Dan Lindley ⁽¹⁾

Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Buffer Zones

Prepared for Presentation at APSA, Washington, D.C., August 2000

Panel: 19-12, Strategies to End Conflicts

Friday, 8:45

• Introduction
• Definition and Types of Buffer Zones
• The Theoretical Effects of Buffer Zones
• Offense/Defense Balance
• Deterrence
• Transparency
• Mediation and Calming of Incidents
• Unintended Consequence: Barrier to Peace
• Case Studies
• UNFICYP on Cyprus
• Origins
• Functions
• Effectiveness
• UNDOF on the Golan Heights
• Origins
• Functions
• Map 1: The AOS and AOL of the Disengagement Agreement on the Golan Heights
• Effectiveness
• mini-case studies (these are not written up)
• Korea
• Inner-German Border
• Conclusion
• Findings
• Table 2: Findings by Case
• Table 3: Findings by Effect
• Implications
• Table 4: The Sweet Spot for Buffer Zones (and for peacekeeping more generally)




Introduction





As this paper is being written, a new buffer zone is having a rocky start in Kosovo and a buffer zone is being planned for the Congo if a peace accord is ever reached. What can buffer zones do to promote peace? How do they work in theory? And how well do they work in practice? Despite the existence of buffer zones from Korea to the Golan Heights to Cyprus, these fundamental questions have not been rigorously assessed by scholars. Buffer zones seem like they should help keep the peace, but do they? And what do existing buffer zones tell us about how to design better ones in the future?

In theory, buffer zones can increase the odds of peace in a number of ways. They can shift the offense/defense balance towards the defense, increase deterrence, and increase transparency. Third party monitors in the buffer zone can further reinforce these effects and they can also mediate and temper incidents between the opposing forces.

The effectiveness of buffer zones can vary over time. The promise of a buffer zone, especially a monitored zone, can increase the willingness of adversaries to sign a peace agreement. A buffer zone and accompanying monitors can help forces disengage and separate peacefully during the initial stages of a cease-fire or peace agreement. Over time, the buffer zone can still help promote peace and stability in the ways indicated above, Finally, Nassar's expulsion of the U.N. forces in the Sinai signaled aggressive intent on Egypt's part and thus helped Israel prepare for war. Even in their dying moments, buffer zones can make life harder for revisionists.

On the other hand, the Korean, Cypriot, and Golan Heights buffer zones all came about after cease-fires, not permanent peace agreements. Could it be that the very fact that buffer zones stabilize a cease-fire actually hinders parties from seeking a more permanent peace? The theory that parties seek peace after 'hurting stalemates' is persuasive. ⁽²⁾ If buffer zones prevent a hurting stalemate, or more subtly, push the prospect of war further toward a distant horizon, then they may rob adversaries of an incentive to come to the table for serious negotiations about a permanent peace.

In this paper, I will first develop the theoretical arguments about the effects of buffer zones. Then I will examine these effects with two detailed case studies of Cyprus and the Golan Heights and with less detailed examinations of other buffer zones and border areas including Korea and the Cold War inner-German border.





Definition and Types of Buffer Zones





A buffer zone is a physical distance that separates adversaries. Adversaries are supposed to stay out of the buffer zone. Buffer zones may be monitored by third parties, such as U.N. peacekeepers. There are four types of buffer zones: interstate monitored, interstate not-monitored, intrastate monitored, intrastate not-monitored.







Table 1: Types of Buffer Zones

	Interstate	Intrastate
Monitored	Golan Heights	Kosovo, Cyprus (Congo)
Not Monitored	Korea, Inner German/Berlin Wall zone (3)







The Theoretical Effects of Buffer Zones

Buffer zones may promote peace in four main and sometimes overlapping ways. They may shift the offense/defense balance towards the defense, increase deterrence, increase transparency, and make it easier for peacekeepers to interpose themselves between adversaries. Interposition facilitates the mediation and calming of potentially escalatory incidents along the buffer zone. Buffer zones can also possibly retard peace by removing incentives of adversaries to negotiate more seriously. I will discuss each of these in turn.





Offense/Defense Balance





The offense/defense balance measures the relative ease of conducting offensive versus defensive operations. This balance is affected by military technology, training, geography, intelligence, and alliances. ⁽⁴⁾ The offense/defense balance tilts towards the offense when offensive operations are relatively easy and vice-versa when these operations are more difficult. If defense is relatively easy, then war will be less likely for a number of reasons elaborated by Stephen Van Evera, including: there will be less reason to believe the offense will succeed, windows of opportunity and threats will appear less inviting and pressing, and there will be less incentive to strike first. ⁽⁵⁾ Real or perceived defense dominance may deter a potential revisionist, while perceived defense dominance may lead to complacency on the part of status quo powers. Likewise, real or perceived offense dominance may increase the chance of war and/or arms races.

A buffer zone creates a greater distance between the opposing forces and this can shift the offense/defense balance towards the defense in several ways. Limits on forces flanking the buffer zone may also shift the balance towards the defense. First, distance increases warning time of impending attack and thus helps the defender prepare more effectively. A standing start surprise attack is harder as the offensive forces must travel the width of the buffer zone before engagements actually begin. The direction and strength of the main attacks may be easier to discern if the attacker must first cross a buffer zone.





Limits on forces around the buffer zone can help in similar ways. If the limits such as those monitored by UNDOF are adhered to, they make offense harder because they equalize the ratio of forces available for a standing start attack. As defenders frequently possess a number of inherent advantages, it is often noted that commanders need a ratio of 3:1 (or so) in attacking forces before they can be confident of victory. ⁽⁶⁾ The counterargument is that the defender's forces are also limited. If neither side builds up before the attack, and if the quality of forces is lopsided in favor of the revisionist, then a 1:1 ratio may still be enough for a successful surprise attack. Finally, if the limits are not adhered to, then the act of breaking the limits can provide warning to the status quo power. Build-ups of forces when there are rules against such build-ups provide a margin of increased warning compared to a build-up without rules because the breaking of agreed-upon rules is a possible indicator of malevolent intention. Of course, fear rather than hostile intent may lead a state to be the first to break the rules. Limits on forces likely need verification, either with rules and procedures established by the adversaries, or by third parties.





