Dan Lindley

The Republic of Cyprus' Road to European Union Accession: Missed Opportunities to Promote a Cyprus Solution

April 23, 2003 (1)

This is an internet version of an article which appeared in a special issue of Hellenic Studies, on the topic: "The Fifth EU Enlargement: Revisiting the Triangle of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey," Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 37-56.


In this article, I argue that the twin tasks of the pursuit of European Union accession for Cyprus and the search for a Cyprus solution combine to present all concerned states and organizations with a number of contradictory strategic problems. These problems were and are nearly impossible to surmount. Nonetheless, the short term deals and political logrolling that characterized the EU's approach to Cyprus accession foreclosed strategizing about how to use the EU's leverage to help resolve the Cyprus problem. Further, Cyprus' accession is only one-third of the problem faced by the EU, the UN, and those concerned with Aegean affairs. The status of North Cyprus must be resolved, and Turkey must be tied to the West through accession to the EU. The Republic of Cyprus will be in the EU. But the hardest work remains.


This article focuses on the twin diplomatic strategies of the pursuit of European Union (EU) accession for Cyprus and the pursuit of resolving the Cyprus problem. Because of lack of planning, side deals, and a number of paradoxes and conundrums, there was little coordination between the accession strategy and the Cyprus problem strategy. As a result, the best opportunity to resolve the Cyprus problem since it began has apparently been lost. The EU is importing the Cyprus problem and Turkey is somewhat estranged and further from EU membership than it should be. Perhaps these difficulties will be overcome, perhaps not. In the meantime, this article explores how the current failures came about and what lessons they offer for Aegean and EU diplomacy in the future.

Resolving the Cyprus problem is akin to facing a Gordian knot, but the multiple failures in the diplomacy surrounding Cyprus highlight the difficulties the EU faces as it tries to create a common foreign and security policy. Some of these problems are idiosyncratic state interests, side-deals by states that affect the entire EU, and the inability to coordinate long-term strategy within the EU bureaucracy, between the bureaucracy and member states, and between member states.

I will highlight these themes and arguments in this article. I will first lay out some of the paradoxes and conundrums facing states involved with the Cyprus accession and peace issues. Then I will chart how Cyprus got on the EU agenda, and trace its progress towards accession through the numerous EU summits. I will highlight features of the Annan peace plan, and offer reasons for hope and pessimism for Cyprus' reunification. Finally, I will speculate on positive and negative possibilities as we look to the future.

The Paradoxes and Conundrums of Cyprus Diplomacy

Although this is a critical article, it is important to begin with a review of the paradoxes and conundrums of Cyprus diplomacy. There are so many factors and tradeoffs involved that a review offers some grounds for charity towards involved states and diplomats. Consider the poor diplomats facing all these factors: (2)

These points raise three issues. First, they suggest that coherent diplomacy over EU accession for Cyprus is made very difficult and complicated if accession strategies are linked to strategies for resolving the Cyprus problem. Since the strategies are almost necessarily linked, I recognize that the EU and other interested parties faced huge hurdles as they worked their way into this situation. However, I argue that these structural problems were exacerbated by the side-deals and ad-hocery that characterized the EU's approach to Cyprus. This was especially true early on, and incremental steps then took on their own momentum and made strategic planning more difficult.

Second, the latter set of points suggests that a diplomatic solution to the Cyprus problem also faces its own set of intrinsic hurdles, regardless of linkages to the EU accession process.

These difficulties almost seem to create too many logical difficulties to overcome, a diplomatic Rubic's cube. But there are ways out. The way to resolve the first set of difficulties is for Europeans to more fully and sincerely embrace EU membership for Turkey, and for Turkey to also place a high value on this more credible offer and for Turkey to exert control over Rauf Denktash (the current leader of the "TRNC"). It is also possible that the Turkish Cypriots, based on their large pro-EU demonstrations, may also be willing to make great strides to achieve this goal.

The way to resolve the difficulties over the Cyprus problem are more difficult. The domestic political issues could be solved with dedicated new leaders over several years. Unfortunately, the Republic just elected someone who ran on a platform critical of the Annan plan and there is little sign Denktash will leave office soon. Should he leave office, there are a number of reasonable contenders in the wings. One, Mehmet Ali Talat, leader of the Republican Turkish Party, has made a number of positive statements on the Annan Plan, including:

We do not run away from negotiations...we have every right to attend this sort of meeting. Denktash has alienated himself from the people, he no longer represents the people. (6)

The more serious issue is that of constitutional design. It is impossible to design a constitution that protects the Turkish Cypriots as a group without also giving them veto rights and other privileges. I find the similarities between the Annan plan and the fatally flawed 1960 constitution quite disturbing. I can not think of alternatives, short of such political and ethnic evolution on Cyprus such that both sides see themselves more as Cypriots than Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. On Cyprus, people are part of groups, more than they are individuals. Reflecting this, the constitution of Annan has lots of protections built in for group rights. Many of these features such as veto privileges and specified representation percentages are what brought down the 1960 constitution.

