 5, that [the] London-Zurich agreements and Constitution have continuing validity and that necessary changes can be accomplished through [the] agreement [of] both communities.”⁴⁶ After the initial State Department response in early August, Wilkins again reminded Makarios of the U.S. position during a meeting on August 27: “I recalled our support for [the] continuing validity of [the] Constitution and treaties, as stated last April and subsequently, subject to normal change by agreement between [the] two parties.”⁴⁷

By early October, the developing issues in Cyprus had reached the attention of President Johnson. He issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 266 stating, “we should do all we can in cooperation with the Guarantor Powers to prevent a showdown between the Greek and Turkish communities,” and requesting “recommendations on what measures might be taken.”⁴⁸ The State Department responded on October 28 with recommendations involving a “three-power approach,” consisting of the Guarantor powers, to Makarios and Kutchuk. The plan was intended “as a fallback position to the British plan,” which promoted negotiations between the two communities and the Guarantor Powers. The U.S.’s three-power approach, on the other hand, would “require the Cypriot leaders to reaffirm support of the London-Zurich agreement and the Cyprus Constitution,” attempt to settle the municipalities dispute, and revise London-Zurich to allow normal amendment procedures.⁴⁹ These recommendations were then distributed to the embassies in Cyprus, Athens, Ankara, and London.

Makarios remained unconvinced that intercommunal negotiations would be sufficient to solve the Constitutional issues and continued to develop his proposed amendments. On November 26, Wilkins reported that Makarios “had virtually completed [a] memorandum

⁴⁶ State Department to Cyprus, teleg., April 28, 1963, DSCF, POL 18, NARA, MD.

⁴⁷ Cyprus to State Department, teleg., August 27, 1963, DSCF, POL 15-5, NARA, MD.

⁴⁸ October 28, 1963, Department of State S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, Master files of National Security Action Memoranda, 1961-1968, NARA, MD. Copies of this memorandum were also sent to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

listing approximately ten constitutional provisions which required amendment.”⁵⁰ In addition to Wilkins’ urgings against this action, Rusk also sent a telegram instructing the ambassador to state that “we are greatly disturbed at his constant references to ‘amendments’ of [the] constitution” as it would “stop GOT [Government of Turkey] and Turkish-Cypriot cooperation before it got started.”⁵¹

Makarios released the amendments on November 30 despite these warnings and Turkey promptly announced their rejection of any changes. The Secretary of State met with the Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou regarding the amendments in early December. During the meeting, Rusk stated that the “U.S. feels that the two communities should work out this problem in the first place and then the guarantor powers.” In addition, he made clear that the “U.S. does not need this additional problem,” and that the U.S.’s “primary concern is that whatever comes out of this be worked out by agreement.”⁵² Wilkins confirmed this position in a meeting with Makarios on December 22. He stated that, “it seemed to us preferable to work out solutions with [the] Turkish Cypriots through discussions and that it still seemed to me that changes could be effected within [the] framework of [the] Constitution.”⁵³ The U.S. State Department’s policy, as communicated to the involved parties, was therefore in favor of an independent, unified Cyprus with a government structure based on the original Constitution. All problems should either be worked out amongst the Turkish and Greek Cypriots or, if necessary, in consultation with the Guarantor Powers.

The violence escalated during this period in December and the State Department responded with concern, but limited involvement. Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot expressed this reaction to the Turkish Ambassador when he stated that the “U.S.G [U.S.

⁵⁰ Cyprus to State Department, teleg., DSCF, POL 15-5, NARA, MD.

⁵¹ State Department to Cyprus, teleg., November 27, 1963, DSCF, POL 15-5, NARA, MD.

⁵² Rusk to State Department, teleg., December 18, 1963, DSCF, POL 25, NARA, MD.

⁵³ Cyprus to State Department, teleg., DSCF, POL 25, NARA, MD.

Government] shared GOT [Government of Turkey] concern over violence in Cyprus and would continue [to] be helpful in any way possible,” but the “primary responsibility” belongs to the Cypriot communities and the “special role” of the Guarantor Powers.”⁵⁴ The U.S. interpreted the violence as “hostilities not planned by either side,” and stated that the “armed underground organizations [of] both communities are out of control.”⁵⁵

The UK, Greece, and Turkey did ultimately meet regarding the crisis in January, but the conference did not proceed smoothly. By the end of January, the UK had suggested a NATO force with a U.S. contingent in order to establish peace on the island. According to Ball, the British Ambassador Ormsby Gore reported that U.S. and NATO forces were necessary because “putting additional British forces in is probably just going to make the situation worse rather than better.”⁵⁶ During a meeting with Gore, Ball agreed to discuss a possible “token contribution” from the U.S. of a battalion of 1200 men.”⁵⁷ Johnson immediately vetoed the possibility, however, and stated “we should give no encouragement to the UK to think that we would join in an allied force,” and, “we must do more in a diplomatic way than we have so far.”⁵⁸ He added, “I think that the British are getting to where they might as well not be British anymore if they can’t handle Cyprus.”⁵⁹ Thus the U.S. continued to avoid direct involvement, maintained that the British should be primarily responsible, and even criticized the UK for its inability to handle the situation.

Rather than troops, Johnson encouraged a plan of action that involved sending someone to the region to “make an all out diplomatic effort.”⁶⁰ In the end, Ball made the trip

⁵⁴ State Department to Cyprus, teleg., December 24, 1963, DSCF, POL 25, NARA, MD.

⁵⁵ State Department to the Embassy in Turkey, teleg., December 24, 1963, DSCF, POL 25, NARA, MD.

⁵⁶ President Johnson to Under Secretary of State Ball, telephone conversation, January 25, 1964, Recordings and Transcript Files, Tape F64.07, Side B, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

⁵⁷ Memorandum of conversation, January 24, 1964, Department of State Files, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, NARA, MD.

⁵⁸ Memorandum of Conference with President Johnson, January 25, 1964, National Security Files, File of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin Texas.

⁵⁹ President Johnson to Under Secretary of State Ball, telephone conversation, January 25, 1964, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 64.08, Side B, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

⁶⁰ Johnson to Ball, telephone conversation, January 28, 1964, *ibid*.

and began meeting with leaders in London, Ankara, and Athens in early February. On February 9, Ball met with Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou and informed him that “U.S. concern with [the] Cyprus problem [is] prompted primarily by our concern with peace.” Ball endorsed a peace-keeping force and a mediator, but refused to make any concrete promises regarding U.S. participation. The Under Secretary then met with Makarios on February 13 and learned that the Archbishop planned to go “ahead with his foolish plan of sending an expedition to ask the Security Council to try to undermine the Treaties of Guarantee by seeking a resolution reaffirming the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus,” an deal with an international force later. Ball berated Makarios with “a lurid picture of the consequences that would entail from the folly he has proposed.” Ball expressed concerns that Makarios was either “a prisoner or a fool or both,” and for the first time recommended that “both governments...exercise the rights of unilateral intervention granted them under the Treaties of Guarantee and move into Cyprus peacefully.”⁶¹

The U.S. was opposed to the involvement of the UN Security Council for two foreign policy reasons. First, any Security Council decision had to involve Cold War politics and the Soviet Union. The State Department believed the Soviet Union, non-aligned bloc, and other countries were likely support Makarios’ move to undermine the Constitution and three treaties. In this case, the U.S. would be forced to vote against the measure and damage its own international relations and standing at the same time. Second, the U.S. had maintained for the past year that the conflict should be decided by the communities on Cyprus and the Guarantor Powers. The involvement of the UN would allow for the influence of the Soviet Union and the non-aligned countries. As a result of this and other possible scenarios, the U.S. opposed the internationalization of the Cyprus conflict outside of the Guarantor Powers.

⁶¹ Cyprus to State Department, teleg., DSCF, POL 23-8, NARA, MD.

Ball's recommendation of "double enosis" raises another issue, however, in that it seems to confirm the conspiracy theorists' hypothesis that the U.S. was interested in allowing an invasion in 1964 in order to protect their strategic interests. This is not the only time that Ball suggests this course of action; the conspiracy theorists mention his endorsement of the possibility on February 14, but he also stated on May 10 that "I find Papandreou's repeated references to 'enosis' a healthy sign," and "...[f]rom the point of view of all of NATO, we should regard 'enosis' as a useful component in any final solution since it would mean that a NATO government would have charge of the Island rather than the wolf in priest's clothing." He qualifies his argument for enosis by stating that "there would have to be some kind of territorial concessions by Greece" in order to receive Turkish agreement.⁶² On June 1, Ball again states that "we seem to detect...that a territorial quid pro quo might be an ingredient in an eventual settlement...we are anxious that these very fragile seeds be permitted to germinate."⁶³ Thus Ball consistently felt that some form of double enosis or territorial acquisition by both Greece and Turkey was the best way to achieve stability on the island.

Ball was not alone in his recommendations either, as other state department officials made similar suggestions. In April, recently appointed Cyprus Ambassador Taylor Belcher argued for either enosis or some form of associated status between Greece and Cyprus, which would tie Cyprus to the West, reduce the danger of Communism, end the island's non-aligned policies, set back Soviet policy in the area, and provide the U.S. a friendly government to negotiate with regarding its communications facilities. The Embassies in Athens and Ankara immediately reported similar conclusions, while the Turkish Ambassador Hare made clear that Turkey would insist on its presence on Cyprus as an "essential ingredient in any solution involving abrogation of [the] present treaties."⁶⁴ Belcher then

⁶² State Department to Secretary of State Rusk, teleg., DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

⁶³ State Department to Cyprus, teleg., DSCF, POL 23-8, NARA, MD.

⁶⁴ Turkey to State Department, teleg., April 8, 1964, DSCF, POL 23-8, NARA, MD; Athens to State Department, teleg., April 8, 1964, *ibid*; Turkey to State Department, teleg., May 12, 1964, *ibid*.

made an identical recommendation twice in June, but the communications facilities were notably absent from the discussion.⁶⁵ In late June, even the UN mediator Sakari Severi Tuomioja stated that in his opinion, the “only basis is enosis, with whatever compensation is necessary to make it palatable to the Turks.”⁶⁶ With the exception of Belcher’s first recommendation, all of the above officials described this form of solution as the best way to achieve stability on the island with no mention of the strategic interests of the U.S..

While negotiating with the parties in Geneva, Dean Acheson also made several references to the possibility of enosis or partition as possible forms of a solution for Cyprus. These suggestions were made in the context of Acheson’s attempts to find a middle ground between Greek and Turkish demands that the Cypriots could potentially accept. On July 14, during a meeting with the Greek representative Demitrios Nikolareisis, Acheson proposed an “arrangement within [the] framework of some sort of enosis which would give Turk-Cypriots assurance that...their...way of life would be safeguarded.” This assurance would come from the presence of areas of Turkish self-rule or the existence of some international authority.⁶⁷

As negotiations continued, in early August, Acheson again stated that some form of “plebiscite or other action on enosis could be precipitated” after an announcement had been made that Turkish-Cypriot welfare would be safeguarded.⁶⁸ An agreement between Greece and Turkey regarding Cyprus must also be announced before hand, Acheson pointed out a few days later, or the Turkish Government “would certainly fall.”⁶⁹ On August 7, Acheson also added the element of Turkish troops when he suggested that “popular upheaval [in] Turkey could be overcome by [the] announcement that Turkish forces would shortly arrive

⁶⁵ Cyprus to State Department, teleg., June 6, 1964, *ibid.*; Cyprus to State Department, teleg., June 12, 1964, *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Tuomioja to Ball, memorandum of conversation, June 26, 1964, Department of State Files, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

⁶⁷ Mission in Geneva (Acheson) to State Department, teleg., DSCF, POL 23-8, NARA, MD.

⁶⁸ Mission in Geneva to State Department, teleg., August 2, 1964, *ibid.*

⁶⁹ Mission in Geneva to State Department, teleg., August 6, 1964, *ibid.*

not as enemies but by prior agreement.”⁷⁰ He summed up these proposals on August 18 in a telegram to the Department of State as well as the memorandum intended to brief President Johnson before the National Security Council, which the conspiracy theorists also cite.⁷¹

Thus the conspiracy theorists are correct when they state that U.S. officials made recommendations in favor of double *enosis*, *enosis*, or mutual territorial acquisition for Greece and Turkey during this time. The conspiracy theorists falsely argue that these recommendations constituted U.S. official policy at the highest level of the administration for the next decade. As early as the 1964 crisis, evidence exists that this was not the case: Johnson never endorsed such a plan, other officials—including Acheson himself—ultimately rejected the proposals, and the State Department later acknowledged the mistakes it made during this particular crisis and altered its policy accordingly.