Distance between forces may also shift the balance towards the defense in a more tactical or small scale way. Distance makes it harder for opposing forces to harass and provoke each other. Whether such incidents are accidental or deliberately provoked, fewer is better. Distance reduces the likelihood of incidents and the possibility of escalation into larger conflict.





Deterrence





The concept of deterrence is simple in essence, if not in practice. Deterrence occurs when policies adopted by a status quo state make the cost of attack and war outweigh the benefits to a potential revisionist. The greater warning and more difficult surprise attacks created by buffer zones discussed above increase deterrence. Buffer zones, especially those monitored by third parties, may increase deterrence by complicating the plans of revisionists in several ways. First, monitors and peacekeepers may be able to identify a buildup (especially if it violated a zone of arms limitations) of a revisionist and alert the world and/or the status quo power. A timely signal could spur defensive preparations and balancing, either strengthening deterrence or allowing a fairer fight. This would require that the peacekeepers had better information than the other parties. Second, the peacekeepers could report which side initiated combat. Perhaps a minor deterrent in itself, this function may also facilitate the applications of sanctions and other punitive measures.

Third, while peacekeepers are usually not militarily significant, they do provide some level of symbolic deterrence. It simply does not look good to attack blue helmets. Fourth, if the peacekeepers are drawn from medium or great powers - something which is increasingly common in the post-Cold War world, then the monitors may serve as a tripwire for more forceful involvement by these powers. Attacks could trigger retribution, and the fear of this enhances deterrence. Finally, monitors and buffers can serve another tripwire function, depending on the inclinations and historical knowledge of the aggressor. When Egypt asked the U.N. Emergency Force I to leave the Sinai/Gaza armistice line with Israel in 1967, it helped signal impending conflict and identify the aggressor. This could happen again, but a new revisionist might be more subtle than Egypt or might simply overrun or bypass the peacekeepers. ⁽⁷⁾

Transparency

Transparency describes what adversaries know about each other's capabilities and intentions. The more transparency there is, the more they know. Although transparency's effects are not always benign, increased transparency is generally thought to have three main effects. First, it reduces unwarranted fears and thus reduces arms races and security spirals based on the worst casing caused by incomplete information. Second, it reduces miscalculation. Whether wars are contests spawned by uncertainty about relative power or are caused by accidents or disputes over borders, increased transparency, less miscalculation, and less uncertainty should all lower the probability of war. ⁽⁸⁾ Finally, if adversaries want to make peace, but can't trust each other enough to do so, then it may be that the promise of increased transparency can bring the parties to the peace table. Such a promise may take the form of a monitored disengagement and subsequent buffer zone.

A buffer zone, especially one that is monitored, can increase transparency and hopefully provide the above-outlined benefits in a number of ways. First, a well-marked and patrolled buffer zone can prevent miscalculation and disagreement over the exact location of the where the borders are between adversaries. Such disputes helped fuel the recent Ethiopia-Eritirea conflict. If good fences make good neighbors, then buffer zones should help. Second, the basic mission of monitoring peacekeepers is to observe, inspect, and report on activities in and along the buffer zone. This function is even more detailed and formalized when there are areas of arms limitations. Observation and inspections can reduce unwarranted fears that one side might harbor about the other's activities. Very often, it is only the peacekeepers who are able to go on site and investigate the complaints and suspicions of the adversaries. Finally, monitoring and observation gives additional assurance to each side that the other is not planning an attack or otherwise acting aggressively.





Mediation and Calming of Incidents





Monitored buffer zones make it easier for peacekeepers to interpose themselves between opposing adversaries in case of incidents and flare-ups. Compared to trying to patrol amidst intermingled populations, a buffer zone makes it easier to spot incidents at an early stage and it gives the peacekeeper a recognized territory to occupy in between the two sides. Peacekeepers are not militarily strong enough to prevent a deliberate war and may not be able to prevent a serious provocation from escalating. However, they can damper down lesser incidents using a variety of techniques.

Peacekeepers can calm incidents by physical interposition so long as the two sides are sufficiently deterred by their presence. The fear of being caught by the peacekeepers may prevent some incidents in the first place. Monitors can mediate disputes between the sides, solving the problem with a negotiated settlement, or just by letting the two sides vent. They can cajole the provocateurs into ceasing and desisting, or the peacekeepers may coerce troublemakers by threatening to report them up the chain of command. This power to report up the chain of command and to publicize incidents before the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Security Council, and world community is of modest absolute influence, but it is one of the most powerful tools in the peacekeepers arsenal.

The technique of reporting on troublemakers only works if the provocations are from rogues and are not a matter of deliberate policy. This highlights what I call the term the operational definition of consent in a peacekeeping operation: the ability to get someone in trouble. With consent, there is always someone of higher rank than the troublemaker who can punish the troublemaker and stop the incident. If there is no penalty for creating incidents, then such provocations are a matter of deliberate policy and it is likely that the provoking side does not agree with the mission of the peacekeepers.





Unintended Consequence: Barrier to Peace





The final possible effect of buffer zones is an unintended consequence. If it is true that states or adversaries need to reach a hurting stalemate or otherwise face the prospect of pain to take peace talks seriously, then it is possible that buffer zones are counterproductive in two ways. First, they may be put in place sometime before the conflict has run its course. Buffer zones would then symbolize gains foregone for the side that could have won more if the conflict continued. This is most likely to occur in situations where the parties in the conflict are coerced to the peace table by greater powers. Such a peace would be precarious at best as the dominant side would likely be looking for a way to rekindle the fight. The Balkans may, if they haven't done so already, make one wonder about the wisdom of 'coerced peaces.'