I do not see enough societal change produced by bicommunal activities and government policies (from education to propaganda) to have strong faith that there is yet a common Cypriot identity that overrides the ethnic divisions. (7) To be sure, recent Turkish Cypriot demonstrations in favor of reunification are encouraging, but I suspect that they may be motivated by material incentives, not shifts in their ethnic self-identification.

The precondition for a 1960-type constitution to work and not produce gridlock and disputes over roles and powers is for both sides to work constructively toward the common good and to not think of themselves primarily as different sides. Yet if the situation was really so promising, the special rights and protections would not be necessary in the first place.

The counter-argument, and bet, embodied in the Annan plan is that a constitution with vetoes and special group privileges may work for enough years that the two sides may eventually come to identify with their common good. The key difference between the Annan plan and the 1960 constitution is that the former starts with the two sides separated, and largely keeps them that way for a number of years. This is likely to prevent or reduce much potential conflict. However remote the possibility, should things turn sour on Cyprus after reunification, security concerns based on ethnic identities will likely predominate.

Finally, to weigh all the points and conundrums, and put them into the context of who has power and vetoes in the current EU is to realize that, in the end, Greece could (and did) drive the Republic of Cyprus into the EU regardless of Cyprus' division and EU members' objections. Of course, the Republic of Cyprus is among the top of the candidate countries in terms of wealth and closing the chapters. But this also means that veto politics seemed to overwhelm strategizing about how to combine the process of Cyprus' accession, the prospect of Turkish accession, and Aegean relations into one nice package.

In the end, the Republic of Cyprus seems on a path into the EU, while a Cyprus solution and Turkish issues are left for the future. This may not be too pessimistic as the EU is still a large lure for Turkey. On the other hand, we have seen some very negative statements about Turkish accession from some quarters. For those who wish to keep Turkey out of the EU, the current state of affairs - Republic of Cyprus in and the Turkish Cypriots out - is probably the best they can hope for.

The Path to Accession

Cyprus took its first major concrete step towards EU accession in June of 1973 when it entered into an Association Agreement with the European Community (the EC was the institutional predecessor to the EU). This followed Britain's January 1973 membership in the EC and helped give Cyprus preferential trading status with its primary trade partner and former colonizer. In 1987, the Agreement was strengthened by an additional Protocol.

Cyprus applied for full EC membership in July of 1990. This move was thought to provide an impetus to the stalled Cyprus problem negotiations. (8) The impetus became clearer in 1993 when the European Commission decided that Cyprus' application had been made in the name of the whole island. Would this help bring along the North? Or alienate them? And was this momentous interpretation the result of deliberate strategizing by the EU?

Strategy took a backseat to logrolling, and an intra-EU deal was made to make this deal to move forward with Cyprus in 1993. In exchange, Greece allowed the EU to move forward with Macedonia. At the time, the Greek's were pressing for the EU to begin the process of inviting Cyprus to apply for membership. Simultaneously, the other members of the EU were trying to establish official relations with Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in an effort to stabilize it so as to prevent it from collapsing into wide-scale violence, along with other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Greece resisted establishing relations because of various problems it had historically with Macedonia, involving territorial claims, sovereignty, and symbolism. Along with clarification on Cyprus's application, another sweetener to the Greeks in 1993 was that the EU appointed an observer to Cyprus as a step toward eventual commencement of Cyprus membership application to the EU. (9) Thus, Greece got more formal recognition of Cyprus's application and an EU observer to Cyprus, while the EU was allowed to proceed with Macedonia.

Another instance of logrolling over strategy occurred in 1995. Until that time, Greece had consistently vetoed all efforts on the part of the EU to set-up a customs union with Turkey. Greece had also blocked a large EU aid package to Turkey of $725 million since 1986. In return, for these vetoes, the rest of the EU held up Cyprus' progress toward accession. For example, at the December 1994 Essen EU summit, the EU refused to give Cyprus a start date for negotiations.