From the beginning of the crisis, President Johnson argued that the British should take primary responsibility for the Cyprus situation and reach a negotiated solution with the other Guarantor Powers. Apart from the evidence shown above, Johnson also sent letters to the British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home and Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou with statements to that effect.⁷² As the crisis developed, he informed George Ball via telephone that the U.S. would not be directly involved in an international peacekeeping force. His letter to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu on June 5 argued against Turkish intervention, and the partition that would result, in the strongest diplomatic terms possible. In a telephone conversation several days later, Johnson told Rusk, “I think that the last thing we want him [Inonu] to do is let me be the peacemaker and later wind up on my

⁷⁰ Mission in Geneva to State Department, teleg., *ibid*.

⁷¹ Mission in Geneva to State Department, teleg., DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD; President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert Komer to President Johnson, memorandum, August 18, 1964, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

⁷² State Department to United Kingdom, teleg., February 18, 1964; DSCF, POL 23-8, NARA, MD; Johnson to Papandreou, letter, February 20, 1964, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

lap. I think we ought to carry it right to Ankara and Athens,” and later, “...I have no solution. I can’t propose anything.”⁷³ He made the same position clear to Greek Ambassador Alexander Matsas on June 11: outside powers cannot solve the situation and the Greeks and Turks must settle it themselves in the least humiliating and most permanent manner possible.⁷⁴ Johnson supported the Acheson negotiations and endorsed a decision based on his proposals for the minority community and the principle of a Turkish base.⁷⁵

At the September 8 lunch, however, Acheson and Ball’s proposed intervention plan was discussed and Johnson was overtly pessimistic about the idea. He “indicated his own doubt that the plan as put forward could in fact be neatly and tightly controlled, without risk of escalation,” and “noted that the next two months were not a good season for another war.” Acheson, Ball, and Bundy discussed the meeting later and Acheson expressed his opinion that the President “wanted to make sure nothing happens.”⁷⁶ The negotiations are emphasized as the most effective route to a solution from this point on, which indicates that Johnson vetoed the proposed NATO plan. Thus Johnson never explicitly accepted a double enosis plan. Any secret plan to “NATO-ize” Cyprus would have needed Johnson’s support to proceed.

In addition, other State Department officials later rejected Acheson and Ball’s recommendations. In a conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin, Rusk reminded the official that “the President had referred to intervention as a ‘last resort,’” and this act would “constitute no solution...the very catastrophe which all of us should now work to prevent.”⁷⁷ On June 9, Rusk expressed concern about the negotiations and requested

⁷³ June 9, 1964, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 64.31, Side A, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

⁷⁴ Department of State Files, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

⁷⁵ State Department to Greece, teleg., August 16, 1964, DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

⁷⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6.; Footnote 3 on this document, found in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968: Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, ed. James E. Miller (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), 309.

⁷⁷ Rusk to State Department, teleg., May 11, 1964, Department of State Central Files, POL 23-8, NARA, MD.

Ball's return to the U.S. in order to "be sure that we are all on the same track here and see where we are going." He argued that:

...you [Johnson] and he [Ball] and I and our people working on this should come to a final conclusion on what we ought to shoot for. And there is no conclusion on that at the moment, and the conclusion that they have been talking about in London is something that will almost guarantee the Turks would intervene and this is what concerns me.⁷⁸

Rusk never explicitly argued against the double enosis concept, but he expressed doubts about its potential success and concern for its consequences.

Acheson himself later argued against enosis as a solution in August. On the 19th he telegraphed the Department of State and stated, "Instant enosis...seems to us here to contain [the] fatal flaw that [the] Turks will not stand still for it or after it unless they have prior assurance...that it will be quickly followed by [a] settlement meeting their essential demands."⁷⁹ By September 3, Rusk offered a new arrangement to the embassies in Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia. The main points of the arrangement for Greece required it to restore normal conditions on the island, assist in rehabilitation and resettlement of Turkish Cypriot refugees, avoid military support to Cyprus against Turkey, and prevent Cyprus from receiving military aid from other countries. Turkey would agree not to intervene militarily, prevent the Turkish Cypriots from restarting violence, and avoid provoking Greece.⁸⁰ These recommendations marked a significant shift from the suggestions of double enosis, but the ambassadors—Ambassador Hare in particular—generally agreed that this strategy was the most effective to maintain peace for the moment. On December 29, even Ball stated, "we see no solution in [the] direction [of] either enosis or double enosis," and "if progress appears possible toward [an] independent Cyprus with [the] protection of the Turk minority,

⁷⁸ Rusk to Johnson, telephone conversation, June 9, 1964, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 64.31, Side A, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

⁷⁹ Rusk to State Department, DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

⁸⁰ State Department to Greece, Ankara, Paris, Nicosia, London, DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

we should strive for this,” and that the next step should be negotiations.⁸¹ The U.S. would consistently favor this policy for the next several years.

Therefore, while the U.S. considered and even favored the possibility of double enosis or enosis with Turkish acquisition of territory, the plan was ultimately rejected based on the changed conditions on the island in favor of negotiations. This directly counters the conspiracy theorists’ argument that the policy was set aside until the crisis in 1974. There is no denying, however, that the State Department’s endorsement of double enosis at this time demonstrates a poor grasp of the Cyprus situation’s political realities. The U.S. deliberately chose to deal only with the leaders of the Guarantor Powers and negotiate over the heads of Makarios and the Cypriots. U.S. officials believed it would be simpler to negotiate a Greco-Turkish solution and impose it on Makarios rather than including him in the process. The flaws in this position became clear and the State Department realized its error. Ambassador Belcher reported on October, 6 1964, that “Makarios himself is becoming ever stronger with a popular base spread throughout all sectors on the island,” and Hare reported that “Makarios and Makarios alone will call [the] tune as to [the] timing and nature of any significant steps...[which] has obvious implications for our long-standing assumption that [the] nub of [the] problem was to get GOT and GOG talking.”⁸² Therefore the U.S. made demonstrable errors based on a poor understanding of Makarios’ influence as well as the need to include Cypriots in any negotiation.

The other crucial aspect of the conspiracy theorists’ argument concerns the U.S. communications facilities on Cyprus. The conspiracy theorists’ fail to effectively define what they mean by term “communications facilities.” State Department documents describe several US installations on the island that include a Radio Relay Office operated by Naval

⁸¹ State Department to Turkey, teleg., DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

⁸² Cyprus to State Department, October 6, 1964, DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD; Turkey to State Department, November 30, 1964, *ibid.*

personnel, “communications facilities” at Mia Milia and Yerolakkos, and a Foreign Broadcast Information Service station.⁸³ The U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, Grant, stated that they were for monitoring and reporting on “radio broadcasts from the countries in this area,” and handling “relay traffic for the Department of State.”⁸⁴ In this paper, when referring to communications facilities, these are the installations I refer to that were most likely used for intelligence and monitoring purposes.

During this crisis the facilities are mentioned periodically. The first instance describes them as an interest that the U.S. has on the island, as on January 24, 1964 in a meeting with British Ambassadors.⁸⁵ While the potential for a problem was discussed once as well, it is worth noting that Makarios never used them as leverage to gain U.S. support during this particular crisis.⁸⁶ On September 11 of the same year, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Phillips Talbot reported on the facilities to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He stated that the communications operations were “significantly curtailed as a result of the February 1964 evacuation and by subsequent additional personnel reductions or transfers of activity away from Cyprus.” He claimed “the curtailment would affect the value of the operations but that it would be tolerable on a reasonably temporary basis.”⁸⁷ These statements indicate that, while the facilities did have some value, they were not so significant that their functions could not be moved elsewhere for a period of time. This counters the conspiracy argument that claims their operations were significant enough to endorse an invasion of the island for their protection. At this time, then, the U.S. moved

⁸³ Popper (NEA) to Coerr (INR), “Future of Department’s Radio Relay Office,” memorandum, September 30, 1971, Record Group 59.

⁸⁴ Cyprus to State Department, teleg., November 9, 1973, Record Group 59: Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 – 12/31/1974, National Archives Archival Databases, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=98140&dt=1573&dl=823> [accessed 10 November 2007].

⁸⁵ Memorandum of conversation, Department of State Files, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, NARA, MD; State to Cyprus, teleg., August 15, 1963, DSCF, POL 15, NARA, MD.

⁸⁶ State to Cyprus, teleg., August 15, 1963, DSCF, POL 15, NARA, MD.

⁸⁷ Talbot to INR, memorandum, Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), Office of the Country Director for Cyprus, Records Relating to Cyprus, 1963-1972, NARA, MD.

into the next crisis without serious concerns about the future of its facilities, but encouragement of the use of negotiations to achieve stability in the region.

PART IV. 1967: Another Crisis Averted

Chapter 3

The Reemergence of Hostilities and the Conspiracy Theorist's Interpretation

Between 1965 and 1966, Cyprus experienced a period of uneasy peace as intercommunal negotiations slowly progressed. The Turkish Cypriots continued to operate their own administration outside of the internationally recognized government of the Republic of Cyprus. The two communities were not absolutely divided, however, as the UN Green Line was porous, arms remained widely distributed, and intercommunal incidents could easily escalate.⁸⁸ UNFICYP worked diligently to contain the tensions through local leaders.

During this period, the conspiracy theorists' argue that Britain's declining economy and reduction of military presence around the world under Prime Minister Harold Wilson angered American leaders. This included the 1966 announcement that Britain was reducing its forces in Cyprus, Aden, Malta, Guyana, and other areas of Southwest Asia such as Singapore and Malaya.⁸⁹ According to O'Malley and Craig, "[t]his marked the beginning of the end of Britain's role as a worldwide military power, and alerted the Americans to the prospect that one day they might lose the use of the Cyprus facilities."⁹⁰ American concerns were allegedly compounded by the new Middle Eastern crisis that included the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Nasser and the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. The authors argue that loss of both the Canal and Middle Eastern oil led to an increase in the British economic crisis and a cut of over 150,000 military and civilian personnel, which again infuriated the Americans.⁹¹

⁸⁸ James, 170.

⁸⁹ O'Malley, 123-124.

⁹⁰ O'Malley, 124.

⁹¹ O'Malley, 124-125.

The political situation was complicated by a military coup in Greece on April 21, 1967. Whether or not the U.S. was involved in or supported the right-wing military faction under George Papadopoulos that took over the Greek government is outside the scope of this paper, although some of the conspiracy theorists—such as Lawrence Stern—argue this was the case. The change in government had implications for the situation in Cyprus, as the junta developed an aggressive, nationalistic stance on the Cyprus issue that would help bring about a crisis. Tense negotiations continued both at the intercommunal level as well as between Greece and Turkey.

The situation exploded after Greek Cypriot forces led by George Grivas launched attacks on two Turkish Cypriot villages, Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou in November 1967. The incident escalated and, in response, Turkey again began amassing forces for an intervention. The U.S. sent Cyrus Vance on a diplomatic mission of “shuttle diplomacy” to convince Turkey to back down and avoid war within NATO. Turkey demanded the withdrawal of all Greek forces greater than the limits set down in the Treaty of Alliance, a total of 10,000 troops, as well as the removal of Grivas. Greece agreed and the crisis was averted, for the moment. The Greek junta would use other tactics to increase their influence on Cyprus instead.

O’Malley and Craig are the only conspiracy theorists who mention an agreement concluded in 1968 that permitted the U.S. to continue using their communications facilities on the island. They claim that the CIA was also permitted to access the British bases, establish their own radio monitors, and build secret antennae for the U.S. intelligence network at the cost of \$1 million dollars in a secret fund.⁹² They fail to state whether or not this assuaged U.S. fears about the loss of those facilities.

⁹² O’Malley, 129; Stern, 107.

O'Malley and Craig also argue that Johnson was the "crucial restraining influence on both the Turks and his own senior officials, such as George Ball and Dean Acheson, who wanted NATO to force a partition on Cyprus."⁹³ They state that the U.S. had already abandoned the concept of guaranteed independence for a united Cyprus and accepted that Turkey could one day be allowed to occupy part of Cyprus. Their evidence lies in the plans devised by Acheson and Ball. The conspiracy theory's description of the second crisis ends with ominous concerns about the future because, as they argue, Nixon and Kissinger "had fewer qualms about the kind of covert action needed to get rid of Makarios."⁹⁴

⁹³ O'Malley, 130.

⁹⁴ O'Malley, 130.