Second, and more pertinent to actual buffer zones today, is the prospect that buffer zones work sufficiently well to reduce the fear of war enough to prevent the sides from pursuing a final peace settlement. Keep in mind that there are only cease-fires on the Korean peninsula, the Golan Heights, and Cyprus. The condition for this to be true is that both sides must otherwise and without the buffer zone fear war and not feel that they could gain from war if it did break out. This will be discussed more in the case studies.





Case Studies





United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus





The case of Cyprus allows for comparison and variation in two ways. It involves UN peacekeeping before and after a buffer zone is created. It also shows that conflict and incidents increase where the buffer zone is narrow, and lessen where it is wider.

Origins

Cyprus became independent from Britain in 1960. Inter-communal fighting broke out in 1963 after three years of constitutional crisis and government gridlock between the majority Greek Cypriots and minority Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots sought to maximize their control of Cyprus and many wanted to unite with mainland Greece (enosis). Britain tried to stop the conflict, but turned to the U.S. and NATO when it failed. Risking an intra-NATO Greco-Turkish war, Turkey threatened to intervene to prevent enosis and to protect the endangered Turkish Cypriots. While issuing stern warnings that succeeded in preventing a Turkish move, Washington proposed to send a NATO force of 10,000 troops. The stronger the PKO, the less likely war. The U.S. wanted peace on Cyprus mostly to prevent possible war between Greece and Turkey. The left-leaning (Greek) Cypriot President Makarios rejected the U.S./NATO proposal, and the Soviets viewed the NATO move with alarm. To reconcile these competing interests, the parties turned to U.N. and in March 1964 the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus began to be deployed.

Makarios and the Soviets feared the distributional consequences of the proposed strong NATO force. Both helped move the issue to the U.N. where they had more control over outcomes. UNFICYP did not come about because the local parties wanted to make peace and needed reassurance to do so. Instead, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were in more of a PD than a coordination game, and UNFICYP was largely imposed on Cyprus. Even though an imposed PKO might likely be quite strong, UNFICYP's resulting strength was modest, fell short of U.S. hopes, and reflected the fact that it was a great power compromise. UNFICYP reached its peak strength of 6411 (multinational not NATO) soldiers in June 1964, declined to 4737 by December 1967, and settled down to around 1200 after the 1974 Turkish intervention. While it was probably US pressure rather than UNFICYP's deployment that did the most to prevent Turkish intervention in 1964, neither sufficed in 1974.

Functions of the Peacekeeping Operation

UNFICYP's first operational phase was between 1964 and 1974 when Turkish Cypriots continued to live throughout the island, but in enclaves. As UNFICYP tried to limit conflict wherever it might occur, it had to deploy throughout Cyprus as well. Improvisation and tactical flexibility was at its relative peak in this first phase. The second phase began after Turkey intervened in 1974 (following ten years of sporadic violence). By occupying the Northern 37% of Cyprus, Turkey effectively partitioned the island as Greek Cypriots fled South and the Turkish Cypriots moved North. UNFICYP currently patrols and monitors the buffer zone which was created by the distance between each sides' 1974 cease-fire lines.

Mandates are a peacekeeping operation's marching orders from the Secretary-General

and Security Council. UNFICYP was mandated to:





"to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." ⁽⁹⁾





This open-ended mandate survived 1974 and remains to this day. It says nothing about how the force should prevent fighting and restore "law and order," nor does it define "normal conditions." Although tighter definitions of UNFICYP's functions followed shortly, ⁽¹⁰⁾ the initial mandate resulted from the crisis atmosphere surrounding UNFICYP's deployment and the uncertainties of peacekeeping in internal conflict. Following failure in Somalia in part due to mission leap, an oft-heard recommendation for PKOs is that their mandates be narrow and explicit. Yet UNFICYP's mandate has worked from 1964 to the present precisely because it was so flexible.

UNFICYP's peacekeepers have always patrolled areas of tension, interposed themselves between adversaries, and acted as mediators and cajolers when trouble arose. Their mission has always been to detect, correct, and deter defection. UNFICYP's 1200 peacekeepers currently confront about 1000 incidents per year along the buffer zone, including antagonisms, overmanning of positions, military construction and improvement of positions, overflights and maritime violations, shootings and weapons discharges, and entry into the buffer zone. By maintaining the status quo established by 1974 cease-fire, UNFICYP aims to foster conditions conducive for peace negotiations.

Effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Operation

UNFICYP is effective and does promote peace, but mostly because of cajoling and brow-beating by peacekeepers acting on their own and at the lowest possible level. Only a modest amount of its effectiveness is due to increased transparency. The force does not deter on a strategic level.

Overall, UNFICYP successfully defuses most of the 1000 (+/-) incidents it confronts each year. By so doing, it reduces the risk of escalation and war. The chance of war is slim when insults or slingshots are involved. War is more probable following shootings or mass demonstrations when UNFICYP may be less able to control unintentional escalation. For example, there was a rapid buildup of forces on both sides following the killing of Greek Cypriot National Guardsman Stelios Panayi in the buffer zone in 1996. The odds of war would have been much greater without UNFICYP, but UNFICYP would have been overwhelmed if these forces had opened fire. UNFICYP can not prevent deliberate war.

Counterfactuals help assess peacekeeping: How would the adversaries behave and what would they know or not know in the absence of UNFICYP? According to former force commander General Ahti Vartiainen, UNFICYP adds little to each side's strategic assessments. ⁽¹¹⁾ The background information independently available to the parties about each other's capabilities is very good. On a tactical, day-to-day level, the level of opacity and uncertainty exacerbating any given violation varies by incident, but in general is quite low. In this respect, UNFICYP's absence would have only a small impact. On the other hand, UNFICYP's effectiveness with cajoling, browbeating, and interposition would be more sorely missed and the small chance of war on Cyprus would increase modestly.

To explain the varying role of opacity, there is little ambiguity attending slingshotting or insults. Peacekeepers can still calm the incident by interposition, cajoling, mediating, and/or threatening the offenders with a report to their superior officers. Using the liaison system to threaten to report (or actually report) up the chain of either sides' command is an oft-used and effective tool.