However, the French took over the EU presidency in early 1996 and spurred progress by threatening to block further negotiations on Cyprus unless the Greeks agreed to accept the establishment of such a trade union. The Greeks stipulated various conditions, chiefly their demand that the EU adopt an official position that Cyprus would be asked to begin the application process for EU membership at the fixed date of six months after the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference of 1996. They wanted the application to move forward regardless of whether or not the political problems on Cyprus had been solved. Although several other EU members expressed concern about allowing into the union a divided and potentially troublesome island, France was able to get this position of a fixed date officially established. As such, the customs union with Turkey was allowed to go into effect. Germany, with a large Turkish population, had been a key promoter of the customs union. (10)

There were secret discussions about this deal between the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe and the Greek Government (represented by its former secretary of state for European Affairs, Iannos Kranidiotis). So far as I know, the exact terms of the deal have yet to be revealed, nor is it clear that the French persuaded the rest of the EU of the terms it negotiated. (11) Whatever the case, a combination of backroom deals and pressure in both directions led to progress on Cyprus' accession.

One result of these side-deals is that they foreshadow the EU's official policy of endorsing Cyprus accession regardless of whether a Cyprus solution is found. Ultimately, this lessens leverage on the Republic of Cyprus, as well as on European negotiators. At the same time, this position angers the Turkish side, while also depriving them of the ability to stop accession for the South. While it is hard to figure an optimal, leverage-maximizing route to EU accession and resolution of the Cyprus problem, these negotiations show that temporary fixes, and deals to 'kick the can down the road' predominated over strategizing for the long term.

In point of fact, removing a solution as a precondition for accession was not formally agreed to until the Helsinki summit of 1999. What was agreed to prior to 1999 was that the Republic of Cyprus could enter accession negotiations without a solution, not that there were no preconditions to accession itself. However, through the late 1990s, Cyprus and Greece engaged in a heavy spin campaign trying to convince everyone that 'no accession preconditions' was indeed the EU policy. Yet, while things were evolving in that direction, many EU members still did not want to import the Cyprus problem and did want a solution to be a precondition for Cyprus' accession. For example, Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister, said in 1995 "We do not want to import Cyprus' problems," and a British official said "We don't want to import the Cyprus problem into the EU." (12)

This confusion about what the EU really negotiated, and what some members really want is another symptom of the side-deals and logrolling surrounding Cyprus' accession. (13)

A smart EU would be accused of wisdom if it strategically alternated between saying Cyprus can accede regardless of the island's division and that it is hesitant to import the Cyprus problem. Unfortunately, such alternations were not the result of planned policy, but instead resulted from ad hocery and responses to pressures of the moment. By this time, Cyprus' accession had taken on such momentum and was grouped with the whole Eastward expansion, that the path had become nearly inevitable. What was still unsure was whether a Cyprus solution could also be achieved, and how the EU would position itself on the possibility of future Turkish membership.

While it is true that the Greeks and Greek Cypriots are guilty of trying to wish dreams like the three freedoms and other negotiating positions into reality, it is also true that their overall strategy has been quite successful. The vast deliberative process of the EU means that by the process of incrementalism, little steps can add up into one irreversible reality. So, by small measures and small deals, Cyprus' path to accession was eventually assured. This process means that overall strategizing is shortchanged, and it may augur well for the Turks in the long term if they continue to jump through the hoops. For now though, determination over the long term (and a meaningful veto) played to the Greek/Greek Cypriot advantage.

As more recent events are probably more familiar for most of the readers, I will only briefly summarize and comment on the more recent Luxembourg, Helsinki, and Copenhagen summits.

The Luxembourg summit took place in December 1997. There the EU decided to open accession negotiations with the 'first wave' of Eastern European countries, plus Cyprus. This was a satisfying outcome for Cyprus, but it infuriated Turkey who had hoped to be moved further along toward candidacy status, but were instead just invited to future conferences. Turkey threatened to cut off further political dialogue with the EU and to integrate North Cyprus into Turkey should the Republic of Cyprus accede unilaterally. (14)

The Helsinki summit of December 1999 officially made Turkey a candidate country, although no start date for negotiations was offered, and it was made clear that Turkey had to meet stringent human rights and other criteria (Copenhagen criteria).