Chapter 4

The Realities of U.S. Policy in 1967

In January of 1966, the Secretary Rusk renewed the U.S. recommendation that “what is needed at this time to move [the] Cyprus problem off dead center is [the] resumption [of] active UN mediation,” and stated, “[the] Department tends to agree that, to obtain GOT acceptance of any formula, it may be necessary to continue [the] prohibition against enosis at least for [a] time.” Thus the U.S. believed the UN should be the primary mediator and enosis was still not a valid overall solution.⁹⁵ Turkey, however, disagreed with this assessment and began demanding more significant U.S. involvement. In February, the new Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil told the U.S. Ambassador that the U.S. “had an important role to play,” and “if U.S.-Turk agreement on [the] best alternative [was] reached, [the] U.S. would then, he hoped, use its influence to achieve results.”⁹⁶ Several months later, on April 22, Caglayangil met with Secretary Rusk and argued that the U.S. should “influence Makarios and the Greek Government to see that nothing happens.”⁹⁷ Turkey also released an aide-mémoire that Ball described as “a clever diplomatic move to involve [the] U.S. more deeply in [the] Cyprus problem.”⁹⁸

The State Department, however, responded with a message that deliberately refused to endorse significant U.S. involvement. Ball stated, “The United States Government sympathizes with those who have suffered hardships as a result of unsettled conditions on the island,” and, “The U.S. is closely following and encouraging the efforts of the UN Secretary-General’s personal representative, Ambassador Bernardes, to bring about improved

⁹⁵ State Department to the Mission to the UN, teleg., January 29, 1966, DSCF, POL 27-14 CYP/UN, NARA, MD. This telegram was also sent to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, London, and Paris.

⁹⁶ Memorandum of conversation, February 21, 1966, DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

⁹⁷ Memorandum of conversation, DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

⁹⁸ State Department to Turkey, May 31, 1966, DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

conditions on the island.” He went on to endorse the Turkish and Greek government intentions to begin talks regarding Cyprus and described it as “a most encouraging development which will permit consideration of the means of achieving a settlement.”⁹⁹ Explicit support from Rusk and the ambassadors for the secret Greek-Turkish dialogue would continue throughout the following year.¹⁰⁰ In September 1967, Rusk again endorsed the discussions and stated that the “important thing now is that talks continue, and that real effort be made [to] compromise on differences which, if substantial, do not seem [to] be irreconcilable.”¹⁰¹ Thus the U.S. maintained its distance from the Cyprus problem and limited its actions to endorsement of Guarantor Power negotiations.

The negotiations ultimately failed, however, and violence erupted once again in November 1967. On November 17, President Johnson sent a message to Archbishop Makarios appealing to him “to do everything within the power of your Government to reduce the threat to peace now hanging over your region.”¹⁰² He also sent a similar message to Caglayangil, who responded:

At such an hour I expected that a message coming from a country with which we have a common destiny would be different...I had expected that given this situation our American friends would come and tell us that they regret that they have prevented in the past a Turkish initiative and that they would say: ‘Now the decision is yours.’¹⁰³

Johnson’s message had clearly not met the Turkish expectations. The Turks immediately demanded the removal of all Greek troops and the U.S. sent Under Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to negotiate a ceasefire starting on November 23. In the meantime, Rusk sent a telegram to all the involved ambassadors stating that “the stakes are such that the future of

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Greece to State Department, teleg., September 15, 1966, DSCF, POL 27; State Department to Greece, teleg., September 19, 1966, *ibid.*; Turkey to State Department, teleg., October 22, 1966, *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ State Department to Greece, teleg., September 15, 1967, *ibid.*

¹⁰² State Department to Cyprus, teleg., *ibid.*

¹⁰³ Turkey to State Department, teleg., November 18, 1967, *ibid.*

our bilateral relations is secondary to the prevention of hostilities between Greece and Turkey,” and:

We need not apologize to any of your host governments for the harshest pressures we may put on the interest of maintaining peace. The issues in Cyprus itself are, strictly from the point of view of the U.S. national interest, trivial compared to peace between Greece and Turkey. Our responsibility is to support that central U.S. national interest.¹⁰⁴

This message was clearly not an endorsement of double enosis or an explicit encouragement of military intervention by either party in order to maintain communications facilities. Rusk was making clear that stability and prevention of war between NATO allies was the ultimate goal at any necessary expense.

Vance was able to achieve a ceasefire that involved the removal of all Greek troops from Cyprus. The State Department heaped praise on Vance for his efforts and stated that “without his activity, Turkey would now be at war with Greece.”¹⁰⁵ Vance, however, emphasized in a telegram that his object was “to stop [the] outbreak of war and not to solve all [the] problems of Cyprus,” thus significant issues remained.¹⁰⁶ His most serious problem was convincing Makarios to go along with the Greek-Turkish agreement. Makarios protested the need for “an enlarged and improved mandate for UNFICYP” without further discussion in the UN Security Council as such changes could cause issues with manpower and authority in the future.¹⁰⁷ He continued to reject this portion of the agreement into December, and ultimately Vance left Cyprus for Athens without Makarios’ support.

The crisis had been averted, however, and the ceasefire held. In January of 1968, the U.S. began to discuss its overall strategy for Cyprus once again. Rusk recommended that the U.S. either provide “strong support for the United Nations mediation of a longer-term

¹⁰⁴ State Department to Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, November 23, 1967, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Summary Notes of the 578th Meeting of the National Security Council, November 29, 1967, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 4, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

¹⁰⁶ Greece to State Department, November 27, 1967, DSCF, POL 7, NARA, MD.

¹⁰⁷ Greece to State Department, November 30, 1967, *ibid.*

settlement, or support for its mediation of interim measures while we take over the search for a long-term settlement.”¹⁰⁸ The majority of State Department officials, however, lacked confidence in the ability of UN mediation to reach an effective solution. This was most evident during an NSC meeting from January 24, where Assistant Secretary of State Lucius Battle, Cyrus Vance, Joseph Sisco, and Secretary Rusk agreed that “we are not optimistic about what U Thant [the current UN mediator] can achieve and should not let him fail without having something of our own ready to put in his place.”¹⁰⁹

In light of these recommendations, a proposal was put forward that the Canadians would initiate a plan for a conference between Greece, Turkey, Greek Cypriot, and Turkish Cypriot representatives. The conference would attempt to complement U Thant’s mediation work and discuss a viable constitution for Cyprus.¹¹⁰ The initiative ultimately fell through, however, while the UN Secretary General pushed forward a proposal for discussions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots only.¹¹¹ The post-crisis momentum for negotiations rapidly dissipated in the following months.¹¹²

U.S. policy before, during, and after this particular crisis raises several questions for the conspiracy theorists. If the State Department, run by primarily the same group of officials as in 1963-4, was intent on a NATO partition of the island through a Greek-Turkish invasion, how would the conspiracy explain the emphasis on maintaining a negotiation process? In addition, why did the Acheson-Ball plan, as laid out in the August 19 memo, never resurface as a viable option during the November crisis? These are questions that the theorists do not address in their respective works. The clearest answer is that the U.S. State Department no longer considered endorsement or encouragement of double enosis or enosis

¹⁰⁸ Rusk to Johnson, memorandum, January 17, 1968, DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

¹⁰⁹ Memorandum for the Record, January 24, 1968, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 4, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin.

¹¹⁰ Greece to State Department, teleg., February 9, 1968, DSCF, POL 27, NARA, MD.

¹¹¹ Turkey to State Department, teleg., March 6, 1968, *ibid.*

¹¹² Cyprus to State Department, teleg., August 2, 1968, *ibid.*

an effective way to create stability on Cyprus. Officials had come to the conclusion that any solution must be negotiated between the most significantly involved parties, which now included the Cypriots and did not include the United States.

The conspiracy theorists also point out both the decline of British influence in the Middle East during this period and the rise of U.S. involvement in the region. They argue that this is relevant because the British decline involved a reduction in its military presence in the Mediterranean, including the SBAs on Cyprus. This allegedly caused consternation among U.S. officials, since the SBAs were a crucial strategic asset. I argue that this point is largely irrelevant because the communications installations and the SBAs were not the U.S.'s prime concern on Cyprus. As the above description of the realities of U.S. policy during 1963 and 1964 shows, the U.S. was first and foremost interested in preventing war between NATO allies and avoiding a significant conflict in the Mediterranean.

Additional documents show that the U.S. was not worried about the SBAs or their future status. In February 1967, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prepared a memorandum regarding the U.S. and UK installations in Cyprus. The report describes the value of the SBAs to the Cyprus economy and states that the bases “provide the margin that puts Cyprus economically in a better position than most other countries of the Eastern Mediterranean.” As a result, the Cypriots were not likely to protest their existence in the future for economic reasons. In addition, the document describes the withdrawal of personnel from the bases: approximately 3000 of the 4950 troops from only the Dhekelia base would “probably be completed by September,” while the British would continue to maintain approximately 8000 men. The INR expressed no concern or anger at this reduction in forces within the memorandum.¹¹³ This indicates that the U.S. did not appear overtly

¹¹³ “U.S.-UK Installations in Cyprus,” Thomas Hughes to Granville Austin, memorandum, February 13, 1967, Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), Office of the Country Director for Cyprus, Records Relating to Cyprus 1963-1972, NARA, MD.

angry about the reduction in forces at this time and the British still maintained a sizable number of troops on the island.

The U.S. communications facilities were also not a serious concern during this time, as indicated by further documents that describe the diplomatic negotiations to finalize the stations' existence from 1965-1968. The two groups of representatives met on January 9, 1965 to create an official agreement based on Makarios' informal promise in 1960 to allow the facilities to remain with the possibility of financial compensation to Cyprus.¹¹⁴ Negotiations slowly continued until February 4 when the Mr. G. Phylaktis of the Ministry of Finance raises the first serious objection to the facilities' existence. He argued that the U.S. was "asking for too much, 'a state within a state,'" and claimed the Cyprus government "must now make the determination whether it wished to have the radio stations at all." According to the memorandum of the meeting, the other members of the Cypriot negotiating team immediately countered Phylaktis statement by stating that there was "no doubt that that one question had been settled in the affirmative some time ago" by Makarios and the rest of the Cyprus government. The question was not raised again throughout the remained of the discussions.¹¹⁵ This indicates that the existence of the facilities was no longer a negotiable issue, as agreement had already been established that their functions could continue. The U.S. had no reason to be concerned about their future.

The final agreement was concluded in 1968 and authorized the existence of facilities in Nicosia, Yerolakkos, and Mia Milia. It also gave the U.S. the ability to "establish, maintain, and operate radio land lines, high frequency, very high frequency, ultra high frequency, microwave communications networks and to receive and dispatch communications and other allied equipment for this purpose."¹¹⁶ The Cypriots would be

¹¹⁴ Memorandum of conversation: Privileges and Immunities, January 9, 1965, Record Group 59, *ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Memorandum of conversation: Privileges and Immunities – Radio Stations, February 4, 1965, *ibid.*

¹¹⁶ "Draft Agreement," September 1967, *ibid.* (An attached memorandum indicated that this draft was identical to the final agreement.)

reimbursed \$1.4 million dollars annually “for the life of the agreement for services rendered.” This is possibly the \$1 million dollars the conspiracy theorists mention. It was not a “secret fund,” for Makarios, but rather a negotiated annual compensation.¹¹⁷ There was therefore no reason for the U.S. to consider a NATO plan to protect SBA’s that were under thorough British control or communications facilities secured by an international treaty. The status quo on the island was in fact better for the U.S. facilities and their operations, whereas dramatic changes in the power structure—such as a coup or an invasion—would have a detrimental impact on their continued existence.

PART V. 1968-1973: The Calm Before the Storm

President Richard Nixon was known as a fervent anti-Communist and, once in office in 1968, he normalized relations with the Greek junta and restored the country’s military aid. The conspiracy theorists use Nixon’s extreme anti-Communism and support for the junta to support their argument that he was consistently infuriated by Makarios’ non-aligned policy and contacts with the Soviets. Nixon and Kissinger’s dislike of Makarios’ political allegiances was allegedly sufficient to encourage his removal from the Cypriot Presidency.¹¹⁸

This period is also notable for the number of attempts on Makarios’ life. The first incident was an attack on his personal helicopter in March of 1970, in which Stern and Hitchens hint the CIA may have had a part.¹¹⁹ The Archbishop managed to escape the fiery

¹¹⁷ William Handley to Ball, “Approval of Agreement with Cyprus Concerning Radio Facilities,” teleg., *ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Stern, 91; Hitchens, 80; Christopher Hitchens, *Cyprus* (London: Quartet Books Limited, 1984), 75.

¹¹⁹ Stern, 87-88; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 71.

inferno unscathed. Second, in 1972, a group of bishops within the Greek Orthodox Church demanded Makarios' resignation from the Presidency as it conflicted with his ecclesiastical duties. As Archbishop, Makarios convened a Holy Synod in 1973 and defrocked the rebellious bishops in retaliation. Two additional potential plots emerged later that year; the first was reportedly organized by General George Grivas, while the second involved land mines that exploded just moments before Makarios' car drove past. These assassination attempts have been credibly linked to the work of the junta through their officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard. The conspiracy theorists use this connection to the junta as evidence that Nixon overtly backed the removal of Makarios, since he supported the Greek military government.¹²⁰

One month later, in June of 1971, Makarios made an eight-day visit to the Soviet Union to gain further support for the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. In the meantime, General Grivas returned to Cyprus, possibly with junta support, and began reorganizing the EOKA forces into a new group, EOKA-B. U.S. concerns about the Communist influence on Cyprus were already high, but they peaked early in 1972 when Makarios acquired a significant amount of Czechoslovakian arms for his police force. The threat of a military takeover by Greece loomed once again, but warnings against such a move by the U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca managed to end the crisis.