More ambiguity may attend a construction incident where it may not be clear what is being constructed, what its purpose is, and whether or not it violates the status quo. Here, UNFICYP peacekeepers can investigate on-site, something neither side can do on its own. The incident may or may not confirm the fears of the other side, and UNFICYP can endeavor to correct any violations. This ability to investigate complaints is almost unique to third parties. ⁽¹²⁾ When UNFICYP succeeds in dispelling unwarranted fears by reducing uncertainty and increasing transparency, this moves the parties away from fears of CD or DC and towards CC.

That said, opacity does not greatly exacerbate incidents on Cyprus. Especially with low-level incidents, reality is often clear and fears well-founded. Both sides are "masters of provocation." ⁽¹³⁾ UNFICYP calms most provocations, but not primarily because it reduces uncertainty and increases transparency. With more important incidents that garner public attention, fears may be unwarranted, but they are likely to be so ingrained and so fanned by propaganda and a nationalistic press that UNFICYP can do nothing to help. ⁽¹⁴⁾

However, cajoling, browbeating, and interposition do help calm a great number of incidents on Cyprus. UNFICYP successfully tames the vast majority of the 1000 or so incidents it confronts every year. The odds of conflict and war on Cyprus would increase significantly without UNFICYP. On the other hand, UNFICYP has trouble with some of the more serious and exceptional incidents. When UNFICYP has to confront demonstrations, it can only concentrate about 250 of its 1150 peacekeepers in one place, and these peacekeepers are unarmed. One or two peacekeepers can calm a slingshotting incident, but 250 peacekeepers can do little against hundreds of motorcycle-riding demonstrators bent on causing provocations.

UNFICYP's effectiveness can be conceived of in what I call the Roulette Wheel analogy. Every time there is an incident, there is a risk of escalation, tragedy, and even war. Thus, every time there is an incident, the roulette wheel of tragedy and war gets spun. Of course, the chance of war is slim when insults or slingshots are involved. But the chance of tragedy or war goes up considerably when more serious incidents are involved.

UNFICYP can't eliminate the possibility of war on Cyprus, but it effectively shifts the odds on the roulette wheel away from war. With UNFICYP on Cyprus, there is less chance of the wheel coming up war whenever it is spun. UNFICYP's benefits are probabilistic, not cast in stone. Moreover, UNFICYP can't prevent war if one side wants one or if an incident gets out of hand and escalates beyond UNFICYP's limited ability to control it.

As Nicholas Sambanis notes, Cyprus is usually the prime case cited when arguing that peacekeeping actually retards the peace process. I believe that UNFICYP's effectiveness helps create a better atmosphere for the Cypriots to make peace. Without UNFICYP, more incidents would escalate, tensions would be higher, and peace would be even more distant.







Analysts who believe UNFICYP retards peace want to remove UNFICYP. They argue that removing UNFICYP would make the two sides face more squarely the possibility of war and that this would increase their incentives to negotiate a peace while also leading to greater discipline along the buffer zone/border. There is some logic in this point. There is currently poor discipline along the buffer zone (compare to the Cold War inner-German border for contrast). Also, the Greek Cypriots in particular use the U.N. to communicate to the larger world and they rely on UNFICYP and the buffer zone to save them from their own provocations. The Turkish side grumbles about UNFICYP (half of which is paid for by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots), but they tolerate it. They aren't too worried about war, they enjoy decisive military superiority and believe that the Turkish Forces are the real peacekeepers, ⁽¹⁵⁾ and they believe that the benefits of de facto partition currently outweigh the costs.

Despite these points, removing UNFICYP would be very risky and the probability of disaster resulting from removal outweighs the possible benefits. First, who or what would manage the land-grabbing that would result when UNFICYP gave up control of the buffer zone (three percent of Cyprus' land)? This alone could lead to war. Second, if there are 1000 recorded shooting, antagonism, and other incidents a year when there is a buffer zone separating the two sides, why is there any reason to believe that there would be less rather than more of these incidents if the two forces became face to face over the 180 kilometer border? Deterrence theorists would argue that removing the buffer zone would make the costs of conflict more obvious, and thus enhance deterrence (note that the real costs of conflict remain unchanged, with or without the buffer zone).

On the other hand, there are two reasons why deterrence theorists may be wrong. This is because there are two groups of Greek Cypriots who may not be swayed by a relatively small shift in the perceived costs of conflict (here I am speaking of Greek Cypriots because I assume that if the Turkish side wasn't happy with the status quo, they would either use their superior force or negotiate more seriously to change it). In the first group are those who don't recognize Turkey's overwhelming superiority. They are likely to be so blinded by ethno-nationalism that they can not be deterred from provocations under any conditions. They are also likely to be willing to pay high costs to make political points. The second group is more subtle. They already don't want war, especially because they know they would lose. Thus, they too would scarcely be affected by a relatively small shift in the perceived costs of conflict. But this group still harbors hostility and contempt toward Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Their persistent ethno-nationalism is likely to lead to continued incidents along any common border.

There may be fewer incidents because of the subtle increase in deterrence or there may be more incidents because of closer proximity. Whether there would be fewer or more incidents is indeterminate, so the real question then becomes: is war more likely when hundreds of incidents a year occur in a land with UNFICYP and a buffer zone or when hundreds of incidents occur in a land without them? UNFICYP and the buffer zone are preferable because of UNFICYP's demonstrated daily success in taming incidents.

Another reason to believe that there would still be incidents along the border if UNFICYP was withdrawn is that there are often naval and air incidents between Greek and Turkish forces throughout the Aegean. As naval and especially air forces are capital intensive, these forces include what are presumably well trained and disciplined troops, under what is presumably fairly tight command. Thus, there is no reason to think that isolated infantry troops along what would be the 'inner-Cyprus' border would be less prone to risky incidents than their air and naval counterparts.

In the end, the essence of the argument of those who want to remove UNFICYP is that they want to increase the odds of war to increase the odds of peace. Interestingly, this logic rests on believing UNFICYP does keep some peace in the first place. Thus, they are right that removing UNFICYP would clearly increase the odds of war. But for the reasons just offered, removing UNFICYP would do little to increase the odds of peace. Instead, removal of UNFICYP could easily backfire and lead to war.