With regard to Cyprus, the summit's final declaration noted that:

(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors. (15)

Greece finally got the wording it wanted: officially, a Cyprus solution is not a precondition for accession. (16) However, it is worth noting the diplomatic mumbling here. How can something (a solution) that is not a precondition also greatly facilitate something? Is a solution a quasi-precondition? What are all the relevant factors? In any case, the no preconditions language is the clearest in the relevant paragraph, so Cyprus took another incremental step towards membership.

Greece approved Turkey's candidacy in exchange for the no preconditions language, and for clear stipulations as to the progress Turkey had to make on its route toward accession. (17) It is also true that Greco-Turkish diplomacy had considerably warmed in recent years, thanks in part to "earthquake" diplomacy, Turkish reforms, and new leadership in various countries. Helsinki helps show what a mutually beneficial approach can accomplish, although no real progress was made towards a Cyprus solution.

If my theory of EU incrementalism becoming EU facts is right, then Helsinki will be viewed as a historic turning point for Turkey's eventual accession. Perhaps it is somewhat ironic that candidacy status was made possible by the Greeks, but I would rather hail the Greeks for enlightened self-interest.

Nothing will help Greek security more than a Turkey further tied to Western values and democratic procedures. As the EU as a security organization is most powerful in the leverage it wields prior to their candidates' accession, this is the time to work hard and long with Turkey to bring about the changes required for long term stability.

The final EU summit that played a meaningful role was the December 2002 Copenhagen meeting. The meeting noted: "Today marks an unprecedented and historic milestone in completing this process with the conclusion of accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The Union now looks forward to welcoming these States as members from 1 May 2004."

With regard to Turkey, the EU noted:

The Union recalls that, according to the political criteria decided in Copenhagen in 1993, membership requires that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. (18)

Although this seems to be a positive and concrete step, Turkey was dismayed that no set date was given for opening accession negotiations and Turkey accused the EU of an "act of prejudice." (19) The Guardian reported that the deal between pro-Turkish supporters Britain and the U.S. "reflected only a minor six-month concession by France and Germany, which had voiced most concern about the accession of a 68 million-strong Muslim nation." (20)

In reviewing the various EU summits, the bottom line is that there has been insufficient use of the leverage EU accession process to help resolve the Cyprus problem. If a solution is reached, it will be because the Euro spoke to the Turkish Cypriots, not because the Eurocrats planned well.

Having covered how the EU came up short in helping resolve the Cyprus problem, I will now briefly review the current plan to reunify the island, and turn to a discussion of the Cyprus' future.

The Annan Plan, and the Futures of Cyprus and Turkey

The Annan plan was submitted by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan for consideration in November 2002. It has a large number of provisions, and I will not review them all here. Instead, I will focus on what I believe to be the key shortcoming of the plan: that it treats the Cypriots like distinct groups and not individuals. As such, it contains group-based veto rights and group-based apportionment of government responsibilities. These were the exact same features found in the 1960 Cyprus constitution that led to gridlock, disputes about government responsibilities, eventual breakdown of the government, ethnic conflict, and invasion.

It is important to note that the 1960 constitution might have worked had there been harmonious relations between the two sides. However, intra-Cypriot disputes pervaded the new government and the constitution's features meant that these disputes could cause the government to gridlock. The following chart highlights a few similarities between the 1960 constitution and the Annan Plan.

1960 Constitution vs. Annan Plan:

Some Group-Based Similarities

Issue 1960 (21) Annan Plan (22)
Group-Based Vetoes GC President, TC Vice-President, each with right of veto in certain issues.

House of Representatives had simple majorities, but had to have separate majorities (ie a veto for each community) within both communities for taxes, duties, modifications to electoral law, and a few other issues.

Presidential Council decisions need a simple majority but must have the vote of at least one member from each group.

Parliament can pass bills with simple majorities of both chambers, so long as ¼ (sometimes 2/5) of the Senators from each group vote in favor.

Group-Based apportionment 7:3 ratio of GC to TC ministers

7:3 Deputies ratio in House of Representatives

7:3 civil service ratio

6:4 armed forces service ratio

Equal GC:TC ratio in Senate

Proportional ratio in Chamber of Deputies, but TC's get a minimum of 25%.

TCs get a minimum of two of the six seats in the Presidential Council, of which one will be in charge of either foreign affairs or European affairs

Rotating Presidency

Court apportionment Supreme Court: 1 GC judge; 1 TC judge; 1 external/neutral judge with two votes. Supreme Court: 3 GC judges; 3 TC judges; 3 external judges.