Despite the Greek junta's contentious domestic and international policies, the U.S. decided to begin home-porting the Sixth Fleet at the Greek port of Piraeus in September of 1972. This was interpreted as a controversial vote of confidence in the regime to the benefit of U.S. naval power in the Mediterranean.¹²¹ The criticism of home-porting only increased after an internal coup in November of 1973 pushed Papadopoulos out of power and installed the leader of the military police, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, as the new head of the Greek

¹²⁰ O'Malley, 132.

¹²¹ Stern, 71; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 75-76.

junta. Ioannides was a more radical and unpredictable member of the government's right-wing military faction, which would have consequences for Greece's policy towards Makarios and Cyprus within the next year.

The conspiracy theorists, O'Malley, Craig, and Mallinson in particular, argue that this period from 1973 to 1974 was also one of the most dangerous times during the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. They cite the Yom Kippur war between Arabs and Israelis in 1973, growing Soviet success in the advancement of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and the instability in Greece under Ioannides as evidence of the critical nature of these years.¹²² As a result of this danger, they argue the U.S. needed to closely monitor Soviet nuclear capabilities and missile test launches more than ever. British spy stations and airfields in Cyprus as well as U.S. facilities in Turkey and Iran were allegedly important to maintain an American advantage.¹²³

O'Malley and Craig claim, however, that the British were not cooperative with the U.S. concerning the use of their facilities, particularly during the Yom Kippur War. In fact, the British reportedly denied the U.S. any use of the airfield at Akrotiri in order to reinforce the Israelis.¹²⁴ In addition, O'Malley and Craig argue that the British wanted to remove all military forces from Cyprus up until July of 1974, based on information from a political adviser to the British Foreign Secretary.¹²⁵ Thus, "[n]ot only could the Americans no longer be sure that Britain would let them use the Cyprus facilities when they most needed them, but now they could not be sure there would be any facilities left to use at all"¹²⁶ This allegedly contributed to the U.S. concerns about their strategic interests in Cyprus and

¹²² O'Malley, 140.

¹²³ O'Malley, 141.

¹²⁴ O'Malley, 145.

¹²⁵ O'Malley, 150.

¹²⁶ O'Malley, 150.

convinced them that a Greek coup as well as a Turkish invasion of the island would be in their best interest.

PART VI. 1974: The Final Showdown

Chapter 5

January to July 15, 1974: The Greek Coup and its Immediate Aftermath

The tumultuous year of 1974 opened with the death of legendary EOKA and EOKA-B leader George Grivas. The conspiracy theorists make the generally accepted claim that Ioannides and Greek National Guard took control of EOKA-B's activities at this time.¹²⁷ O'Malley and Craig also state that in April, "some American officials demanded that Washington put pressure on the colonels to warn them off taking action against Makarios, but the State Department did nothing."¹²⁸

To further complicate the situation, relations between Turkey and Greece began to break down over oil rights, territorial control of islands in the Aegean, ownership of the continental shelf, and the Turkish population in Thrace. Turkey exacerbated the situation by authorizing studies of oil existence and granting oil exploration permits in areas of the Aegean involved in territorial disputes. Greek leader Ioannides was radically anti-Turkish and was willing to go to war over many of these issues in addition to Cyprus.

After the string of assassination attempts and further evidence of Greek interference on Cyprus, Makarios began to act. On July 1, he attempted to reduce the size of the Greek-infiltrated National Guard. The next day, he sent an open letter to the powerless Greek President Phaedon Ghizikis that challenged the actions of the Greek government in Cyprus. He stated, "More than once I have sensed, and on one occasion almost touched, the invisible hand stretched out from Athens seeking to destroy my human existence," and "I am not a district governor appointed by the Greek government, but the elected leader of a great section

¹²⁷ Stern, 95.

¹²⁸ O'Malley, 152.

of Hellenism, and as such I demand appropriate treatment from the mother country.”¹²⁹ He demanded the recall of all the Athenian officers within the National Guard.

On July 15, Makarios’ palace in Nicosia was attacked by the National Guard, the President was declared dead, and the installation of a new government under Nicos Sampson was announced. Makarios had in fact escaped to Paphos and was taken from there to Akrotiri, one of the British SBA’s. The RAF flew him to Malta and then on to London. Meanwhile, fighting spread throughout the island between pro-Makarios forces and the National Guard. The Turkish-Cypriots immediately became concerned for the safety of their community and called for support from Turkey. Turkey responded by sending their leader, Bulent Ecevit, to London to suggest a joint military response from the base at Akrotiri as Guarantor powers. British Prime Minister Wilson refused and instead called for tripartite talks as he sent a British task force towards Cyprus. Kissinger sent Joseph Sisco on July 18 as his representative to attempt negotiations between the Greeks and Turks and stave off war within NATO.

Turkey invaded the port city of Kyrenia on July 20, 1974 and took control of the Kyrenia-Nicosia road, which enabled them to connect with the Turkish-Cypriot enclave in the capital. Atrocities were reported by both sides as fighting raged across the island. At this time a British task-force arrived in Cyprus solely to secure their bases and civilians, not to deter further Turkish military actions. By the end of July the Cyprus crisis of 1974 had reached a violent climax.

Chapter 6

Who is to Blame for the Coup?

¹²⁹ R.R. Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle* (Winchester: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1982), 122. This quote can be found in almost any book on Cypriot history.

The Conspiracy Theorists' Argument

The conspiracy theorists' have three primary reasons why the U.S. must have been involved in the Greek-orchestrated coup on Cyprus on July 15: the "two-track diplomacy" that was characteristic of both Nixon and Kissinger, the repeated warnings of the coup's imminence, and Kissinger's neutral response to events. Each argument will be explained in more detail here and countered in the discussion of the realities of U.S. policy in subsequent sections.

The conspiracy first claims that Nixon and Kissinger operated with a system of "two-track diplomacy."¹³⁰ This method of policy-making primarily involved keeping the majority of political advisers in the dark.¹³¹ O'Malley and Craig state that, "Kissinger believed it was easier to change policy by circumventing the normal channels and excluding from the decision-making process many of those who were theoretically charged with carrying it out."¹³² By ignoring most of his staff and emphasizing secrecy, Kissinger was able to simultaneously present one policy line in public and covertly pursue his own foreign policy objectives. In support for this claim, O'Malley and Craig cite the unexplained removal of several key State Department staff members: Greek Ambassador Tasca, chief of the Cyprus desk Tom Boyatt, chief of the Greek desk George Churchill, and the unnamed chief of the Turkish Desk.¹³³ In fact, they argue that the State Department consistently operated over the head of Greek Ambassador Tasca and only conducted discussions through the CIA in Athens. As additional support, the authors cite Kissinger's policy decisions regarding the coup in Chile in 1970 and weapons supplies in Pakistan in 1971. Here, Kissinger was involved in covert activity and used intelligence groups rather than traditional State

¹³⁰ Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 69.

¹³¹ Stern, 114.

¹³² O'Malley, 162.

¹³³ O'Malley, 163; Stern, 97.

Department channels. The conspiracy theorists argue that this indicates Kissinger was likely to employ such tactics elsewhere.¹³⁴

Next, the conspiracy authors describe a string of warnings that to which the State Department should have reacted in order to prevent Ioannides from initiating the coup. These warnings counter Kissinger's later claim that "the information was not laying around in the streets."¹³⁵ U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Taylor Belcher reported that junior State Department officials had been trying to convince Kissinger to warn Ioannides against such plans for weeks.¹³⁶ In May, Kissinger reportedly received a memorandum from Chief of the Cyprus Desk Thomas Boyatt that "summarized all the cumulative and persuasive reasons for believing that a Greek junta attack on Cyprus and Makarios was imminent," and that "such a coup...would beyond doubt trigger a Turkish invasion."¹³⁷ On June 7, the *National Intelligence Daily*—a widely read periodical among State Department officials—outlined a warning of a coup based on claims made by Ioannides.¹³⁸ On June 20, the *New York Times* reported a conversation between Ioannides and a CIA station chief in which the Greek dictator stated he was contemplating military action against Makarios.¹³⁹ By June 27, the "State Department" reportedly received their "first explicit warning of a coup," but Tasca was not immediately informed and the State Department did not act.¹⁴⁰ The authors who made this claim did not specify who in the State Department received this warning or why it was different from those they previously cited.

O'Malley and Craig also describe a confusing series of events on June 29. Two days after the State Department's receipt of the initial coup report, the authors claim chief of the

¹³⁴ O'Malley, 162-3.

¹³⁵ Hitchens, 84; Stern, 105; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 78.

¹³⁶ O'Malley, 165; Hitchens, 81.

¹³⁷ Hitchens, 81; Stern, 98; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 81.

¹³⁸ Hitchens, 81; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 79.

¹³⁹ Stern, 95.

¹⁴⁰ O'Malley, 165; Hitchens, 83.

Cyprus desk Thomas Boyatt ordered Tasca to warn Ioannides against the action, but ruled out the use of explicit pressures in the memo. Tasca then questioned the order because the situation, as he saw it, lacked the urgency that would require a diplomatic move. O'Malley and Craig state this was a result of Kissinger conducting communication exclusively through the CIA and ignoring Tasca. Boyatt apparently repeated the order, but Tasca had inexplicably left Athens for a family engagement in Switzerland. Boyatt reported the situation to Joseph Sisco, who contacted Tasca's deputy Elizabeth Brown. Brown allegedly repeated the statement that the situation lacked urgency and, as a result, Ioannides was not warned against a coup.¹⁴¹ According to Lawrence Stern, Tasca was repeatedly cabled to warn Ioannides and ultimately failed to meet with him. Instead, he made representations at lower levels of the Greek government that proved ineffective. Thus the regime "considered the warnings from Tasca as window dressing and not serious American objections to a coup."¹⁴²

The conspiracy theorists cite further warnings, primarily CIA reports, from July. On July 3, CIA analysts reported that Ioannides had personally assured an unnamed source that there would be no action, but prefaced the statement with warnings that events had moved towards a showdown.¹⁴³ Again, on July 11, the analysts reported Ioannides claims that there would be no action, but argued that an attempted coup could not be ruled out. O'Malley and Craig cite a CIA post-mortem, which reviewed the events leading up to the coup and concluded that the State Department relied on these analysts when formulating policy.¹⁴⁴ By this time, Makarios had sent his letter to the Greek government and rejected Ioannides counter demands. Both the letter and the rejection of Ioannides' demands should also have warned Kissinger of an unavoidable confrontation between the Greek junta and Makarios,

¹⁴¹ O'Malley, 165-166; Stern, 98; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 79-80.

¹⁴² Stern, 100.

¹⁴³ Stern, 102.

¹⁴⁴ O'Malley, 166; Stern, 102.

according to the conspiracy theorists.¹⁴⁵ Finally, on July 12 Makarios allegedly told the U.S. Ambassador about Ioannides' plots against him, which CIA analysts reportedly confirmed.¹⁴⁶ In sum, the conspiracy theorists use this series of warnings to illustrate the State Department's knowledge of the coming events and failure to act before the coup occurred. This evidence is intended to support the argument that U.S. involvement should be considered a sin of commission and merits blame for the subsequent crisis.

Lastly, the conspiracy argues that Kissinger's neutral and delayed response provides additional evidence that he supported Greek interference on Cyprus.¹⁴⁷ Kissinger's initial public statement contained no rebukes, pressures, or changes in military alert status. He simply stated, "The United States has long been on record as opposed to any resort to violence on the island. Our policy remains that of supporting the independence and the territorial integrity of Cyprus and its constitutional arrangements, and we urge all other states to support a similar policy."¹⁴⁸ The U.S. was equally non-committal at the U.N. and in regards to the recognition of the new government under Nicos Sampson. O'Malley and Craig cite a State Department spokesman who insisted that, "the question of recognition as of the moment does not arise."¹⁴⁹ They claim that a lack of discouragement on Kissinger's part amounted to encouragement of invasion in order primarily to protect the U.S. interests in their facilities.¹⁵⁰

The Actual U.S. Role in the Coup

In this section I will counter the conspiracy theorists' arguments regarding the Greek-orchestrated coup. Their argument focuses on Kissinger's role in their explanation American

¹⁴⁵ O'Malley, 167; Stern, 104; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 80-81.

¹⁴⁶ O'Malley, 167.

¹⁴⁷ O'Malley, 177.

¹⁴⁸ O'Malley 172; Stern, 112.

¹⁴⁹ O'Malley, 173; Hitchens, 85-86; Stern, 112; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 88.