United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

Origins

Syria (and Egypt) went to war with Israel on October 6 of 1973. An October 24 cease-fire did not stick and Syrian and Israeli forces continued skirmishing well through May of 1974, with post-October casualties peaking in April. The Israelis occupied positions as far into Syria as Saassa, 25 miles from Damascus. Throughout the Spring, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Syria and Israel trying to consolidate the cease-fire. On May 31st, the two sides signed a disengagement agreement that included a cease-fire, the establishment of UNDOF, return of prisoners, and other issues.

The promise of a U.N. monitoring force had little influence on the cease-fire negotiations. The negotiations succeeded primarily due to the self-interest of each side, as partly shaped by US diplomacy, leverage, and security guarantees. Israel ended a costly war and Syria regained some territory it lost in the 1967 war. The U.S. said it might reassess relationships, manipulate aid levels up or down, and promised Syria that Israel would not put heavy weapons into certain locations. ⁽¹⁶⁾

However, the creation of UNDOF's buffer zone did help the negotiations by increasing ambiguity and creating bargaining space. Instead of ceding the hotly contested town of Quneitra directly to Syria, Israel was able let it become part of the Syrian-administered U.N. demilitarized zone. Kissinger wrote that: "it was inconceivable that Israel would tolerate having the main force of the Syrian army follow it into territories evacuated as a result of the agreement." Both sides were able to make territorial concessions to UNDOF which they could not make to each other. As a result, UNDOF's areas of responsibility were adjusted several times in the course of negotiations. ⁽¹⁷⁾

This 'figleaf effect' was a valuable, but also indirect, byproduct of UNDOF's creation. UNDOF's buffer zone enlarged each side's win-set while reducing apparent losses. With this figleaf, compromises were less stark, and this helped both sides save face with both domestic and international audiences. The bargaining over force size described below reinforces the point that Syria and Israel were very concerned with symbols and images - and their audiences.

If peace was reached for primarily for strategic reasons, and UNDOF's primary contribution was the figleaf effect, what was the specific role of reducing uncertainty or the need for enforcement in UNDOF's creation? Two factors suggest that UNDOF's intended role was minimal. First, the US agreed during the peace negotiations to fly a U-2 over the Golan on a weekly basis and share the photos with Israel and Syria. This intelligence is more timely and is more likely to be complete than UNDOF's biweekly inspections. ⁽¹⁸⁾ However, Syria can not rely on American impartiality in a crisis or war, and this hurts the U-2's ability to reduce fears of surprise attack. Second, if enforcement was a big issue, then there should have been important debates about force size and capability and resulting effectiveness. But the big debate between Syria and Israel over force size was about symbolism. Syria wanted the smallest possible unarmed observer group to minimize the impression of Syrian loss of the Golan. In contrast, Israel wanted 3000 armed troops primarily to help reify its gains. The resulting mix of 1200 armed UNDOF troops mixed with a few UNTSO observers was a compromise between these two positions. ⁽¹⁹⁾

In sum, UNDOF's potential to increase transparency (not to mention provide enforcement) played a negligible role in obtaining the May cease-fire. The figleaf effect played a modest role, while self-interest and great power intervention played the largest roles. The primary distributional effects of UNDOF were symbolic, not strategic or even tactical.

The Functions of UNDOF

UNDOF's tasks and structure make it an apparent exemplar of a transparency-increasing monitored buffer zone. As Map 1 makes clear, the Golan Heights buffer zone is in large part an arms control agreement verified by the UN. UNDOF was created by the May 31, 1974 separation of forces agreement between Israel and Syria. UNDOF's mandate was to monitor the cease-fire, principally by supervising and inspecting the Area of Separation (AOS) and the Areas of Limitation (AOL). The AOS is a buffer zone while the three AOL on each side of the AOS are areas where the number and types of Israeli and Syrian soldiers and equipment are limited.

No Syrian or Israeli armed forces were allowed in the 80 kilometer long and 15 km to 300m wide buffer zone (AOS). Syrian civilians and civilian police were permitted to return to towns and land in the AOS and their AOL. In the AOL closest to the AOS, two brigades of soldiers were allowed on each side, with specific limits set on tanks (75), short range 122mm or less artillery (36), and total troops (6000). In the middle AOL, 162 artillery pieces were allowed with a maximum range of 20 kilometers, 450 tanks were allowed, and there were no limits on personnel. Finally, no surface to air missiles were allowed in any area. ⁽²⁰⁾ Map 1 summarizes this agreement:

Map 1: The AOS and AOL of the Disengagement Agreement on the Golan Heights ⁽²¹⁾
















































































To monitor the AOS, UNDOF conducts foot and vehicular patrols and staffs 30 permanent positions and 17 other observation posts. These armed peacekeepers are supplemented by 90 unarmed United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observers who staff in pairs eleven observation posts along the AOS lines. ⁽²²⁾

To verify the force limits in the AOL, UNDOF uses UNTSO observers to conduct biweekly inspections of some 500 Syrian and Israeli positions. Liaison officers from the side inspected accompany the U.N. observers. Inspectors are not supposed to physically count the troops at each base in the first AOL. Instead, they ask for a head-count from the local commander. When counting weapons, inspectors are not allowed to be intrusive and are just supposed to count what they can see. ⁽²³⁾

After inspections, UNDOF reports the results to both sides. To the violators, it gives the exact type and number of the offending weapon(s)/personnel and their location down to 1000 yards. The other side receives more general information about the category of the violation (UNDOF can threaten to release more specific information if the violator does not comply with the agreed limits). The identity of the violator is never publicly released.