These similarities do not automatically justify pessimism. There are several reasons that the Annan plan may work, if adopted. First, unlike in 1960, the two sides are already separated. This will make it harder for local incidents to flare up or to escalate. Second, the amount of international pressure that will be brought to bear will be greater now than then. The EU in particular will have a vested interest in making things flow smoothly. So long as things go well, neither side will have an interest in bringing the government to its knees with their respective veto powers, nor should there be much bickering over allocations of powers and deputies.

However, there are reasons for pessimism. First, the plan has plenty of opponents on all sides. Denktash has been roundly criticized - even by UN resolution 1475 - for blocking adoption of the Plan. While this has caused much gloating and bitterness on the Greek Cypriot side, a little introspection would show that passage of the Annan plan was by no means assured on the Greek Cypriot side. President Glafcos Clerides, who had spent much of his political lifetime pushing the Republic of Cyprus towards the EU, lost his re-election bid to Tassos Papadopoulous, who won in part because of his critical stance towards the Annan plan. The plan faced widespread skepticism in the South from a wide part of the political spectrum. Even the powerful Church "categorically rejected" the plan. (23) Denktash's rejectionism has so far let the Greek Cypriots avoid hard reckoning on their side.

Second, the reunification of Germany - a possible model for Cyprus - was not without problems. Although the problems there were fairly minor, the two German halves still experienced tensions and culture clashes in the 1990s. Such problems will likely be more severe on Cyprus given the much greater disparities in culture, religion, wealth, as well as racism and the spectre of the past Greco-Turkish conflict. While the two component states will start largely separated, spoilers and hot heads could well spell trouble if they are not quickly suppressed. Such spoilers have often driven the political agenda between Pakistan and India, and between Israel and the Palestinians.

By importing a divided Cyprus, the EU risks eventual conflict between Cyprus and Turkey. Should this unlikely event come about, this would probably be a challenge too great for the EU's nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy (and associated relatively small military power) to handle. Should Turkey ever entertain using force on Cyprus, it would only do so knowing that EU membership aspirations were hopeless. This means that the EU's leverage would be quite small in this eventuality.

By importing a Cyprus unified under the Annan plan, the EU risks possible 1960-like deterioration and eventual conflict.

This means that no matter the outcome, Cyprus' EU accession now gives the EU a vital interest in preventing disputes from arising in the first place on Cyprus. A key to stability is to keep relations between the 'Mother' countries of Greece and Turkey on an even keel. The best way to achieve this is to admit Turkey into the EU.

Thus, one punchline in all of this, whether it is the EU's importation of the Cyprus problem, or a Cyprus reunified by the Annan plan, is that the EU now faces more pressure to move forward with Turkey's accession. A rather double-edged sword indeed. To some, importation of the Cyprus problem is reason not to admit Turkey. But in fact, the risks inherent in the importation provides strong incentives for the EU to stabilize its Southeastern borders.

1. Dan Lindley, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, 448 Decio Hall, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556. Phone: 574-631-3226; Fax: 574-631-8209; Email: dlindley@nd.edu; Webpage: http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/. I thank James Thompson for an excellent job of research assistance.

2. Some of these factors are no longer relevant, but all were part of the challenges faced at some point.

3. Some EU states may not want a 'second Greece' in the EU either, but the Cyprus accession train left the station too long ago... Cyprus' accession may mean that mainland Greece can take the high road on some issues (particularly Aegean issues) confident that Cyprus will veto on those issues. For some arguments along these lines, see William Wallace, "Reconciliation in Cyprus: The Window of Opportunity," Policy Paper RSC 2/10, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, August 2002. It will be interesting to see if this prospect is a catalyst (one of many) for overhaul of EU voting procedures. The counter-argument is that the present Greek team of Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Foreign Minister George Papandreou is probably the most constructive, self-enlightened, and open to Turkey (and to a fair Cyprus solution) in recent history. They often seem more encouraging of eventual Turkish EU accession than other EU members. In my view, this is enlightened self-interest and a very good thing.

4. In parentheses to denote the lack of international recognition.

5. As Cyprus has now acceded, the Greek threat has been overtaken by events. However, the juxtaposition of these threats does highlight the diplomatic minefield regrading Cyprus.

6. In "Denktash Spurns Simitis Talks Invitation but Opposition Groups to Attend," Cyprus Mail, April 17, 2003.

7. For more on this argument and the dangers of premature unification, see Dan Lindley, UNFICYP and a Cyprus Solution: A Strategic Assessment (M.I.T. DACS/Security Studies Program Working Paper, May 1997), available via MIT or <<http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/UNFICYP/>>.