¹⁵⁰ O'Malley, 176.

policy and emphasizes his non-committal and delayed response to both the warnings and the subsequent crisis. His actions are allegedly explained by his “two-track” diplomatic policy and desire to save Cyprus as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” The three most serious problems with these claims, however, are that they ignore the fact that Cyprus was not a U.S. priority at the time, misinterpret Kissinger’s responses to the coup, and fail to describe the key positions of the State Department early in the crisis. The conspiracy’s errors will be demonstrated through an examination of newly released documents including Kissinger’s memoranda of conversation, State Department Telegrams, and other documents available through the Freedom of Information Act. The conspiracies generally rely on the same few memoranda and, in the case of O’Malley and Craig, one report from the Senate Investigative Committee. A more complete picture of the U.S. and its activity during the 1974 crisis emerges through these new documents.

The conspiracy theorists heavily emphasize the warnings that the State Department should have immediately acted upon as early as May of 1974. The first problem with this point is that foreign policymakers, Kissinger in particular, did not see Cyprus as a priority. While individuals such as Thomas Boyatt of the Department of Near Eastern Affairs felt that the situation was urgent, more influential officials did not share his opinions as other matters required their constant attention. Examples of these issues include, but are not limited to, Watergate, the Middle East after the Yom Kippur War, the oil crisis, détente with the U.S.S.R., and the communist government in Chile. Kissinger himself raises a second problem in his discussion of the Cyprus crisis on August 5th with members of the State Department. He states, “I don’t question that there were such intelligence reports [warning of the coup].” However, he goes on, “an intelligence report that isn’t called to my attention, has no standing, and it is the function of intelligence people, when they have something that they think is of importance, to bring it to the attention of the top policymaker, the President,

the Secretary of State, or whoever else.” He concludes, “If the information doesn’t reach me, or the President, it isn’t useful and it isn’t just enough to put it in the daily paper—it must be flagged as being of some significance.”¹⁵¹ While this speaks volumes about who had the most influence on decisions while Kissinger was Secretary of State, it also makes clear that the right people did not recognize or learn about the significance of the growing turmoil in Cyprus.

Finally, in regards to the warnings, the U.S. did in fact warn Ioannides against any coup attempts in a telegram from Joseph Sisco to Tasca on June 29. While the telegram does not resolve the confusing string of events that O’Malley and Craig outline, it does make clear what the U.S. position was in regards to an overthrow of Makarios regardless of whether or not Tasca conveyed the message. Sisco stated that “it is evident that Ioannides is seriously considering [a] way to topple Makarios from power,” and, “In our view [an] effort to remove Makarios by force contains unacceptable risks of generating chaos [and] eventually causing [a] Greco-Turk confrontation.” He concludes by specifically instructing Tasca to state that because of these risks “we would be strongly opposed to any move of this nature.”¹⁵² Thus, once notified of the potential for a Greek-orchestrated coup, the State Department notified those involved, gave orders they thought the situation required, and did little more because of their foreign policy emphasis on other areas.

Secondly, the conspiracy theorists misinterpret Kissinger’s responses after the coup as neutral, purposefully non-committal, and acquiescent to the island’s new situation. This behavior is allegedly indicative of Kissinger’s support for the 1964 Ball and Acheson plan discussed above. The first problem with their interpretation is that the U.S. plans after 1967

¹⁵¹ “Cyprus Critique,” memorandum of conversation, August 5, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, Digital National Security Archive, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKT01274 [accessed 16 September 2007].

¹⁵² State to Greece and Cyprus, teleg., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, NARA, MD.

emphasized the use of diplomacy and U.S. political influence with the leadership of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey to handle any subsequent crisis. This contrasts sharply with the argument that the American plan during this period involved military intervention by Greece and or Turkey.

The emphasis on diplomacy is most clear in the contingency plans drawn up between the 1967 and 1974 crises. Three of these plans are most significant and relevant to the 1974 crisis because of when they were developed and their detailed nature. The first was completed in July of 1971 by the Department of Near Eastern Affairs and lists, among other things, seven possible events on Cyprus that range from a breakdown in the intercommunal talks, to a Greek orchestrated removal of Makarios, to a risk of Turkish intervention.¹⁵³ The use of U.S. military forces were not considered as an option for any of these contingencies and diplomatic pressure in the form of aid cutoffs were the most extreme of these potential reactions. Sisco reiterated these recommendations to Kissinger in a second contingency study memorandum from August 1971 where he stated, "U.S. responses vary... However, all responses generally involve direct U.S. diplomatic activity (usually in conjunction with the UK) in Athens, Ankara, Nicosia...and support of UN efforts." In addition, he later states, "Finally, our ace in the hole in a crisis on the scale outlined above remains the Special Presidential Mission...This option should be preserved as a last ditch effort to avoid or resolve a Greco-Turk confrontation."¹⁵⁴ Thus the last ditch effort was more diplomacy, rather than allowing the Greeks and/or the Turks to invade in order to resolve a confrontation between the two over Cyprus.

The third contingency study, also completed by the Department of Near Eastern Affairs, is noteworthy since it was completed on May 6, 1974. This would therefore have

¹⁵³ Sisco to Davies, "NSSM – Cyprus Planning," memorandum, July 2, 1971, Record Group 59, Records Relating to Cyprus, 1963-1972, Box 13, NARA, MD.

¹⁵⁴ Sisco to Kissinger, "Cyprus: Contingency Plans for Violent Incidents," memorandum, August 13, 1971, *ibid.*

been the final contingency study for the State Department to examine when the crisis began in July. The report, drafted by Thomas Boyatt and Richard Erdman, summarizes in its introduction that “the only asset effectively available to policy makers is the degree of diplomatic/political influence that the U.S.G [government] can bring to bear on the situation.” In addition, it states that “the important decisions relate almost exclusively to diplomatic strategy and tactics and focus on the questions of whether, when, with whom, and how to use our diplomatic influence in an evolving contingency scenario.” The contingencies the paper examines include “a mainland Greek putsch against Makarios” and, “a joint Greco-Turk attempt to occupy and partition Cyprus.” The recommended response to both of these events was, “low-key joint diplomatic representations to Greece and Turkey to prevent them from undertaking potentially disastrous para-military or military adventures in Cyprus.”¹⁵⁵ This policy was the most logical conclusion after the U.S. experiences on Cyprus in 1964 and 1967 where diplomacy successfully diffused both crises. In addition, it is consistent with the way Kissinger and the State Department reacted to the 1974 crisis and also explains why the U.S. would be unwilling to utilize its own military forces in order to enforce the peace or prevent an invasion of Cyprus.

Third and finally, the conspiracy theorists fail to clearly explain the positions and objectives of the U.S. government after the coup occurred. The four most significant of these priorities are emphasized throughout the State Department documents and include: prevention of the internationalization of the conflict, a firm understanding of on-island developments before decisions are made, no support for Sampson, and encouragement of the restoration of the constitution and the opening of negotiations.

Evidence of these priorities can be found in the minutes and memoranda of conversation from the first few days of meetings as well as telegrams between the State

¹⁵⁵ “Contingency Study for Cyprus,” memorandum prepared by Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, S/S – 1 Files: Lot 83 D 411, Box 3418, NSC Contingency Plans: Cyprus, NARA, MD.

Department and its embassies. The State Department's primary objective from July 15 onward was to prevent the internationalization of the Cyprus conflict in order to avoid a Greek-Turkish war and check any potential increase in Soviet involvement. On July 15 at 10 am, during the first meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (SAG) concerning Cyprus, Sisco opened discussions by outlining what he saw as America's two primary objectives: first, "do what we can to avert war between Greece and Turkey," and second, "do what we can to avert Soviet exploitation of the situation." Kissinger concurred and stated that "our immediate objective is to keep this thing from becoming internationalized, the Greek-Turk problem, the Soviet angle."¹⁵⁶ The next day, in a second SAG meeting, Kissinger reiterated that "[o]ur first objective is to prevent the situation from becoming internationalized," with the assent of the other policymakers in attendance, which included sixteen people from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and the National Security Council staff.¹⁵⁷ He again made the same point in a SAG meeting on July 18, despite the fact that the issue had already reached the UN.¹⁵⁸ The early evidence therefore suggests that Kissinger, the State Department, and other groups within the U.S. Government consistently believed that their primary objective should be to prevent external involvement. These officials also believed, up until July 19, that prevention of internationalization was in fact still possible.

These meetings also demonstrate Kissinger and other officials' demands for a firm understanding of the developments on the island before major decisions could be made and U.S. positions on the issues became public. Immediate confusion concerned the whereabouts and condition of Makarios, the potential for an internal war against Cypriot Communists, the possibility of *enosis*, and the possible Turkish reactions to the coup. In the initial meetings

¹⁵⁶ "Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG)," Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files, Meetings Files, WSAG Meetings, NARA, MD.

¹⁵⁷ "Minutes of Meeting of the WSAG," July 16, 1974, *ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ "Minutes of Meeting of the WSAG," *ibid.*

on July 15 and 16, Kissinger stated “[t]here really is nothing we can do at this time internally,” and the situation was described as “murky.” Sisco bluntly claimed, “We just don’t know what’s going on.” In response, Kissinger argued that, “we have to have a firm understanding of the situation before we jump,” and Sisco advocated “cautious,” “low-profile” action.¹⁵⁹ Rather than establish immediate public positions in support of Greece or Turkey, the U.S. elected to issue a statement supporting the Cypriot constitution as well as its independence. Questions remained, however, as late as July 18 regarding the permanence of Nicos Sampson as the new Greek Cypriot leader, the possibility of Makarios’ return, whether or not he would need to lean on the Left for support, the future of the Greek government, and Turkey’s possible actions. As a result, Kissinger continued to state that the U.S. should “avoid taking a stand” and “avoid assuming a public posture which commits us to any particular course of action.”¹⁶⁰ Rather, he wanted “the situation to crystallize...in order to enable concerted action later.”¹⁶¹ The State Department was clear regarding the need for a coherent situation in order to develop a similarly coherent policy.

This State Department demand for clarity, however, is one of the more heavily criticized U.S. policies by both the conspiracy theorists and other historians and politicians. Critics claim that the U.S. should have acted more rapidly to establish their position against the Greek actions and in favor of Cypriot independence in order to prevent the subsequent Turkish military action. Kissinger and the State Department feared that a strong stance against Greece would encourage a Turkish intervention because the threat to Cypriot sovereignty would appear more serious.¹⁶² In addition, they simply did not have the detailed

¹⁵⁹ Minutes of the July 15, 1974, WSAG Meeting; Minutes of the July 16, 1974 WSAG meeting.

¹⁶⁰ Minutes of the July 18, 1974, WSAG Meeting; State to Nicosia, London, Athens, Ankara, Kissinger, teleg., July 18, 1974, Record Group 59: Records of Joseph Sisco, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, NARA, MC.

¹⁶¹ “Cyprus Crisis,” memorandum of conversation, July 18, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, Digital National Security Archive, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKT01252 [accessed 16 September 2007].

¹⁶² Ibid.

knowledge of the inner workings of the island necessary to confidently make the major decisions the critics demand. This is certainly not an excuse for the Department, since it employs individuals who are responsible for obtaining this sort of detailed knowledge, and the U.S. may indeed merit criticism for its policy. However, the U.S. reaction in no way indicates that a conspiracy was at work. Rather, it indicates that Kissinger and the Department had been caught unprepared for how to handle just such a crisis and therefore adopted a “wait and see” strategy in the hopes that the path most beneficial to the U.S. would become clear.

Next, the conspiracy theorists question the U.S. policy regarding recognition of Nicos Sampson as the new Cypriot leader. The documents provide ample evidence that the U.S. never intended to recognize Sampson during the crisis, regardless of what was portrayed to the public. Kissinger stated in the July 16 SAG meeting that “[w]e don’t want to recognize Sampson,” and believed he was “just a figurehead anyway.”¹⁶³ On July 17, Kissinger made clear that Sampson was “a most unattractive guy” and “it’s not in our interest to have him.” Thomas Boyatt agreed that “Sampson certainly is not acceptable.”¹⁶⁴ Kissinger later told Callaghan to convey to the Turks that the U.S. “was not supporting Sampson.”¹⁶⁵ These statements were confirmed in a telegram to the U.S. ambassadors on July 18 that stated, “The U.S. also cannot accept the Sampson regime,” but continued on to argue that it should not be removed until a substitute could be found.¹⁶⁶ By July 19 Joseph Sisco had begun his shuttle diplomacy and Kissinger instructed him to inform the parties that “we now believe the Clerides solution is the only one,” which indicates that the U.S. had begun supporting Clerides as Cypriot President. This would be their position for the remainder of the crisis.

¹⁶³ Minutes of the July 16, 1974, WSAG Meeting

¹⁶⁴ “Minutes of Meeting of WSAG,” Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings, NARA, MD.