Over and above arms limits violations, there are several categories of violations UNDOF may confront, including military entry into, firing into, overflight of, and construction in the buffer zone (AOS). According UNTSO Lt. Colonel Ray Martin, the head of Observer Group Golan - Tiberias, there had not been a major violation in 22 years. He attributed this to a clear mandate, to a system that was "very transparent" in that everyone knows where everything is, to the cooperation of both sides, and to UNDOF's deterrent effect. When asked if the U.N. had made peace work on the Golan, he said it was a chicken and egg problem: "Who can tell?" ⁽²⁴⁾

Sheep and shepherd violations constitute ninety-nine percent of all violations faced by UNDOF (one percent are unidentified civilians, sometimes defectors or smugglers). UNDOF's response is to send out a patrol and persuade the shepherds to return to their side of the line. These incidents are reported to UNDOF, but are typically not reported to the U.N. in New York. ⁽²⁵⁾

In sum, UNDOF is a highly centralized and routinized peacekeeping operation. It is well structured, at least on paper, to effectively reduce a great deal of uncertainty within its areas of responsibility). UNDOF should be very able to detect, correct, and deter defection as theorized above. In addition, its zones limit enough forces and are sufficiently deep that they may also shift the offense/defense balance towards the defense by making it modestly harder to launch a surprise attack.

Effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Operation

For a short but critical period during the initial disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, the disengagement agreements did provide reassurance, reduce miscalculation, and increase transparency. By specifying the exact mechanics of disengagement, including UNDOF monitoring, the agreements "significantly diminished the prospects for war by reducing the tension resulting from the unstable postwar troop movements." ⁽²⁶⁾

Thereafter, UNDOF's effects have been modest. UNDOF's force commander, Major-General Johannes C. Kosters, cautioned not to make too much of the confidence-building effects of UNDOF; the chance of conflict is very low and UNDOF's force is only "barbed wire and nothing more" ⁽²⁷⁾ As UNDOF does not confront many serious or potentially serious incidents (in contrast to UNFICYP), it can not have significant influence on a micro-level either.

In practice, UNDOF's inspections and monitoring do not live up to their theoretical potential to increase transparency and reduce uncertainty. UNDOF can not add information to either side's threat assessments (or tame unwarranted fears surrounding incidents). Mackinlay argues that in 1974, UNDOF's monitoring ability may have been "as effective as that of the Syrian and Israeli armies." Since then, both sides have improved their intelligence-gathering capabilities, while UNDOF's remained largely stagnant. ⁽²⁸⁾ While Israeli intelligence is superior to Syria's, neither side relies much on UNDOF's monitoring, except to the extent that it serves as a backup.

Operationally, there are four problems with the inspection system. First, the inspectors have to trust the troop figures that the local commanders give them. Second, UNDOF is not intrusive and thus can not find hidden weapons. Third, several sources said that the Israelis in particular move weapons up and back for exercises in between the regularized biweekly inspections. Fourth, both sides routinely deny the inspectors access to some areas, in particular the intelligence gathering stations. This difficulty is just as routinely reported in the Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

The monitoring system has shortcomings as well. Although UNDOF's buffer zone is shorter than UNFICYP's (80 vs. 180 kilometers), there are still not enough troops or technology to provide permanent, all-weather, high-confidence monitoring. For example, the night vision equipment is inadequate, but Mackinlay writes of 'reports' that neither side wants to see the surveillance equipment of UNDOF updated. If true, this clearly downgrades the stock placed in UNDOF's provision of transparency. ⁽²⁹⁾ Even if they were better equipped, the OPs are not sufficiently staffed to provide complete surveillance. This is in particular true of the two UNTSO officers who can not possibly maintain a constant watch during their seven day tours at their observation posts.

These problems are not as severe as appearances suggest. First, both sides usually keep so far below the agreed limits that there is virtually no question about compliance. Typical personnel counts are about 2000, where 6000 are permitted. Equipment is generally at 40-60% of allowed levels. ⁽³⁰⁾ Second, one would predict that if either side thought the other was committing a violation, then they would report it to UNDOF and request a special inspection. However, this almost never happens. According Major-General Kosters, in his one and a half years with UNDOF, there had not been a single request for a special inspection. This was because both sides trusted that UNDOF was doing its work: "They never argue our verification." ⁽³¹⁾

All of this makes clear the answer to the counterfactual: what if UNDOF was not there? Not much would change, especially since the disengagement. Israel is a status quo power that is easily able to deter or defeat Syria, and both sides' intelligence outstrips UNDOF's. This point is underscored by the fact that when Israel fought Syria in Lebanon in 1982, and while Israel built up its forces on the Golan, Syria actually drew down its Golan forces. It is implausible to believe that Syria did this because UNDOF's 1200 troops provided a shield or contributed to Syria's threat assessments. Instead, war itself on the Golan appeared implausible to Syria (and Israel), despite the fact that Syria and Israel were fighting heavily only a short distance away. ⁽³²⁾

In sum, UNDOF appears to be a thorough, well constructed buffer zone. But there is less than meets the eye. Peacekeepers on the Golan do less to help keep the peace than do their brethren on Cyprus. This is because of the peaceful and cooperative opposing forces, the high quality of background information available to these forces, and the shortcomings of UNDOF's inspection and monitoring capabilities and routines. Indeed, if UNDOF's inspections were more flexible and less routinized, Israel might be less prone to move equipment forward in between inspections.





KOREAN CASE: to write up, but conclusions and arguments are summarized below.





INNER GERMAN CASE: to write up, but conclusions and arguments are summarized below.






Conclusions




Buffer zones do not appear to have many strategic, war/no war effects. But, through physical distance and monitoring, they can reduce the number of potentially escalatory incidents. By definition, they can do so only when the parties are prone to incidents. Incidents may be due to a combination of lack of discipline, incentives for incidents, and possibly depth of underlying conflict. This means that buffer zones work in the Goldilocks zone of tension in between war and peace. They will not deter determined aggression, when tensions are too hot. They are irrelevant where peace is strong (too cold). But they can work at the margins, where tensions simmer just hot enough to boil over into incidents from time to time.

In practical terms, buffer zones work best at this tactical level when they are wide and when they are actively patrolled by peacekeepers who can interpose themselves and deter, cajole, investigate, and/or mediate.