8. Ellen Laipson, "Government and Politics," Chapter 4, in Frederica M. Bunge, ed., Cyprus: A Country Study, 3 ed. (American University Press, 1980), p. 206. Some basic facts on the EU for this article were found at <<http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm>>.

9. "EU Observer to Assist in UN Talks on Cyprus," in "European Insight," December 24, 1993, via Lexis-Nexis; Misha Glenny, "Nerves Fray as Sick Bogeyman of Europe Takes the Chair," the Times, December 31, 1993, via Lexis-Nexis. For more on Macedonia and Greece, see also Monteagle Stearns, "Greek Security Issues," F. Stephen Larrabee, "Greece and the Balkans: Implications for Policy," and Susan L. Woodward, "Rethinking Security in the Post-Yugoslav Era," in Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaidis, The Greek Paradox: Promise vs. Performance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for Science and International Affairs, CSIA Studies in International Security, 1997).

10. "EU Must Solve Greek Veto of Turkish Customs Union," Agence France Presse, December 21, 1994, via Lexis-Nexis; "Foreign Minister Reacts to French Minister's 'threat, '" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 21, 1994 via Lexis-Nexis; Despina Kyvrikosaiou, "Greece Sets EU Summit Agenda," United Press International, December 6, 1994, via Lexis-Nexis.

11. Agence France Presse, "Ankara Pours Cold Water on Cyprus' Joy at Joining EU," February 7, 1995, via Lexis-Nexis.

12. Quotes are from, respectively: Michael Binyon and George Brock, EU Takes Step Towards Cyprus Membership," the Times, February 7, 1995; Lionel Barber, "EU Customs Deal Takes Shape," Financial Times, February 7, 1995 both via Lexis-Nexis.

13. For an example of this spin-it-into-a-fact phenomena, see "The European Council Meetings at Corfu and Essen: The Next Enlargement will Include Cyprus" from the Cyprus Press and Information Office at <<http://www.pio.gov.cy/ir/cyprus_eu/corfu_essen.htm>> which concludes, about five years in advance, that "The Corfu and Essen conclusions are important, not only because they affirmed the eligibility of Cyprus for membership, but also because the issue of Cyprus' integration to the E.U. have been clearly disassociated from the solution of the Cyprus problem, since the latter is not considered a precondition for its accession to the Union."

14. Barry James, "Turkey Is Rejected for EU Membership Amid Signs of Showdown on Cyprus, Ankara Ends Political Dialogue" International Herald Tribune, December 15, 1997 at <<http://www.iht.com/IHT/BJ/97/bj121597.html>>.

15. HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL : PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS / Council-Documents mentioned in Annex VI to be found under Press Release Library / Miscellaneous; Press Release: Brussels (11/12/1999) Nr: 00300/1/99 via: <<http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm>>.

16. Anthony Georgieff, "EU: Summit Statement Released," RFE/RFL report, December 13, 1999 at <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/12/F.RU.991213154356.html>>.

17. Remarks of Phil Gordon, "Turkey and the European Union after Helsinki"conference report, Institute of Turkish Studies, at <<http://turkishstudies.org/reportsa.html>>.

Press Release: Copenhagen (13/12/2002) Nr: 400/02 via: <<http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm>>.

19. The Guardian, "Turkey Accuses EU of Prejudice," December 13, 2002 at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,7369,859575,00.html>>.

20. Ian Black and Michael White, "EU Dashes Anglo-US Hopes for Early Talks on Turkish Entry," The Guardian, December 13, 2002 at <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,7369,859247,00.html>>.

21. from Laipson, "Government and Politics," pp. 165-167. The 1960 Cyprus census pegged the Greek Cypriots at 77% of the population, and the Turkish Cypriots at 18.3%. Most studies state that this ratio persists, even though there are many ambiguities especially those surrounding settlers from mainland Turkey in North Cyprus. For example, the U.S. Department of State says this "Ethnic groups: Greek (77%), Turkish (18%), Armenian and other (4%)" at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5376.htm>>.

22. Plan as published in the Cyprus Mail, November 14, 2002.

23. Quote from: Elias Hazou, "Church Rejects UN Plan as Unacceptable," Cyprus Mail, November 19, 2002; see also "Alex Mita, "Matsakis, Perdikis, Koutsou: Plan is a Disaster," Cyprus Mail, November 16, 2002 and BBC, "Cyprus Election Threatens Peace Plan," February 17, 2003 at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2770493.stm>>.