¹⁶⁵ Kissinger to Callaghan, telephone conversation, July 17, 1974, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Telephone Conversations, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

¹⁶⁶ Minutes of the July 18, 1974, WSAG Meeting.

At this point it seemed possible either that Sampson would establish himself as leader, especially since Makarios had fled the island, or that a civil war would develop between right-wing and Communist forces. Again, due to the fact that the situation was “too complicated” and the need to “see what develops on the island” in order to determine “who to support,” the U.S. decided to avoid the recognition issue and claim it simply hadn’t arisen yet.¹⁶⁷ The U.S. may merit criticism again for its failure to take a public stance against an unsavory leader installed by outside forces. However, the State Department was certainly not in favor of a continuation of his leadership and the U.S. reaction again in no way indicates that it was utilizing Sampson to encourage a Turkish invasion.

Finally, the U.S. also made clear that it supported the restoration of constitutional rule and the beginning of negotiations to reduce tension in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first affirmation of this policy was on July 15 in the SAG meeting where Kissinger stated that “we want to advise [the Turks] on preserving the present structure on the island,” and Sisco agreed.¹⁶⁸ He reaffirmed this position on July 18 when he argued that “an ideal solution would be to get negotiations started, within the Zurich framework, towards a solution on which all sides agree.”¹⁶⁹ This policy was then communicated to the U.S. ambassadors later that same day in a telegram that instructed them to encourage “conditions for the development of a compromise and negotiated settlement which would permit the maintenance of constitutional arrangements on Cyprus.”¹⁷⁰ The next day, as rumors of Turkish troop movements began, Ambassador McCloskey confirmed that “a military solution is completely out of the question and we are working for a solution through diplomatic processes.”¹⁷¹ The evidence does not confirm the belief that the U.S. was intent

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Minutes of the July 15, 1974, WSAG Meeting.

¹⁶⁹ “Minutes of Meeting of the WSAG,” July 18, 1974, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings, NARA, MD.

¹⁷⁰ Minutes of the July 18, 1974, WSAG Meeting

¹⁷¹ “Minutes of Meeting of the WSAG,” July 19, 1974, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA, MD.

on a change in the Cypriot government that better accommodated U.S. interests. Rather, it shows that the U.S. felt a return to the pre-crisis government system and the continuation of negotiations would create the best conditions for the establishment of peace. Therefore the documents portray the early role of the U.S. as pragmatic and distant rather than as a consistent supporter of invasion.

Chapter 7

Who is to Blame for the First Turkish Invasion?

The Conspiracy Theorists' Interpretation

The conspiracy theorists also argue that the U.S. must have been involved in or endorsed the Turkish invasion. They support this by stating that, again, the U.S. had plenty of warning, Kissinger did not effectively arm Sisco to conduct credible negotiations, and the U.S. explicitly refused to provide military support to the British as Foreign Minister James Callaghan requested. This evidence will be discussed further in this section and countered in a later section on the realities of the U.S.'s policy.

The conspiracy theorists again claim that the U.S. had sufficient warning to move against the Turks and prevent the invasion. First, the U.S. and British electronic facilities on the island and throughout the region should have detected the movement of thousands of Turkish troops during the days prior to July 20. The primary function of most of these spy stations was to “eavesdrop on military communications and spot the movement of aircraft,” and thus the Americans and British allegedly must have had information about the armada landing craft.¹⁷² In addition, O'Malley and Craig cite general warnings from the CIA, U.S. diplomats in Nicosia and Ankara, as well as media reports that the State Department did not act on. This was reportedly the only time when State Department initiatives were inconsistent with intelligence reports.¹⁷³ In contrast, National Security Council and State Department officials, including Ambassador Tasca, claimed they had not received the information.¹⁷⁴ O'Malley and Craig state this is further evidence that Kissinger kept important information from the majority of his staff.

¹⁷² O'Malley, 179.

¹⁷³ O'Malley, 181.

¹⁷⁴ O'Malley, 179.

Secondly, the conspiracy theorists again claim that the U.S. was involved because Joseph Sisco was sent to negotiate between Greece and Turkey armed with nothing capable of convincing Turkey that it was in their best interest to avoid military interference in Cyprus. Sisco also allegedly made no suggestions of punitive actions against the Turks and had little or nothing to negotiate with. O'Malley and Craig cite George Ball who stated, "He [Sisco] wasn't armed with enough in the way of American leverage to be able to accomplish anything with the Ankara government and they went ahead."¹⁷⁵ This was apparently because Kissinger chose not to provide Sisco with more weapons to deter the Turks.

Lastly, the conspiracy theorists claim that James Callaghan requested joint U.S.-British action to deter invasion, but the U.S. refused to provide the necessary military support. The authors support this claim with evidence that the British were unable to mount an operation on their own due to a lack of firepower in the area and the statements of Callaghan's military adviser, Tom McNally.¹⁷⁶ McNally reportedly stated in an interview that it was made "quite clear that Henry Kissinger was not going to get the Americans involved and didn't think it was a good idea for Britain to get involved either."¹⁷⁷ Thus any military or negotiated attempt to deter the Turkish invasion was hamstrung by Kissinger's actions, which indicates that he supported and encouraged the move. In summary, O'Malley and Craig argue that:

Kissinger's action ensured the Turks knew their only hope of keeping the Greeks off Cyprus was to intervene militarily themselves, as was their right under the Treaty of Guarantee. Despite the culminating crisis over Watergate in Washington, Kissinger chose to act against the advice of experts in his own department, and in a way that ran the greatest risk of provoking a legally justifiable Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. The most logical explanation of why Kissinger pulled his punches with the Turks is that he believed the threat of Greece going to war over such a move could be contained.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ O'Malley, 181; Stern, 116; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 97.

¹⁷⁶ Hitchens, 87.

¹⁷⁷ O'Malley, 184.

¹⁷⁸ O'Malley, 186.

The Reality of U.S. Policy Regarding the First Turkish Invasion

The conspiracy theorists' describe a U.S. policy of secrecy and intrigue incompatible with the actual development of State Department actions and goals. There are four major reasons why this is the case: the U.S. handled the warnings of invasion in a manner consistent with its policy up until that time, Joseph Sisco's mission was nearly impossible from the beginning, the U.S. never intended to provide military support to an intervention mission, and the facilities on the island were no longer a U.S. priority.

The first indicator that the U.S. was not involved in a conspiracy concerns the warnings of the coming invasion. The primary State Department reaction to the rumors of Turkish troop movements was based on Sisco's shuttle diplomacy. On July 19, Kissinger acted in a manner consistent with prior U.S. policy when he instructed Sisco, via Ambassador McCloskey, to "tell them [the Turks] that we object strongly to their actions, that it has strong consequences for everybody, [and] we now believe that the Clerides solution is the only one," by which he meant Clerides' establishment as the President of Cyprus.¹⁷⁹ In the meantime, he contacted a number of advisers including the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Director of Central Intelligence William Colby for advice on how to handle the situation. Kissinger informed Schlesinger that "we think the best solution now is to have a negotiation as rapidly as possible looking for the return to constitutional government," and qualified his statement by saying "we don't think this will really fly but at least it's a slender thread." Schlesinger felt "the Turks at this stage aren't going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island," but Kissinger responded that "they are willing to stabilize their forces and willing to accept the existing structure."¹⁸⁰ While this plan of action and confidence in Ecevit's ability to control his military may have been misguided, it is also

¹⁷⁹ Kissinger to Schlesinger, telephone conversation, July 19, 1974, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Telephone Conversations, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

inconsistent with encouragement of an invasion. Colby's recommendation was "to get the Greeks not to fight. To say all right, let's negotiate and discuss what ought to be done," and Kissinger appeared to agree.¹⁸¹

Critics may claim this was another example of Kissinger's "two-track" diplomacy, but his instructions to the foreign ministers in Paris, London and Bonn early in the morning of July 20 indicates otherwise. McCloskey reported that the U.S. position was to support a ceasefire, begin negotiations between the guarantor powers in London, and reestablish constitutional rule in Cyprus. In addition, he confirmed that Kissinger had instructed Sisco "to be brutal towards the Turks in the sense that he can say that we will withhold all military aid in the event there is an all-out war."¹⁸² Thus the evidence indicates that the U.S. did react to the warnings of the impending invasion and their reactions were completely consistent with the prior policies: support the independence of Cyprus and a constitutional government through negotiations and diplomacy.

Secondly, to add to the consistency, Joseph Sisco's mission to the governments in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia fit in smoothly with both the contingency plans recommendation of a "low-key diplomatic initiative" in the event of a crisis.¹⁸³ It began on July 18, but by the following day Sisco had already reported back to the State Department, "I have the distinct impression that no matter what is done in this situation, the Turks see it as an ideal time to achieve by military intervention a longstanding objective, namely double enosis."¹⁸⁴ Therefore he recognized the limited effectiveness of his own actions during this time to create stability on Cyprus. As he wrote the telegram on July 19, the Turks were in fact already amassing troops in preparation for an invasion. Kissinger later stated in August

¹⁸¹ Kissinger to Colby, telephone conversation, July 19, 1974, Kissinger Papers, Library of Congress, DC.

¹⁸² "Minutes of Meeting of the WSAG," July 20, 1974, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA, MD.

¹⁸³ "Contingency Study for Cyprus," memorandum prepared by Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, S/S - 1 Files: Lot 83 D 411, Box 3418, NSC Contingency Plans: Cyprus, NARA, MD.

¹⁸⁴ Greece to State, teleg., July 19, 1974, Record Group 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951-1976, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, NARA, MD.

that Sisco's mission was, "First, to clarify the real intentions of all of the parties...And secondly to convey to the parties...our analysis of the situation and an explanation of our motivation," rather than an explicit attempt to reach a solution.¹⁸⁵

In fact, Sisco worked to establish an agreement and a cease-fire, but shuttle diplomacy was not as effective in 1974 the way it had during the previous two crises. This was primarily because Turkey had already reached the conclusion that military intervention would be the most effective means to achieve their country's goals. This was due in part to the frustration that resulted from the outcome of the previous two crises as well as internal pressures on the Turkish government from the public and the military. In addition, the situation in 1974 was distinct from the previous crises because both Cyprus and Greece lacked a legitimate government with international support. Turkey was able to attack an internationally recognized "professional thug" in Cyprus and a despised dictatorship in Greece to "protect the Turkish Cypriots" from a serious threat.¹⁸⁶ The lack of government also made Sisco's negotiations in Athens and Nicosia next to impossible. Therefore, despite Kissinger's instructions to "be brutal towards the Turks in the sense that he [Sisco] can say that we will withhold all military aid in the event there is an all-out war," there was little that Sisco could do to prevent the escalation of the conflict.

Thirdly, the conspiracy's claims regarding U.S. refusal to involve themselves militarily in support of the British also fail to prove that the U.S. was involved in the Turkish invasion. As discussed above, the U.S. had a long established plan to use only diplomatic means to handle any crisis on Cyprus. The involvement of U.S. military forces, even in support of a British preventative movement, was never considered or discussed as a possibility up until the 1974 crisis. Thus Kissinger's refusal to permit the use of U.S. troops

¹⁸⁵ "Cyprus Critique," memorandum of conversation, August 5, 1974, Digital National Security Archive. For full citation see footnote 160.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

was consistent with State Department policy and does not indicate his encouragement of a Turkish invasion, but rather his confidence in the ability of diplomacy to re-establish peace.

A significant part of the conspiracy theorists' argument concerns the U.S. facilities and British Sovereign Base Areas (SBA's) on Cyprus. These facilities were allegedly so important that the Turkish invasion was permitted in order to maintain their existence and ability to fulfill their intelligence-gathering functions. On the contrary, however, State Department and CIA documents from the early 1970s clearly state that their value was not enough to risk a Greek-Turkish war, indicate that both the facilities and the bases were of limited significance, and assure the State Department that the Cyprus Government will continue to permit their operations.

In the early 1970s, America's primary objective in the Eastern Mediterranean was to prevent war between Greece and Turkey and not to maintain access to the British SBA's and the communications facilities specifically located on Cyprus. This is clear in the documents from the crisis itself, where the State Department's five major priorities include the prevention of the conflict's internationalization and not the protection of the bases, as described above. This point was also made clear prior to the crisis in March 1970 in a memorandum from Thomas Davis of the Near Eastern Affairs Cyprus Desk. The memorandum detailed the Cyprus Desk's view on the different "analytical axes for approaching Cyprus' impact on U.S. policy in the Mediterranean area," and stated that "[w]e hope that this millennium would not bring the issue of the British bases and our communications facilities to the fore but this risk is distinctly preferable to [the] danger of [a] Greco-Turkish conflict over an unsettled Cyprus situation."¹⁸⁷ The consistency in the State Department's evaluation of the Cyprus facilities' importance between 1970 and 1974

¹⁸⁷ Davies to Schiff (NEA), "Cyprus – NSSM 90," memorandum, March 6, 1970, Record Group 59, Box 11, NARA, MD.

indicates that the Department's policy did in fact prioritize peace between Greece and Turkey over salvaging the communications operations in Cyprus.