Findings





The following two tables summarize my findings, first by case, then with reference to the effects of buffer zones discussed in the theory section.





Table 2: Findings by Case

Case	Main Observations, in order of possible effects presented in theory section.
UNFICYP	* Does change O/D balance on tactical/incident level. Width Matters. Irrelevant to strategic level. * Does not affect deterrence * Does increase transparency, but only modestly * Does help mediation and calming of all but overwhelming incidents * Does not provide a barrier to peace OTHER: Big decline in violence post-1974 shows value of partition and separation.
UNDOF	* No apparent effects on O/D balance, though a modest deductive case could be made. * Does not affect deterrence * Does not increase transparency, despite appearances of so doing * Does not help mediation and calming of incidents; there are no incidents. * Does not provide a barrier to peace OTHER: Where there is peace and no incidents, buffer zones are irrelevant.
Korea	* Probably changes O/D balance on tactical/incident level. Strong counterfactual case can be made that many more incidents would occur without a buffer zone. Many incidents have taken place anyway, and by 'end-running' the buffer zone. * Does not affect deterrence * Does not increase transparency * Does not help mediation and calming of incidents, except to the extent that it helps to have a meeting place in the no-man's land. * Does not provide a barrier to peace OTHER: Airplane bombing and submarine incidents show that buffer zones can not change the course of a determined provocateur
Inner-German	* Wall did change O/D balance on a tactical/incident level * Did not affect deterrence * Did not increase transparency * Does not help mediation and calming of incidents * Did not provide a barrier to peace, although it was a symbolic irritant OTHER: While the wall did stem tension provoking refugee incidents, the general calm after the wall was built attests to the ossification of the Cold War, and the tremendous discipline of the soldiers along the line (opposing forces were often very, very close to each other)
Kosovo (more research needed)	OTHER: Buffer zone not preventing killing and harassment because parties are still intermingled in many spots. Buffer zones imply partition, and this is not the case.








Table 3: Findings by Effect

	Strategic (war/no war decisions)	Tactical (incidents that can escalate)
Peace Negotiations and Separation/ Disengagement of Forces	Sort of. Buffer zones can lessen 'zero-sum' nature of territorial negotiations. Parties 'give' land to U.N. zone, not directly to enemy.	Yes. Peacekeepers and monitored disengagement plans can ease separation/ disengagement of forces (UNDOF).
Offense/Defense (physical effects that affect deterrence)	No, only works deductively. Helps defense in theory, hard to see it working in practice against a determined adversary. (33)	Yes. Buffer zones can greatly reduce incidents, but only when parties are prone to incidents in first place and also have some respect for the buffer zone. Width is important. Physical distance can prevent many incidents if buffer zone is respected. (UNFICYP; Nicosia vs. most of rest of BZ)
Deterrence (peacekeepers that affect deterrence)	No. Israel and Turkey fought through peacekeepers in 1973 and 1974; Egypt kicked them out in 1967.	Yes. On a tactical level, interposition works well on Cyprus both pre and post 1974. But post 1974 shows that interposition made much easier by buffer zones.
Transparency (reduces miscalculation and unwarranted fears)	Mostly no. Hard for any buffer zone, with or w/o peacekeepers to add knowledge that adversary can't get more reliably through own means (UNDOF). Less true as GNP/development decreases. Exception: Buffer zones can clarify borders and reduce miscalculation. But, on Cyprus, borders still not clear.	Sometimes. Peacekeepers can often investigate (often on-site) incidents that each side could never investigate themselves. On this level, unwarranted fears and possible miscalculation may be reduced.
Mediation/Cajoling (active intervention during incidents)	No. Almost by definition this relates only to discrete incidents.	Yes. UNFICYP does this very well. Strictly a function of peacekeeping, which is made easier by existence of buffer zone.
More harm than good (reduces incentives to	Buffer zones only symbolic, too many other factors at work for them to matter	No, clearly more good than harm. Cheap and easy with modest effects = good (less) bang for





Implications





The cases suggest a number of lessons and bounding conditions for the successful operation of buffer zones. First and foremost are the preconditions for them to be effective. As mentioned above, they will not work to prevent determined aggression, nor are they relevant in times of stable peace. Instead, they work in the Goldilocks range summarized in Table 4:





Table 4: The Sweet Spot for Buffer Zones (and for peacekeeping more generally)

War/determined aggression	Moderate Tension/Incidents (Goldilocks range)	Peace
Buffer zones do not help	Buffer zones help Pre-requisite: adequate separation Aided by: 1. monitoring; 2. distance	Buffer zones do not help





A second lesson is that width matters. The wider the zone, the harder it is to create tension-increasing incidents. A three mile width suggests itself as it exceeds the range of sniper rifles. One may hope that longer range weapons are less likely to find themselves in the hands of rogue provocateurs. A related consideration is 'porousness' of the buffer zone. A buffer zone which is easy to sneak into and through makes offense easier, and detection and peacekeeper intervention harder. Areas on Cyprus where it is easier to sneak are more prone to incidents than wide open, flatter areas. This bodes ill for the proposed Congo zone.





A third lesson is that peacekeepers can help, again so long as we are in the Goldilocks area.





A fourth lesson is that buffer zones imply separation of adversaries. As Kosovo shows, buffer zones work less well when parties are not separated. This lesson is reinforced by the history of intercommunal violence on Cyprus which declined as the parties were separated.





Finally, it is worth remembering that even if the buffer zone on the Golan today is less effective than meets the eye, the peacekeepers and the zone had greater calming effects during the negotiations and initial separation of forces.





Although the number of cases studied here is rather small, the answers to these questions about more general causes of war would help determine the potential effectiveness of buffer zones, even granting that they must operate in the Goldilocks range.





1. When do problems during disengagements and separations of forces ever re-ignite wars?

2. When do relatively minor incidents (killings along borders, etc.) ever ignite wars?





If the answers to these questions is yes, then operating in the Goldilocks range is a valuable activity. If no, then buffer zones may beat the alternative of no zone, but their overall effects can only be expected to be modest.

