**Becoming Good:  Narrow Dispositions and the Stability of Virtue**

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In this paper I comment on three points that seem to me to have received insufficient attention in contemporary discussions about virtue.  First, I argue that our interest in becoming good (as good as possible) should be divorced from an interest in being better than others, or better than the norm, and that if it is, then we need to be careful about the bearing of some experimental psychology on the discussion, for much of that literature assumes that virtue is something distinctive.  Instead of conceiving of virtue as distinguishing some people from others, we should conceive of it as correcting certain human tendencies that are destructive of social and personal well-being.  Second, I examine the idea that virtue can be developed from situation-specific dispositions through thoughtful generalization and integration with other such dispositions, and I discuss some difficulties for and alternatives to this proposal.  Third, I suggest that rather than seek a general recipe for the development of desirable dispositions, we focus on the sources of stability or instability for these dispositions one by one.