One reason why the State Department developed this policy may have been because of the limited significance these facilities and bases had for the U.S.. The British bases were less significant because of their declining importance for the British government as well. Several documents from the Near Eastern Affairs desks support this assertion in 1970 and 1971. In June of 1970, Thomas Davis sent another detailed memorandum to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's (INR) Philip Stoddard regarding the British SBA's at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. According to Davis' report, the British had 3,749 Army personnel and 5,369 RAF personnel stationed in the SBA's as of April 1970 and, "[f]or the time being, the UK is expected to maintain these force levels."¹⁸⁸ In addition, Davis states that "[b]efore political considerations...the bases...played important operational roles in the management of Britain's overseas activities." As of 1970, however, "the role of Cyprus in the UK's global strategy seems headed for decline" since the UK depends more on its "West About" route overflying the U.S. in order to supply its bases in East Asia rather than the Middle Eastern route through Cyprus.

The SBA's decline in importance was also because the U.S. appeared unwilling to use them for strategic purposes. This same memorandum from Davis makes clear that Cyprus lacked strategic value for any mission against the U.S.S.R. He states that "[t]he U.S. Sixth Fleet has its own offensive-defensive capability against the Soviet Squadron in which the UK forces on Cyprus play no role." In addition, NATO has no interest in the Cyprus bases because "anything that NATO (i.e., the U.S.) might contemplate doing from Cyprus against the U.S.S.R and Eastern Europe could be accomplished more readily from Incirlik, Cigli, [Turkey] and Athens where U.S. forces are already in being." The memorandum states

¹⁸⁸ Davis to Stoddard (INR), "British Sovereign Base Areas," memorandum, June 4, 1970, *ibid.*

that, while the U.S. receives intelligence information collected by the British, “the U.S. duplicates most of these with its own missions out of Athens” and the information the UK provides primarily concerns Cyprus and the UAR. Finally, the U.S. has decided at least once not to use Cyprus as a base for a special mission—in early 1969, according to Davis—and the Near Eastern Affairs desk also provided several compelling reasons why the U.S. should continue this policy in January of 1971. Their primary objections include the difficulty in obtaining Makarios and UK’s approval, the unlikelihood that the U.S. would be able to use the facilities again, and the backlash from the Cypriot people through propaganda.¹⁸⁹ While it is unclear whether the State Department agreed with this assessment or not, these reasons are undeniably compelling.

The communications facilities had decreased in importance for the U.S. as well due to the previously described reductions after the 1967 crisis. In addition, as a memo from the INR to Cyprus Ambassador David Popper indicates, the State Department had established plans to “phase out RRO [another of the State Department’s Radio Relay Office] in Cyprus, perhaps as early as Fiscal Year 1973,” by September 1971.¹⁹⁰ These documents indicate that Cyprus’ strategic value had depreciated significantly by the beginning of the 1970s. The picture they provide of Cyprus is quite different from the “unsinkable battleship” O’Malley and Craig describe.

Regardless of the facilities’ significance for the U.S., both the Cypriot and British governments made clear that the facilities were not at risk before the crisis occurred. The British repeatedly asserted that Makarios had not questioned the bases’ existence since the crisis in 1963, most likely because of the significant economic support they provided to Cyprus. In addition, in 1968, UK Defense Minister Healey stated that the British “could not

¹⁸⁹ Davis to Sisco, “Akrotiri as Base for U-2 Flights,” memorandum, January 22, 1971, *ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ Popper (NEA) to Coerr (INR), “Future of Department’s Radio Relay Office,” memorandum, September 30, 1971, *ibid.*

make use of Malta for all the purposes for which we now need facilities in Cyprus.”¹⁹¹ These claims combined with the SBA’s previously mentioned intelligence functions offer support for the assertion that these bases were not going to be completely phased out at any point.

The communications facilities also appeared secure according to the Cyprus government’s statements. In November of 1973, Representative Vassos Lyssarides made a statement in the Cypriot Parliament against the U.S. communications facilities, referred to them as “a blow against Cyprus,” and asked whether the government planned to “wind them up.” The Foreign Minister responded with a brief statement confirming that the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs is satisfied that the interests of friendly and neighboring countries are not affected by the presence of American monitoring stations in Cyprus.” The U.S. responded by notifying the Foreign Ministry that, as of November 2, the U.S. expected “we would be substantially reducing American communications operations [at Mia Milia and Yerolakkos] here,” which further confirms the declining importance of these facilities.¹⁹² Cypriot support of the Foreign Minister was confirmed on November 29 when the House of Representatives defeated Lyssarides’ motion to close the communications facilities.¹⁹³ Thus the official policy of the Cyprus government did not question the continued operation of these facilities—although they may not even exist in the future. These documents thus do not describe the U.S. facilities as the lynchpins in the Cold War intelligence system upon which the conspiracy theorists base their argument. Further problems with the conspiracy theories are visible as the narrative of the 1974 crisis continues following the first Turkish invasion on July 20.

¹⁹¹ “British Sovereign Base Areas,” June 4, 1970, *ibid.*

¹⁹² Cyprus to State Department, teleg., November 9, 1973, Record Group 59: Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 – 12/31/1974, National Archives Archival Databases, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=98140&dt=1573&dl=823> [accessed 10 November 2007].

¹⁹³ Cyprus to State Department, teleg., November 30, 1973, Record Group 59: Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974 – 12/31/1974, National Archives Archival Databases, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=104445&dt=1573&dl=823> [accessed 10 November 2007].

Chapter 8

July-August 1974: The Aftermath of the First Turkish Invasion

The conspiracy theorists admit that the U.S. took the lead in the diplomatic endeavors to prevent war that included Sisco's continued negotiations and telephone calls from Kissinger.¹⁹⁴ However, they argue against Kissinger's assertions that the ceasefire he arranged on July 21 and 22 prevented the Turkish military from occupying more than a small portion of the island. O'Malley and Craig state that Kissinger encouraged the Turks to see the ceasefire as a time to reinforce their position on the island before beginning the second half of the two-stage invasion plan. They quote Turkish writer Mehmet Ali Birand, who reportedly heard Kissinger tell Ecevit, "It was essential for you to seize a bridgehead and this you have done. Now, you will have to await reinforcements before you can advance further," and, "Your bridgehead is strengthened, your reinforcements are about to land on the island, and can continue to do so after the ceasefire. In short you have time to take all the measures necessary for your security."¹⁹⁵

By this point, the Turkish forces had complete control over Kyrenia and an approximately 20-mile-wide corridor between there and the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia. On July 23, Nicos Sampson resigned as President and Glafkos Clerides took his place based on the law of the Constitution. Confrontational skirmishes continued within Nicosia along the UN established "Green Line" dividing the two communities. Regardless of the continuing conflict, talks between the Greeks, Turks, and British were arranged in Geneva for July 25. The U.S. sent Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs William Buffum as Kissinger's personal representative. O'Malley and Craig criticize Buffum and Kissinger for their "extraordinary failure to criticize Turkish action in breaking

¹⁹⁴ O'Malley, 191.

¹⁹⁵ M.A. Birand, *30 Hot Days* (Nicosia: K. Rustem and Bro. Publishers, 1985), 45.

the ceasefire...even after the illegal Sampson regime had been replaced by Clerides,” during the Geneva negotiations.¹⁹⁶ The talks continuously faltered, however, as the three sides struggled to remain on speaking terms. Kissinger saved the talks at least once through long-distance telephone calls to the British, Greek, and Turkish leaders and ultimately managed to broker an agreement that called for the removal of Turkish troops after a settlement on Cyprus’s future, a standstill in fighting, and the creation of a UN buffer zone.

A second round of talks, again in Geneva, was arranged for the beginning of August. The Cypriot representatives were to be included for the first time. They opened on August 8 with immediate tension over the continued movement of Turkish troops and Makarios’ refusal to accept any form of partition. Meanwhile, Nixon resigned from office on August 9 to avoid impeachment over the Watergate scandal and Gerald R. Ford became President. Kissinger stayed on with the new administration and this time sent Arthur Hartman to Geneva as his representative and the U.S.’s observer. The talks repeatedly stalled as a result of Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Gunesh’s frequent demands for an immediate agreement based on partition and rumors of Turkish plans for a second invasion. O’Malley and Craig argue that Kissinger denied the likelihood of a second invasion and “made it clear that the United States was content with Ecevit’s reassurances of military restraint,” despite British mediator James Callaghan’s conviction that the military movement was imminent.¹⁹⁷ Thus the conspiracy theory holds that the U.S. prevented the British from moving in militarily and preventing the establishment of further Turkish military control over territory.

Despite later shifts in the Turkish position, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots refused to even consider the plans for separate Turkish cantons and division of the island. The talks began to break down on August 13 and 14 as Turkish forces began to move. O’Malley and Craig argue that Kissinger exacerbated the situation when he released a State Department

¹⁹⁶ O’Malley, 201; Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*, 87; Stern, 131.

¹⁹⁷ O’Malley, 210.

statement that said, among other things, that “the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them.”¹⁹⁸ The implication is that the coup, which the U.S. reportedly knew about in advance, gave the Turks the right to seize control of more guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot community, including autonomous zones.¹⁹⁹

On August 14, the Turkish forces moved out from Kyrenia, Nicosia, and the corridor connecting the two cities. The Turkish leader, Ecevit, reportedly confirmed the agreeing policies of the U.S. and Turkey regarding Cyprus, while Greece pulled out of NATO’s military wing.²⁰⁰ Ultimately Greece did not have the strength to counter the Turkish operation. The Turks continued to advance, however, until August 18, when O’Malley and Craig state the Americans moved the aircraft-carriers *Forrestal*, *Independence*, and *Inchon* into the Eastern Mediterranean. They argue that this shows the influence the U.S. was capable of exercising as well as the support for Turkish troop movements only into specified areas.²⁰¹ They then blame the collapse of the talks on Kissinger’s encouragement of Turkish objectives and refusal to support British military deterrence actions.²⁰² The 1964 plan developed by Acheson and Ball allegedly came to fruition through Kissinger’s actions in 1974, achieving the desired partition of the island and protection for the U.S. facilities.

Chapter 9

The Reality of the U.S. Policies Post-Invasion

In contrast to the conspiracy theory, the U.S.’s policies during the time period between July 20 and August 15 were not developed in order to achieve the plan developed by

¹⁹⁸ O’Malley, 214; Stern, 132; Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 99.

¹⁹⁹ O’Malley, 214.

²⁰⁰ O’Malley, 217-218.

²⁰¹ O’Malley, 220.

²⁰² O’Malley, 220.

Acheson and Ball. First, the conspiracy argues that Kissinger and the State Department encouraged the Turkish troop movements in between the country's two military interventions. Kissinger's statements that appeared to encourage the Turkish troop movements, however, were in fact his attempts at first negotiating a cease-fire and then an agreement between Greece and Turkey. It is most likely true that Kissinger allowed Turkish troop movements and Mehmet Ali Birand's account, *30 Hot Days*, is generally accepted by all sides as a reliable Turkish source. The troop adjustments were permitted, however, so that the Turks did not feel their troops were at risk within their beachhead or that their government was in disadvantaged position in the international negotiations.

Mehmet Birand in fact supports this interpretation when he stated that "they had to [move]...the area held no room for manoeuvre such as was necessary for their security."²⁰³ In one of these conversations Ecevit himself also claimed that "[w]e must ensure the full security of our forces in the island."²⁰⁴ The Cyprus Task Force formed on July 22 to coordinate Departmental activity in the crisis agreed when they stated that "[t]he Turks will probably insist on consolidating their position on the island so that they will have a realistic basis for partition or at least negotiation."²⁰⁵ General George S. Brown of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred during another SAG meeting that same day: "I think the Turks will pour enough stuff in during the ceasefire to put them in a better bargaining position."²⁰⁶ Thus the U.S. adopted a pragmatic position by accepting that Turkey was bound to continue moving their troops and this must be permitted in order to achieve a ceasefire. Birand agreed with this assessment of America activity when he stated that Kissinger adopted "a realistic policy," not endorsement of a conspiracy with Turkey, during this time period.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ Birand, 49.

²⁰⁴ Birand, 39.

²⁰⁵ Hartman to Kissinger, briefing memorandum, July 22, 1974, Record Group 59: Records of Henry Kissinger, Box 9, NARA, MD.

²⁰⁶ "Minutes of Meeting of the WSAG," July 22, 1974, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA, MD.

²⁰⁷ Birand, 58.