1. I am an assistant professor in the department of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. Some of this paper is derived from my dissertation: Transparency and the Effectiveness of Security Regimes: A Study of Concert of Europe Crisis Management and United Nations Peacekeeping. Comments welcome. Contact: Department of Government and International Studies, 448 Decio Hall, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556. Phone: 219-631-3226; Fax: 219-631-8209; Email: dlindley@nd.edu; Webpage: http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/

2. See I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, 2 ed. (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989). There are, of course, many possible influences that can lead adversaries to make peace.

3. One might classify Korea and Inner German as intrastate cases.

4. See Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?" both in International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998). Sean M. Lynn-Jones surveys the offense-defense literature in depth in "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vo. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995). The catalyzing work on the issue is Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978).

5. Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," pp. 7-16.

6. Mearsheimer and IS conv forces debate.

7. On the events of 1967, see Mona Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force I," in Durch, ed., Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, pp. 124-125; Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 220-223; Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and Its Future (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 58-70; and Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection: Security 'Regimes' and the Management of International Conflict," International Journal, Vol. XL, No. 4 (Autumn 1985), p. 620. Egypt's closure of the Gulf of Aqaba a few days later was another and even more serious signal.

8. Some might make the argument that increased transparency makes it easier for an aggressor to plan its attack. This may be true in some cases, but in other cases transparency may help identify that aggressor. These arguments seem to cancel each other out. The surprise attack literature suggests that psychological blinders and organizational routine are more responsible for creating vulnerability to surprise attack than incomplete information.

9. Karl Th. Birgisson, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," in William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 222.

10. See Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, Vol. 4: Europe 1946-1979 (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 96-97, 129-139, and chapter 9 for the Mandate, the Status of the Force Agreement, and letters and aides memoires from the Secretary-General, all of which filled out the functions of UNFICYP.

11. Interview, May 7, 1996.

12. One can think of near-exceptions such as the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission which endeavored to resolve disagreements about strategic arms control implementation during the Cold War.

13. Interview, Spokesman Waldemar Rokoszewski, May 6, 1996.

14. For details, see discussions of the 1996 demonstrations and the Roccas Bastion construction incident in...

15. This belief is shared by a number of people I have spoken to who are in positions where it would be impolitic to say this in public.

16. Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 1056-1057; 1079-1110; William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 210-212; Reich, Quest for Peace, pp. 266-267; and Ensio Siilasvuo, In the Service of Peace in the Middle East, 1967-1979 (London, Great Britain: Hurst and Company, 1992), p. 261. See also Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 255-259.

17. Shlomo Aronson, Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective (Baltimore, MD: 1978), p. 242. See also Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1079-1089, quote on p. 1047.

18. American Israel Public Affairs Committee "Near East Report: Keeping the Peace," February 7, 2000 (via http://www.aipac.org/).

19. See Aronson, Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East, p. 242, James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, p. 328, Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1089-1090, Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, pp. 130-132, Quandt, Peace Process, p. 213, Bernard Reich, Quest for Peace, pp. 266-267, and Siilasvuo, In the Service of Peace, p. 260. Aronson does not agree and says that the Israelis wanted a large U.N. force of 3000-5000 U.N. troops so that it could actually help deter Syria and so that it could do its monitoring effectively.

20. Mona Ghali, "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," in Durch, ed., Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, pp. 152-155, Siilasvuo, In the Service of Peace, pp. 260-269 as well as its appendix 8a "Separation of Forces Agreement," 31 May, 1974, appendix 8b, "Protocol concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," and appendix 9, "Statement by the Chairman as agreed by the parties [operational plan for UNDOF]," pp. 369-374, and United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 3 ed. (New York, NY: United Nations, 1997), pp. 73-75.

21. From Mackinlay, Peacekeepers, p. 129

22. United Nations, Blue Helmets, 3 ed., pp. 76-78; United Truce Supervision Organization, "UNTSO," brochure.

23. UNDOF SOPs, pp. 3-37.

24. Briefing, Tiberias, Israel, May 30, 1996. Martin also noted that things could change very quickly on the Golan Heights. During Israel's 1982 Grapes of Wrath Operation in Lebanon, some Syrian military forces approached the buffer zone and within ninety seconds, two Israeli F-16s came flying along their side of the zone.

25. Briefing, Captain Deschambault, May 20, 1996; interview, Captain Ken-Ichi Kawazu, Japan, Deputy MPIO, May 20, 1996; interview, Lt. Colonel Mats Torping, Sweden, Chief, Observer Group Golan, May 21, 1996, and other interviews. See also Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, p. 144.

26. Reich, Quest for Peace, pp. 267-268.

27. Interview, May 21, 1996.

28. Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, p. 151. Interview, Major-General Kosters, May 21, 1996. Mackinlay also notes that the two sides can communicate through UNDOF if there are problems in the AOS and AOL. However, this rarely happens.

29. Interview, Major-General Kosters, May 21, 1996; The Peacekeepers, pp. 141 and 151.

30. Captain Deschambault, May 20, 1996.

31. Interview, May 21, 1996.

32. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Ina Friedman ed. and trans., Israel's Lebanon War (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 117-118 and 155, and Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (London, Great Britain: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 190.

33. It helps to remember the arguments for defensive defense (DD). The point of DD was not primarily to help deterrence, but to be less provocative and reduce security spirals. Reducing security spirals is most relevant in a world where you face a party that has become your adversary by accident and spiral, not where you face an adversary you need to deter. Against a determined adversary, the only way a buffer zone could help deter was if it became a killing zone for whoever went into it. I assume that the Korean buffer zone is pre-targeted by South Korean and U.S. forces to make it into a killing zone. But does that add much to deterrence? I can not say for sure, but I suspect that many other things go into North Korea's calculations: the overall balance of forces, U.S. nuclear weapons, that the entire front on both sides is a killing zone for everyone regardless of the buffer zone, etc. Maybe on the margins though, it does make the job for the South easier.