The rest of the public statement the conspiracy theorists cite above does not appear to support Turkish troop movements, but rather it confirms support for the constitution and the territorial integrity of Cyprus, argues that diplomatic measures have not been exhausted, and expresses opposition to military action.²⁰⁸ Birand in fact quotes a conversation from this period between Kissinger and Ecevit where Kissinger states, “I know that you are not satisfied with the territory you presently hold, but it would be much better to resolve your disputes at the conference table.”²⁰⁹ After the August 13 press conference statement, Birand also quotes the Turkish UN Ambassador Coskun Kirca who stated that Turkey interpreted the statement as an endorsement of the Turkish “right to march” if their “principles are not accepted” even though the Greek UN Ambassador strongly disagreed.²¹⁰ The statements only reiterated previous U.S. policy, however, and the State Department should not be held responsible for the Turks misinterpreting their public positions as encouragement or support.

Secondly, there is no doubt the U.S. received warnings of the coming second invasion as the conspiracy theorists’ claim. The State Department reacted as they did not because of their support for Turkey’s actions, but rather because the State Department believed Ecevit’s assertions to Kissinger that he would delay the military action and control his generals. Ecevit assured Kissinger at least twice that he could enforce both a 24-hour and a 36-hour delay in Turkish action in order to negotiate with his generals.²¹¹ As demonstrated above, Kissinger also made clear to Ecevit during this time that further military movements were not an acceptable solution. Thus the State Department believed that, through Ecevit, they could control further movements.

²⁰⁸ Birand, 111.

²⁰⁹ Birand, 93.

²¹⁰ Birand, 111.

²¹¹ Kissinger to Ford, Memorandum of Conversation, August 13, 1974, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers.

Regardless of the warnings received or U.S. perceptions of the situation, there was little to nothing the U.S. could have done to prevent the second invasion. By August 9, Sisco had reported that “a Turkish army plan to being another military operation on August 20” had been discovered because, “further military action might be required if Turkey’s objectives were not obtained by diplomatic means.”²¹² On August 12, Deputy Assistant Secretary to Europe Wells Stabler stated that if “he [Ecevit] is determined to go, there is not much we can do.”²¹³ Birand agreed with this assessment of the situation when he described the military and government views on a second invasion as early as the end of July. The military stated that “[o]ur plans had always envisaged a two-stage operation...this was unavoidable.” The government also claimed that “[a]ll the plans discussed allowed for two phases...[t]he breathing space between the two operations was a technical necessity,” although phase II would be postponed if Greece could agree.²¹⁴ Thus the U.S. influence to prevent a second intervention was limited in its potential scope.

Finally, the U.S. did not support the British military intervention at this time again because it was never part of their policy for Cyprus to involve U.S. troops in any way, as described above. In addition, during a time of transition in the Presidency after Richard Nixon’s resignation, the possibility of committing troops to an already controversial crisis simply did not exist. As Kissinger stated on August 10 in a conversation with President Ford, “[w]e could not—really in the first 48 hours of your term in of office—be very relaxed about unilateral military action.”²¹⁵ Thus the second denial of U.S. troops in no way supports a conspiracy, but rather was a logical political decision by the State Department. Thus the

²¹² Mission in Geneva (Hartman) to State, teleg., August 9, 1974, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

²¹³ Memorandum of conversation, August 12, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, Digital National Security Archive, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKT01283 [accessed 16 September 2007].

²¹⁴ Birand, 50.

²¹⁵ Kissinger to Ford, telephone conversation, August 10, 1974, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

U.S.'s actual policies during this last phase of the crisis still support the assertion that the State Department was working toward a ceasefire and negotiations rather than further Turkish control of the island for the sake of relatively insignificant and underused U.S. facilities and British SBA's. This concludes the analysis of the conspiracy theories in comparison with the actual U.S. policies during the three crises.

CONCLUSION

Overview of the Arguments for Each Crisis

In conclusion, the United States government developed a consistent policy during the 1960s and 1970s that encouraged the use of negotiations and diplomacy to diffuse the three crises on the island of Cyprus and maintain stability among NATO countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. This contrasts sharply with the portrait of America painted by the conspiracy theorists, where the State Department allegedly encouraged a Greek-orchestrated coup and Turkish military intervention in order to protect its interests on the island. These interests were apparently the U.S. communications facilities and British Sovereign Base Areas located throughout Cyprus.

Specifically, during the 1963 and 1964 crisis, the conspiracy theorists argue that the U.S. and British governments cooperated to establish partition on the island. They support this assertion by describing how George Ball and Dean Acheson collaborated on a plan that would allow for simultaneous Greek and Turkish invasions in order to create stability and protect the U.S. facilities. This plan was allegedly the blueprint for the U.S.'s policies for the next decade. While suggestions like the Ball-Acheson plan were made by State Department officials, their recommendations were not official U.S. policy at the highest level throughout the next ten years. Johnson never fully supported the idea, these same officials later rejected the plan, and the State Department altered its policies accordingly. In addition, the U.S. did not appear concerned about the future of its facilities and in fact cut down their operations.

During the 1967 crisis, the conspiracy theorists argue that the U.S. had grown increasingly frustrated with the British reductions in their military expenditures and presence around the world. This allegedly led to U.S. concerns about the future of the Cypriot Sovereign Base Areas for their Cold War intelligence needs. In contrast, however, the State

Department documents indicate that the U.S. consistently supported negotiations and diplomacy to diffuse the crisis. There is no evidence that the U.S. was angered by the relatively minor reduction of British troops in Cyprus and the U.S. had already safeguarded their own communications facilities through an agreement with the Cyprus government concluded in 1968.

In 1974, the conspiracy argument claims the U.S. must have been involved in the Greek coup because of the “two-track” diplomacy characteristic of both Nixon and Kissinger, the repeated warnings the State Department received and did not act on, and Kissinger’s neutral responses to the events. The U.S. allegedly encouraged the Turkish invasion because they again failed to act on the warnings, did not provide Joseph Sisco with enough to negotiate effectively, and refused to provide military support for a British intervention.

In reality, this assessment of the U.S. policies ignores the fact that Cyprus was not a State Department priority at the time, misinterprets Kissinger’s actions, and fails to outline what the U.S. priorities actually were: prevention of the internationalization of the conflict, a firm understanding of on-island developments before decisions are made, denial of overt support to Nicos Sampson, and encouragement of the restoration of the constitution and the opening of negotiations. In addition, the U.S. handled the warnings of invasion in a manner consistent with its policy up until that time, Joseph Sisco’s mission was nearly impossible from the beginning, the U.S. never intended to provide military support to an intervention mission, and the facilities on the island were no longer a U.S. priority. Finally, the U.S. permitted Turkish troop movements for the sake of negotiating a ceasefire, but did not condone them, and would have been unable to prevent a second invasion regardless. Thus the realities of the U.S. policies during each crisis illustrate government support for

negotiations and diplomacy rather than covert operations involving external interference on Cyprus.

The Implications of the Argument

To conclude, I will look at both the historical and the policy implications of my argument. This thesis clarifies the history of America's role in Cyprus during the 1960s and 1970s by establishing the correct narrative of the State Department's policy development. The narrative rebuts the arguments of conspiracy theorists such as Brendan O'Malley, Ian Craig, Lawrence Stern, William Mallinson. I accomplish this by targeting the two key points of the conspiracy theory: first, that the U.S. had a continuous, decade-long plan to partition Cyprus through external military intervention and second, that this plan was based on the strategic value of Cyprus as a military base and source of intelligence. Instead, I showed that the first major point is refuted by describing how America's policy evolved and changed over the course of that decade. Next, it is clear that the communications facilities and Sovereign Base Areas did not merit the importance attributed to them by the conspiracy theorists. War between NATO allies Greece and Turkey would have done much more significant damage to U.S. Cold War interests than the loss of three or four relatively minor intelligence facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, war would force the U.S. government to choose sides and lost more important strategic interests, such as the Sixth Fleet or installations in Turkey, as a result. While the U.S.'s rationale was not always commendable or favorable to the Cypriot people and at times the State Department's decisions may merit criticism, the U.S. did not orchestrate a decade-long conspiracy to protect its own interests on the island. Therefore, my thesis adds an important correction to the existing literature on the crises on Cyprus.

This thesis also answers the larger question of how conspiracy theories should be handled by encouraging research-based, scholarly analysis of these theories. The conspiracy theory was not developed in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the Cold War and U.S. policy during that time period. Historians have demonstrated that the State Department and the CIA were involved in covert activity in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, as well as other areas. Intelligence and the strategic value of both alliances and geography had great value to the U.S. government in its battle against the perceived threat of Communism and the possibility of nuclear war. This gives the impression to some that the U.S. could and did exercise control over countries all over the world to the benefit of its own interests, and the detriment of those of the Soviet Union, at this time. This thesis demonstrates that, in at least one instance, the State Department was caught unawares and forced into a reactive position during a crisis rather than the puppeteer pulling the strings. In fact, if the U.S. possessed that level of control its foreign policy had a better chance of success in Cyprus, by avoiding the damage to its relations with Greece, Turkey, in Cyprus, as well as other nations, such as Iran.

A more nuanced depiction of U.S. Cold War involvement on the global stage is needed among Cypriots and Greeks to counter this image of absolute control and the sense of helplessness, bitterness, and lack of responsibility that has developed as a result.

Greek Cypriots in particular have also used this conspiracy theory in ways that have had a negative impact on the success of the intercommunal negotiations since 1974. Pro-reunification websites such as “Action Cyprus” blame the U.S. for the coup and invasion and are not alone in their claim that Washington is responsible for deeply worsening and perpetuating the Cyprus problem through its actions in 1974. The U.S. is allegedly further responsible for the continued division of the island because it does not put enough pressure on Turkey to agree to a solution.²¹⁶ Further criticism comes from Greek Cypriot

²¹⁶ Michael Jansen, “American Duplicity II,” *Action Cyprus*, [20 July 1999], <http://www.greece.org/cyprus/Takism6.htm> [Accessed 9 May 2008].

disappointment with the Annan Plan as well as the U.S. role in its negotiation and terms. Perhaps the Cypriots hold the U.S. responsible, “not because the U.S. did too little, but because it never cared enough to do more.”²¹⁷

Regardless, the conspiracy theory shifts culpability away from the intractable positions of the Cypriots themselves, the influence of Turkey, and the Greek Cypriot role in the stagnant intercommunal negotiations. If the U.S., and to a certain extent the U.K., is to blame for the continued division of the island then the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are not guilty of perpetuating the conflict themselves. Ultra-nationalist propaganda and zero-sum positions, such as those demanding the removal of all foreign troops and settlers and the complete reunification of the island, run rampant as a result and further prevent constructive, cooperative discussions. My argument clarifies the U.S. role during 1974 and emphasizes the fact that the State Department was not involved in such a conspiracy to create partition on Cyprus, which reduces the influence of this theory that encourages inflexibility and mistrust.

Finally, Cyprus is currently in a position of great potential since the recent election of President Demetris Christofias and his willingness to restart negotiations. On March 22, 2008, President Christofias and the Turkish leader Mehmet Ali Talat met in the Nicosia airport to discuss the creation of working committees that would aid the UN-sponsored talks. In addition, the two leaders talked about the possibility of opening the Ledra Street barrier within two weeks, so that pedestrian traffic could move directly between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot areas of Nicosia along the street known primarily for its shops and cafes.²¹⁸ On April 4, that barrier was destroyed and pedestrian traffic can now move freely between

²¹⁷ Unsigned Comment on O'Malley and Craig's *The Cyprus Conspiracy, Cyprus Conflict*, <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/US%20role%20in%20'74%20-%20comment.html> [Accessed 9 May 2008].

²¹⁸ Jean Christou, “Let the Talks Begin,” *Cyprus Mail*, [22 March 2008], <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/> [accessed 22 March 2008].

the two sides at the center of the capital city.²¹⁹ Advances such as these in the intercommunal talks are the type of rational and constructive movements found in a negotiation process free of conspiracy theories, ultra-nationalist propaganda, and zero-sum positions. The road to peace will not be simple or easy, given the current political turmoil in Turkey and its demand that the Annan Plan be used as the basis for any negotiations.

For the sake of a Cyprus solution, these advances must continue and increase. The rejection of conspiracy theories can only encourage such developments in order to finally bring this decades-long conflict to a successful, lasting, and peaceful conclusion. Giralamo Dandini wrote in his *Materials for a History of Cyprus*, “The kingdom [Cyprus] has from all time had a variety of masters.”²²⁰ Let it be clear that the United States was not one of them. I argue that the Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks had more responsibility for their destiny than many of them believe. The international community must encourage the Cypriots to continue asserting control over their own future through a productive peace process.

²¹⁹ Jean Christou, “Open at Last,” *Cyprus Mail*, [4 April 2008], <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/> [accessed 4 April, 2008].

²²⁰ Quoted in Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 29.

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